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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Research Problem, Question and Aim 
 
“I sell here, Sir, what all the world desires to have--POWER.”1
 
 
What James Watt’s business partner is supposed to have said when he promoted the steam 
engine still holds true today. Power, or energy as a more frequently used term, constitutes the 
fundamental basis of human life. For Europe, in particular the European Community, energy 
constitutes a fundamental building block. Even more, as “energy is a strategic and therefore 
political commodity (...)”2 it has been assessed as determining “the nature and the destiny of 
the European Union”3. In the past decade, European energy markets have undergone dramatic 
change as elementary adjustments to European Energy Policy have fundamentally 
restructured the European energy industry, especially its gas and electricity markets. The 
focus in this work has been put on European gas markets and players active within. This has 
been chosen due to a lack of research determined in this area as is enlarged on later. 
Moreover, choosing a specific focus also satisfies a central criterion when conducting 
research in that the definition of a concrete unit of analysis provides the boundaries of a study 
and allows the comparison of findings with other studies.4
 
 
Central to this work is the fundamental change process that was initiated in the European gas 
industry with the introduction of liberalisation measures in 1998. The significance of this step 
becomes particularly apparent in the following depiction: “The development of the European 
gas industry is in some senses very much a fairy tale. It has all the ingredients of a great story 
with nation states battling for territory, the gas companies behaving like ‘barons’ who mark 
out their fiefdoms and, some would say, control the lives of their ‘serfs’ in the form of 
                                                 
1  Lienhard (1994), p. 3. Italicised by author. Also see Anonymous (1999a). 
2  Rutledge/ Wright (2000), p. 26. Also cf. Horsnell (2001), p. 29. 
3  Keppler (2009), p. 203. 
4  Cf. Yin (2003a), pp. 22-26. 
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customers.”5 While complete market opening was carried out as a process of continuously 
implementing different regulatory measures over time, it brought elemental change to the 
traditional and long-term institutionalised industry that until then was characterised by 
governmental management and monopolistic closed market structures. European 
liberalisation measures broke up these structures by introducing the ‘wind of competition’6, 
requiring the unbundling of vertically integrated companies and thereby opening markets to 
competition and consumer choice. This again demanded of incumbents7 to suddenly deal with 
forces and requirements not known before and “popping up in a number of unexpected 
places”8, threatening their mere survival.9
 
 
The introduction of liberalisation did not remain the only regulatory ‘attack’ on established 
structures and on ways of doing business, however. In what can be characterised as a “fully 
hands-on”10
                                                 
5  Mabro/ Wybrew-Bond (1999), p. 1. 
 approach to change the Commission also initiated significant regulatory 
adjustments to enhance security of supply and ecological conditions of the European Union. 
While those on supply security demanded organisational investments into strategic gas 
infrastructure and the diversification of gas supplies, for example, ecological ones were 
addressed at shifting the focus from the utilisation of fossil fuels to renewable sources of 
energy and to stipulating public awareness of such concerns. In fact, the enhancement of 
competition, security of supply and the ecological situation, the latter categorised under the 
term sustainability, came to constitute the three main goals of European Energy Policy. In 
addition to this, change was also characterised by the emergence of new types of stakeholders 
and the alteration of the role of prevailing ones, such as national governments and authorities, 
the European Commission and other European authorities. Moreover, not only did 
competitors emerge from within the same industry but also from across foreign borders as 
well as from related and unrelated sectors. At the same time consumers and environmental 
pressure groups posed new expectations regarding competitive prices, security of supply and 
6  Cf. Percebois (1999), p. 14. 
7  The term incumbent is used as an expression characterising established players in the market. In most cases 
these were large governmentally owned monopolies as will be enlarged on in chapter III. 
8  Radetzki (1999), p. 25. 
9  Cf. Radetzki (1999), p. 23. 
10  Heren (1999), p. 5. 
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sustainable energy production. Following this, a classification can be made with respect to the 
type of influences exerted in that they differ by their nature and hence require different forms 
of action from the companies affected. While competitive and business-oriented forces 
demand efficient organisational structures, profit maximisation, and increasing profitability, 
for instance, regulatory, normative and societal ones entail appropriate stakeholder 
management for companies to retain their legitimacy. 
 
Essentially, this new type of organisational environment is characterised by a degree of 
uncertainty so far unknown to the majority of European gas incumbents, fundamentally 
questioning established ways of doing business and thus exerting extreme pressure to adapt. 
This consideration becomes particularly paramount when taking into account that those 
players which do not behave according to rules and expectations may threaten their 
legitimacy, if not survival, as “rebels are rarely tolerated”11 in the marketplace. At the same 
time it has to be taken into account that such drastic changes also open up opportunities to be 
taken advantage of. The criticality of these changes for European energy incumbents also 
becomes apparent when considering that European Energy Policy has not only been used as a 
tool to further converge national systems to complete the single internal market12 but has even 
been viewed as the ‘make-or-break challenge and litmus test’13
 
 for the institution of the 
European Union as such.  
These considerations then raise the question of how incumbents reacted to these changes 
and how they played “the new game when the new rules are not completely known”14
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11  Miller (1994), p. 328. 
12  Cf. Genoud et al. (2004a), p. 122. 
13  Cf. Röller et al. (2007), p. III; Keppler (2009), p. 222. 
14  Peng (2003), p. 283. 
The aim of this thesis therefore is to determine organisational behaviour adopted in 
response to such drastic environmental change, in particular, how European energy 
incumbents strategically behaved in order to secure their survival and be successful in 
their new environment. 
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Due to the complexity of the situation the research question has been formulated in such an 
open manner so as to allow an unbiased approach to analysis. This is explained next. 
 
 
1.2 Structure 
 
Basically, and serving as the discourse of inquiry, a thesis’s structure provides the set-up for 
approaching the research questions.15 Having laid out the research proposition, formulated the 
research question and explained the thesis’ aim, another essential building block is to outline 
its structure. Following that “it is hard to describe and explain something satisfactorily unless 
you understand what something is”16 and that energy policy must also always be seen as a 
reflection of historical events,17
 
 the subsequent chapter after the introduction, i.e. chapter II, 
presents the fundamental characteristics of the European Gas Industry before 1998 in order to 
provide the reader with a basis and emphasise the magnitude of the changes introduced as 
explained in chapter III. 
Divided into two main sections and covering the analysis period from 1998 to 2008, the third 
chapter first explains the alterations made to European Energy Policy in the decade analysed, 
to then determine the structural changes having taken place in the industry over this period. 
Based on this, chapter III finishes with a brief conclusion and derives possible implications 
for organisational behaviour to formulate the research question in direct context. 
 
Guided by this empirical reality, the theoretical approach of this thesis is established in the 
next chapter (chapter IV). Such an inductive procedure has been assessed as especially 
suitable in cases where ‘real phenomena’ are observed and explanations drawn.18 While 
Mintzberg points out that “all theories are false”19
                                                 
15  Cf. Downey/ Ireland (1979), p. 630. 
 as they too strongly simplify the world, 
others remark that it does not require a ‘masterful theoretician’ to determine the most 
16  Ghauri (2004), pp. 117-118. 
17  Cf. Czakainski (1993), pp. 18-19. 
18  Cf. Mintzberg (1979), p. 584; Beutel (1988), p. 32. 
19  Mintzberg (1979), p. 584. 
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appropriate approach. Instead, a thorough literature review which considers the full range of 
theories relevant should be carried out, so that the ‘lessons learnt’ enhance the understanding 
and knowledge on the topic.20
 
 
Having conducted such an analysis it has been found that no single theoretical approach exists 
which covers the complexity of the research setting and fulfils all requirements for being able 
to conduct a comprehensive analysis. Similar difficulties have also been encountered by early 
researchers who claim that “organizational phenomena are much too complex to be described 
adequately by any single theoretical approach”21
 
. In order to counteract this fact a look has 
been taken at existing theories normally applied for analysing such phenomena in order to 
ground the most appropriate ones and establish a ‘theoretical skeleton’ which allows the 
accomplishment of the research aim. This procedure has again been guided by the fact that the 
forces constituting European gas industry change can be characterised as market (e.g. 
competitive) and non-market (e.g. regulatory) related. Based on this assessment a business- 
and an institutional-based approach are proposed as the most appropriate ones to capture 
empirical reality and enable a comprehensive analysis. Thus, after a brief introduction to the 
fundamentals of organisational behaviour in response to environmental change the two 
approaches are presented as the ‘Business Perspective’ in 4.2 and the ‘Institutional 
Perspective’ in 4.3. In section 4.4 then their applicability as a framework for analysis is tested 
and confirmed. While constituting the two main framing theoretical pillars, both perspectives 
predominantly focus on the organisation’s external environment. The following section (4.5) 
therefore complements the two pillars by providing insights from an internal perspective. 
Chapter IV closes with the conclusion (section 4.6) that an integrated approach is required to 
comprehensively analyse incumbents’ behaviour in response to the change of the European 
gas industry. 
As no model exists to fulfil these requirements though, one will be developed by the 
researcher. This is done in sections one and two of chapter V by building on insights from 
                                                 
20  Cf. Miles (1979), pp. 591-592; Bonoma (1985), p. 204; Gadamer (1999), pp. 553, 560; Yin (2003a), pp. 28-
31, 47; Yin (2003b), pp. 3-5. 
21  Tolbert (1985), p. 12. Also cf. Kieser (1995), pp. 29-30. 
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relevant empirical and theoretical research and on the theoretical foundations worked out in 
the previous chapter. In the last section of this chapter (5.3) the procedure is summarised and 
the applicability of the model for empirical analysis concluded on. 
 
Before being able to carry out the empirical analysis in chapter VII, the research methodology 
has to be determined. This is done in the preceding chapter VI. Based on findings from 
methodological research it has been determined that analysis here should be built on 
qualitative case studies as the most appropriate form for carrying out research (6.1). 
Following this, the method and process of conducting qualitative case study research are 
explained in the second and third section of this chapter (6.2 and 6.3), followed by a depiction 
of the research set up developed for this thesis in section 6.4. Essentially to be pointed out is 
that findings in this work have often been marked through direct and indirect quotes as 
required in order to emphasise institutional behaviour in particular. 
 
Chapter VII is devoted to the empirical analysis of the four case studies chosen and thus 
consists of four major sections (7.1-7.4), one for each case study. Analysis of these four cases 
follows the same pattern: The first part provides a brief introduction to the company. In the 
second and third part the company’s development is analysed from a Business and an 
Institutional Perspective, respectively. Finally, the organisation’s development is determined 
from an Integrated Perspective and its strategic path derived in the fourth part. 
 
The results from this intra-case analysis are discussed in the subsequent chapter, chapter VIII. 
This is done by comparing findings with regards to commonalities and differences in section 
8.1, determining explanations for these results in the second section (8.2), and by assessing 
performance outcomes of the four case companies analysed (8.3). In the fourth and last 
section of this chapter (8.4) these results are validated against industry developments in the 
research period as well as against findings from recent academic research and from other 
sources. 
 
The thesis closes with Chapter IX where final conclusions are drawn. Categorised into three 
sections, the first (9.1) presents the findings and contributions of this thesis. The second (9.2) 
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again discusses its limitations based on which implications for future research are drawn 
before terminating this work with a section termed ‘Final Word’ (9.3). 
 
The structure just explained above is illustrated in the following figure. 
 
Figure 1:22
 
  Structure of thesis 
 
 
                                                 
22  Own figure. 
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1.3 Contribution of Thesis 
 
To conclude, with the topic and approach chosen this thesis enhances research in several ways 
and areas. From an empirical perspective the analysis satisfies an essential requirement of 
scientific work as being ‘highly empirically informative’23 in that it describes the fundamental 
structural change from one industry setting to a totally new one and the organisational 
behaviour within. A particularly beneficial aspect here is the depiction of change being 
composed from different types of forces and as coming from different directions in that all 
three pillars of European Energy Policy and their interrelatedness are looked at. Also recent 
work still remarked that more research was required on these subjects. The analysis of 
industries being subject to regulatory forces and where organisations are “neither competitors 
nor confederates”24 has been described as the “stepchild”25 of management research. 
Especially, the interrelatedness of European Energy Policy goals and its consequences have 
only been addressed relatively recently. While some, for example, pointed out that reforms 
should not be thought of in isolation as it was “the totality of energy policy which determines 
how the system performs, not the individual parts”26 others see a convergence of all three 
goals in the long-run.27 Similarly, this thesis also enhances the understanding of a new 
environmental setting in an industry in which, ‘if it wasn’t for competition’, a company would 
hardly be “endogenously motivated to serve its environment”28
                                                 
23  Cf. Beutel (1988), pp. 30-31. 
. Value for theoretical research 
is created by taking a two-sided perspective of two apparently different approaches to analyse 
empirical findings through these two lenses. Moreover, by building a model and integrating 
the two approaches, analysis can also be carried out from an integrated perspective and thus 
significantly enhance explanatory power not only in form of allowing a more comprehensive 
examination, but by providing a different view on results. Additionally, the model enables to 
map organisational behaviour as a development path over time. This may reveal similar 
development paths which again permits the observer to draw conclusions on overall industry 
development.
24  Russo (1992), p. 25. 
25  Russo (1992), p. 13. 
26  Helm (2008), p. 34. 
27  Cf. Röller et al. (2007), p. 10. 
28  Midttun (2001), p. 19. 
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This as well as the multi-dimensional approach in general may also serve managers as an 
instrument to analyse the organisational environment in a comprehensive way and raise 
awareness regarding different types of forces and their respective effects. Furthermore, it 
reveals a range of forms of strategic behaviour that can be adopted. The industry perspective 
and comparison with competitors again provide an indication of overall development and thus 
a basis for reacting if necessary. Based on these arguments this thesis can be said to provide 
an essential guideline for future analysis of organisational behaviour in response to 
environmental change. The value of this work is also fundamentally enhanced through the 
methodological approach adopted. Apart from being descriptive, which used to be the usual 
but sole approach in organisational research for a long time,29 it is also explanatory in that its 
multivariateness30
 
 reveals several possible connections and not only allows a capturing of the 
whole breadth of corporate behaviour but also an in-depth analysis of the findings made. 
Apart from its academic contributions this thesis is also believed to be an interesting work to 
read following the continuous topicality of the research topic addressed. Or, as formulated by 
an observer shortly after market opening: 
 
“Scarcely a day now passes without a story about heady manoeuvrings  
by boring old European utilities”31
                                                 
29  Cf. Mintzberg (1979), p. 583. 
. 
30  Cf. Hambrick (1980), pp. 567-570. 
31  Anonymous (2001a). 
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CHAPTER II CHARACTERISTICS of the  
TRADITIONAL GAS INDUSTRY 
 
 
2.1 Fundamentals of Natural Gas 
 
Features of Natural Gas 
 
Generally, gas is a source of energy which again is the basic requirement for life on earth. The 
term ‘energy’ originates from the Greek word ‘energeia’. The way it is applied today was 
introduced by Thomas Young in 1802 to describe the general working capacity of machines 
as a process ‘in work’.32 Fundamentally, energy appears in different forms such as fossil fuels 
like crude oil, coal, or natural gas which in their purest and simplest form are stored solar 
energy that has been captured in underground deposits,33 thereby making them exhaustible 
and not renewable. Other forms of energy sources to be distinguished are those being 
manufactured from biological energy resources such as biogas which, for example, is 
produced from different energy plants, wood, straw, or animal excrements.34 While these are 
also ‘exhaustible’ they are renewable at the same time. Other forms like solar energy or wind, 
hydro and tidal power again are renewable as well as non-exhaustible as ‘automatically’ 
produced by nature. Such energy sources are mainly referred to as ‘renewables’.35
 
  
                                                 
32  Cf. Slesser (1988), p. 88; Feddeck (2003), p. 6. In 1829, Jean V. Poncelet was the first to define energy as 
the ‘capacity to perform work’. Following this definition energy can neither be generated nor destroyed. This 
elementary energy principle was already recognised by von Huygens in 1673 and then established as law by 
Hermann Helmholtz in 1847. It is also known as the first fundamental theorem of thermodynamics according 
to which it is inaccurate to speak of energy ‘production’ or ‘consumption’ as energy cannot be created (or 
destroyed) and therefore cannot be produced or consumed but can only be converted into another form. Cf. 
Grathwohl (1982), p. 9; Bockhorst (2002), pp. 8-11; Rebhan (2002), pp. 15-22; Feddeck (2003), p. 6; Kraus 
(2004), pp. 68-69. As the terms energy production and consumption are commonly known and used though, 
these expressions will also be applied throughout this work. Specifically, the term ‘production’ here is 
defined as “the extraction and subsequent transformation of fossil or fissile energy sources, and their 
delivery to the economic system” (Slesser (1988), pp. 91-92). 
33  Cf. Bischoff (1990), p. 22; Slesser (1988), p. 183. 
34  Cf. Schroeter (2007a), p. 4; Thrän et al. (2007), pp. 15-16; Pecka (2008a), p. 9. 
35  Cf. Auer (2004), p. 11. 
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Energy, in particular natural gas, has been an important source for the development of 
mankind.36 The energy source ‘gas’ has to be distinguished from gases which are 
manufactured from different solid, liquid or gaseous fuels through chemical transformation 
and natural gases which have to be extracted from the earth’s soil. While the word ‘gas’ itself 
was only introduced around 1609 by the Flemish scientist Jan Baptista van Helmont, who 
used this expression to describe those types of air which were different to that of atmospheric 
air, the term ‘natural gas’ was first used by the Italian scientist Lazzaro Spallanzani in 1795.37 
As a result of the specific geological circumstances under which it originated in the 
underground storage system, a mixture of miscellaneous chemical compounds can be 
distinguished which again determine its physical characteristics:38 Natural gas consists of a 
highly combustible mixture of hydrocarbon-rich gases which, depending on the source of 
origin, can be distinguished into two different qualities of low- (L-) and high- (H) calorific 
natural gases.39 Due to these differences and its volatile state, the extraction, transportation 
and storage of natural gas make it a technically and economically demanding product.40 The 
fact that various forms can neither be interchanged nor mixed easily and even after processing 
still differ, presents a major technical and commercial hurdle.41 As necessary adjustments are 
relatively costly and time-consuming even a “mere announcement of a particular natural gas 
quality by a transportation company is enough to stop its physical transportation (and hence 
its use in a particular area)”42
                                                 
36  The earliest observations were probably made by the Ancient Greek who in their narratives described 
supranational forces in form of ‘seas of flames’ on the Caspian Sean, most likely crude oil which had been 
ignited by lighting (cf. Körting (1963), p. 18). Similar observations were made much later by Volta who 
started first experiments and envisaged possibilities for economic application (cf. IEA (1982), p. 9). 
, making ‘competition run into difficulties simply because of its 
37  Cf. Körting (1963), pp. 18-19; Peebles (1980), p. 7. 
38  Despite extensive research on the topic of the origin of natural gas there are still many different opinions 
prevalent today. While some believe natural gas to be a by- or an end product of the formation process of 
petroleum others think it has a separate origin. The most widely represented hypothesis though is that natural 
gas origins from remainders of organic substances which inhabited the earth more than a quarter of a billion 
years ago as is also described in this work. For a more extensive explanation on the different possible forms 
of origin see, for example, Körting (1963), p. 23; Minchin (1968), pp. 42-43; Kehrer (1970), pp. 1-29. 
39  The main element (70-90%) is methane. Other components are ethane, propane, butane, carbon dioxide, and 
in traces (0.2%) oxygen. Cf. Thielen (1999), p. 5; Kraus (2004), p. 75. L-gas is mainly found in Northern 
Germany and the Netherlands, H-gas in Russia, Norway or the North Sea. Cf. Kunde (1995), pp. 2-3; Kuck 
(1999), p. 41; Rott (2004), p. 4. 
40  Cf. Hoffmann (1994b), pp. 499-500; Klinski (2006), pp. 70-72. 
41  Cf. Kemmer et al. (1970), p. 776; Kunde (1995), p. 3, Rott (2004), pp. 4-6. 
42  Rott (2004), p. 8. Translation by author. 
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different calorific values’43. In general though, transportability is a major advantage of gas as 
it is relatively easy to do once an infrastructure system exists, especially as it becomes more 
economical the higher its calorific value.44 Another of its ‘superiorities’ is that it burns 
without leaving hardly any traces of root while developing less carbon dioxide than oil or coal 
during combustion and, almost lacking carbon monoxide, has no major toxic components. 
Reaching highest degrees of purity it is thus preferred as an efficient and environmentally 
sound source of energy,45 allowing it to be sold at a premium price compared with other 
fuels.46
 
 
Before any form of energy can be used though it has to be transformed. This transformation 
process is depicted in the following section. 
 
 
Gas Transformation Chain 
 
An energy transformation chain describes the metamorphosis of energy sources from their 
raw condition to their final form for application by end consumers. The first step of this multi-
stage transformation process is constituted by primary energy which in the case of gas exists 
either in form of natural gas or as manufactured gas produced from energy sources such as 
coal or biomass.47
                                                 
43  Cf. Rott (2004), p. 6. Translation by author. 
 In the second step of the chain natural gas is transformed into secondary 
energy sources such as municipal heat, different product gases or refinery products. These 
again turn into final energy when being to the consumer’s disposal, where possibilities for the 
application as ‘employed’ or ‘derived’ energy are manifold. An advantageous characteristic of 
44  Cf. Schreiter (1965), pp. 24, 27, 88; Musil (1972), p. 103; IEA (1997), p. 115; Rojey (2002), p. 8. 
45  Cf. BGW (2004), pp. 3-5, Rott (2004), p. 2. For more specific details on natural gas characteristics cf. Guo/ 
Ghalambor (2005). Despite its environmental friendliness though, also natural gas is not completely free of 
emissions as methane, its main constituent, also is a greenhouse gas. Its advantage particularly arises in 
comparison with other fossil fuels of which natural gas has the lowest emissions per unit of energy produced 
(cf. IEA (1997), p. 116) and as methane emissions from natural gas systems still represent significantly less 
than those from natural ecosystems (cf. Rossert (1996), p. 8). 
46  Cf. Odell (1992a), p. 57. 
47  As gathered from literature research there is no clear definition of the term ‘primary energy’. Following the 
characterisation of natural gas, it here is defined as a form of energy “that has not undergone any sort of 
conversion” (World Energy Council (1992), p. 8). 
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natural gas derives from the fact that transformation losses, which normally arise when energy 
is being transformed from one source to another, can be kept relatively small with natural gas 
reaching a very favourable degree of effectiveness of nearly 90%.48 A fundamental area of 
application is to use gas as a fuel or feedstock in industry where high-temperature heating is 
utilised for applications such as melting, drying processes or steam generation in metal, 
ceramics, or paper production, or in the chemical industry to produce paraffin or synthetic 
lubricants that go into final products such as pesticides, paint, pharmaceuticals, oils, ammonia 
and transportation fuels. This transformation has become possible through an important 
technological advancement called Gas-To-Liquids (GTL) which enables the production of 
synthetical products from natural gas otherwise produced from crude oil, often even showing 
higher quality characteristics and the monetisation of gas resourced through the expansion 
into other segments and markets.49 Another large consumer of natural gas is the residential 
sector where it is used for heating purposes. Following its major application in the heating 
segment, where it presents a nearly perfect substitute for coal and oil, natural gas consumption 
is extremely dependent on weather conditions. Especially in mature markets an increase in 
sales is mainly the result of lower temperatures. A further possible form of application is as a 
fuel in the transportation sector or as a feedstock for electricity production.50 Following these 
multi-purposes natural gas has thus also been termed a major ‘cash cow’ for suppliers.51 
Moreover, when considering the external costs of electricity generation, natural gas has an 
advantage over oil and coal but loses out over nuclear energy as well as renewables due to 
their subsidisation. At the same time gas and electricity characterise substitute fuels with 
regards to heating and cooking purposes.52
                                                 
48  Cf. World Energy Council (1992), p. 8; Kraus (2004), p. 167. For a very detailed and specifically 
technologically as well as chemically oriented overview over particular scientific aspects of the conversion 
possibilities of natural gas cf. Iglesia et al. (2001); Guo/ Ghalambor (2005); Kidnay/ Parrish (2006). 
 
49  Cf. Schubert et al. (2001), p. 459; IEA (2004), p. 134; Hirsch et al. (2005), pp. 42-43. GTL has to be 
distinguished from Natural Gas Liquids (NGL), respectively Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) produced from 
manufactured not natural gases (see above). 
50  Cf. Fleisch et al. (2001), pp. 423-428; Schubert et al. (2001), pp. 460-463; IEA (2002), p. 111; Rojey (2002), 
p. 10; EIA (2005), pp. 46-48; IEA (2005), p. 171; Rostrup-Nielsen (2005), pp. 3-5, 12-16, 23; Trimm (2005), 
pp. 125-126, 134-135; Védrine (2005), pp. 403-405; EIA (2006), p. 55. Some have particularly pointed out 
the possibility of selling synthetic products produced from natural gas at higher prices. Cf. Babu (2001); 
Fleisch et al. (2001); Dybkjaer/ Christensen (2001); Schubert et al. (2001); Jensen (2003), p. 32; Seeliger 
(2004), pp. 22-25; Trimm (2005); Védrine (2005); Mohrdieck (2007), p. 9. 
51  Cf. Schmitz (2006), p. 26. 
52  Cf. Anonymous (2007a), p. 3. For a comparative study cf. Bartels/ Fiebig (1996). 
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While the gas industry was originally built up on manufactured gas, it is today mainly natural 
gas which is used. In the following section the natural gas industry’s specific characteristics 
are explained in more detail. 
 
 
2.2 Characteristics of the Natural Gas Industry 
 
2.2.1 Activities constituting the Industry Value-Chain 
 
Fundamentally determining the industry’s structure are the individual activities for bringing 
natural gas from the ‘wellhead to the consumer’, i.e. from its place of deposit to that of 
application. Constituting the industry’s value-chain, these activities, classified into upstream, 
midstream and downstream segments, are outlined in the following.  
 
 
Upstream Activities 
 
Exploration and Production (E&P)53
 
 
Natural gas in its purest form is found in nature where it is stored in and extracted from on- or 
offshore underground deposits in depths of up to 5,000 metres. Initially only discovered 
randomly during oil production and, its value not recognised, flared off,54
                                                 
53  While this is a common term to be used, exploration as a step before extraction and production will not be 
considered as this would go too much into detail for the purpose of this work. For a more specific overview 
see, e.g., Köckritz (2005). 
 the Chinese 
actually are said to have been the first to develop deep drilling along with separation 
techniques to use natural gas commercially. Today, different drilling technologies exist which 
enable efficiency to be improved and the amount of recoverable reserves to be extended while 
54  Cf. Minchin (1968), p. 91. Sometimes the gas which still lies under the subsoil is also called ‘raw gas’ which 
then becomes natural gas when being extracted. Early on, natural gas was even regarded as the “stepbrother 
of oil” (Estrada et al. (1995), p. 2). 
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reducing environmental damage.55
 
 Still, although such advancements have made the 
development of formerly uneconomic fields, where gas lies below 3,000 metres, economically 
viable and although reliable production concepts are already available for production in the 
Arctic Ocean where conditions are particularly extreme, many remaining deposits nowadays 
lie offshore below the seabed in difficult climatic conditions. Such resources cannot be 
accessed yet with the existing technology. Further technological innovations therefore are a 
key success factor in the industry. Moreover, as the extracted gas has no value if it cannot be 
brought to users, and as most deposits lie in remote places of consumption, a functioning 
transportation system is the backbone of the industry, particularly as it also determines the 
structure of gas markets and its regulation. Another characteristic of natural gas is its 
storability which gives it an advantage over other energy carriers such as electricity. These 
activities constitute the midstream area of the gas value-chain and are depicted in more detail 
in the following. 
 
Midstream Activities 
 
Pipeline transportation 
 
The largest volume of gas is transported by pipeline. One of the earliest forms of pipeline 
transportation known to be built was again by the Chinese using bamboo cane pipes.56
                                                 
55  Cf. Peebles (1980), p. 6; Kidnay/ Parrish (2006), p. 1. Another issue is safety concerns. Extraction activities 
may even trigger off earthquakes - as happened before. Cf. Anonymous (2006a), p. 3. 
 The 
European pipeline system was set up using steel pipes which are still also used today. Long-
distance high-pressure pipelines bring the gas from the wellhead to a distribution point where 
it is fed into a regional, mid- and then into the local low-pressure grid. Generally, several 
issues have to be considered with regards to transportation, such as the fact that the gas has to 
be processed, i.e. cleaned, to make it suitable for transportation. Other major obstacles to 
overcome are the transportation of different gas qualities (see above) and the drop in pressure 
which may result in substantial gas losses. Another technicality with regards to the 
56  Cf. Peebles (1980), p. 6; Kidnay/ Parrish (2006), p. 1. 
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disturbance-free flow of gas is the need to keep up the pressure by balancing in- and outflows 
as gas off-take at one point affects the whole network. A flexible instrument to alter pressure 
to a certain extent is known as ‘line-pack’, i.e. storing compressed gas within the network, 
and thus also functioning as a storage device.57
 
 This is a crucial network characteristic as 
localisation of storage in pipelines is much more flexible than in underground reservoirs or 
man-made systems and so additionally enhances the important role transporters play for 
overall industry structure as is explained in greater detail below. 
 
Transportation by LNG 
 
Particularly in case of sources which lie very remote from areas of consumption, 
transportation by pipeline may not be viable or possible at all. In this case an alternative form 
of transporting natural gas is in liquid form as liquefied natural gas (LNG). LNG is produced 
by cooling down natural gas to below minus 160 degrees where it then turns liquid at 
atmospheric pressure.58 This liquefaction process reduces the overall volume by about 600 
times to that of natural gas in its gaseous state and thus makes it suitable for transportation 
over long distances and for flexible storage.59 Islands such as Japan, which are often not 
suitable for links with pipelines, are particularly reliant on LNG imports. Although there have 
been attempts of transportation by train and even plane, movement of LNG is mainly done via 
the seaway on special LNG tankers, the first of which were deployed at the beginning of the 
1960s. In 1964, the United Kingdom (U.K.) was the first country in the world to import LNG 
from Algeria on a long-term commercial basis. At the same time this contractual delivery 
initiated the start of the world’s first commercial international LNG project.60
                                                 
57  Cf. Hoffmann (1994b), pp. 393-395; Kunde (1994), p. 3; Schmitt (1994), p. 1124; VSG (1996), pp. 1-2; IEA 
(1997), pp. 115-140; Rojey (2002), p. 9; Rott (2004), p. 4. 
 Shortly after, 
Gaz de France (GdF) started regular LNG imports with its tanker Jules Verne. Since then, 
58  The very basics of this technique have been known since its discovery around 1870 by the German engineer 
Carl Linde who observed that certain gases liquefy under pressure while they begin to boil at temperatures 
below zero degrees when pressure slackens. From this observation Linde was able to build the first 
refrigerating machine whose concept is still applied today. Cf. Thielen (1999), p. 14. 
59  One cubic metre of LNG equals 600 cubic metres of natural gas under normal condition. Also here different 
quality and technical aspects have to be considered though. Cf. Kessler et al. (2005), pp. 42-46. 
60  Cf. Peebles (1980), pp. 2, 21, 28-29, 104, 109-111; IEA (1997), p. 126; Hensing et al. (1998), p. 80; Sietz 
(2006), p. T1. 
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these special vessels have continuously developed regarding size, materials - transportation of 
gas from Arctic reservoirs, for example, has to take place in special ice-capable tankers - and 
capacity. While the first tanker, which was used as an experimental shipment in 1959, had a 
capacity of 5,000 cubic metres, tankers 15 years later had a capacity volume of 125,000 cubic 
metres. With this development LNG transportation was increasingly realised as a viable way 
to ship gas otherwise flared from remote places. At its final destination the LNG is transferred 
into its original gaseous state again in special regasification plants in order to be transferred 
into the natural gas pipeline grid.61
 
 
 
Transportation as CNG 
 
Another possible way of transportation is as compressed natural gas (CNG) where the gas is 
compressed under high pressures between 150 and 250 bar (compared with 80 bar for pipeline 
transportation). CNG transportation, which is possible by water or road, is still strongly 
dependent on further technological progress and so far has only been viable for low volumes. 
At the same time CNG poses a form of transportation particularly viable for regions which 
lack a pipeline infrastructure and are relatively small as LNG facilities require substantial 
space.62
 
 
 
Storage 
 
An essential advantage of natural gas, especially LNG as mentioned above, over other energy 
sources is that it can be stored. Constituting another value-chain activity, the major function 
of storage is to balance daily and seasonal demand variations, cover peak demand and act as a 
buffer in the case of supply disruptions. This is particularly essential as the majority of gas 
supply volumes is contractually bound on a long-term basis and cannot suddenly be re-
                                                 
61  Cf. Minchin (1968), pp. 90-91; Rathmann/ Ruppert (1985), p. 3; Hoffmann (1994c), p. 833; IEA (1997), pp. 
117-126. 
62  Cf. IEA (1997), pp. 118, 127, 130-131. 
Chapter II: Characteristics of the Traditional Gas Industry 18 
directed to other places of demand. Allowing large volumes to be taken, natural gas is mainly 
stored in underground reservoirs. These can be salt and rock caverns, pore storages like 
aquifers, or depleted hydrocarbon reservoirs. While relatively high volumes can be withdrawn 
from caverns at once, thus providing a relatively large degree of flexibility, they only offer 
small capacities compared with pore storages where gas may only be taken gradually, as the 
natural pressure system and way of flow must be kept in balance. Technically, underground 
storage is still a recent application. In Europe, the first pore storage was built in the 1950s. 
Today, about 640 storage facilities are active worldwide, about 160 of them in Europe, more 
than 400 in the USA.63
 
 
 
Downstream Activities 
 
For the gas to reach consumers such as households or small- and medium-sized industry it 
needs to be distributed regionally and locally, characterising major downstream activities. 
Here, special attention has to be paid to the different peculiarities of natural gas such as its 
form and composition, which often requires additional treatment to become distributable after 
high-pressure transportation, particularly after crossing national borders. In fact, for transition 
into the national distribution system pressure has to be reduced drastically to only a few bar. 
Distribution activities become even more complex when H-gas has to be transformed into L-
gas, or vice versa, to integrate regions with different gas qualities and supply structures. This 
procedure makes distribution not only more complex but also more costly and time 
consuming. Biological energy resources, too, require technical transformation and 
adjustments to natural gas quality - biogas is then called biomethan - when it is to be fed into 
the natural gas supply system.64
 
 Constituting the final downstream activity, gas is marketed 
and sold to end users. 
These activities constitute the natural gas value-chain as illustrated in the following figure. 
                                                 
63  Cf. Wölfer/ Leunig (2004), p. 116; Pasternak et al. (2005), p. 39; Arnold (2006), p. 24; Focht (2007a), p. 6. 
64  Cf. VSG (1993), p. 2; Rott (2004), pp. 5, 10. For an explanation on technical and cost aspects cf. Klinski 
(2006), p. 74; Wuppertal Institut et al. (2006), pp. 20-38, 50-57; Kanngießer (2007), p. 6; Leuschner (2007), 
pp. 30-32; Ott (2007), p. 10; Thrän et al. (2007), pp. 1-14, 31-38. 
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Figure 2:65
 
  Natural gas value-chain 
 
 
In addition to the characteristics of these individual activities, the actors who are engaged 
along the chain constitute a specific part of the industry as is explained next. 
 
 
2.2.2 Actors engaged along the Industry Value-Chain 
 
Generally, no universal term exists for players active in the industry. While the European 
Union generally defines any actor engaged in at least one of the value-chain functions and 
responsible for commercial, technical and/ or maintenance related to those tasks as a ‘natural 
gas undertaking’,66 a certain classification can be made according to the industry’s value-
chain activities: While exploration activities are often carried out by specialised players called 
E&P companies, the largest producers of natural gas are mainly the major oil companies.67 In 
fact, the first major discoveries made in Europe near Groningen in the Netherlands with 
substantial impact on the energy scene in Western Europe were developed by oil majors Shell 
and Esso.68 Similarly, in Italy the national oil company AGIP had been put in charge to 
develop domestic gas supplies, and in France it was the national oil major Elf. An exception is 
Russian Gazprom which mainly is a gas producer but also extracts oil.69
                                                 
65  Own figure based on the depiction of activites described above. 
 The sale of gas 
66  Cf. European Parliament and Council (2003a), Article 2, Recital 1. In all cases these ‘actors’ may either be a 
natural or legal person carrying out the respective function. This is therefore not mentioned again explicitly. 
67  This is due to the fact that natural gas is often produced as a by-product of oil production which oil 
companies can take advantage of. Cf. Minchin (1968), pp. 41-42; Odell (1979), pp. 126-127; Radetzki 
(1999), p. 18. Apart from that, oil companies had already been engaged in the gas industry even before 
natural gas made its way to the market when delivering oil as a feedstock for manufactured gas and 
companies like Esso or Mobil Oil Corporation entered into contracts with gas works to supply refinery gas. 
Cf. Körting (1963), pp. 565-582. 
68  Cf. Odell (1979), pp. 122-123; Peebles (1980), pp. 125-126; Peebles (1999), pp. 93-133. 
69  Cf. Rapp (1992), p. 20; Estrada et al. (1995), pp. 98-104; Stern (1998), p. 23. 
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across national borders, again, in most cases is carried out by specially founded export 
companies. In the case of the Dutch resources, for instance, Shell and Esso together with the 
Dutch government, as part-owner of the resources, set up a joint state-controlled company, 
N.V. Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM), in order to market the gas across the Dutch 
border.70 The actor who brings the gas into national territory again is called importer. This 
often is the national transportation company. In order to bring the gas from its field of 
production across national territories, producers and importers often jointly financed the 
necessary infrastructure, thus creating a mutual dependence still of relevance today.71 In the 
midstream segment a distinction can be made between transmission companies, or more 
precisely transmission system operators (TSOs), and distribution companies, i.e. distribution 
system operators (DSOs), sometimes also grouped as transportation companies. While TSOs 
transport the gas in high-pressure pipelines over long distances and in most cases across 
national boundaries they also assume the function of wholesalers to DSOs on the next level. 
DSOs are responsible for the further supply in mid- and low-pressure pipelines within a 
region or local municipality. Both are generally responsible for operating, maintaining and, if 
necessary, developing the respective transportation system and its interconnections as well as 
for guaranteeing the long-term capacity of their system to meet the demand for the required 
transportation service.72 Storage facilities again are operated by storage system operators 
(SSOs)73 which in reality in most cases are TSOs. The last level is operated by ‘supply 
undertakings’ which supply and sell the gas to final customers.74 In addition to these 
operating agents, governmental bodies, land owners, environmental groups and even 
customers are also engaged along the value-chain.75
                                                 
70  Cf. Odell (1979), p. 122; Peebles (1980), pp. 120-125; Peebles (1999), pp. 96-99. 
 This is enlarged on further below. Before 
doing so though the traditional structure is laid out first to form a basis for understanding the 
change process and because several traits of this structure are still prevalent today. 
71  Cf. European Commission (2007a), p. 27. 
72  Cf. European Parliament and Council (2003a), Article 2, Recitals 4 and 6. 
73 Cf. European Parliament and Council (2003a), Article 2, Recital 10. 
74 Cf. European Parliament and Council (2003a), Article 2, Recital 8. 
75  Cf. IEA (1997), p. 133. A prominent example for such a customer is German BASF with its own subsidiary 
Wintershall, which early engaged in the production and transportation of natural gas and was thus also 
considered a ‘troublemaker’ within the European gas industry (cf. Chevalier (1992), p. 177). 
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2.3 Traditional Structure of the European Gas Industry 
 
2.3.1 Monopolistic and Demarcated Areas closed to Third Parties 
 
The natural gas industry, ‘painstakingly built up already in the era of manufactured gas’76
 
, is 
characterised by certain features which favoured closed market structures but hindered 
competition and the free flow of gas between Member States, and thus finally the creation of 
a common internal market as aimed for by the European Union. 
 
Natural Monopoly 
 
Fundamentally, the European gas industry is characterised by specific features which are 
common to all infrastructure industries. A major one of these characteristics is that of a 
natural monopoly which is determined by the fact that the gas grid constitutes an essential 
facility and a highly capital intensive asset. The building of a second pipeline parallel to an 
already existing one and the accompanying duplication of monopolistic structures is not only 
economically infeasible and inefficient, but has been argued to reduce overall welfare for 
society. Moreover, specifically built for a certain purpose and route, transportation facilities 
nearly completely lose their value once one side closes down its business, a circumstance also 
known as a hold-up situation. Such asset-specific investments therefore present irreversible 
commitments which are “literally sunk into the ground”77. However, while these aspects 
constitute an essential feature of natural monopolies, they do not automatically imply the 
existence of monopolistic market power as competition is generally possible, either by direct 
pipe-to-pipe competition or, in cases where a pipeline is operated by several parties, when 
customers are able to choose their counterparty.78
                                                 
76  Cf. Peebles (1980), p. 1. 
 Moreover, transportation by pipeline can 
also be substituted by other forms of transportation (see above). Thus, the specific cost 
structure also has to be considered. Characterised by large fix costs and constant marginal 
77  Ellig/ Kalt (1996), p. xvii. 
78  Cf. Dörband (2005), pp. 32-36. 
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costs for the actual provision of the service, i.e. the transportation of gas, large sales volumes 
and a large, stable customer base are essential. This, together with a sub-additive and 
declining average cost curve, makes it more efficient and less costly if transportation is 
carried out by a single actor who can also more easily balance demand and supply.79 
Similarly, if transportation is bundled with upstream production and downstream supply 
vertical economies of scale can be exploited. Such infrastructures represent ‘monopolistic 
bottlenecks’ and provide pipeline owners or controlling operators with substantial quasi-rents 
and market power to take advantage of while posing significant barriers for new entrants. An 
exception often mentioned in literature is Germany where Wintershall in 1989 had built its 
own pipeline to supply its chemical plant and bypass Ruhrgas, the main importer until then. In 
1996 this was even followed by a Joint Venture (JV) with Gazprom to establish Wingas (65% 
Wintershall-owned, 35% owned by Gazprom) and build a new pipeline parallel to that of 
Ruhrgas to transport and sell gas from Russia in Germany and beyond, and so introducing 
elements of competition in the gas market.80 In addition to such predominantly natural 
monopolistic structures the European gas industry has also been characterised by considerable 
parts of public ownership and far-reaching state intervention,81
 
 having resulted in the 
establishment of statutory monopolies and integrated ownership structures as is explained in 
the following. 
 
State Ownership and Governmental Engagement 
 
After first discoveries had been made in Europe, natural gas developed to become an 
important element in the national energy mix as well as for overall economic and social 
welfare. In many cases this made the provision of gas a national task by either setting up 
national companies or by granting exclusive rights to produce and supply energy in 
                                                 
79  For an in-depth theoretical explanation cf. Sharkey (1982). For an empirical example cf. von Hirschhausen 
(2007). 
80  Cf. Estrada et al. (1995), pp. 96-97; Golombek et al. (1995), p. 86; Rossert (1996), pp. 25-26; IEA (1998), p. 
34. This example shows that also apparently natural monopolies are ‘open to attack’ when challengers are 
determined and willing to invest the necessary capital. Cf. Radetzki (1999), p. 20; Dörband (2005), p. 33. 
81  Cf. Radetzki (1999), p. 17. These characteristics have been commonly accepted as general industry features 
in literature. Also cf. Helm/ McGowan (1989), pp. 238-248; Kahane (1990); Hensing et al. (1998), pp. 77-
89; von Hirschhausen et al. (2004). 
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demarcated areas in order to limit entry, and to protect the investor’s assets, the latter thus 
constituting statutory monopolies. In most European countries producers, importers, 
transporters and also distributors were largely government controlled and value-chain 
activities were performed by a single vertically integrated company. Such constellations 
provided incumbents with substantial “opportunities for fine-tuning economies of scale and 
scope”82 and thus organisational profit. Today, vertical integration and public shareholding in 
the utility sector are also high. About one third of gas transmission networks of the EU, for 
instance, are in the majority state-owned.83 Although there were different grades of 
integration across European Member States, vertical integration was generally acknowledged 
as “the guiding principle of the previous market structure”84 in Europe. Basically, vertical 
integration refers to the internalisation of network externalities due to the existence of 
reliability costs. One example would be producers who lack the incentive to maintain the 
necessary pressure in the infrastructure system which is needed to supply customers further 
downstream. Transmission companies are therefore interested in reliable relationships with 
their upstream supplier. In addition, backward integration has been chosen in cases where the 
‘bottleneck’ activity is regulated, while the upstream part is not. This has allowed inflating 
costs upstream and at the same time the accumulation of additional rents.85
                                                 
82  Tolmasquim et al. (2001), p. 337. 
 Producers, facing 
the TSO as a bottleneck and barrier to market entry, are looking to integrate downwards. 
Similar considerations are significant for the relationship between transmission and 
distribution companies. While TSOs are interested in stable purchasing volumes to make 
investments viable, DSOs need a secure source of supply to satisfy their customers. Vertical 
integration thus allows a high and regular utilisation of capacities and an exploitation of 
economies of scale, while reducing uncertainty with regards to large sunk costs and a long life 
span of the investments. In this respect, a major distinction can be made regarding the mode 
of vertical integration, i.e. whether integration takes place via ownership rights 
(internalisation) or long-term contracts. Others speak of these two types as ‘actual’ and 
83  Cf. European Commission (2007a), pp. 40, 75. 
84  European Commission (2007a), p. 28. 
85  Lyon and Hackett in fact determined vertical integration as one of four essential bottleneck characteristics, 
the others being large quasi-rents, exchange relationships governed by regulatory policies and the growing 
scope and complexity of networks. Cf. Lyon/ Hackett (1993), pp. 382-386. 
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‘effective’ integration.86
 
 While both forms are characteristic for the industry, in reality 
different forms and combinations exist. These forms are briefly presented, based on the 
general distinction between internalised vertical integration and long-term contractual 
arrangements. 
 
Vertical Integration 
 
Vertical integration via internal coordination refers to the situation where value chain 
activities are all performed by the same company. Generally, competitive functions such as 
production and sales, and natural monopolistic activities like transportation are performed 
under one corporate roof. The European Commission has defined vertically integrated 
companies as ‘natural gas undertakings or a group of undertakings whose mutual relationships 
concern the performance of at least one of the functions of transmission, distribution, LNG or 
storage, and at least one of production or supply of natural gas’.87 While there are cases of full 
integration there are those where internal integration only takes place between the domestic 
producer and the national TSO or, in the case where there are no indigenous resources, 
between TSOs and DSOs.88 In cases where ownership integration was not possible, e.g. 
foreign suppliers not being allowed to take ownership over essential national facilities, it was 
substituted by long-term contracts in order to establish some degree of stability and security 
and ensure the amortisation of investments by making producers carry the price and buyers 
the volume risk.89
                                                 
86  Cf. Kahane (1990), p. 246. 
 The duration of such contracts normally is as long as the infrastructure is 
used. Due to the long amortisation time of such projects, the majority of such contracts were 
established over a period of up to 25 years. A central feature of such gas contracts lies in the 
concept of the ‘Daily Contract Quantity’ (DCQ) which obliges the seller to guarantee for a 
minimum capacity of production, while the buyer again has to take off a minimum volume 
and pay what is called a ‘Minimum Bill’. Contractually this was established as a ‘Take-or-
87  Cf. European Parliament and Council (2003a), Article 2, Recital 20. 
88  In this case also production becomes part of the bundled product. Cf. Lyon/ Hackett (1993), p. 380. 
89  From a theoretical perspective, the importance of long-term contracts for uncertainty reduction has been 
particularly pointed out by Williamson (1985). 
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Pay’ (ToP) clause, often accounting for 70 to 90% of the annually contracted volume. This 
guarantees the seller a minimum income flow to cover his debt duties from financing the 
development of the field.90 The importer and subsequently the TSO again, in charge of the gas 
after it has crossed the border, needed the certainty of being able to sell the gas contracted to 
amortise their investments. This was often realised by defining demarcation areas which were 
either established by law, or existed because of being tolerated in that there existed a “clear 
tacit understanding among the gas executives that they respect each other’s territory”91. The 
TSO thus ‘passed the purchase obligation downward to the DSO’92 which again was granted 
defined areas of supply to customers with different user profiles for being able to pool 
demand, and ensure a balanced utilisation of facilities, thus reducing their sales uncertainty. 
The establishment of long-term contracts and demarcation areas as a form of ‘effective 
integration’ therefore also allowed disintegrated companies to become connected.93
 
 
Essentially, those players with ownership and power over the transportation function linking 
buyers and sellers posed a major barrier to entry for third parties. Moreover, by acting not 
only as transporters but also as marketers both activities were inseparably bundled. In many 
cases, also the storage activity has been part of this bundled offer as not only grids but also 
storage facilities were owned by the transporters. Such actors have thus also been described as 
‘gatekeepers’ or ‘effective bottlenecks’ in that suppliers could only directly sell to TSOs.94 
These again could not directly access final consumers but had to sell to DSOs following 
which also downstream markets remained closed to third parties.95
                                                 
90  Cf. Estrada et al. (1988), pp. 264-268; Estrada et al. (1995), p. 20. 
 Only in the case of 
industrial or commercial users with large purchasing quantities, such as power generation 
companies or industrial buyers, the gas was sold directly, bypassing distribution via DSOs (as 
indicated by the dotted line in the figure). At the same time also DSOs had substantial market 
powers, deriving from their historical origin of having been “almost by definition, monopolies 
91  Estrada et al. (1988), p. 252. 
92  Cf. Lyon and Hackett (1993), p. 386. 
93  Cf. Kahane (1990), p. 246. 
94  Cf. Stern (1998), pp. 10-11; Rutledge/ Wright (2000), p. 11; Bernardini (2004), p. 2. 
95  These were therefore also called “citigate markets” (Lyon/ Hackett (1993), p. 386). Supply to wholesalers, 
regional or local distributors and major industry customers sometimes also called ‘primary distribution’, that 
to commercial and residential consumers ‘secondary distribution’. 
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which grew up during the era of town gas”96. Also the Transit Directive installed in 1991 did 
not abolish these structures as it only obliged TSOs to negotiate over not grant access to their 
pipelines and thus did not enable suppliers to sell gas in foreign markets downstream.97
 
 A 
final outcome of these natural as well as statutory structural conditions has been a highly 
vertically integrated and thus close market set-up as illustrated in the following figure. 
 Figure 3:98
 
  Traditional industry structure characterised by monopolies and vertical 
integration 
 
                                                 
96  Stern (1998), p. 19. 
97  Cf. European Council (1991). Italicised by author. 
98  Own figure based on depictions from above. 
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In order to protect consumers from actors abusing their market power inherent in such 
structures, governments had intervened by both directly nationalising or at least regulating 
value-chain activities and price setting.99 At the same time this involvement also allowed 
governments to secure a substantial part of industry profits while freeing companies from 
having to operate efficiently, although this created a net loss for society.100 Another specific 
characteristic within this setting is the pricing of natural gas. Traditionally, natural gas prices 
have been linked to oil prices. The pricing of gas to its closest substitute fuel had “robbed”101 
the industry of much freedom of price setting but allowed producers to reduce the price risk 
they were initially carrying as natural gas industries were just beginning to develop.102 While 
the whole pricing system is very complex and kept highly confidential with details never 
published,103 it had become known that the production situation at Groningen was of a degree 
of excellence virtually unmatched elsewhere in the world, allowing such low-cost extraction 
that producers could generate maximum profits, leaving energy consumers as the ‘losers’. 
Moreover, the linkage to oil implied that the costs for gas imports into Europe have been 
decoupled from the actual costs of extraction and that gas prices mirrored neither the ‘real’ 
demand nor supply situation.104
                                                 
99  Another reason was that prices for manufactured gas production, which had initially been carried out parallel 
to natural gas production, would have had to be subsidised as they would have not been competitive 
anymore. Cf. Morgenthaler (1960), pp. 840-843. 
 The actual realities of the demand-supply-situation in the 
European Union are looked at in the following section. 
100  Cf. Lyon/ Hackett (1993), pp. 381-382; Dörband (2005), p. 30. For an example of possible social welfare 
losses of natural gas pricing cf. Klein (1993). 
101  DRI-WEFA (2001), p. 53. 
102  Another reason was that oil companies also produced natural gas and thus tried to avoid eroding their oil 
sales when making gas more attractive than oil in areas possible for substitution (back then particularly in the 
heating segment). This linkage is also ironically described as “the gift that Exxon brought to the party” 
(Heren (1999), p. 5), following the erosion of oil sales when cheaper natural gas appeared in the market. In 
Europe it were Shell and Esso that introduced the concept of the ‘oil-escalated price’ to the market after the 
first major discoveries had been made in Groningen (see above). Cf. Odell. (1969), p. 235. 
103  Information that does appear in public is based on estimations. Cf. Estrada et al. (1988), p. 263. 
104  Cf. Odell (1969), pp. 235-241; Correljé/ Odell (2000), p. 21. This has also been described as a situation 
frustrating “the working of textbook micro-economics” (DRI-WEFA (2001), p. 5). 
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2.3.2 Increasing Dependence on Natural Gas Imports 
 
Fundamentally and due to the favourable geological conditions that existed some million 
years ago, natural gas deposits also exist in the European region, particularly in the seabed 
beneath the North Sea. First large-scale discoveries in Europe105 were made in Groningen in 
the Netherlands in 1959. This not only characterised the “fons and origo”106 of the European 
natural gas business but marked the beginning of a new epoch for European gas markets and 
turned out to be the most important occurrence for the internationalisation of gas trade in 
Europe.107 Production at Groningen only started in 1965 though as NAM (see above) and the 
Dutch government had “spent several months sitting on the discovery”108. In 1990, the largest 
producers within the EU were the Netherlands (34%), the U.K. (25%), Romania (14%), Italy 
(9%), and Germany (8%). The only two countries with an autonomous self-supply and 
volumes for exports though were the U.K. and the Netherlands. Between 1990 and 1997, 
overall production in the EU increased by 24% from 162 to 201 bcm. On a global basis in 
comparison, proven reserves in Europe only account for less than 2% of the world’s 
reserves.109 Moreover, several indigenous fields are approaching their depletion. Even if not 
becoming exhausted immediately, plateau production had already been reached in the Lacq 
field in France as early as the 1970s and only shortly after in the Frigg field in the North 
Sea.110 Apart from this, supplies from the still resourceful Groningen field have declined over 
the years and the Dutch government issued a decree to protect national gas resources and 
restrict exports.111
 
 
                                                 
105  Commercialisation of natural gas had started in the U.S. With continuous positive news regarding its 
application as well as a growing need for energy after the Second World War when many coal fields were 
damaged or even destroyed and oil was relatively expensive, systematic search for natural gas also began in 
Western Europe. Cf. Hensing et al. (1998), p. 77. For a more detailed historical review cf. Odell (1979). 
106  Heren (1999), p. 5. The Groningen field is also called the Slochteren field as the findings were made near the 
town of Slochteren in the province of Groningen. Cf. Peebles (1980), p. 122. 
107  Cf. Estrada et al. (1995), pp. 9, 33. 
108  Heren (1999), p. 5. The reason for this was that the Dutch government as well as Shell and Esso were 
looking to derive the largest economic benefits from these findings while not threatening other areas of 
energy supply. Cf. Estrada et al. (1995), p. 9; Heren (1999), p. 5. 
109  Own calculations based on data from BP (2009) and Eurostat (2010). 
110  Cf. Rempel (2002), pp. 227-228. 
111  Cf. Rossert (1996), pp. 14-15; Mulder et al. (2007), p. 51. 
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On the consumption side however, demand for natural gas continuously increased, having 
tripled between 1970 and 1985, particularly since the 1990s after having long been ignored as 
a base-load energy. Over the course of time, and especially after the abolishment of the ban 
on gas use for electricity generation in 1989, natural gas, in fact, became a central source in 
the energy mix.112 In absolute terms this signified an increase of more than 20% from 356 
bcm in 1990 to 435 bcm in 1997. In 1996, natural gas even replaced solid fuels as the second 
most important energy carrier after oil which accounted for about 40%. In fact, the share of 
solid fuels declined from 27% in 1990 to 20% in 1997 while nuclear energy increased from 
12% to 14% and renewables from 4% to 5%. In final consumption the largest share of natural 
gas was accounted for by the household (residential) and services (commercial) sector where 
gas is particularly used as a source of heating, already accounting for nearly 54% in 1990. Its 
growth had been particularly driven by its increasing application in electricity generation, 
having risen by more than 15% between 1996 and 1997.113
                                                 
112  Cf. Estrada et al. (1988), pp. 9-11, 17; Odell (1992a), pp. 42-49. Early calculations assumed that, starting 
from 50 bcm in 1968, natural gas had the potential to reach between 220 bcm in a pessimistic and 730 bcm 
in an optimistic scenario. Cf. Odell (1969), pp. 250-251. In Western Europe, the share of natural gas in 
overall energy use increased from 1.8% in 1961 to 15% in 1989. Cf. Odell (1992b), p. 289. 
 When comparing this demand-
supply situation, a major supply gap becomes apparent as well visible in the illustration 
below. 
113  Own calculations based on data from Engerer/ Horn (2009), p. 278 and Eurostat (2010) for EU-27. 
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 Figure 4:114
 
  Development of European natural gas production and consumption from 1990 
to 1997 (in bcm) – Revealing an increasing gap 
 
 
 
In addition to this already unbalanced demand-supply situation it has to be considered that 
“more than half”115 of the value chain lies beyond European market borders with the three 
major suppliers being non-EU members Russia, Algeria and Norway116, in 1996 accounting 
for 54%, 24% and 22% of imports,117 respectively. Furthermore, this supply structure is 
characterised by one of monopsy with only a few powerful supplying consortia which also are 
mainly state-owned, such as Russian Gazprom, Dutch Gasunie, Norwegian GFU118
                                                 
114  Own figure based on data from Eurostat (2010). 
 or 
115  Dorigoni/ Pontoni (2008), p. 12. As a rule of thumb, the European industry value chain has been calculated 
to be made up by import and international transportation activities by 57%, by national transport and storage 
by 10%, and by distribution and sale by 18 and 15%, respectively. Cf. Dorigoni/ Pontoni (2008), p. 12. In 
fact, about 30% of global gas reserves are located in areas too far from places of consumption and difficult to 
access places, making future production uneconomic and uncertain for the future. Cf. World Energy Council 
(1992), pp. 254-255; Adelman/ Lynch (2002), p. 38; IEA (2002), p. 114; Sieber (2005), pp. 63-65. The IEA 
has thus pointed out an increasing investment need to develop future gas supplies, ranging from $2.7 trillion 
in 2004 (for the period 2003-2030) (cf. IEA (2004), p. 144) to $3.9 trillion in 2006 (for the period 2005-
2030) (cf. IEA (2006), pp. 121-122). 
116  Despite not being a member of the EU, Norway can still be said to take a somewhat different role, not only 
being part of the OECD but politically and socially close to the “Western community” (Estrada et al. (1988), 
p. 248). At the same time it has to be considered that the Norwegian state has direct and indirect stakes in 
Statoil and Norsk Hydro. Cf. Estrada et al. (1995), pp. 226-227; Stern (1998), p. 22. 
117  Own calculations based on data from Eurostat (2010). 
118  Consisting of Statoil, Norsk Hydro and Saga Petroleum, is the Norwegian Gas Negotiating Committee 
coordinating Norwegian gas sales and acting as a gatekeeper in form of a resource management and wealth 
management instrument for the Norwegian State. Cf. Sunnevag (2000), pp. 311-319. 
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Algerian Sonatrach. The rest of the market is divided into about twelve other suppliers with 
around 3-5% market share each, exemptions with 11-12% being the oil companies Shell and 
Exxon which again own stakes in Gasunie and GFU. Due to this geological reality the 
majority of supplies has to be transported over long distances and often under extremely 
difficult conditions to reach places of consumption.119 The major pipelines bringing gas into 
the EU are hence those from the main supplying countries: the Interconnector bringing gas 
from the U.K. to Belgium, ‘Progress’ and ‘Yamal’ from Russia, ‘Medgaz’ and ‘Transmed’ 
connecting Algeria with Spain and Italy, respectively, and ‘Frigg’, ‘Zeepipe’ as well as 
‘Norpipe’ and ‘Europipe’ bringing gas from Norway to the U.K., Belgium, and Germany.120
 
 
While the European Union already is strongly dependent on natural gas imports, the 
increasing gap between consumption and supply has been continuously widening (see figure 4 
above), thus increasing import dependency on natural gas as indicated in the figure below. 
Figure 5:121
 
  Threat of increasing import dependency on natural gas (EU-27, in %) 
 
 
 
Despite this critical situation, the European community had already determined early that a 
“greater reliance on natural gas is desirable as part of diversification of energy sources”122
                                                 
119  Cf. European Commission (2001a), p. 16. 
 to 
120  For an illustration of the European pipeline grid cf. European Commission (2001a), p. 63. 
121  Own figure based on data from European Commission (2001a), p. 23; DIW (2009), p. 278. 
122  European Council (1991), p. 1. 
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reduce dependence on coal and oil imports. Similarly, gas utilisation has been further fuelled 
to encounter increasing ecological issues as “gas enjoys a relatively easy passage against the 
strengthening environmentalists’ anti-energy use pressures”123, especially in light of a 
growing public rejection of the increasing utilisation of nuclear power.124
 
 This is looked at in 
more detail in the next section. 
 
2.3.3 Environmental-Ecological125
 
 Concerns 
Fundamentally, large-scale concerns regarding issues of ecology and sustainability can be 
said to have been kicked off as soon as 1970 following the still well-known publication of 
‘The limits to growth’ by a research group called the ‘Club of Rome’ which had carried out a 
comprehensive multivariate study on the utilisation and future supply of various natural 
resources. In the case of natural gas the group had projected that natural gas would only last 
for another 22 years.126 Receiving global attention at that time this study essentially raised 
peoples’ concerns about the conservation of natural resources. In fact, natural gas was soon 
after perceived as too valuable to be fired in power plants. The European Community in 1975 
even implemented a ‘Gas Burn Directive’ which prohibited by law the application of natural 
gas for electricity production.127 While this constituted a major threat to the future existence 
of the natural gas industry as such, it was soon after counteracted by events that, in fact, again 
established natural gas as a critical part of the energy mix. One was the nuclear catastrophe of 
Chernobyl in the Ukraine which resulted in a general questioning of the application of nuclear 
power in the fuel mix and in the promotion of natural gas as a substitute especially for 
electricity generation. At the same time also an increasing awareness for ecological issues 
could be observed which “came as heaven sent to the gas industry”128
                                                 
123  Odell (1992a), p. 47. 
, driven by early debates 
124  Cf. Odell (1979), pp. 126-128; Odell (1992b), p. 291. 
125  This term has been chosen to distinguish from the organisation’s general environment. Some use the term 
environment to refer to an organisation’s ‘ecological’ environment. Cf. Bansal/ Roth (2000), p. 717. 
126  Cf. Meadows et al. (1972), pp. 46-49. 
127  Cf. Horsnell (2001), p. 29. 
128  Estrada et al. (1995), p. 116. 
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around the Helsinki Protocol of 1985 to reduce sulphur emissions.129 Also within the 
European Community these issues were addressed with augmented attention. In fact, the 
Single European Act (SEA) which was established in 1986 put as two of its central goals the 
‘improvement of environmental quality’ and the ensuring of a ‘prudent and rational utilisation 
of natural resources’.130 The subjects of climate change and environmental protection actually 
stayed in focus and were even enforced further with the ratification of the Kyoto protocol in 
1992, demanding a reduction of CO2 by 8% between 2008 and 2012 compared to 1990 
levels.131
 
 With regard to this, the European Community had been a major driving force, 
establishing the first trading system on carbon emission rights as is, amongst others, enlarged 
on in the following chapter. 
 
2.4 Shortcomings of the Traditional European Gas Industry 
Structure – Contradicting the Goals of European Energy 
Policy 
 
Essentially, the above depiction has revealed that the European Community faced several 
severe issues in different areas which required to be addressed. This has become particularly 
prevalent in order to achieve the Community’s objectives of creating an internal energy 
market where consumers could freely choose their supplier while at the same time ensuring a 
sufficient and secure as well as affordable and environmentally friendly provision of energy. 
While these goals had actually already been mentioned before any official treaties on 
integration were established132 and a first step for implementing an Internal Energy Market 
had already been taken in 1988,133
                                                 
129  After initial discussions the Protocol was finally signed in 1994 by 33 countries obliging themselves to 
reduce emissions by 80% until 2000 compared with 1980. Cf. Estrada et al. (1995), p. 78. 
 it was particularly recent regulations which have 
130  Cf. European Communities (1986). 
131  Cf. United Nations (1992); United Nations (1997). 
132  In 1955 the participants of the Conference of Messina had already pointed out that “putting more abundant 
energy at a cheaper price at the disposal of the European economies constitutes a fundamental element of 
economic progress” (Eurotreaties (2010), p. 1). 
133  Cf. European Commission (1995), published in addition to ‘Energy in Europe’. Cf. Klom (1996), p. 28. 
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“undeniably”134 initiated a “philosophical change”135 in the European gas market. In 1995, a 
White Paper formulating ‘An Energy Policy for the European Union’ was issued which 
established three objectives that were to become the three main pillars of the common energy 
policy:136
 
 
► To increase competitiveness by liberalising the “government-designed”137 “anti-
competitive ghetto”138 of the European gas industry not compatible with the idea of a 
single open market where consumers should be able to choose their supplier of choice 
and where gas supplies should go to places of highest value in the most efficient way 
to be sold at prices determined by demand and supply in order to finally enhance 
overall economic welfare139.140 The European Commission sees the liberalisation of 
gas markets as “a very important tool which contributes to the development of the 
European economy towards its goals of efficiency and competitiveness in an ever-
increasing global market place”141
 
. 
► To guarantee security of supply for European consumer following the ‘economic 
realities of the supply chain to consumers’,142
                                                 
134  Genoud et al. (2004a), p. 114. Also cf. Dronnikov et al. (2003), p. 27. 
 i.e. the fact that the European 
135  Estrada et al. (1995), p. 75. 
136  Cf. European Commission (1995). 
137  von Hirschhausen et al. (2004), p. 204. 
138  Heren (1999), p. 4. 
139  Empirical studies, for example, had indicated an increase in Western European economic welfare of 15-20% 
in the long-term. Cf. Golombek et al. (1995). Others again found vertical unbundling in addition with 
downstream competition to result in inefficient upstream investments and to reduce welfare. Cf. Baake et al. 
(2004); Casarin (2007). 
140  Cf. European Commission (1988), p. 63; Krahl (2005), p. 23. 
141  European Commission (2000a), p. 5. Also the general trend towards increasing globalisation (cf. Levitt 
(1983)) and more ‘modern schools of thinking’ (cf. Klom (1996), p. 33; Genoud et al. (2004b), p. 13) as well 
as positive examples from liberalisation in the U.S. (cf. Lyon/ Hackett (1993)) and the U.K. as the 
‘laboratory’ and pacesetter for the rest of Europe where a significant drop in prices and the incumbents’ 
market share could be observed, had a strong demonstration effect (cf. Estrada et al. (1995), p. 224; Rossert 
(1996), pp. 27-28; IEA (1998), pp. 129-174; Guizot (1998), p. 30; Correljé/ Odell (2000), p. 21; Finon 
(2004), p. 198). Recently though, a reverse trend can be observed in the U.K. as suppliers have been accused 
of abusing their market power and as the fact that investment into new energy sources is lacking to further 
guarantee price stability has created dissatisfaction up to that deregulation by now is being ‘demonised’ in 
Britain. Cf. Esterhazy et al. (2008), pp. 60-61; Thibaut (2010). 
142  Cf. Clegg (2001), pp. 3-4. At the same time it does not necessarily mean that resources further away are 
more expensive to transport as e.g. for long-term contracted gas from Algeria in 2004 cost 9.80 €/ MWh 
while 12.80 €/ MWh had to be paid for Dutch gas. Cf. European Commission (2007a), pp. 124-125. 
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Community is highly dependent on natural gas imports from sources far beyond its 
borders, especially as there are “external market influences which cannot be balanced 
by the market itself”143. The EU defined security of supply as “the ability of the gas 
system to provide a continuous and reliable supply of gas to customers on an 
economic basis and to cope with interruptions”144
 
. 
► To ensure the sustainability of energy provision due to the increasing ecological issues 
and growing concern for environmental matters such as climate change. In this 
respect, natural gas plays an important role because of its above mentioned role as an 
environmentally friendly source of energy. 
 
In the following chapter these three goals of European Energy Policy and the change they 
brought to the European gas industry are analysed in more detail. 
                                                 
143  IEA (2004), p. 64. While some remarked that the availability of natural gas resources was not to be a 
problem within the next decades (cf. Rossert (1996), p. 14; Lerche (2000); Odell (2004)) there is substantial 
uncertainty regarding future supplies. This also becomes apparent from the vast and scattered existence of 
different publications on this topic. In conducting a web research on ‘hydrates’ Lerche, for instance, found 
more than 600,000 articles dealing with this topic. Cf. Lerche (2007). 
144  de Miguel (1995), p. 25. 
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CHAPTER III ELEMENTAL CHANGE of the EUROPEAN GAS 
INDUSTRY 
 
 
3.1 European Energy Policy Changes 
 
3.1.1 The Liberalisation Process – Introducing Competition and 
Enhancing Security of Supply 
 
The fundamental change process can said to have begun in 1998 when the first liberalisation 
package, Directive 98/30/EC,145 was implemented. Despite having been criticised as 
reflecting not much more than a “broad degree of consensus and compromise”146 found 
between Member States - as the initial plans for market opening had been watered down so 
much that the final result in 1998 was one of only ‘fuzzy liberalisation’-147 the regulatory 
amendments made in Directive 98/30/EC introduced and characterised significant change. A 
second major package, Directive 03/55/EC was put into practice five years later. While both 
as well as subsequent directives were directed at increasing transparency148, facilitating third 
party access (TPA) to essential infrastructure149
 
, and allowing consumers to freely choose 
their supplier in order to enhance competition and security of supply, a distinction can be 
made according to the degree of coercion exerted through the different directives.  
In fact, a characteristic of the whole change process is the escalating development of 
measurements, actually not planned as such. The first directive was presented as a framework 
                                                 
145  Cf. European Parliament and Council (1998). 
146  Klom (1996), p. 35. 
147  Cf. Andersen/ Sitter (2007), pp. 8, 15. 
148  Transparency refers to the provision of market participants with relevant data. Cf. European Commission 
(2007b), p. 1. 
149  This includes upstream pipelines from production sites, processing facilities, LNG terminals, (high-pressure) 
transmission pipelines, storage facilities, balancing and other ancillary facilities as well as regional and local 
distribution pipelines. Cf. European Parliament and Council (1998). 
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of general principles leaving Member States a certain degree of freedom to take account for 
the principle of subsidiarity and enable them to choose the procedure that best fits their 
specific situation. For instance, other than making TPA to essential facilities mandatory as 
initially planned,150 the first directive allowed Member States to choose between negotiated 
third party access (nTPA) based on voluntary commercial agreements in form of controlled 
self-regulation,151 regulated third party access (rTPA) with common and generally public 
tariffs, or a combination of both systems. No matter which of these forms of access was 
chosen, network access always had to follow objective, transparent and non-discriminatory 
principles152 while negotiations had to be held in ‘good faith’ with neither party abusing its 
position.153 In addition to this, integrated natural gas undertakings were required to 
‘accounting unbundle’ grid activities from commercial actions by creating ‘Chinese Walls’154 
by keeping separate internal accounts for their transmission, distribution and storage activities 
in order to avoid discrimination, cross-subsidisation and competitive distortions.155 While 
these measures were referred to as ‘qualitative’, those concerning the degree of market 
opening were termed ‘quantitative’. In order to allow for a gradual adjustment, supplier 
choice at first was only effective for so-called ‘eligible customers’ such as gas-fired power 
generators or end consumers with more than 25 mcm of gas consumption per year.156 As a 
minimum requirement, the degree of market opening had to be at least 20% of the total annual 
national gas consumption by August 2000, the deadline for implementation into national law. 
This further increased the degree of market opening to 28% after five years, and to 33% after 
20 years when the Directive entered into force.157
                                                 
150  Cf. European Council (1990); European Council (1991). 
 In order to avoid imbalances and unfair 
151  Here, presupposing ex-ante approval by authorities, contract tariffs were to be individually negotiated with 
grid operators which again were required to lay open to third parties the central conditions for use of their 
infrastructure. Cf. European Parliament and Council (1998), Article 15(2). 
152  Cf. European Parliament and Council (1998), Article 14. At the same time companies were allowed to deny 
grid access in case of capacity constraints, when preventing compliance with public service obligations, and/ 
or when facing serious economic and financial difficulties. Cf. European Parliament and Council (1998), 
Articles 14-17, 25. 
153  Cf. European Parliament and Council (1998), Articles 21 and 22 which specifically refer to Article 86 of the 
Treaty of Rome. 
154  These are barriers in IT systems to prevent commercially sensitive information flowing between companies 
operating both as grid operators and suppliers. Cf. European Commission (2000a), p. 11. 
155  Cf. European Parliament and Council (1998), Article 13. 
156  The term was only explicitly defined in the second directive as “customers who are free to purchase their gas 
from the supplier of their choice” (European Parliament and Council (2003), Article 2, Recital 28). 
157  Cf. European Parliament and Council (1998), Articles 18 and 29. 
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competition a ‘reciprocity clause’ had been included, allowing Member States to refuse 
network access of eligible customers from another Member State if its degree of opening was 
below the minimum requirement.158 In the year 2001 another Green Paper on security of 
supply, termed ‘Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply’ was issued,159 
also reinforcing liberalisation measures. However, following an assessment made in 2001 on 
the progress of measures,160 finding that much “remains to be done”161, the Commission 
began to “make threatening noises”162
 
 to increase pressure. 
In order to further ‘speed up the liberalisation process’163 an ‘acceleration directive’, Directive 
03/55/EC, was therefore passed in 2003 and extended to include LNG as well as other types 
of gases such as those produced from biomass.164 This second directive not only tightened 
quantitative and qualitative measures, enabling all non-household consumers and private 
households to freely choose their supplier from July 1, 2004 and 2007, respectively, but made 
regulated TPA as well as the legal and functional unbundling of transmission and distribution 
(see above) obligatory. This implied that the transportation and distribution business had to 
become legally and functionally separated entities.165
                                                 
158  Cf. European Parliament and Council (1998), Article 19. Further derogations were granted in case of 
economic or financial difficulties, or when qualifying as an emergent, i.e. infant natural gas market where 
the first commercial supply contract was not installed more than 10 years before. Cf. European Parliament 
and Council (1998), Articles 2, 25, 26. 
 Moreover, self-regulatory power was 
replaced by ex-ante control, and Member States were obliged to install a competent body 
functioning as a regulatory authority to watch over adherence to requirements. To facilitate 
the coordination and cooperation of the different national authorities, a basis was established 
for the creation of a supportive regulator, the European Regulators Group of Electricity and 
159  Cf. European Commission (2001a). 
160  Cf. European Commission (2001b). 
161  European Commission (2004a), p. 1. That this might actually be the outcome had already been indicated in 
the first Directive itself as it stated that “once it (the Directive, remark by author) had been put into effect, 
some obstacles to trade in natural gas between Member States will nevertheless remain in place” (European 
Parliament and Council (1998), §32). 
162  Anonymous (2001b). 
163  Cf. European Commission (2000a), p. 21. 
164  Cf. European Parliament and Council (2003). 
165  This also means that neither top nor operational management may have decision-making power over the 
respective other entity. Also the parent company only has limited supervision rights, being able to approve 
the overall financial plan but has no oversight over daily operational figures. An exemption to legal but not 
functional unbundling was granted to DSOs serving less than 100,000 customers. Cf. European Parliament 
and Council (2003), in particular Articles 9 and 13. 
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Gas (ERGEG), as an independent advisory group of representatives from national regulatory 
authorities. While being without any decision-making power, ERGEG proposes non-binding 
instruments to improve the functioning of common interaction.166 Similar voluntary measures 
were prepared by the European Gas Regulatory Forum, also called the Madrid Forum, which 
had been installed in 1999 as a platform for stakeholders to discuss possible self-regulatory 
measures, the 15th Forum having taken place in 2008. In 2002, participants of this forum, for 
example, agreed on non-binding Guidelines for Good Third Party Access Practice for Storage 
System Operators (GGPSSO) that were followed by an amended second set one year later.167 
For technical issues the European Association for the Streamlining of Energy Exchanges 
(EASEE) was formed, offering common business practices for technical harmonisation such 
as for nomination times or gas quality standards in order to improve gas exchange between 
regions with different gas qualities.168 Due to the industry’s low commitment to these rules 
such voluntary agreements “did not turn out to be a success story”169. Thus, in order to further 
improve security of supply, several additional measures were taken. On a regulatory level this 
included an additional directive in 2004, legally demanding Member States to adopt 
transparent and non-discriminatory standards which are compatible with a competitive 
common market. This assigned clear roles and responsibilities to market actors.170 
Additionally, a specific regulation (REG/05/1775) on conditions for the ‘access to the natural 
gas transmission networks’ to complement DIR/03/55 was implemented through a setting of 
harmonised obligatory minimum criteria applicable from July 2006. This included the 
requirement of allocating capacity on a non-discriminatory basis, of congestion management 
based on use-it-or-lose-it (UIOLI) principles,171 of balancing of gas flows on a real-time 
basis,172
                                                 
166  Cf. European Parliament and Council (2003), Article 25(1); Recital 14. ERGEG (2008), p. 80. Monitoring 
results are published on www.energy-regulators.eu. 
 and of publishing technical and commercial capacity data. At the same time it 
granted investors an appropriate rate of return and temporary exemption from TPA for new 
167  For an overview over all events cf. European Commission (2008a). 
168  Cf. European Commission (2007a), pp. 38, 257. 
169  Haase (2008), p. 31. 
170  This also includes regulations to protect household consumers from temporary supply disruptions, 
demanding companies to keep a minimum level of gas in stock. Cf. European Council (2004). 
171  This implies that if capacities are not used by a transport customer the grid operator may allocate capacities 
to third parties. 
172  This means that actual system needs are reflected as balancing, in functioning as a ‘default market’, is 
important for maintaining overall liquidity. Cf. European Commission (2007a), pp. 245-256. 
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infrastructure projects.173 Other measures to enhance security of supply included the 
establishment of associations of TSOs such as Gas Transmission Europe (GTE) and European 
Transmission System Operators (ETSO). In addition to this ERGEG considered creating a 
single European TSO regulated by EU authorities to counteract the existence of several 
different national ones and thereby accelerate the creation of a single European market as well 
as enhance security of supply.174
 
  
Apart from regulatory enforcements and as market opening in itself generally is no guarantee 
for free choice and competition, market liberalisation and integration were seen as having to 
go hand in hand. Thus, incentives were provided, such as in the case of investments into 
strategic infrastructure. In order to ‘energise’ Europe’s infrastructure and enhance security of 
supply across European borders, the Commission launched several different initiatives such as 
the ‘EU-Russia Energy Dialogue’175 or the so called TEN-E priority projects to support the 
development of essential pipeline and LNG projects.176 The amalgamation of measures again 
was to be supported by initiatives such as the Gas Regional Initiative (ERI) which was 
launched by ERGEG in 2006 in order to accelerate the integration of the “juxtaposition of 25 
national markets”177. Another important measure set up to increase transparency and improve 
market functioning was the plan of implementing a ‘Charter of Electricity and Gas 
Customers’ Rights’.178 Similarly decisive were court rulings questioning institutionalised 
structures such as those set by the European Court of Justice on historical bilateral long-term 
contracts which granted priority over other requests for capacity reservation.179
 
 
The year 2007 constituted an important ‘landmark’180
                                                 
173  Cf. European Commission (2007c). 
 for the European gas sector with all 
consumers theoretically being able to freely choose their supplier as demanded by the second 
directive, and despite the advancements made, several inquiries, among these “one of the 
174  Cf. European Commission (2007a), p. 217. 
175  Cf. European Commission (2004b). 
176  Cf. European Commission (2003a); European Commission (2004c). 
177  European Commission (2005a), p. 4. 
178  Cf. European Commission (2005a), p. 14. 
179  Cf. European Commission (2005a), p. 6. 
180  Cf. ERGEG (2008), p. 23. 
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most thorough investigations in the Commission’s history”181, revealed that a “number of 
serious shortcomings”182 continued to exist. Despite these deficiencies and “reluctant to give 
up the fight”183 the Commission remained convinced that there was no alternative to 
liberalisation.184 In order to be more effective though, an enhancement of regulatory measures 
was needed, especially as the autonomy granted to Member States in the transposition to 
national law had resulted in a ‘regulatory vacuum’185, demanding the combination of the 
Commission’s powers under antitrust law, merger and state aid control as well as structural 
and pro-competitive measures. In September 2007, a third liberalisation package was thus 
presented, proposing the sharpening of regulatory measures by escalating vertical dis-
integration to ownership unbundling (OU), the establishment of an independent European 
regulator, the granting of an institutional role to ETSO and GTE to increase cooperation 
between TSOs, the installation and enforcement of binding guidelines to increase 
transparency and improve the storage situation, and the implementation of an Energy 
Consumers’ Charter to enhance consumer protection and prevent energy poverty.186
 
  
Apart from these regulatory directives and initiatives to boost competitiveness and security of 
supply, measures were also taken to achieve the third goal: making the EU’s energy approach 
more environmentally friendly and sustainable. How this was done is laid out in the following 
section. 
                                                 
181  European Commission (2007a), p. 19. These investigations also included ‘surprise inspections’ of companies 
that were suspected of being engaged in collusive arrangements and market foreclosure. Cf. European 
Commission (2007a), pp. 31-32. 
182  European Commission (2007a), p. 328. 
183  Anonymous (2006b), p. 5. 
184  Cf. European Commission (2007d), p. 2. 
185  Cf. European Commission (2007a), p. 31. There was, for instance, evidence that regulators were being 
influenced by political decision-makers or that Member States had abused autonomy to reach different social 
goals. Cf. ERGEG (2008), p. 72. 
186  Cf. European Commission (2007b); European Commission (2007c); European Commission (2007e), p. 10. 
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3.1.2 The ‘Greening Process’ - Towards an Environmentally Friendly 
and Sustainable Energy System 
 
The EU has been pursuing an ambitious plan to become the world leader in renewable energy 
as early as the beginning of the 1990s.187 The first Community strategy to limit carbon 
dioxide (CO2) and enhance energy efficiency had been issued in 1991. Two years later, a 
Council Decision was taken for Member States to achieve a 5% share of the total fuel 
consumption by motor vehicles in biofuels.188 In 1997, a White Paper called ‘Energy for the 
Future – Renewable Energy Sources of Energy – White Paper for a Community Strategy and 
Action Plan’ was issued, promoting renewable energy sources as a major driver to achieve the 
above mentioned goals. Part of this ‘strategic action plan’ was to reach a 12% share of 
renewables in overall consumption by 2012.189 These measures had become particularly 
important with regards to the Kyoto protocol which had been on its way since 1992 (see 
2.3.3). In fact, the EU, which had ratified it in 2002,190 was actually assessed to have been 
“the principal global champion of the Kyoto Protocol”191. In order to achieve the targets set, a 
Council Decision was adopted in 1999 to implement the ‘Energy Framework Programme 
1998-2000’192 which again was followed by the launch of the European Climate Change 
Programme (ECCP) in 2000.193 In addition to this, the notion of efficiency was addressed by 
installing ‘An Action Plan to Improve Energy Efficiency’194
                                                 
187  Cf. European Commission (2001a), p. 11. 
. These specifically energy 
related measures were framed by major initiatives on a supra-European level. The major one 
to be mentioned in this respect is the Lisbon strategy also formulated in the year 2000 as a 
European response to globalisation and a measure to accelerate the creation of a common 
energy market. While Member States initially could not agree on concrete measures, the 
interrelationship of European energy policy with overall European policy also becomes 
apparent here in that the major aim of the Lisbon strategy was to achieve sustainable growth 
188  Cf. European Council (1993). 
189  Cf. European Commission (1997). 
190  Cf. European Council (2002). 
191  Keppler (2009), p. 218. 
192  Cf. European Council (1998). 
193  Cf. European Commission (2000c). 
194  Cf. European Commission (2000b). 
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and make the European Union the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world by 
2010.195 Moreover, while the issue of sustainability had been specifically pointed out for the 
first time in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 with regards to the objective of achieving a 
‘balanced and sustainable development through establishing an internal market without 
barriers’,196 it soon after also found its way into energy policy. In 2001, for instance, the 
Commission presented a Green Paper called ‘A sustainable Europe for a better world: A 
European Union strategy for sustainable development’. In order to change patterns of 
consumer behaviour and make the EU the most energy-efficient region in the world the paper 
emphasised the need for a new ‘intelligent’ approach to energy utilisation, thereby adding an 
environmental dimension to the Lisbon process. The action plan included measures for the 
improvement of energy efficiency and for promoting the production of electricity from 
renewables, requiring Member States to set national indicative targets consistent with the 
Community goal, formulated in a directive on the promotion of electricity production from 
renewable energy sources in 2001. Having to be implemented by Member States by 2003, this 
directive set the target of achieving a share of 22% of the EU-15’s total electricity 
consumption by 2010.197 After the Accession Treaty in 2003 this goal was adjusted to 21% 
for EU-25.198 In the following three years (2002-2004) several directives with concrete 
individual measures were adopted such as on energy savings in buildings in 2002,199 on the 
taxation of energy products in 2003,200 and for the extension of the application of combined 
heat and power generation (CCGT) in 2004.201 Also within this period a Biofuels Directive 
was adopted in 2003 to achieve a share of 2% biofuels in the transportation sector by 2005 
and 5.75% by 2010,202 following a Communication on ‘alternative fuels for road 
transportation and a set of measures to promote the use of biofuels’ which emphasised the 
potential of biofuels as short-term substitute fuels and that of natural gas for the long-term.203
                                                 
195  Cf. European Commission (2007f). 
 
Apart from these directives another major step was taken during this time with the 
196  Cf. European Communities (2002), Article 2. 
197  Cf. European Parliament and Council (2001). 
198  Cf. European Commission (2004b), p. 11. 
199  Cf. European Parliament and Council (2002). 
200  Cf. European Council (2003). This directive enables Member States to reduce tax rates on renewable energy 
sources. 
201  Cf. European Parliament and Council (2004a). 
202  Cf. European Parliament and Council (2003b). 
203  Cf. European Commission (2001c). 
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development of a greenhouse gas (GHG) Emission Trading System (ETS). Based on a draft 
directive in 2002 that was agreed on in July 2003 to officially start in January 2005, it 
imposed objectives to reduce GHG emissions agreed on under the Kyoto Protocol. Under this 
scheme the exceeding of quotas of CO2 emissions implies penalty payments if not traded for 
by certificates. While these allowances were to be allocated for free within the first national 
allocation plan (2005-2007), those for the second period (2008-2012) had to be obtained by 
participating in the emissions trading scheme, and later be bought on the market. This 
directive (Directive 2004/101/EC) was passed in 2004 to enable participants to combine CO2 
emissions trading with credits from Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) projects as defined in the Kyoto protocol.204
 
 
Over the course of time and further driven by ratifying measures of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, which demand an augmented market penetration of renewables and 
an improvement of efficiency, measures on sustainable development were further tightened 
by grouping individual means into specific programmes. In 2003, the EU thus adopted a 
multi-annual programme called ‘Intelligent Energy for Europe 2003-2006’205 which was 
paralleled by the creation of an ‘Intelligent Energy Executive Agency’206 responsible for 
managing the programme and informing the Commission. In order to raise public awareness 
and promote the utilisation of renewable energy, two major campaigns were launched for the 
periods from 1999-2003 and 2004-2007, the latter again emphasising the notion of 
sustainability.207 This was further promoted through the initiation of the ‘Sustainable Energy 
Europe Campaign 2005-2008’ looking for the direct involvement of public actors.208
                                                 
204  Cf. European Parliament and Council (2004b). While the CDM is a market mechanism that offers incentives 
to invest in projects promoting clean energy technologies and efficiency in developing countries, the JI 
instrument allows participants to jointly implement emission reduction measures and use the reduced 
emission units to meet the targets of the Kyoto Protocol. Cf. United Nations (1997), Articles 6, 12, 17. 
 At the 
same time, the years 2005 and 2006 can particularly be characterised as periods for the 
implementation of further regulatory measures. In 2005, a ‘Green Paper on Energy 
Efficiency’ was issued in order to drive further actions by economising 20% of energy 
205  Cf. European Parliament and Council (2003c). 
206  Cf. European Commission (2003b). 
207  In this respect the first promotion was called ‘Campaign for Take-Off for Renewable Energies’, the second 
one ‘Campaign for Sustainable Energy’. Cf. EREC et al. (2004), pp. 5, 39. 
208  Cf. European Commission (2008). 
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utilisation.209 Along with this, additional measures were taken to augment the utilisation of 
renewable energy sources such as the implementation of a ‘Biomass Action Plan’210, the 
adoption of a European ‘Strategy for Biofuels’211, an Eco-Design Directive,212 or of a 
proposal for a ‘European Directive to Promote Renewable Heating and Cooling’213. The year 
2005 also marked the revival process of the Lisbon strategy which was finally signed in 2007 
to enter into force in January 2009. The Lisbon strategy, which includes a special chapter on 
‘Energy and Climate’, emphasises the importance of tackling climate change by applying a 
mix of regulatory measures and instruments, subsidies, tax incentives and market-based 
instruments such as completing gas and electricity liberalisation. This would further increase 
competition and emissions trading to generate a positive impact on overall macro-economic 
development.214 Also the Spring European Council of 2006 on Growth and Job Strategies 
pointed out that the creation of an efficient and integrated energy policy was ‘at the heart of 
the Commission’s priorities’.215 One year later this was followed by the ‘Competitiveness and 
Innovation Framework Programme 2007-2013’ which included further measures to enhance 
efficiency, such as a ‘National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency’, a community energy tax 
framework and, as a launch pad for international agreement, a 20% CO2 reduction target by 
2020.216 Furthermore, a ‘European strategy plan for energy technologies’ was passed.217
 
 
At the same time and in view of the fact that “Europe has entered into a new energy era”218, 
facing not only European but global “energy challenges of the 21st century”219
                                                 
209  Cf. European Commission (2005b). 
, demands were 
made for a more comprehensive approach towards a ‘true European Energy Policy’ and the 
creation of a ‘European Energy Vision’ as “the idea of maintaining 27 separate European mini 
210  Cf. European Commission (2005c). 
211  Cf. European Commission (2006a). 
212  Cf. European Parliament and Council (2005). 
213  Cf. EREC (2005). 
214  Cf. European Commission (2007f). 
215  Cf. European Commission (2007g). The energy sector is a substantial economic driver within the EU, its 
21,500 enterprises generating about €240 bn of gross value added, corresponding to 4.7% of the wealth 
created by the EU-27 non-financial business sectors. Cf. European Commission (2007h), pp. 229-245. 
216  Cf. European Parliament and Council (2006). 
217  Cf. European Commission (2007i). Also cf. European Commission (2007j). 
218  European Commission (2006b), p. 3. 
219  European Commission (2006c), p. 1. 
Chapter III: Elemental Change of the European Gas Industry 46 
markets in energy is absurd (…) and dangerous”220. While the legitimate right of Member 
States to follow their own external relations to securing energy supply and to choosing their 
domestic energy mix was not to be questioned, a common approach on energy issues was 
seen as a declaration of the energy sector’s strategic importance. As an expression of this the 
‘Green Paper on Strategy’ was adopted in 2006 which established the three main pillars of 
European energy policy goals as still valid today:221 Competitiveness, security of supply and 
sustainability. In order to reach these objectives, several concrete measures were proposed: 
The completion of the internal gas and electricity market, the diversification of sources of 
supply (including an EU-Africa strategy and the support of Norway in developing new 
sources in the high north of Europe), the dealing with climate change, the implementation of a 
strategic energy technology plan as well as of a common external energy policy. After a first 
‘Strategic Energy Review’ these were further substantiated one year later through an Action 
Plan on Energy Policy for Europe within which the EU committed itself to the 20-20-20 
targets, i.e. decreasing GHG emissions by 20% while improving energy efficiency by 20% 
and increasing the share of renewables in the consumption mix by 20% to be implemented 
through an ‘Energy and Climate Package’.222 In 2008, a proposal was then made for the 
enhancement of the Renewables Directive in place since 2001 (see above) to further tighten 
existing regulations and integrate such as the above mentioned measures to boost the 
application of renewables.223 Similar developments can be observed in the transportation 
sector where measures were extended for the ‘greening’ of transport.224
                                                 
220  Barroso (2006), p. 3. 
 A second review 
focussed on the aspect of supply security, recommending the adoption of an EU Energy 
Security and Solidarity Action Plan with measures to diversify supply sources and 
infrastructure, to improve external energy relations, to install strategic gas supplies and crisis 
response mechanisms, and to promote new technologies such as Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS) plants. The latter would allow the environmentally friendly recycling of carbon dioxide 
221  Cf. European Commission (2006b). 
222  Cf. European Commission (2007k). 
223  Cf. European Commission (2008b). 
224  Cf. European Commission (2008c). 
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emissions from fossil power stations by separating the CO2 during the combustion process and 
transporting it via special pipelines for capturing it in underground storages.225
 
 
 
3.1.3 Assessing European Energy Policy Change – A Complex and 
Interrelated Process 
 
After having depicted the development of changes to European Energy Policy the complexity 
and magnitude becomes apparent. In order to provide an overview, the main changes have 
been laid out in the following illustration. 
                                                 
225  Cf. European Commission (2008b). 
Chapter III: Elemental Change of the European Gas Industry 48 
Figure 6:226
 
  Development of European Energy Policy  
 
                                                 
226  Own figure based on depictions above. 
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Apart from providing an overview this illustration also shows the high degree of 
interrelatedness that is characterised by mutual reinforcement and depicts also trade-offs 
between the three goals. While the substitution of fossil fuels with more environmentally 
friendly natural gas, for instance, supports the strive for sustainability, it at the same time 
increases consumption of natural gas and hence import dependency. This again threatens 
security of supply. Achieving more competitive markets on the other hand augments security 
of supply as investments are directed to places of demand where prices are higher. Concrete 
measures such as improving efficiency on the other hand decrease demand for energies like 
natural gas and thus enhance security of supply while at the same time reducing emissions. 
This supports the aim of increasing sustainability and achieving an internal market as 
companies are required to become more competitive. The interdependency of these issues has, 
in fact, over the course of time come to be referred to as the ‘Triangle of European Energy 
Policy’ with the initial notion of ‘Environmental Protection’ according to the development 
illustrated above having been replaced by the more encompassing term ‘sustainability’. This 
is illustrated in the figure below. Instead of placing each goal at one tip of the triangle, they 
have been depicted as intertwining and overlapping circles within the triangle to indicate the 
above mentioned interdependencies. 
 
Figure 7:227
 
  Triangle of European Energy Policy 
 
 
How the developments influenced market structures is analysed in the following section. 
                                                 
227  Own figure. 
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3.2 Changes in the European Gas Market Structure 
 
3.2.1 Changes along the Industry Value-Chain 
 
3.2.1.1 Development of Consumption Patterns 
 
As indicated (see figure 4), natural gas consumption has continued to increase over time, 
having developed from 435 bcm in 1997 to 520 bcm in 2007, to account for nearly one 
quarter in the EU’s energy mix. The largest area with around 35% of natural gas consumption 
again is the residential and commercial sector, followed by the industrial sector with about 
33% and the transportation segment with still less than 5%. In addition, when comparing final 
energy consumption, natural gas is the second most important energy source, accounting for 
24% behind oil with 41%. Electricity accounts for 21%, renewables and solid fuels for 5% 
each, and derived heat and industrial waste for 4%.228 The largest growth driver in the past 
decade however has been the increased application of natural gas as an environmentally 
friendly energy source in electricity generation such as in CCGT plants,229 fuelled by the 
energy policy objective for environmental sustainability as laid out above. The application of 
natural gas for power generation increased immensely by more than 130% between 1996 and 
2007, while that of coal and nuclear energy declined. Today, gas-fired power plants already 
produce 20% of the EU-27 electricity, compared with 7.5% in 1990.230 At the same time this 
development significantly impacts on total EU natural gas consumption in the future. It is 
generally expected that demand will increase due to natural gas’ environmentally friendly 
characteristics and new technologies such as GTL (also see chapter II). Nevertheless, 
differences exist regarding the extent of this growth.231
                                                 
228  Own calculations based on data from Eurostat (2010). 
 Depending on the study looked at, 
229  Cf. Seeliger (2004), p. 25; EIA (2005), pp. 41-42; Bräuninger/ Schröer (2007), pp. 1-2. Some studies project 
that around 40% of future EU gas demand is driven by demand from the electricity sector. Cf. Observatoire 
Mediterraneen de l’Energie (2001), p. 2; European Commission (2008e), p. 56. 
230  Own calculations based on data from Eurostat (2010). 
231  Despite the fact that demand forecasts are generally difficult to make and prone to vagueness due to the 
complexity of interrelatedness (cf. Eckerle et al. (1992), figure 1-1; Heß (2005), p. 2), the uncertainty of its 
drivers and the sheer amount of studies available, all including different factors and methods of evaluation 
(cf. Götz (2007), p. 2; Hirschl et al. (2007), p. 2; Beilharz (2008)), some estimations have nevertheless been 
presented here in order to give at least an indication of possible developments. For an extensive overview 
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experts forecast an increase of EU natural gas demand between 700 bcm by 2020 and 800 
bcm by 2030,232 and in case of high growth of even more than 900 bcm.233 This implies a 
growth rate of more than 2% annually. Analyses commissioned by the European Commission 
expect the share of natural gas to have reached around 30% of gross inland consumption by 
2030.234
 
 
 
3.2.1.2 Development of Production and Sourcing Patterns 
 
In contrast to the increase in demand, indigenous production of natural gas has been declining 
since 2004. This can be explained by the fact that the U.K. turned from an exporter into a net 
importer of natural gas in that time.235 Apart from reducing the EU’s indigenous production 
volumes, this also means that the U.K. will absorb natural gas flows which would have 
otherwise gone to the Continent, especially those coming from nearby and reliable sources 
like Norway. In fact, gas fields in the North Sea already are mature and the potential for 
extraction in the future is restricted as the majority of remaining gas deposits either is too 
small or too remote to be viable for economic production, or is even restricted due to 
ecological concerns.236 On top of this, the necessary infrastructure system is lacking which 
would be needed to bring such gas to shore.237 Such impediments are expected to turn 
Denmark and the Netherlands into net importers between 2015 and 2020.238
                                                                                                                                                        
over expected developments in Europe cf. Mantzos et al. (2003) and for Europe in a global context cf. 
Uyterlinde et al. (2004). For an overview over relevant studies on global forecasts cf. Brand (2005), pp. 209-
213. For examples of historical developments of relationship between these forces cf. Bourdaire (2003); 
Doucet (2004). 
 The amount of 
proved natural gas has been continuously declining over the past years and when again 
comparing the EU’s gross inland consumption of natural gas with indigenous production, the 
232  Cf. Bothe/ Seeliger (2005), pp. 3-4. 
233  Cf. Hirschl et al. (2007), p. 3. In comparing different studies several authors have shown that foreceasts for 
2030 may diverge up to 350 bcm. Cf. Götz (2007), pp. 2-4; Hirschl et al. (2007), p. 2. 
234  Cf. Mantzos et al. (2003), p. 150; Eurogas (2007), p. 2. Figures are for the baseline scenario. 
235  Cf. Eurostat data. Since then, the ‘drying up’ of British gas production and its consequences has also been an 
ever-emerging topic in literature and press. Cf. Guizot (1998), p. 32; Anonymous (2006c), p. 3; Faye (2006); 
Wright (2006); Anonymous (2007b), pp. 35-36; Minsaas/ Strowger (2008); Anonymous (2008a), p. 47; 
Anonymous (2009a), p. 25; Otzen (2009a), p. 5; Otzen (2010a), p. 4. 
236  Cf. Kalkoffen (2005). 
237  Cf. IEA (2004), p. 154; Seeliger (2004), pp. 10, 20; Anonymous (2007b), p. 36. 
238  Cf. Dronnikov et al. (2003), p. 18. 
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supply gap has become larger over the years and can be expected to increase even further in 
the future when comparing forecasts on projected consumption and production (see figure 8 
below). 
 
Figure 8:239
 
  Development of gross inland consumption and indigenous production of 
natural gas in EU-27 from 1997 to 2007 and future forecasts (in bcm) 
 
 
 
This development again implies that natural gas import dependency has continuously grown, 
having increased from 45.6% in 1998 to 54% in 2004 and 62.3% in 2008 (see figure below). 
And as already shown in figure 5 above, this trend is expected to continue in the future. 
                                                 
239  Own figure, for period 1997-2007 based on data from Eurostat, for forecasts from Observatoire 
Mediterraneen de l’Energie (2001, p. 2) projects 777 bcm for EU-30 until 2020; IEA (2004), pp. 154-155. 
Figures on forecasts have been aggregated and refer to EU-25, EU-27 or EU-30 but here have been taken as 
an indicator for a possible overall development. 
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Figure 9:240
 
  Development of natural gas import dependency of EU-27 
 
 
 
With regards to the origin of supplies Russia, Norway and Algeria have also remained the 
three principal importers in 2007, accounting for a share of 43%, 29% and 18%, respectively. 
The remaining 10% is covered by new suppliers who have been developed to increase 
security of supply. The largest share (6%) is held by Nigeria which also accounts for the 
steepest increase in the past few years, followed by Qatar (3%) and Trinidad &Tobago 
(1%),241 a development which can be explained by the fact that these sources supply LNG as 
is enlarged on below. Despite the slight diversification of supply sources the aspect of 
geographical location has remained a critical issue as relevant resources are all concentrated 
in a certain geographic area which has come to be known as the ‘Strategic Energy Ellipse’, 
characterising the region stretching from the Caspian Basin to the Persian Gulf States where 
40% of the world’s natural gas reserves are located. This fact has been assessed as “one of the 
most significant geo-strategic realities of our time”242
 
. 
When looking at future projections on import sources to the EU, studies show that Russia, 
Norway and Algeria are expected to remain the major suppliers until at least 2030. In fact, the 
reserve base in Russia at the moment is acknowledged as the world’s largest, the Russian Far 
                                                 
240  Own figure based on data from Eurostat (2010). 
241  Own calculations based on data from Eurostat (2010). Data for EU-27 for the year 2007. 
242  Kemp/ Harkavy (1997), p. 111. For an illustration see p. 113. 
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East and Eastern Siberia fields alone are estimated to hold nearly 6 tcm,243 and favourable 
scenarios exist for production levels of 700 bcm annually.244 Norway again, having only used 
little gas itself, has generally increased domestic production,245 and is projected to remain a 
relatively stable supplier in the future. At the same time it has to be considered that recently, 
due to increasing demand from industry, capacity constraints have arisen. This, in addition to 
the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol to reduce CO2 emissions, may lead Norway to build 
new gas fired power plants which will increase domestic gas consumption while reducing 
amounts for future exports. Such issues again make supplies from other sources even more 
crucial for the EU. While new gas discoveries have mainly been made during oil production, 
new natural gas fields have recently been found off the coasts of Argentina, Brazil and 
Israel.246 The world’s largest region of supply in the future though will be the Middle East 
where exporters such as Iran and Libya but also Egypt, United Arab Emirates or 
Turkmenistan are gaining importance.247 Currently, the world’s quantitatively most extensive 
project to develop future supplies is that of the giant South Pars field in the Iranian Persian 
Gulf. The fact that Iranian reserves will eventually find their way to the world market despite 
political issues has thus been stated as “far from inevitable”248. It is estimated that Iran will 
have the highest production growth rate in the future, turning from a net importer in 2004 to 
the second-largest net exporter and becoming the second-largest pipeline exporter by 2030.249
                                                 
243  Cf. Khartukov/ Starostina (2002), p. 208. 
 
244  Cf. Mastepanov (2005), p. 10. An annual production rate of even 800 bcm has been claimed possible by 
Gazprom (cf. Wüst (2007), p. 148) and also Gazprom’s Vice president Medwedew claimed that Gazprom 
would deliver as much gas as demanded by the market’ (cf. Hirn/ Student (2006), p. 57). These figures 
probably have to be taken with care as presented by Russian officials interested in demonstrating Russia’s 
future production capacity following growing concerns of its customers regarding Russia’s, respectively 
Gazprom’s, ability and political willingness to make the necessary investments to develop fields and produce 
sufficient volumes for export. Cf. Bourdaire (2003), p. 28; Otzen (2007a), p. 5; Voswinkel (2008), p. 21. 
245  Cf. Rosendahl (2008), pp. 5-8; Anonymous (2009b). 
246  Cf. IEA (2004), p. 135. More recently: Anonymous (2008b); Engdahl (2009); Heumann (2009). 
247  Cf. IEA (2004), p. 141; Bothe/ Seeliger (2005), pp. 3-5; IEA (2009), pp. 38-39. 
248  Kemp/ Harkavy (1997), p. 123. 
249  Cf. Seeliger (2006); Brüggmann (2009), p. 2. 
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3.2.1.3 Analysis of Midstream Activities 
 
Apart from the diversification of sources of origin a change can also be identified with 
regards to the means of importing the gas. In this respect, transportation via LNG has gained 
increasing importance. In the beginning, when still in its infant state, it was merely used to 
supplement local gas supplies and was regarded as gas for niche markets.250 By now, LNG 
has become “a major international source of gas supply in its own right”251. The growing 
importance for European supply can also be derived from the fact that LNG imports have 
nearly doubled from 28 to 52 bcm between 2000 and 2006, characterising an increase from 
6.7% to nearly 10% of total gas demand. The two main recipients of LNG in Europe are 
Spain and France, accounting for more than 50% and 30% of import capacities, 
respectively.252 These are followed a long way behind the third and fourth largest importers 
Belgium and Portugal, both receiving less than 6% of LNG supplies together. While LNG is 
not expected to replace pipeline gas, substantial growth is forecast in the future, showing 
supplies to have amounted to 100-142 bcm by 2010 and 190-240 bcm by 2030, depending on 
the study looked at. This would imply a share of nearly 32% of LNG of total gas demand.253 
Experts believe that the most important European LNG import market in the future will be 
Great Britain, taking into account that indigenous resources are declining (see above) and 
increasing demand cannot be covered by pipeline supplies alone.254 Newcomers for LNG 
demand can also be expected to develop within Europe to diversify away from main pipeline 
gas exporters. A similar growth scenario in form of a ‘LNG Revolution’255
                                                 
250  Cf. Odell (1992a), p. 55; Rüster/ Neumann (2006), p. 11. 
 can also be 
observed on the world market as LNG is becoming a global commodity. It is expected to 
251  Peebles (1980), p. 2. This development was especially driven by technical advancements and capacity 
increases of tanker size, making LNG deliveries more economical. While the standard size of LNG vessels 
currently in operations is 145,000 cubic metres, tankers of 200,000 or even 265,000 cubic metres volume are 
already being planned (compare with chapter II). For details on technical and economical developments of 
the LNG chain see Chabrelie (2003), p. 3; EIA (2003), p. 42; Jensen (2003), p. 3; Kessler et al. (2005); 
Seeliger (2005), p. 10; Sietz (2006), p. T1; Rüster/ Neumann (2006), pp. 7-10; Sanders (2006), p. 25; Krude 
et al. (2007), p. 24. 
252  This ranking had changed from 2001 to 2002 when Spain became Europe’s largest LNG importer before 
France. Own calculations based on data on LNG movements from BP (2003) and BP (2004). Also cf. 
Seeliger (2005), p. 10; European Commission (2007a), pp. 261-270; Krude et al. (2007), p. 22. 
253  Own calculations based on data from Seeliger (2004), p. 17; Bothe/ Seeliger (2005), p. 6; European 
Commission (2007a), pp. 262-263, 269; BP (2009). 
254  Cf. Otzen (2005), p. 11. 
255  Cf. Jensen (2003). 
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account for more than one third of total transportation with a growing number of participating 
nations and so turn into an increasingly interconnected business.256 For the European gas 
market this again increases global competition for LNG supplies. Efforts have thus been made 
to further diversify sources of LNG supply. While Algeria accounted for the largest share of 
European LNG imports in 2002, it was overtaken by Nigeria as the largest importer in 2008. 
Today, both account for nearly a third of import volumes. Qatar, Egypt as well as Trinidad & 
Tobago follow with a share between 12% and 16% each. Other exporters to the EU, although 
marginal, are Libya, Oman and Equatorial Guinea with less than a 5% share.257 At the same 
time, production is controlled by major nationalised LNG companies, while imports are 
dominated by oil and gas majors.258
 
 
 
Pipeline infrastructure 
 
Despite this diversification of sources and ways of transportation, the issue of geographical 
location remains critical in the future, making gas “politically and commercially different”259. 
Access to resources is becoming more and more dependent on geopolitics as the most 
hydrocarbon-rich countries have proven to be the most restrictive with regards to producing 
these supplies and accommodating private investment.260 Moreover, as natural gas transports 
cross more and more national borders and “hydrocarbon molecules are increasingly asked for 
their passports”261 the aim of ensuring a secure gas supply becomes more prone to 
uncertainty. Energy has always been a highly political subject with fossil fuels having been 
used as a political weapon of resource nationalists and terrorists in the past.262
                                                 
256  Cf. Jensen (2003), p. 10; Parker (2006), p. 6; Rüster/ Neumann (2006), p. 3. Also cf. Seeliger (2006). 
 The politisation 
of energy markets has become increasingly stronger though with growing global demand 
257  Cf. European Commission (2007a), pp. 262, 265 and own calculations based on data from BP (2009), p. 30. 
258  Cf. Jensen (2003), pp. 4, 23; Anonymous (2005a); Kessler et al. (2005), pp. 12, 16; Otzen (2005), p. 11; 
European Commission (2007a), pp. 88, 268; Holz (2007), p. 19. 
259  Estrada et al. (1988), p. 103. 
260  Cf. Foss (2005), pp. 115-116; Haltermann/ Pfeil (2006), p. 10; Thumann (2008), p. 19. 
261  As expressed by Jacques de Jong, an advisor to the Dutch government. Cf. de Jong/ Liao (2006), p. 1. 
262  Cf. Kemp/ Harkavy (1997); Jensen (2003), pp. 29-30; Seeliger (2004), pp. 19-20; Dorian et al. (2005), pp. 
41-44; Anonymous (2006d), pp. 12-13; Anonymous (2007c); Chevalier (2009), p. 38. For an overview of 
examples of oil supply disruptions as a consequence of different crises cf. van Bohemen (2008), p. 16. 
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prone to leading to fights, even war, for natural gas resources.263 By now, the “annual gas 
squabble”264 between Russia and Ukraine (see above) has become something of a “Christmas 
ritual”265. Even Norway, although not part of the EU, has implemented EU energy policy 
regulation and is perceived as a European supplier. It has also recently been criticised for 
looking to sell its gas to the higher-priced U.S. market, and although Norway’s responsible 
ministers guaranteed that they would not to use gas as a political weapon and so remain a 
reliable partner,266 an element of uncertainty remains for European importers. Moreover, 
while traditional suppliers have retained their bargaining power (see above), newcomers are 
characterised by a large degree of government involvement, monopoly power and the 
dominance of oil and gas majors.267
 
  
Against the background of these developments the concept of storage and the development of 
trading possibilities have become particularly critical as is laid out next. 
 
 
Storage and trading activities 
 
Security of supply storage has become an increasingly important business, turning from an 
instrument to balance seasonal demand and supply fluctuations (see chapter II) to a strategic 
asset to react to short-term changes, as for example created by increasing trade, and for 
hedging against price volatility.268 Following the demand by ERGEG to facilitate the trade of 
storage capacities (see above), an internet based online trading platform was recently 
installed, enabling storage operators to offer their unused storage capacity and sell it on the 
market for additional profit. Buyers again can purchase missing volumes to become more 
flexible.269
                                                 
263  Cf. Schürmann (2004), p. 11; Umbach (2005); Kneissl (2006); Brüggmann (2007), p. 8; Ginsburg (2007), 
pp. 32-33; Hecking/ Proissl (2008), p. 23; Herbermann/ Rinke (2008), p. 3. 
 At the same time regulations on security of supply and liberalisation have also 
264  Anonymous (2009a), p. 25. 
265  Anonymous (2009c), p. 12. 
266  Cf. Rinke (2006), p. 3; Ertel (2007), p. 88. 
267  Cf. Jensen (2003), pp. 4, 23; Anonymous (2005a); Kessler et al. (2005), pp. 12, 16; Otzen (2005), p. 11; 
European Commission (2007a), p. 88; Holz (2007), p. 19; Röller et al. (2007), pp. 6-7. 
268  Cf. Parker (2006), p. 6; Deschkan (2008), p. 23. 
269  Cf. Dunker (2007), p. 9. 
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affected the way that gas is exchanged on the market. Initially executed mainly in form of 
bilateral long-term contracts (also see chapter II), spot trade was used as a bargaining tool or 
last resort to secure market share of gas in difficult segments.270 Over the course of time 
independent spot markets began to develop in form of hubs or exchanges where physical 
natural gas as well as financial products could be traded, thus functioning as a distribution 
link between the upstream and the downstream business.271 In the beginning however, 
volumes traded on hubs as well as exchanges remained relatively low. The Commission 
therefore announced investigations as to whether new entrants were disadvantaged while its 
efforts to free volumes through gas release programmes were beginning to draw interest by 
pure trading companies to become active in this segment.272 Particularly recently, the 
development of trading activities increased at a pace not thought possible shortly before.273
 
 
This also fuelled the competitive situation which is analysed in the following section. 
 
3.2.2 Changes in the Competitive Situation 
 
3.2.2.1 Development of the Degree of Market Opening and Switching 
Behaviour 
 
Following the gradual introduction of regulatory requirements as laid out above, the average 
degree of market opening steadily increased over time, having reached 50% after the 
implementation of the first and nearly 75% after that of the second directive.274
                                                 
270  Cf. Estrada et al. (1988), p. 245. 
 Despite this 
progress, assessments revealed that competition initially remained weak and that TPA had 
only increased by 3%. It showed, for example, that although several companies were 
identified as having become interested in becoming active in the European gas industry 
during the first phase of market opening, the majority of attempts to enter markets in reality 
271  Cf. European Commission (2007a), pp. 33-34; Ristola (2008), p. 6. 
272  Cf. DRI-WEFA (2001), pp. 67-68; European Commission (2005a), pp. 10-12, 20-25; European Commission 
(2007a). 
273  Cf. ERGEG (2008), pp. 18-22; Bruce (2009), p. 1; ERGEG (2009), pp. 5, 12-13. 
274  The degree of market opening is measured as the percentage of total natural gas consumption of customers 
who can choose their supplier. Figures are for EU-15. Cf. Goerten/ Clement (2005), pp. 1-2. 
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finally failed.275 Also the option of changing suppliers was not extensively taken advantage 
of. Moreover, apart from initially being only possible for eligible customers, many players 
were also bound to long-term contracts. This, as well as the fact that the new tenders offered 
had the similar disadvantageous terms and thus provided no benefits, had a “chilling effect on 
customers’ switching behaviour”276. In fact, between 2000 and 2001 only around 17% of 
consumers changed their supplier.277 Over the course of time however, along with the 
intensifying regulatory measures on liberalisation, competition started to increase as 
incumbents attempted to enter each other’s territories. Additionally, foreign producers such as 
Gazprom,278 regional players, oil majors, specialised suppliers such as LNG and storage 
operators or renewables-based providers began to expand along the gas value-chain.279 Apart 
from such entrants from energy-related areas, competitive threats were also increasing from 
actors of non-energy related businesses such as financial investors or agrarian companies who 
were becoming interested in buying assets such as grid infrastructure, biogas production 
facilities, or in engaging in trading.280 Technology companies like Siemens, General Electric, 
or Bosch again began to engage in green energy production, steel companies in the midstream 
infrastructure business, and media companies or even churches in the downstream segment, 
selling gas.281 At the same time competitive intensity was further increased through a change 
of consumers’ switching behaviour which only remained rigid in the case of final consumers 
where less than 10% of EU-25 consumers changed their supplier as market opening had 
started later.282 By 2008 overall switching rates had reached 19%.283
                                                 
275  Cf. DRI-WEFA (2001), pp. 28-31; Immenga et al. (2003), p. 37; European Commission (2005a). 
  
276  European Commission (2007a), p. 239. 
277  Cf. European Commission (2005a), pp. 29-31; European Commission (2005d), p. 4. 
278  Cf. Heinrich (2003), pp. 46-66; Schaudwet/ Ginsburg (2006), pp. 59-66. 
279  Cf. Kempkens (2009), p. 82. While by 1997 U.S. trading company Enron was already waiting to ‘jump’ into 
the Continental European market from its subsidiary in the U.K. also Shell and Gazprom had formed an 
alliance for joint activities not only in oil and gas but also related energy businesses. Cf. Radetzki (1999), pp. 
22-23. By 2005 Shell again had become a market leader for LNG transportation while Statoil, Norwegian’s 
largest oil producer, began to export LNG from its Snohvit plant, with annual production volumes already 
being sold for the next 30 years to the U.S., France, and Spain. Cf. Focht (2005), p. 14; Ristau (2006), p. 9. 
American oil producer Chevron again is planning to build LNG facilities in Australia (cf. Schmidt-Carré 
(2008)), thus presenting a competitor to European incumbents from a global dimension. 
280  Cf. Anonymous (2006e), p. 18; Hegel/ Schulte-Beckhausen (2007), p. 30; Sandhövel (2007), pp. 34-35; 
Katzensteiner (2008), p. 183. 
281  Cf. Seiwert (2008). 
282  Cf. European Commission (2005d), p. 3; Goerten/ Clement (2006), p. 6. 
283  Cf. ERGEG (2009), p. 26. 
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3.2.2.2 Development of Price Structure 
 
This course of development again also affected price setting in the industry. While there had 
been a drop in prices directly after the release of the first liberalisation directive, levels had 
risen again by the year 2000, and since then, development has been characterised by a 
continuous upward trend. A brief drop can only be found for industrial consumers for the 
years 2002-2004 as a consequence of increased switching rates and augmented gas-to-gas 
competition.284 The renewed upward trend since 2004 despite further liberalisation measures 
can be explained by the major upsurge of oil prices which fed through to gas markets. In fact, 
over the course of time, prices for industrial consumers grew by 127%, those of households 
by nearly 70% since 1997.285 This, and the suspicion that in cases of declining oil prices such 
trends in many cases were not passed on to consumers but were retained as substantial 
windfall profits by gas companies, significantly contributed to an increasingly negative image 
and growing public attention to the behaviour of incumbents.286 The increased dissatisfaction 
particularly encouraged energy-intensive and private consumers to produce their own energy 
in decentralised facilities, and switch to other energy sources such as wooden pellets for 
heating, or even to not pay their gas bill.287 Similarly, distributors and industrial consumers 
were beginning to join forces in industrial buying consortia to put suppliers under pressure 
and so augment buying power.288 Also the European Commission became increasingly 
concerned about price developments and announced that in cases of finding proof for 
corporate anti-competitive behaviour it would not “hesitate to take the appropriate 
remedies”289. Competition commissioner Kroes, for example, proposed a new directive that 
would allow consumer associations to file collective redresses in case consumers were forced 
to pay excessive prices due to illegal cartel agreements,290
                                                 
284  See above as well as EC (2004), pp. 8-9. 
 a plan that could be expected to 
have drastic consequences for energy companies. 
285  Cf. Eurostat (2010). 
286  Cf. European Commission (2007e), p. 38; Anonymous (2008c); Nikionok-Ehrlich/ Focht (2009), p. 1. 
287  Cf. Schuh (2006). 
288  Cf. DRI-WEFA (2001), pp. 66-67. 
289  European Commission (2005a), p. 11. 
290  Cf. Berschens (2009). 
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3.2.2.3 Development of Substitute Products 
 
At the same time consumer behaviour not only began to change because of higher gas prices 
but also because of paying more attention to and putting more weight on ecological issues and 
sustainability, a trend to be observed on a European as well as on a global level.291 Due to the 
perception that consequences of climate change are going to become one of the, if not the 
‘biggest challenge mankind has ever faced’292, this development has become more and more 
visible in consumers’ preference for environmentally friendly sources of energy production. 
While this also applies to natural gas (see chapter II), it has been nuclear power and renewable 
energy which have become a substitute threat to natural gas, particularly in electricity 
generation. Their share in the energy mix already accounts for 14% and 7%, respectively.293
Especially nuclear energy has been projected to grow strongly worldwide.
  
294 But also coal, 
with relatively abundant and cheap resources, is increasingly becoming a serious competitive 
threat, particularly as progress is being made on technological developments such as carbon 
capture storage (CCS).295
                                                 
291  Cf. Losse et al. (2007), pp. 27-30; Bergius (2008a). On a global level there are publications such as the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published regularly by the United Nations, the ‘Stern 
Review on climate change’ which claims that 1-2% spending of global Gross Domestic Product are required 
to avoid a seriously harming increase in temperatures (cf. Stern (2006); Stern (2009)), other climate reports 
(cf. Rahmstorf/ Schellnhuber (2006), or numerous press articles and related publications (cf. Dincer (1999); 
Beder (2002); al-Khatib (2004); Anonymous (2006f), pp. 1-24; Anonymous (2007d), pp. 1-32; Anonymous 
(2007e), p. 9; Bethge/ Wüst (2007), pp. 86-89; Losse et al. (2007), pp. 27-30; Bergius (2008a). Moreover, 
following the political conflicts and wars having arisen for fossil resources (see above), this trend has also 
been fuelled by publications promoting peace by using renewable energy (cf. Alt (2002); Scheer (2005)). For 
discussions on the Stern Report cf. Mendelsohn (2006/ 2007); Kümmel (2007). 
 In the heating segment again, a major threat of substitution comes 
from manufactured gases. Although not expected to replace natural gas volumes in total and 
despite having to be adjusted to natural gas quality in a relatively costly and time-consuming 
process to be fed into the grid, the impact of such produced gases is believed to be substantial, 
especially due to the advantage of being able to be produced decentralised close to areas of 
292  Cf. Vorholz (2007a), p. 23. Translation by author. 
293  Data from Eurostat (2010). 
294  Cf. Borger (2005), p. 12; Anonymous (2004a), p. 13; EIA (2005), pp. 72-73; Anonymous (2005b), pp. 48-
50; IEA (2006), p. 4; Berschens (2007a), p. 2; Falksohn (2007), pp. 104-105; Götz (2007), pp. 4-5; Student 
(2007), pp. 84-90; Seiwert (2008), pp. 51-64; Flauger/ Hellmann (2009). Currently there are 439 nuclear 
plants in operation globally, further 68 are being planned. Cf. BMWi (2009). In 1997 in contrast, in view of 
the opening up of electricity markets and the increasing importance of natural gas, there were even thoughts 
whether nuclear power had a future within the EU. Cf. Waeterloos (1997), pp. 13-14. 
295  For substitution in electricity generation cf. Wright (2006). 
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consumption.296 In this respect biogas, also referred to as ‘green gas’297, has gained market 
share. This has especially been fuelled by the formulation of a European Biogas Strategy as 
otherwise “nobody would dream of “thinning” high-quality gas with elaborately compressed 
air for no good reason”298. Between 1990 and 2005, biogas production volumes grew more 
than six fold, between 2004 and 2005 alone by about 15%.299 As most European countries 
provide attractive reimbursements, biogas becomes economical for application in electricity 
generation, in gas-fired household appliances in form of Synthetic Natural Gas (SNG), or as a 
fuel in the transportation sector in form of Biomass-to-Liquid (BTL). Further growth is 
therefore expected in the future.300 Experts claim that the total substitution of European gas by 
biogas is technically possible by 2020-2030 and can cover up to 20% of worldwide energy 
demand by then.301 This advancement is further promoted by the fact that several biogas 
companies and respective associations are lobbying for increased political support and public 
attention.302 Also other substitute manufactured gases such as waste, sewage and pit gas, and 
non-conventional gases like methane gases extracted from coal beds or shale formations and 
tight sands, i.e. low-permeability sandstone, started to gain foothold in the energy mix.303 The 
producers of manufactured gases thus became competitors to the incumbents.304 Despite 
public claims for more sustainable forms of energy production there has been a growing local 
resistance by consumers to new projects in form of a ‘not-in-my-backyard’ attitude which 
often hinders the implementation of such projects.305
 
  
Having laid out the change of European Energy Policy and market structures the implication 
of these developments is concluded on next. 
 
                                                 
296  Cf. Anonymous (2006g), p. 15; Anonymous (2007f), p. 11; Köpke (2007a), p. 22; Schroeter (2007a), p. 4. 
297  Cf. Dronnikov et al. (2003), p. 73. 
298  Rott (2004), p. 10. High-quality gas in this respect refers to natural gas. 
299  Cf. Eurostat (2007), pp. 15-16. 
300  At the same time biogas production is dependent on prices of raw materials which have recently also been 
subject to increases. Cf. Pecka (2008b), p. 27. 
301  Cf. Wuppertal Institut et al. (2006); Klein (2007), p. B12; Köpke (2007b), p. 15; Thrän et al. (2007); Vorholz 
(2007b), pp. 26-27. 
302  Cf. Vorholz (2007b), p. 26; Feist (2008), p. 16; Focht (2009a), p. 9; Pecka (2009a), p. 17. 
303  Cf. Adelman/ Lynch (2002); IEA (2002), p .115; IEA (2004), p. 139; Seeliger (2004), p. 11; IEA (2006), p. 
116; Schacht (2007), p. W1; Anonymous (2008d), p. 4; Kempkens (2008), pp. 78-81; Peer (2009). 
304  Cf. Köpke (2008), p. 20. 
305  Cf. IEA (2006), pp. 121-122. 
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3.3 Implications of Change for the Behaviour of Incumbents 
active in the European Gas Industry 
 
Fundamentally, the analysis above has revealed that the gas market environment has 
significantly changed in the past decade. These changes were not only of different type with 
various sources of origin but have also taken place in different areas. Liberalisation and 
deregulation, as ‘backdrops of tremendous change’306, have opened up former rigid market 
structures by breaking up the value-chain of vertically integrated incumbents, tearing down 
the shelter from competition by introducing respective forces and encouraging consumers to 
switch suppliers. The development of spot markets again undermined existing long-term 
contracts and put substantial pressure on prices. Established players thus faced the threat of 
profit squeezing and the redistribution of wealth along the value chain,307 forcing them to 
become efficiency- and profit-oriented and to develop negotiating skills while also engaging 
in customer-relationship management, in particular as not only the number of customers was 
to be relevant anymore but also their value contribution.308 At the same time, and contrary to 
the notion of deregulation, new authorities and regulatory requirements were implemented.309 
Consequently, while incumbents had been left alone in the past to do their business and their 
relationship with stakeholders had been negotiated out of the necessity of being stuck with 
each other and having to get along, the amendments of European energy policy have 
disrupted these arrangements and changed the setting from one of “cozy cooperation to one of 
jagged stridency”310 where inappropriate behaviour is punished by the market.311
                                                 
306  Cf. Makhija (2003), p. 449. 
 This 
required the re-negotiation with traditional stakeholders and the establishment of relationships 
with new ones who have become attracted to enter the industry and influence industry 
307  As also pointed out by early research (cf. Bleeke (1990), p. 162). For a more recent example cf. Øygard/ 
Tryggestad (2001). 
308  This has in fact been also pointed out by several publications over the course of time. Cf. Commichau 
(1997); Ghobadian et al. (1998), p. S71; Holst (1998), p. 167; DRI-WEFA (2001), p. 84; PWC (2003a); 
Höfermann-Kiefer/ Waltemath (2005), pp. 2-5; Neuhäuser et al. (2005), pp. 810-814; Schikarski/ Wältken 
(2005b), pp. 807-809; Seeliger (2005b), p. 10; Seel/ Timm (2008), p. 24. Also, new IT infrastructure is 
required. Cf. Heider (2007), pp. 44-49; Werthschulte et al. (2007), pp. 48-50; Komornyik (2008), pp. 89-92. 
309  Some researchers thus prefer to merely use the term liberalisation in the sense of a qualitative transformation 
of regulatory modes (cf. Genoud et al. (2004b), p. 13). 
310  Russo (1992), p. 13. 
311  Cf. Mahon/ Murray (1980), p. 126; Estrada et al. (1988), p. 255; Ghobadian et al. (1998), p. S72. 
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profitability. Another source of pressure emerged from the measures to improve security of 
supply. While geo-political matters have always been an issue for European suppliers to deal 
with, the fact that the majority of future supplies lies in areas with difficult local conditions 
has even enforced this situation as indicated above. Regulatory requirements for providing a 
secure provision with natural gas have thus posed an even greater challenge to European 
suppliers in that they face strong supplying power from upstream government-controlled 
oligopolies.312 This situation requires specific political and technical capabilities. At the same 
time incumbents experience a weakening of their buying power due to unbundling 
legislations, intensifying competition and powerful lobbying associations engaged in the 
European market. Security of supply has thus become a critical risk and cost factor to be 
managed and calculated into investment decisions.313 The same holds true with regards to 
ecological concerns. While environmental goods have previously been public, the emphasis 
on sustainability has put a price tag on these goods and additional financial constraints on 
companies. In addition to this is the advancement of other environmentally friendly energy 
sources and new stakeholders from this area threatening natural gas suppliers’ traditional sales 
territory. Moreover, especially recently these new stakeholders have increased their pressure 
on authorities to become more active, complaining that as ‘politics had had itself lead up the 
garden path for too long’314, the ‘ecologisation of the gas market was lagging behind 20 
years’315 and that the crusted structure of the gas sector needed breaking up. Furthermore, 
some renewable energy providers have even aimed to completely substitute customers’ 
natural gas supply with biogas.316
 
 
In conclusion it can be said that these changes came over organisations as exogenous waves 
which have profoundly impacted the organisational as well as the industry’s value-chain and 
thus the traditional business model of incumbents along with their legitimacy. At the same 
                                                 
312  At the same time, also many European downstream markets are still characterised by oligopolies. In this 
respect recent studies have concluded that in order to prevent double marginalisation, vertical integration 
should be allowed if not supported (cf. Boots et al. (2004)), a finding that stands in contradiction to EU 
Energy Policy efforts to unbundle energy companies’ value-chains. 
313  Also these issues by now have been subject to several studies. Cf. PWC (2002); McKenna et al. (2006); 
Haltermann/ Pfeil (2006), p. 5. 
314  Cf. LichtBlick (2007). (Translation by author) 
315  Cf. Schwarzer (2007). (Translation by author) 
316  This topic has only been addressed relatively recently. Cf. Lempp et al. (2002); Klein (2007), p. 12; 
Oesterwind (2007), p. 32. 
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time these changes have also opened up opportunities to enter new business areas – either 
along the traditional gas value-chain or in other energy-related activities. Another opportunity 
lies in the development of a totally new business model in order to maintain or gain a 
competitive advantage, if not to survive in the marketplace. Based on developments laid out 
above this could include related diversification into the production and/ or supply of biogas or 
other manufactured gases, or investments into gas-based electricity generation in form of 
CCGT plants. This not only opens up opportunities for benefitting from arbitrage possibilities, 
selling gas on the market when prices are high, while using it for electricity generation when 
gas prices are low, but also for enhancing corporate image and thus legitimacy. No matter 
whether regarded as threats or opportunities, the growing influence and harmonisation of 
European Energy Policy has increasingly made interfaces between political and corporate 
fields of action more loaded with conflict potential. This has introduced a significant level of 
uncertainty and volatility into the institutionalised industry structure and thus the incumbents’ 
environment, threatening to make the possession and utilisation of established resources and 
capabilities, and traditional assumptions of how the European market works, meaningless.317 
A specific challenge in this respect is the clash of different influences from various directions 
and sources creating “a tension between commercial and public service-orientation running 
right through the industry”318. Liberalisation, for instance, opened the industry to competitive 
forces on the one hand and enhanced customer choice while at the same time introducing new 
regulatory requirements and institutional agents. The same holds true with regards to the other 
two goals as both are not only characterised through the instalment of respective regulatory 
measures and agents, but also through the requirement of companies to fulfil market needs. 
This again requires players to satisfy various expectations of different stakeholders. Some of 
these are new; some have taken on a new role such as the European Commission as a “policy 
entrepreneur”319 or other regulatory bodies who now act as ‘surrogate customers’320
                                                 
317  While this has been pointed out as a potential threat in earlier publications (cf. Rider (1999), p. 19), these 
consequences have been referred to more frequently by recent ones (cf. Weber/ Schuler (2004); Fleissner 
(2005); Schikarski/ Wältken (2005a), pp. 497-499; Oesterwind (2007), p. 32; Schroeter (2007b), p. 22). 
. Their 
increasing degree of activity and the pressure exerted over the course of time has resulted in a 
318  Midttun (2001), p. 17. 
319  Genoud et al. (2004a), p. 122. 
320  Cf. Ghobadian et al. (1998), p. S78. 
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“battle between governments and markets”321.322
 
 The distinct difference between these forces 
and agents, in fact, constitutes a major characteristic of the ‘new’ corporate environment. A 
fundamental distinction that can be made is between market mechanisms and institutions or 
market and non-market forces and actors. These interrelationships and considerations are 
illustrated in the following figure. 
Figure 10:323
Breaking-up the traditional value-chain and industry structure 
  Drivers of industry revolution and organisational behaviour –  
 
 
 
                                                 
321  Chevalier (2009), p. 9. 
322  For an overview of different stakeholders such as regulators, associations, companies and others cf. Genoud 
et al. (2004b), pp. 14-15, 21-22; Anonymous (2006b), p. 6; Esterhazy et al. (2008), p. 58. 
323  Own figure. Due to the complexity of change as laid out in chapter III this illustration has been stylised, 
showing change on an accumulated level. 
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Having faced such a fundamental change of their previously stable, closed and rather 
predictable external environment the research question, which at the same time guides the 
research aim, can be formulated as follows: 
 
How did incumbents strategically behave in order to achieve their goals and survive? 
 
Due to the complexity of the situation, the research question has been formulated in such an 
open manner in order to allow an unbiased approach to analysis. This again has to begin with 
the determination of a sound theoretical basis. The challenge here is to find an approach 
which is able to capture the empirical situation as laid out above and fulfil the following 
requirements: 
 
► Generally be applicable to reflect empirical reality; 
► Allow the classification of different types of environmental forces and actors, more 
specifically the distinction between ‘market’ and ‘non-market’ ones; 
► Explain organisational behaviour in response to environmental change; 
► Take account of temporal dimension to account for development over time; 
► Be able to fill explanatory gaps in order to enhance and bring forward academic 
research; 
► Enable to provide advice for practitioners. 
 
Which theoretical approach can satisfy these conditions is determined in the following 
chapter. The basis for this is set by first looking at the fundamentals of the relationship 
between organisations and their environment to then derive possible approaches for further 
discussion. 
68 
CHAPTER IV ESTABLISHING a THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
4.1 Fundamentals of Organisational Behaviour in Response to 
Environmental Change 
 
Essentially, the determination of the appropriate theoretical approach is guided by the analysis 
of change in the European gas industry and its impact on incumbents’ strategic behaviour. 
 
First of all it is therefore essential to understand the fundamental mechanisms between 
organisations and their environment. The very basis of analysing organisations in context of 
and in transaction with their environments can be said to have been laid by Systems Theory as 
“the most useful way to study organizations”324 and “an excellent way of looking at the 
industrial firm”325, an approach having opened up the ‘black box’ to understand an 
organisation’s relationship with its environment. This had become particularly important as 
organisational environments had turned increasingly complex, if not turbulent, in any case 
uncertain and discontinuous.326 Concrete definitions generally remained vague though, 
described, for instance, as the “set of conditions that are relevant but not under control”327.328 
Drastic environmental changes in turn have been depicted as ‘Schumpeterian shocks’329
                                                 
324  Johnson et al. (1973), p. 41. 
 or 
325  Churchman (1968), p. 62. 
326  Cf. Johnson et al. (1963), pp. 3-6; Farmer/ Richman (1964), pp. 55-56; Katz/ Kahn (1966), pp. 26-27; Katz/ 
Kahn (1978), p. 63; Thompson (1967), p. 18; Perrow (1970), p. 93; Johnson et al. (1973), pp. 13, 508-509; 
Jurkovich (1974); Luthans/ Stewart (1977), pp. 183-184; Katz/ Kahn (1978), p. 32; Scott (1981), p. 119. 
Others used the terms heterogeneous or hostile. Cf. Burns/ Stalker (1961); Emery/ Trist (1965); Lawrence/ 
Lorsch (1967); Thompson (1967); Terreberry (1968); Duncan (1972); Khandwalla (1972); Boulton et al. 
(1982); Tushman/ Anderson (1986); Krickx (2000). For concrete empirical examples cf. Drucker (1971), p. 
101; Kast/ Rosenzweig (1973), pp. 1-2; Bracker (1980), p. 219; Arrington/ Sawaya (1984), p. 160; Ansoff 
(1988), p. 12. 
327  Churchman (1968), pp. 34, 63. 
328  Cf. Thompson/ McEwen (1958), p. 23; Boddewyn (1966); Katz/ Kahn (1966), p. 171; Thompson (1967), p. 
159; Ansoff/ Hayes (1976), p. 1; Lenz (1980a), p. 213; Scott (1981), p. 165; Strati (2000), p. 21. 
329  Cf. Barney (1986a), p. 798; Amit/ Schoemaker (1993), p. 38. 
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“earthshaking revolutions”330. In form of “disruptive outside factors”331 a common trait is that 
they “critically impinge”332
 
 on organisational behaviour. 
The determination of “the appropriate form of interaction”333 with environments 
characterised by such fundamental change has thus been pointed out to be one of the major 
organisational considerations. In this respect particularly the ‘temporal properties’ underlying 
the interaction process have to be considered.334 While some researchers depicted 
organisations’ strategic responses as results of rational planning, emergent developments335 as 
well as of trial-and-error experiments, serendipity, chance, coincidence, intuition or gut 
feelings,336 a common acknowledgement across various theoretical approaches is that 
organisations have to find a fit with their environments by defining a respective strategy 
which determines its relationship with its surrounding in order to be successful in terms of 
achieving organisational goals337, even to survive and not be ‘selected out’338.339 Moreover, it 
has been found that organisations ‘time shift’ their responses along with environmental 
change in that they ‘chase a moving context’340. Another finding is that strategic behaviour 
tends to develop along a continuum from being rather passive and risk-averse to becoming 
more chance-induced and pro-active over time as organisations take advantage of arising 
opportunities.341
                                                 
330  Miller (1994), p. 334. 
 Passive behaviour has been related with re-active strategies, active behaviour 
331  Fleming (1980), p. 35. 
332  Arrington/ Sawaya (1984), p. 160. 
333  Thompson/ McEwen (1958), p. 30. Italics in original. 
334  Cf. Greiner (1972), pp. 40-41; Johnson/ Thomas (1987), p. 347; Fox-Wolfgramm (1988), p. 89; Burgelman 
(1991); Volberda et al. (2001), pp. 209-210. 
335  Cf. Mintzberg (1978); Mintzberg/ Waters (1985). 
336  Cf. Dutton/ Freedman (1985); Makridakis (1990). 
337  For a discussion on organisational goals versus those of organisational members see Simon who finds the 
notion of goals as “indispensable to organization theory” (Simon (1964), p. 1). 
338  This was particularly postulated by researchers of the Natural Selection Perspective. Cf. Hannan/ Freeman 
(1977); Aldrich (1979). Following the criticality of the product ‘energy’ provided by organisations of this 
thesis, it is assumed that gas companies will not be allowed to be selected out and ‘die’. Instead, ‘being 
selected out’ in this study would mean that the company is not able to deal with the new environment and 
become either taken-over in a hostile acquisition or becoming subject to governmental control. 
339  As a variety of these different disciplines cf. Cyert/ March (1963), p. 100; Johnson et al. (1973), p. 50; Lenz 
(1980b); Mahon/ Murray (1980), p. 134; Melcher/ Melcher (1980); Jemison (1981), p. 635; Mahon/ Murray 
(1981), p. 252; Venkatraman/ Prescott (1990); Aharoni (1993), p. 34; Hinterhuber et al. (1996). For an 
introductory overview cf. Poole (2004). 
340  Cf. Hinings/ Greenwood (1988), p. 49. 
341  Cf. Thompson/ McEwen (1958), p. 25; Parsons (1964), p. 340; Johnson et al. (1973), p. 50; Kast/ 
Rosenzweig (1974), p. 509; Dutton/ Freedman (1985), pp. 49-50; Hrebiniak/ Joyce (1985); Hinings/ 
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at the other end of the continuum to pro-active strategic activities. Based on this 
characterisation re-active strategies can be identified as those forms of behaviour which are 
directed at maintaining the status-quo or changing as little as possible, keeping risk and 
resistance at a minimum as often showing in repetitive actions or imitation.342 Pro-active 
strategies again are those with which organisations try to direct external forces to a favourable 
direction in order to satisfy relevant stakeholders and increase organisational value by 
exploring arising opportunities.343 Passive behaviour can be explained by organisations’ 
inherent natural inertia which constitutes their ‘memory device’ and in form of a blueprint for 
replication their natural tendency to follow their ‘liability of newness clock’.344 A natural and 
initial organisational reaction to environmental change therefore is often to simply “ignore 
it”345 and stick to prior routes and known forms of behaviour by simply exploiting a given set 
of routines.346
 
  
This is particularly the case when pressure is externally imposed – as is the case with energy 
policy change in the European gas industry (see chapter III) – and organisations are ‘infected’ 
with the ‘not-invented-here-syndrome’347. Vaughan et al., for instance, assume that in 
situations where companies were institutionalised in a ‘close and warm relationship’ with 
their government – again reference can be made to the situation on the European gas industry 
– they had become invulnerable to emerging environmental pressures and in consequence 
were not aware of the need to react accordingly. They also found that these players perceived 
the increasing importance paid by the public to ecological issues as superficial and thus saw 
no need to become active.348
                                                                                                                                                        
Greenwood (1988); Kelly/ Amburgey (1991); Cummings/ Worley (1993), pp. 495-500; Burgelman (1994); 
Miller (1994), p. 332; Kraatz (1998), p. 622. More recently cf. Simerly/ Li (2000), p. 39; McGrath/ Tschan 
(2004), pp. 65-67. 
 Thus, in following the path once taken and as the commitments 
made in the past often cannot be easily reversed, strategic change is constrained and 
342  Cf. Dutton/ Freedman (1985), p. 46; Cummings/ Worley (1993), pp. 52-53; Specht (1996), p. 152; Ingram/ 
Baum (1997); Romanelli (1999); Baum/ Rao (2004), p. 224. 
343  Cf. Aldrich (1979); Hinterhuber et al. (1996), pp. 89, 99; Specht (1996), p. 152. 
344  Cf. Stinchcombe (1965). Also cf. Amburgey/ Miner (1992), p. 335; Campbell (2004), p. 4. For empirical 
examples cf. Singh et al. (1986). 
345  Dutton/ Freedman (1985), p. 54. Also cf. Hrebiniak/ Snow (1980). 
346  Cf. Amburgey/ Miner (1992), p. 335. 
347  Cf. Van de Ven/ Hargrave (2004), p. 271. 
348  Cf. Vaughan et al. (1997). 
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organisational behaviour mirrors a codification of the past, also described as “the stories 
repeated within the corporate walls”349
 
.  
As such behaviour carries the danger of leading organisations onto a “route to failure”350 and 
into a “dangerous “do nothing” trap”351, a situation which can be characterised as 
organisations being “victimized by dated and irrelevant strategies”352 as opportunities arising 
from change are not explored, it has been shown that organisations over the course of time 
overcome forces of resistance and ‘at least do something’ to finally undergo some form of 
transformational change.353 Research has also shown that the successful organisations are not 
only those which are able to take advantage of arising opportunities but those which co-
evolve and reinvent themselves over time,354 thus developing what above has been classified 
as pro-active strategies. In order to do so however, organisations in many cases first need to 
‘unlearn’355, especially when considering that organisational transformation is never finished 
and strategies have to be constantly modified to fit and continue as long as firms need to 
adapt.356 Particularly the criticality of entrepreneurial activities and pro-active behaviour in 
form of capturing first-mover advantages357 and organisations ‘designing’358 themselves have 
been pointed out in academic research.359
                                                 
349  Foster/ Kaplan (2001), p. 45. 
 In this respect, many writers on organisational 
behaviour in response to environmental change have referred to Schumpeter’s notion of 
350  Dutton/ Freedman (1985), p. 55. 
351  Courtney (2001), p. 47. 
352  Miller/ Chen (1994), p. 7. 
353  Cf. Miller/ Friesen (1980), p. 288; Quinn (1980a); Quinn (1980b); Miller/ Friesen (1984), pp. 248-265; 
Tushman/ Romanelli (1985); Mahon/ McGowan (1996), p. 43; Wischnevsky (2004). Around this time a 
concept known as ‘Issue Management’ became popular. Cf. Ansoff (1975); Dutton/ Duncan (1987); 
Hainsworth/ Meng (1988); Greening/ Gray (1994); Liebl (1994). While its effectiveness has been recognised 
particularly as a short-term measure, it does not provide researchers with a profound theoretical basis as 
required here. 
354  Cf. Ginsberg (1988), pp. 560, 562; Hinings/ Greenwood (1988), pp. 27, 41, 75; Cummings/ Worley (1993), 
pp. 14, 520-526, 536-537; Miller (1993); Hinterhuber et al. (1996), p. 89; Courtney (2001), p. 38; Bryan 
(2002), pp. 18, 20; Lewin et al. (2004), p. 109. 
355  Cf. Ringbakk (1976), p. 10. Also cf. Nystrom/ Starbuck (1984). 
356  Cf. Cyert/ March (1963); Hedberg (1981); Argyris et al. (1985); Levitt/ March (1988); Lundberg (1989); 
Cummings/ Worley (1993); Bellmann (1996); Specht (1996); Ingram/ Baum (1997); Pasmore/ Woodman 
(1997); Fuentelsaz et al. (2002), p. 259; Epstein (2003); Lynch (2003), pp. 604-605. Schroeder et al. (2002) 
have also pointed out that learning itself is a specific and difficult to imitate capability. 
357  Cf. Lieberman/ Montgomery (1988). 
358  Cf. Hedberg et al. (1976); Weick (1977). 
359  Cf. Markides (1997). 
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‘creative destruction’.360 While this depiction reveals that organisational strategies tend to 
become more active along with environmental change, research with a particular focus on the 
temporal dimension has depicted the development of organisational behaviour as an 
evolutionary journey which in the end shows as a strategic path.361
After having explained the underlying dynamics of organisational behaviour in response to 
environmental change, the next step is to establish of a theoretical approach suited for this 
work. Guided by the empirical reality in form of different types of ‘market’ and ‘non-market’ 
forces, actors and requirements constituting change of the European gas industry and based on 
an extensive literature review, two major streams of research have been identified which are 
assumed to be not only applicable but prerequisite as theoretical approaches for addressing 
the research question formulated above. One of these streams represents business-based 
approaches, here classified as Business Theory (BT). The other is Institutional Theory (IT) 
which has been characterised as the “sole theoretical perspective”
 
362 and “standard theoretical 
toolbox”363
 
 to explain and depict non-competitive phenomena. Both characterise a distinct 
stream of research under the wide umbrella of Organisation Theory. Under the terms 
‘Business Perspective’ and ‘Institutional Perspective’ their applicability for answering the 
research question will be tested in the following. 
                                                 
360  Cf. Tripsas (1997), p. 119; Ellis et al. (2000), p. 299; Rugman/ Verbeke (2000), p. 378; Foster/ Kaplan 
(2001), pp. 41-42; Midttun (2001), p. 13; Delmas (2002); Rodrigues/ Child (2003), p. 2140. 
361  Cf. Mintzberg (1978); Huff (1982); Greenwood/ Hinings (1993). 
362  Carroll et al. (1988), p. 233. 
363  Lamberg et al. (2002), p. 3. 
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4.2 Business Perspective on Organisational Behaviour in 
Response to Environmental Change 
 
4.2.1 Theoretical Background 
 
The ‘Business Perspective’ (BP) view is characterised by combining insights from the area of 
Industrial Economics (IE) or Industrial Organisation (IO), and Strategic Management (SM). 
Although these fields have distinct origins, they are acknowledged as interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing, and are fundamentally established within the field of Business 
Theory364 which allows its application as a research approach. One of the most prominent 
theories building on environmental forces to explain organisational behaviour and success is 
the Industrial Organisation approach,365 also depicted as a field of economics looking at 
“markets that cannot easily be analyzed using the standard textbook competitive model”366. 
Whereas the underlying explanatory concept is the structure-conduct-performance (SCP), the 
central proposition is that market structure determines organisational conduct and sets the 
basis for earning above-average return.367 While the original model assumed the flow of 
determination going in one direction,368 it is acknowledged by now that the elements are 
interrelated in that the conduct of market participants also impacts prevailing industry 
structures.369 Another benefit of the IO approach is that it introduced the notion of strategic 
conduct into the until then prevailing micro-economic-based theories, enabling the 
explanation of organisational behaviour on a corporate level.370
                                                 
364  Cf. Porter (1981); Hoskisson et al. (1999); Martinez/ Dacin (1999); Flagestad/ Hope (2001). Another 
expression at times used in literature to summarise these approaches is ‘Business Theory’ or ‘Business 
Perspective’ but as there is also little ‘conformity’ (cf. Williamson (1994), p. 361), the term ‘business’ has 
been chosen here as it allows a better delineation as will come apparent over the course of this chapter. 
 At the same time the IO 
approach has been criticised for not being able to appropriately explain differences between 
organisational strategies and changes over time, especially in the case of increasing 
365  As, for instance, early applied by Porter (1981). 
366  Schmalensee (1987), p. 803. 
367  Cf. Mason (1939). For empirical work cf. McGahan/ Porter (1997). 
368  The figure most often applied to graphically depict the structure-conduct-performance paradigm is that by 
Scherer. Cf. Scherer (1970), p. 5; Scherer/ Ross (1990), p. 5. For another example cf. Porter (1981), p. 611. 
369  These interrelationships are presented as reverse arrows in Scherer’s illustration of the SCM model. Cf. 
Scherer (1970), p. 5. 
370  Teece attributed this particularly to the SCP paradigm. Cf. Teece (1984), p. 93. 
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environmental uncertainty and complexity.371 The fundament for integrating these elements 
was particularly established by Porter, a ‘legend and leading edge thinker in Strategic 
Management’372 who had set out to “turn IO on its head”373. Inspired by the SCP-model, 
Porter introduced its concept of industry rivalry and showed that companies may change rules 
to their favour by formulating respective strategic responses and thus influence environmental 
structures to their advantage.374 Over the course of time the fundamental insights of these 
approaches became established as the Market-based View (MBV) in the wider business 
literature.375
 
  
Regardless of the continuous advancement of market-oriented approaches however, other 
research results showed that some firms were able to perform better than others, indicating 
that “the external environment is only one part of the economic rent story”376. In directing the 
focus towards the firm itself and as a “discipline that ventures into the black box”377, 
Transaction Cost Theory developed as a stream within Institutional Economics. 
Fundamentally, TCT looks to explain why firms exist at all if all transactions could also be 
handled via the market and prevailing price mechanisms. Coase assigned the reason for 
establishing a firm to the benefit of avoiding the “cost of using the price mechanism”378. 
Oliver Williamson further distinguished between transactions that are organised via the 
market, via internal hierarchy, and via intermediate hybrid forms such as franchising on the 
one end or long-term contracts on the other end of the scale.379
                                                 
371  Cf. Börsig (1981), pp. 252-253; Schreyögg (1984); Dutton/ Freedman (1985), p. 59. For a more 
comprehensive analysis of critiques see, for example, Audretsch (1995). 
 While Williamson in his later 
372  Cf. Mintzberg (1988), p. 64; Mahon/ McGowan (1996), p. 46. 
373  Ghemawat (2002), p. 54. 
374  Cf. Porter (1985), p. 4. 
375  Cf. Chakravarthy (1997); Hoskisson et al. (1999), p. 432; zu Knyphausen-Aufseß (2000), p. 55; Bea/ Haas 
(2001), pp. 24-25. 
376  Amit/ Schoemaker (1993), p. 40. 
377  Hoskisson et al. (1999), p. 432. Similarly cf. Gibbons (2003), p. 7. The utilisation of the term ‘black box’ 
again shows the above mentioned relatedness to Systems Theory as the preceding fundamental approach. 
378  Coase (1937), p. 390. 
379  Williamson, who became a prominent researcher of TCT, also contributed by determining the degree of 
undertainty, asset specifity, bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour. Cf. Williamson (1975/ 1979/ 
1985). Following these considerations, Williamson developed the Organizational Failure Framework, putting 
these forces in relation with each other and analysing their impact on transaction costs (these are costs which 
result ex-ante or ex-post of the conclusion of a contract from search, negotiation, control and adaptation 
processes). Cf. Picot (1982), p. 270). Cf. Williamson (1975), p. 40; Williamson (1991). For a more recent 
review cf. Williamson (2000). 
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work also accounted for the amendment of governance forms in response to environmental 
change,380 TCT has been criticised for not being able to satisfactorily explain why many firms 
engage in more flexible forms of organising, in particular with regards to specialised assets in 
competitive markets which are characterised by rapid change.381 Early studies, for example, 
found that external conditions may change in such ways that vertical dis-integration into 
independent specialised units becomes more viable.382 A recent study indicates that 
uncertainty and vertical integration are not necessarily related.383 In the case of cooperative 
arrangements it has been pointed out that despite higher transaction costs, JVs may turn out to 
be more efficient as they allow the improvement of an organisation’s competitive 
positioning.384 While TCT has become an integrated part to strategy formulation by now,385 it 
has above all been research in the field of Strategic Management which promoted the 
consideration of improving an organisation’s strategic positioning and its competitive 
advantage through the concept of corporate strategy.386 Here it was particularly Chandler who 
determined environmental change as the driver for corporate strategy formulation and 
organisational structure.387 Chandler also was the first388 to define strategy by stating that it is 
the “determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise and the 
adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these 
goals”389. Based on these considerations it was especially researchers like Miles and Snow 
who enhanced insights on strategic content. Building on studies analysing the relationship 
between strategy and structure, they developed typologies of organisational forms for 
classifying strategic response to environmental change.390
                                                 
380  Cf. Williamson (1991), pp. 271-273; Williamson (1993), p. 48; Williamson (1996), p. 39. 
 Also Hofer and Schendel put 
particular emphasis on the state of an organisation’s environment, defining strategy as “the 
381  Cf. Delmas/ Tokat (2005), p. 457. Also cf. Russo (1992), p. 17. 
382  Cf. Harrigan (1985a); Hill/ Hoskisson (1987); Jacquemin (1987); Jones/ Hill (1988). 
383  Cf. Krickx (2000). 
384  Cf. Kogut (1988). For other critical remarks cf. Russo (1992), pp. 17, 25; Sydow (1992), pp. 145-166. 
385  Cf. Williamson (1994), p. 361; Rumelt et al. (1994), p. 27; Hoskisson et al. (1999), pp. 419, 433-434; Foss 
(2000), pp. 2, 10, 12; Simerly/ Li (2000), pp. 45-46; Nickerson et al. (2001), pp. 251-252. 
386  The concept of corporate strategy was especially enlarged on by Learned et al. (1965). 
387  While Chandler formulated that “structure follows strategy” (Chandler (1962), pp. 13-14) March and Simon 
before had based their work on the notion that strategy follows structure (cf. March and Simon (1958)). 
388  Apart from Peter Drucker, who first addressed the strategy issue in 1954 without explicitly mentioning the 
term ‘strategy’ though. Cf. Hofer/ Schendel (1978), p. 16. 
389  Chandler (1962), p. 13. 
390  Cf. Miles/ Snow (1978). 
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basic characteristics of the match an organisation achieves with its environment”391
 
, thereby 
offering a new paradigm on the concept of strategy. How the organisational environment is 
characterised from a Business Perspective is depicted next. 
 
4.2.2 The Organisational Environment from a Business Perspective 
 
From a business-oriented perspective the market environment can be depicted as consisting of 
those influences which affect an organisation’s basis of performance and its positioning in the 
marketplace. A distinction is often made between the wider macro-economic and the narrow 
micro-economic environment which is also called ‘task’ or ‘industry’ environment.392 As 
already indicated by the terminologies, the wider macro-economic environment consists of 
such forces which are not necessarily specific to a certain industry but affect any organisation, 
such as globalisation.393 Of what has come to be known as the PESTEL or PEST framework 
in the English management literature, this outer layer of the organisation’s environment 
includes political, economical, socio-cultural, technological, environmental, and legal 
forces.394 The micro-economic environment again can be distinguished into more specific 
factors such as the industry’s supply and sales market as well as its competitive structure as 
specifically depicted by researchers in the field of IO and MBV approaches. The importance 
of such forces had already been pointed out early by Mason who stated that apart from the 
general classification of input factors as addressed by system theorists (see above), there 
should be ‘many more things’ that determine market structure and respective influence on 
organisational conduct. As such he identified the number of sellers and buyers, possibilities of 
product differentiation, prevailing demand and cost structures as well as the economic age and 
stage of development of an industry, distribution channels, and market share.395
                                                 
391  Hofer/ Schendel (1978), p. 4. 
 Bain pointed 
out that with regards to market structure those industry characteristics which impact on 
competitive conduct should be emphasised, like established rivals or buyers which are close 
392  Cf. Grant (2002), pp. 66-67. 
393  Cf. Lynch (1997), p. 91. 
394  Cf. Roeber (1973); Tregoe/ Zimmerman (1980), pp. 18, 89. The abbreviation PEST can be found when 
political and legal as well as economic and environmental forces are grouped together. 
395  Cf. Mason (1939), pp. 64, 70-72. 
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substitutes for each other.396
  
 The importance of potential market entrants and forces of 
substitution for determining behaviour of incumbents has become a central characteristic of 
these early approaches. 
Within the Strategic Management literature it was again Porter who extended the Industrial 
Economists’ environmental perspective, showing that the type and degree of competition and 
rivalry within an industry resulted from an interplay of the following ‘Five Competitive 
Forces’:397 Supplier Power which, e.g., is strong in the case of monopolistic or oligopolistic 
supply structures, when no substitute input material are available, or when the threat of 
forward or backward integration is high – as used to be the case with gas incumbents before 
liberalisation. Buyer Power again is high when buyers are well informed, switching costs low, 
or products highly standardised. In such cases, industry profitability may be threatened when 
buyers demand lower prices, higher quality and/ or more service, like buyers of gas after 
liberalisation. Substitutes may pose a threat to industry attractiveness in terms of the general 
possibility of buyers choosing a different but similar product, e.g. biogas or renewable instead 
of natural gas. New Entrants increase capacities in the marketplace, leading to decreasing 
price levels and thus threatening profitability, as has been the case after opening up the 
European gas market. The threat of entry is generally determined by the reaction to be 
expected by incumbents as well as the height of barriers to entry (see above). In this respect 
Peteraf and Bergen remarked that especially in dynamic competitive settings substitute 
players and potential newcomers presented the most threatening but at the same time least 
recognisable competitive hazard.398 Intensity of Rivalry results from the attempts of 
established players to increase their market share at the cost of rivals and, amongst others, is 
determined by the diversity of competitors or high exit barriers (see above).399
 
 
In extending Porter’s concept, researchers added ‘complementors’ as additional stakeholders 
to take into consideration, characterising other companies from which buyers may purchase 
                                                 
396  Cf. Bain (1951), p. 298; Bain (1956), p. 2. 
397  Cf. Porter (1985), pp. 4-11. 
398  Cf. Peteraf/ Bergen (2003), p. 1028. 
399  Cf. Schomburg et al. (1994). 
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complementary products or to which suppliers may sell complementary input.400 While these 
forces have been introduced as common industry characteristics, Porter also pointed out the 
importance of the concept of a strategic group which he referred to as a group of firms which 
within an industry follow the same or a similar strategy.401 Their function has been compared 
with one of “walled medieval cities”402 which allow its members to “fend off invasion by 
hostile intruders”403. In an industry context these walls constitute mobility barriers which 
protect established players and enable them to generate higher profits, thus explaining intra-
industry variations in firm performance. Strategic groups also provide certain stability and 
interrelatedness which enable its members to coordinate more effectively. At the same time 
members have to consider that such barriers may be subject to change, as in the case of 
evolutionary developments for instance, and thus may also affect prevailing power structures 
and profitability.404
 
 
 
4.2.3 Drivers and Organisational Goals from a Business Perspective 
 
Based on the “commonplace observation that organisations exist to make money”405 and on 
the insights gained from above, organisational behaviour within the business field can 
probably be best described as a “positioning-economizing perspective”406. According to this 
perspective the strategies employed are directed at most efficiently allocating scarce resources 
to gain a profit. In treating the firm as a profit maximising entity, the underlying rationale is 
not only the maximisation of organisational rents, but an efficiency-orientation which has also 
been described as the rational imperative that most contributes to long-run survivability of 
organisations.407
                                                 
400  Cf. Brandenburger/ Nalebuff (1996); Grove (1996), p. 30. 
 Putting competition at the centre of analysis, early empirical studies claimed 
401  Cf. Porter (1980), p. 129. The notion of strategic groups was first introduced in 1972 by Hunt who in an 
empirical study found that despite high concentration levels within the industry, profitability was low. He 
concluded that industry structure had to be extended to account for the concept of strategic groups. Cf. Cool/ 
Dierickx (1993), p. 48; Reger/ Huff (1993), p. 103. 
402  Cool/ Dierickx (1993), p. 57. 
403  Cool/ Dierickx (1993), p. 57. 
404  Cf. Caves/ Porter (1977), p. 248; Porter (1980), pp. 129-145. 
405  Katz/ Kahn (1966), p. 17. 
406  Nickerson et al. (2001), p. 252. 
407  Cf. Mason (1939), p. 63; Jones/ Hill (1988), p. 165. 
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factors like market share as the main drivers of organisational profit.408 Soon after however, 
further research found that the orientation on profit or large market share should not be used 
as the only measure to determine survival and success in the market place.409 While 
researchers from SM in most cases equate business success with financial performance, today, 
this particularly shows in the orientation on performance figures such as the return on 
investment (ROI) and the concentration on maximising shareholder value,410 they also point 
out the importance of gaining a competitive advantage by establishing a favourable market 
positioning and organisational structure. While Chandler found that the competitive 
advantage of U.S. multinational companies was founded on their multi-divisional structure,411 
thus transferring the classical theory assumption of scale and scope to a corporate strategy 
level, Porter stated that a firm’s long-term competitive advantage was determined by its 
positioning within the industry and the creation of fit among a company’s activities.412 
Fundamentally, this includes the choice of products as well as the level of scope and 
diversity.413
 
 The underlying dynamics of organisational behaviour to achieve these goals 
while responding to environmental change are explained in the next section. 
 
4.2.4 Business Perspective on Organisational Behaviour in Response to 
Environmental Change 
 
4.2.4.1 Fundamental Strategic Behaviour 
 
Basically, an organisation’s strategic behaviour in response to environmental change is driven 
by the fact that such external upheaval threatens its “tried-and-true methods for making 
                                                 
408  In literature these have become known as the PIMS (Profit Impact of Market Strategy) studies, carried out to 
provide management with data on the expected profit performance of various business units under different 
competitive conditions. Cf. Schoeffler et al. (1974). Also cf. Buzzell et al. (1975). 
409  Cf. Tregoe/ Zimmerman (1980), p. 63. 
410  Cf. Wigand et al. (1999), pp. 97-160. Also cf. Rappaport (1998). 
411  Cf. Chandler (1977). 
412  Cf. Porter (1985), p. 11; Porter (1996), p. 75. 
413  Cf. Rumelt et al. (1994), p. 9. 
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strategy”414. Depending on the theoretical lens looked through, organisational responses can 
be characterised accordingly. IO theorists, for instance, based on the assumption that above 
average returns are inherent in market structure, point out the importance of finding ways to 
create barriers to entry against rivals in order to maintain an industry’s profitability, such as 
by building on economies of scale or switching costs to “discriminate profitably”415 and 
invest before potential entrants can, and by strategically behaving without being noticed by 
others as a “maverick stirring the competitive waters”416.417 Williamson above all claimed 
that in times of a large degree of uncertainty and high transaction costs exchanges should be 
concluded via hierarchical or long-term arrangements.418 Others particularly emphasised 
cooperative long-term and exclusive agreements or vertical integration as a means to erect 
barriers to entry for defence.419
 
 
Within the Strategic Management literature again it is common to distinguish between 
different types of strategy levels. The main distinction made is between corporate strategies 
which deal with the scope of the firm’s activities in terms of industries, markets, strategic 
business areas or domains in which it competes, and competitive strategies which determine 
how companies successfully compete in a market or industry and how they navigate in the 
domain selected.420 As this distinction is mainly analytical in nature though and as 
determining where one type ends and the other begins in reality is “far from clear”421, it will 
not be further enlarged on here. Being generally concerned with guiding organisations 
forward, the concept of strategy guides a firm’s strategic consideration of what business the 
company already is or will be active in and the kind of company it is or will be.422
                                                 
414  Szulanski/ Amin (2001), p. 538. 
 In fact, the 
questions of which markets to be in, which products to produce and which activities to 
415  Schmalensee (1988), p. 658. 
416  Schomburg (1994) et al., p. 152. 
417  Cf. Bain (1956); Scherer (1970); Porter (1980); Demsetz (1982); Schmalensee (1988); Grant (1991/ 1998). 
418  Cf. Williamson (1975); Williamson (1981), p. 1546; Williamson (1985), pp. 61-63. Also cf. Schmalensee 
(1988), p. 656; Williamson (1999). 
419  Cf. Bain (1956); Porter (1980); Demsetz (1982); Harrigan (1985b), pp. 28-35; Porter/ Fuller (1989), pp. 375-
390; Sydow (1992), p. 293. 
420  Cf. Bourgeois (1980). Also cf. Grant (2002), pp. 23-25; Johnson/ Scholes (2002), pp. 10-12. 
421  Grant (2002), p. 388. Also cf. Bamberger/ Wrona (2004), p. 141. 
422  Cf. Andrews (1971); Abell (1980); Ansoff (1981), p. 81; Ansoff (1988), pp. 76-85; Lynch (1997), p. 737; 
Grant (2002), pp. 23-24; Johnson/ Scholes (2002), p. 11. 
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perform have been identified as being among the most critical that organisations face in an 
environment characterised by strong competition and change.423 Ansoff distinguished 
between four fundamental strategic dimensions:424 Market penetration, where the organisation 
protects and strengthens its existing products and markets, market development, where new 
segments are developed with existing products in order to gain market share, product 
development, where the organisation develops new products for existing markets, and 
diversification as a strategy where new markets are entered with new products, thus signifying 
the largest change. Already early researchers had pointed out that diversification strategies are 
not only motivated by the possibility to improve efficiency through synergies across other 
businesses but also to create a competitive advantage by simultaneously making better use of 
resources and reducing the risk of dependence on one particular area.425 This may even hold 
for forms of unrelated diversification which takes the firm from where it ‘grew up’, i.e. its 
‘center of gravity’,426 beyond its “cultural heart”427 into product categories totally distinct 
from the original ones. Andersen et al., for instance, described diversification as “a condition 
the firm is always seeking to improve”428. Sometimes the term diversification is also applied 
to characterise the expansion along a vertical scope. In this respect then, vertical integration 
can be looked at not only from a transaction-cost but also from a strategic perspective with 
regards to the number and characteristic of value chain activities performed and whether firms 
integrate forward to move closer to the consumer, or backward to initial production.429 The 
same holds true with regards to the degree of geographical scope where diversification 
characterises an organisation’s internationalisation strategy in terms of the number of 
countries expanded into, the volume of investments, the share of foreign sales or added value, 
the number of employees, management’s international orientation or the choice of market 
entry.430
                                                 
423  Cf. Cummings/ Worley (1993), p. 164. 
 While research in this area could show that organisations which had diversified 
across national boundaries outperformed firms which had diversified only across domestic 
424  Cf. Ansoff (1965). For an illustration see p. 128. 
425  Cf. Andersen et al. (1959), p. 31; Buzzell et al. (1975); Hayes (1980). 
426  Cf. Galbraith (1983), p. 64. 
427  Mintzberg (1988), p. 59. 
428  Andersen et al. (1959), p. 27. 
429  Cf. Harrigan (1984); Wrona (1999), in particular pp. 270-271. 
430  Cf. Kutschker (1999), p. 104. 
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product portfolios,431 empirical evidence on diversification in most cases has produced 
ambiguous results. Porter, for instance, found that most diversification moves had not created 
shareholder value and that most parts were divested again over the course of time before 
having provided a significant positive contribution.432 At the same time Mintzberg remarked 
that each way of expansion also had a “downside equivalent”433. This refers to forms of 
specialisation on a narrowly defined product-market scope, a low degree of vertical 
integration, or a restricted geographical reach such as by withdrawing from existing markets, 
dis-integrating value-chain activities or divesting businesses.434
 
  
Porter also was the one who promoted research on a firm’s competitive advantage on what he 
termed ‘generic strategies’. From this perspective companies should either strive for cost 
leadership by being the producer with the lowest costs in the industry, for becoming unique 
within the industry through differentiation, or by focussing on a certain industry segment and 
optimising conduct there, either in form of a cost or differentiation focus. He argued that a 
cost advantage could be gained by controlling cost drivers or by reconfiguring the value chain 
while a differentiation advantage again was something that “grows out of the firm’s value 
chain”435 and provided something valuable to buyers in that any activity generally holds the 
potential for uniqueness. Others take an organisation’s core business as the starting point and 
map out three fundamental strategic actions in response to environmental change: Those of 
adapting the core business, those of building new businesses and those of shaping the 
organisation’s overall portfolio of businesses.436
 
 
In addition to these general forms of strategic orientation research in this area has particularly 
emphasised the tactics of mergers and acquisitions as means to diversify, internationalise, or 
vertically integrate and rapid ways to obtain resources while opening up opportunities to 
increase profitability.437
                                                 
431  Cf. Bühner (1987). 
 Peng and Heath, for example, found that particularly ‘newcomers to 
432  Cf. Porter (1987); and also indicated by Katz et al. (1997), p. 34. 
433  Mintzberg (1988), p. 32. 
434  Cf. Mintzberg (1988), pp. 38-54; Sydow (1992), p. 148; Hinterhuber et al. (1996), pp. 72-75. 
435  Porter (1985), p. 120. Also generally cf. Porter (1983). 
436  Cf. Bryan (2002), pp. 25-26. 
437  Cf. Andersen et al. (1959); Kutschker (1994). 
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the competitive game’ chose such strategic alliances over other forms of organisation as the 
preferred growth strategy as these provide protection, access to resources and learning 
economies without incurring the costs of the other forms.438 Pearce especially pointed out 
forms of co-opting with competitors, such as when building pipelines under joint ownership, 
through horizontal mergers.439
 
 
 
4.2.4.2 Development of Strategic Environmental Responses over Time 
 
While the above has so far provided the explanatory fundament to explain organisational 
behaviour, it has not displayed the path of development in reaction to environmental change 
over time but only the ‘final consequence of it’.440
 
 This will be looked at now. 
Fundamentally and as indicated in the introductory part (4.1), business-perspective specific 
research, too, points out that organisations strive to re-establish fit after environmental 
change. Empirical studies in this area have revealed that this coincided with increased 
efficiency and higher economic performance.441 Already Schumpeter had remarked that 
“business strategy acquires its true significance only against the background of that process 
and within the situation created by it”442. Within the approaches characterising Business 
Theory, an organisation’s development path has often been depicted in reference to (industry) 
lifecycle developments.443 Early researchers had found that organisations generally follow 
different development phases during this process, characterised, for instance, by a continuous 
process of building, holding, and harvesting strategies.444
                                                 
438  Cf. Peng/ Heath (1996). 
 While researchers from Business 
Theory have depicted the possibility of passively reacting (adapting) or actively shaping the 
organisation’s future development as the most fundamental strategic choice of organisational 
439  Cf. Pearce (1982), pp. 26-27. 
440  Cf. Mintzberg (1988), pp. 31-32. 
441  Cf. Simerly/ Li (2000), p. 31 
442  Schumpeter (1950), p. 83. 
443  Cf. Mintzberg/ Westley (1992); Van de Ven (1992). 
444  Cf. Buzzell et al. (1975); Hofer/ Schendel (1978). Empirical ex.: Cf. Rumelt (1982); Child/ Smith (1987). 
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behaviour in response to environmental upheaval,445 these two options only constitute the two 
extreme ways of possible strategic behaviour to be determined. A more extensive 
categorisation has been provided by Miles and Snow (also see above) who distinguish 
between reactive, defensive, analysing and prospective types of organisational behaviour with 
reactive forms of behaviour constituting the most passive and prospective the most active 
ones. Whereas the authors determined these categories as a response to environmental change 
at a certain moment in time, they explicitly remarked that this classification also allowed 
accounting for the dynamic process of adjusting to environmental change and uncertainty in 
that organisational behaviour tended to become more active over time, showing as a 
continuous development from reactive, to defensive, to analysing to prospective strategies.446 
Only shortly after, Miles, by extending this work through adding a dynamic perspective, 
through case study research analysing organisational strategies of six major US tobacco 
companies after the introduction of an anti-smoking law447 identified an underlying tendency 
of organisations to become more active over time. He also showed that even the most 
“recalcitrant”448 organisations facing such pressures overcame their initial inertia in the end. 
In this respect Miles also pointed out the importance of considering an organisation’s 
development history and its learning process.449 Similar development paths have been found 
in other empirical studies such as in the case of Intel which, despite initially feeling like “Ford 
deciding to get out of cars”450 when leaving its core business, over the course of time began to 
embark on an entrepreneurial track that finally resulted in successful strategic renewal.451 
Back then as well as still today researchers acknowledge that Miles and Snow have captured 
different stages of strategy development rather than a typology of alternative strategic 
behaviours.452
 
  
                                                 
445  Cf. Mintzberg (1978). 
446  Cf. Miles/ Snow (1978), p. 3. 
447  This characterises a form of regulatory enforcement as can be found in those of European Energy Policy. 
448  Miles (1982), p. 242. 
449  Cf. Miles (1982), pp. 247, 256. 
450  Burgelman (1994), p. 41. 
451  For similar empirical examples cf. Jacobides (2005). 
452  Cf. Smith et al. (1986), p. 49. Others have criticised that Miles and Snow’s approach neglected industry 
pecularities as well as organisational capabilities. Cf. Desarbo et al. (2005). This can be countered here as 
industry and organisational characteristics are extensively dealt with. 
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In conclusion it can be derived that the underlying dynamics of strategic behaviour in 
response to environmental change from a Business Perspective takes place as a development 
of passive towards active business strategies. 
 
 
4.3 Institutional Perspective on Organisational Behaviour in 
Response to Environmental Change 
 
4.3.1 Theoretical Background 
 
Since its grounding by Selznick453, institutional theory can be said to have gone through a 
“distinct evolution”454, leading, amongst others, to the fact that no single self-contained theory 
exists. Consequently, “the beginning of wisdom in approaching institutional theory is to 
recognize that there is not one but several variants”455. In order to account for this fact in this 
work, and as others have done, reference is made to “the best available insights from the 
institutional literature, regardless of their disciplinary backgrounds”456
 
, here subordinated 
under the term ‘Institutional Perspective’. The underlying ideas as presented in the original 
approaches are briefly explained first in order to provide a basis for further analysis. 
Having been described as representing “the most complete conceptual transition away from 
models based on technical environments and strategic choice”457, a major reason for the 
emergence of institutional approaches goes back to the critic on traditional economics and 
‘Old Institutionalists’, or ‘Institutionalists of the first generation’. Academics from the ‘new’ 
era found the neo-classical approaches unhelpful.458
                                                 
453  Cf. Selznick (1957). 
 The approach that has recently gained 
increasing weight is what has been termed ‘New Institutionalism’, ‘Neo-Institutionalism’, or 
‘New Institutional Theory’ to show its distinctiveness from Institutional Economy. In its 
454  Lewin et al. (2004), p. 134. 
455  Scott (1987a), p. 493. 
456  Peng (2003), p. 276. 
457  Drazin et al. (2004), p. 162. 
458  Cf. For a depiction of historical relatedness cf. Jacoby (1990). 
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strongest form this perspective rejects the premise that organisational phenomena are the 
outcome of technical considerations. It has thus even been called the ‘antipole’ to rational 
choice approaches.459 As among the first, Meyer and Rowan had criticised that traditional 
economic assumptions had neglected the “dramatic enactments of the rationalized myths 
pervading modern societies”460 and their impact on organisational behaviour. The argument 
by institutional theorists that such myths of rationalisation do not exist because “individuals 
believe in them, but because they ‘know’ everyone else does”461 is crucial to be remarked in 
this context. As “classifications built into society”462 these institutionalised patterns or 
standards have become part of a shared reality and are so taken for granted “in their own 
right”463 that they are not questioned anymore, but at a certain point of time are accepted as 
“the rules of the game in a society”464.465
 
 
Before enlarging on this, a first fundamental statement that needs to be made is that 
institutional forces manifest themselves differently. In literature, no uniform conceptualisation 
exists, so that a substantial degree of vagueness, which partly is a result of the blurred 
terminology used in original literature, often remains.466 In reference to the field of biology 
the term ‘institution’ has been related to such systems that survive dramatic environmental 
change through evolutionary adaptation. This again may explain why certain rituals whose 
origin is not recognised anymore are still carried out. One of the “earliest and most influential 
versions”467 in this field was provided by Selznick who described ‘to institutionalise’ as ‘to 
infuse with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand’.468
                                                 
459  Cf. Müller-Jentsch (2003), p. 249. 
 When looking at 
the conceptual understanding of the original representatives of New Institutional Theory, 
460  Meyer/ Rowan (1977), p. 346. Or, as Walgenbach formulated: “Institutionalisten stehen der Vorstellung 
Webers, dass Organisationen gemäß ihren Blaupausen funktionieren, skeptisch gegenüber” (Walgenbach 
(1995), p. 269). 
461  Meyer (1977), p. 75. 
462  Berger/ Luckmann (1967), p. 54. 
463  Meyer et al. (1983), p. 61. 
464  North (1990), p. 3. 
465  Cf. DiMaggio/ Powell (1991a), p. 9. 
466  Cf. Müller-Jentsch (2003), p. 245; Senge (2006), p. 36; Walgenbach (2006), p. 389. For an overview over 
the development cf. Walgenbach (2002). For examples see Jepperson (1991), p. 143; Schülein (1987), p. 10; 
Esser (2000), p. 1. 
467  Scott (1987a), p. 493. 
468  Cf. Selznick (1957), p. 17. 
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differences but also overlapping contents can be detected. While Meyer and Rowan refer to 
institutions in form of social status, knowledge, particular behaviours, relations, or 
expectations as well as normative obligations and legal rules,469 DiMaggio and Powell again 
emphasise the state and professions, including the legal environment, rituals and standard 
operating procedures, as the major ‘rationalizers’ that mainly drive the process of structural 
change.470 Zucker instead refers to the cultural persistence of institutions and particularly 
emphasises the process of institutionalisation which continuously reproduces behaviours and 
leads to an underlying resistance to change.471 North again distinguishes between formal 
(rules, laws, legislations) and informal (values and perceptions) institutions.472 Based on this 
Scott developed the so-called ‘three pillars of institutions’ - a regulative, a normative and a 
cultural-cognitive one - to better conceptualise these various understandings.473 and Thus, 
despite the fact that such forces have been differentiated from hard factors such as market 
structure, technical issues or dependency on financial resources,474 it is accepted by now that 
also the institutional researcher “takes seriously the assumption that organizations are affected 
by their environments”475
 
. How the organisational environment is depicted from an 
institutional perspective is depicted in the following section. 
 
4.3.2 The Organisational Environment from an  
Institutional Perspective 
 
Within institutional approaches the concept of the organisational field has become prevalent 
to characterise the relevant organisational environment. Introduced by DiMaggio and Powell 
it is defined as the totality of relevant actors which “in the aggregate, constitute a recognized 
area of institutional life”476
                                                 
469  Cf. Meyer/ Rowan (1977), p. 343. 
. Other seminal researchers described these fields as a collection or 
470  Cf. DiMaggio/ Powell (1983), p. 147. 
471  Cf. Zucker (1977). 
472  Cf. North (1990), p. 45. 
473  Cf. Scott (1995), p. 33. 
474  Cf. Hasse (2006), p. 150. 
475  Scott/ Meyer (1991), p. 108. 
476  DiMaggio/ Powell (1983), p. 148. 
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community of organisations which operate in a common meaning system with similar 
products or functions, and which interact more frequently and fatefully with each other rather 
than with actors outside the field while mutually influencing each other and thus being 
relevant from the respective other actor’s perspective.477 Recent literature refers to 
institutional stakeholders who act as ‘gatekeepers of legitimacy’ and, according to their 
perception and preferences, assess a firm’s legitimacy.478 These field agents in turn exert 
different pressures on organisations within and thus are of crucial importance to their survival. 
While DiMaggio and Powell speak of coercive, normative and mimetic mechanisms,479 Scott, 
based on his three pillar concept, distinguishes between regulative, normative and cultural-
cognitive actors, forces and mechanisms at work in an organisational field.480 Despite some 
criticism,481
 
 the concept of organisational fields still forms an important element of 
institutional theory today as it provides a basis for depicting and explaining the implication of 
institutional forces on organisational behaviour. Being an established concept in literature by 
now, its classification is also used here to depict and explain the understanding of the 
institutional environment. 
In this respect the regulatory pillar can be depicted as representing ‘higher-order 
authorities’482 such as the state or regulatory bodies who issue laws, set rules and standards by 
expedience, explicit imperatives of rule-setting, monitoring and sanctioning, or by the mere 
‘virtue of their power’483 impose coercive pressure. While governmental bodies have been 
described as the “most significant”484 and “most obvious stakeholders”485, antitrust agencies 
such as cartel offices also possess a valuable form of power.486
                                                 
477  Cf. Meyer/ Rowan (1977), p. 347; Fligstein (1991), p. 313; Scott/ Meyer (1991), pp. 117-118; Scott (1994), 
p. 70; Scott (1995), p. 56. 
 At the same time there may be 
478  Cf. Lounsbury/ Glynn (2001), p. 553; Bansal/ Clelland (2004), p. 94. 
479  Cf. DiMaggio/ Powell (1983), pp. 150-153. 
480  Cf. Scott (1995), p. 35. 
481  As already pointed out by DiMaggio and Powell making a clear distinction between the different forces in 
reality is not always easy. The classification is therefore mainly analytical in nature but still valuable for 
further conceptualisation. Cf. DiMaggio/ Powell (1991a). 
482  Cf. Delmas/ Toffel (2004), p. 213. 
483  Cf. Scott (1987a), p. 507. 
484  Singh et al. (1991), p. 393. 
485  Delmas/ Toffel (2004), p. 213. 
486  Cf. Burns (1986), pp. 28-29. 
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situations where rather societal pressures become coercive,487 or where organisations have 
become “subject to the whims of suppliers”488. Normative pressures are exerted through 
collectivities such as professional networks or associations which issue certifications, set 
occupational standards or give accreditation. Through ‘professionalization’ in form of 
‘occupational socialization’ where e.g. information and experiences are shared and jobs 
rotated,489 a “pool of almost interchangeable individuals”490 is created. Here it has been 
shown that in many cases decision-makers within professional collectivities have similar 
educational histories and academic backgrounds that often lead to a convergence of mental 
models and result in shared beliefs about the environment and organisational conduct.491 
Within this setting certain expectations are diffused and normative pressures imposed. 
Especially organisations close to the public sphere and open to public scrutiny – as is the case 
with incumbents in the European gas industry - have been found to conform to normative 
pressures.492 Studies have, e.g., revealed that firms were influenced by industry associations, 
consultancies and storytelling to adopt certain standards and strategies.493 The cultural-
cognitive pillar again consist of societal forces which create a set of common beliefs and 
shared logic, leading to the institutionalisation of a certain pecking order that is accepted 
within the field.494 Scott thus described cognitive influences as “the internalized symbolic 
representations of the world”495. This was also particularly emphasised by Zucker who had 
claimed that persisting cognitive forces may become so anchored and taken-for-granted that 
they are continuously reproduced over time, e.g. through symbolic systems such as 
terminologies and signs, without being questioned or sanctioned. By guiding the 
understanding of reality organisations abide to them unconsciously instead of by conscious 
acceptance.496
                                                 
487  Cf. Deephouse (1996), p. 1027. 
 Moreover, as relationships with other field actors are subject to these cultural-
cognitive influences, too, relational networks may also lead to the diffusion of certain myths 
which then again gain legitimacy merely “on the supposition that they are rationally 
488  DiMaggio/ Powell (1983), p. 154. 
489  Cf. Arndt/ Bigelow (2000), p. 514. 
490  DiMaggio/ Powell (1983), p. 152. 
491  Cf. Huff (1982); Porac et al. (1989); Peng (2001). 
492  Cf. Edelman (1990). 
493  Cf. Newman (2000), p. 615; Delmas/ Toffel (2004), p. 214. 
494  Cf. Fligstein (1991), p. 313. 
495  Scott (1995), p. 40. 
496  Cf. Zucker (1977); Zucker (1983). 
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effective”497. From this perspective even efficiency concerns were seen as ‘rationalised 
myths’.498 In other cases certain measures are morally ruled out, such as efforts to apply 
economic criteria to public organisations of social welfare.499 In many cases interest groups 
have been particularly mentioned as important actors. In their role as gatekeepers they have 
considerable power by initiating governmental action, assigning importance to issues, 
exposing gaps between business practices and societal expectations as well as by confirming 
or eroding organisational legitimacy and thus willingly or unwillingly function as institutional 
agents.500
 
 
These forces are seen as ‘templates for organising’501
 
 within which organisations manage 
their survival – which again is dependent on their legitimacy. This will be explained in the 
following section. 
 
4.3.3 Drivers and Organisational Goals from an  
Institutional Perspective 
 
As a major driver of organisational behaviour the “imperative”502 of legitimacy is one of the 
constituting characteristics and has even been assigned to be the “anchor-point”503 for the 
complexities of the institutional world. While Boulding, by stating that “if an institution loses 
its legitimacy, it loses everything”504
                                                 
497  Meyer/ Rowan (1977), p. 347. 
, had already pointed out early the criticality of 
organisations being legitimate, Meyer and Rowan introduced this aspect into NIT by 
emphasising its importance as a prerequisite for organisations to have access to resources to 
498  Cf. Ruef/ Scott (1998), p. 879. Also cf. Scott (1995); Scott (2001). 
499  Cf. Hinings/ Greenwood (1988), p. 56. 
500  Cf. Scott (1987b), p. 114; Aldrich/ Fiol (1994), p. 660; Greening/ Gray (1994), p. 489; Mahon/McGowan 
(1996), p. 65. 
501  Cf. DiMaggio/ Powell (1991a), p. 27. 
502  Selznick (1996), p. 273. 
503  Suchman (1995), p. 571. 
504  Boulding (1968), p. 3. An even earlier reference regarding the importance of organisational legitimacy had 
apparently already been made by Parsons in 1960. Cf. Scott (1991), p. 169. 
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secure their survival.505 Also other seminal researchers argued along this line in that 
organisational survival was dependent on gaining legitimacy in form of political power and 
social fitness.506
 
 
The expression ‘legitimacy’, assumingly to be deriving from the Latin word ‘legis’, implies a 
behaviour which is in accordance with legal requirements.507 By now its application has been 
extended to include other areas as well. Following Scott’s pillar concept, a distinction can be 
made according to regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive legitimacy. In view of that, 
regulatory legitimacy can said to be enforced through legal sanctions which make 
organisations comply.508 Normative legitimacy is morally governed in that organisations 
comply with these forces out of ethical obligations or in conformance with norms established 
by professional institutions.509 Cultural-cognitive legitimacy again is gained by behaving 
according to what is common understanding and taken-for-granted.510 A similar 
categorisation has been made by Aldrich and Fiol who distinguish between cognitive and 
socio-political legitimacy. Cognitive legitimacy shows in the reproduction of taken-for-
granted beliefs and in the conformity to institutionalised archetypes. Socio-political 
legitimacy again reflects the embeddedness in relational and normative situations and is 
granted when organisational behaviour is seen as obligatory and buttressed by institutional 
agents,511 e.g. in form of ‘legitimating pushs by governmental institutions’512
                                                 
505  Cf. Meyer/ Rowan (1977), p. 340. The importance of legitimacy to gain access to resources was also pointed 
out by researchers within the resource dependency field. Cf. Pfeffer/ Salancik (1978). 
. Based on the 
three-pillar concept the actors, forces and mechanisms which provide the basis of compliance 
and organisational legitimacy can be depicted as follows. 
506  Cf. DiMaggio/ Powell (1983), p. 150. 
507  Cf. Ruef/ Scott (1998), p. 879. 
508  Legal mandates also provide legitimacy as already pointed out by Meyer and Rowan (1977), p. 347. 
509  Cf. Hoffman (1999), p. 353. 
510  Cf. Scott (1995). Also see table 1. 
511  Cf. Aldrich/ Fiol (1994). 
512  Cf. Hinings/ Greenwood (1988), p. 71. 
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Table 1: 513
 
 Three pillar concept – Basis of Legitimacy 
 Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Actors/ 
Sources 
Authorities, e.g. state or 
regulatory bodies 
Collectivities, e.g. professions 
& associations 
Society 
Forces 
Rules, laws, sanctions 
 
Certifications, accreditation 
e.g. occupational standards 
Common beliefs, shared logic 
of action 
Mechanism Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Basis of 
compliance 
Expedience in form of 
explicit imperatives, e.g. 
rule-setting, monitoring, 
sanctioning 
 
Social obligations, 
Professionalisation 
 
Taken-for-grantedness, shared 
understanding 
 
Basis of 
legitimacy 
Legally sanctioned Morally governed 
Culturally supported and 
recognisable 
 
 
An important characteristic of these depictions is that legitimacy is granted in form of an 
“external blessing”514 when organisations behave according to requirements, norms and 
expectations. From this perspective organisations do not ‘possess’ legitimacy but obtain it in 
form of a conferred status, endorsement, recognition, support or acceptance from those 
stakeholders upon which they depend and which determine what is appropriate and 
legitimate. This may, for instance, happen in form of ‘regulatory endorsement’ from the 
government or regulators, from professions or associations, or in form of public endorsement 
such as from consumers or voters.515 This has also been described as the ‘standard 
reference’516 of legitimacy, defined by Suchman as a “generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed systems of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”517
                                                 
513  Adopted from Scott (2001) who remarked that while this illustrative distinction was mainly analytical in 
nature it could still serve as a tool to analyse an organisation’s institutional setting (cf. Scott (2001), pp. 51-
58) and thus is suitable for this work. 
. Suchman further 
514  Meyer/ Rowan (1991), p. 56. 
515  Cf. Meyer/ Scott (1983), p. 201; Singh et al. (1991), p. 398; Elsbach/ Sutton (1992), p. 700; Aldrich/ Fiol 
(1994), p. 648; Scott (1995), p. 45; Suchman (1995), p. 594; Deephouse (1996), p. 1025; Deephouse/ Carter 
(2005), p. 332.  
516  Cf. Hellmann (2006), pp. 80-83. 
517  Suchman (1995), p. 574. 
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differentiated pragmatic legitimacy to which he assigned the attributes of ‘exchanging’ or 
‘influencing’. While the first refers to just ‘making sense’, the notion of influence implies that 
organisations can ‘do more’ by becoming active and presenting itself as particularly important 
and valuable.518 Following these considerations Scott later argued that organisations are not 
only capable of merely maintaining legitimacy, but of transforming and even creating it, 
critical aspects which also play an essential role with regards to organisational behaviour 
when confronted with environmental change and crisis. Thus, as pointed out recently by 
researchers, legitimacy not only secures survival and protects organisations from crises,519 but 
also allows them to deviate from institutionalised myths. Especially Scott pointed out the 
criticality of legitimacy and remarked that in order to ensure their survival during institutional 
environmental change organisations had to transport to stakeholders the message that they are 
‘legitimate’.520
 
 Which forms of institutional strategies organisations can apply to do so is 
determined next. 
 
4.3.4 Institutional Perspective on Organisational Behaviour in 
Response to Environmental Change 
 
4.3.4.1 Fundamental Strategic Behaviour 
 
Characteristic for institutional approaches is that especially in the beginning the perspective 
on organisational behaviour has been driven by the appraisal that organisations are “almost 
absorbed”521 by the institutional forces prevailing within an organisational field and forced to 
adopt those templates that have become legitimised there - even if this conformance implied 
the incurrence of costs and took place “in the absence of evidence that it increases internal 
efficiency”522.523
                                                 
518  Cf. Suchman (1995), p. 578. 
 The observation that organisational change may not be driven by 
519  Cf. Bansal/ Clelland (2004), p. 95. 
520  Cf. Scott (1994), p. 64; Scott (1995), p. 47. 
521  Meyer/ Rowan (1977), p. 352. 
522  Powell/ DiMaggio (1991b), p. 73. 
523  Cf. Meyer/ Rowan (1977); Meyer/ Zucker (1989). 
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competition or the need to become more efficient was what had actually lead DiMaggio and 
Powell to analyse what made organisations so similar and explain the “startling 
homogeneity”524 of organisational behaviour. They determined the above mentioned coercive, 
mimetic and normative mechanisms as drivers of such form of behaviour according to which 
organisations model themselves on other organisations they perceive as successful.525 Within 
such spirals of homogenisation where organisations closely observe each other,526 and 
“respond to an environment that consists of other organizations responding to their 
environment which consists of organizations responding to an environment of organizations’ 
responses”527, they become locked in like in an ‘iron cage of and behind institutionalised 
bars’.528 Those organisations which tried to escape this ‘prison’ by deviating from established 
structures were believed to threaten their legitimacy and hence survival.529 Newcomers to a 
field on the other hand were shown to have overcome their liability of newness by imitating 
institutionally legitimated archetypes and being ‘rewarded’530 by being granted the legitimacy 
needed for accessing essential resources. On a field level such an “inexorable push toward 
homogenization”531 was argued as finally resulting in the total institutionalisation of the field, 
leaving no space for individual action and strategic behaviour.532
 
 
It were especially these assumptions which increasingly raised attention by other researchers 
who criticised NIT for not being able to explain why organisations which share the same 
institutional field and face common institutional pressures pursue different, i.e. heterogeneous 
                                                 
524  DiMaggio/ Powell (1983), p. 148; DiMaggio/ Powell (1991b), p. 64. 
525  Cf. DiMaggio/ Powell (1983), pp. 151-156. Especially mimetic isomorphism has received greatest attention 
in literature, likely due to the high visibility of these field developments. Cf. Mizruchi/ Fein (1999), pp. 660, 
667. 
526  Cf. Fligstein (1991), p. 316; Abrahamson/ Fombrun (1994), p. 750. 
527  Powell/ DiMaggio (1991b), p. 65 citing Schelling ((1978), p. 14). 
528  Cf. Meyer/ Rowan (1977), p. 352; DiMaggio/ Powell (1983). 
529  Cf. Meyer/ Rowan (1977), p. 353. This effect has been empirically shown by natural selection researchers, 
with regards to newly founded organisations which had a high the mortality rate due to a lack of legitimacy. 
Cf. Hannan/ Freeman (1989); Hannan/ Carroll (1992); Delacroix/ Rao (1994). 
530  Cf. Scott (1987b), p. 126. 
531  DiMaggio/ Powell (1983), p. 148. 
532  Cf. DiMaggio/ Powell (1991a), p. 14. For early empirical studies cf. Tolbert (1985); Meyer (1982); Ritti/ 
Silver (1986). For other examples cf. Edelman (1990); Fligstein (1990); Edelman (1992); Jennings/ 
Zandbergen (1995); Deephouse (1996); Dobbin/ Sutton (1998); Flier et al. (2003). 
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strategies and to explain change.533 But even seminal scholars themselves had increasingly 
began to “challenge their own view”534. DiMaggio, for example, remarked that the process of 
institutionalisation “bears, if not the seeds of its own destruction, at least openings for 
substantial change”535. In fact, already Meyer and Rowan had indicated that institutions may 
change and organisations actively seek legitimacy, such forms were reduced to ceremony and 
the de-coupling of critical elements from institutionalised expectations and to make visible 
only those that conform to requirements,536 In this respect it has by now been acknowledged 
by critics that NIT also did not totally rule out but rather play down strategic interests.537
 
  
Particularly successive researchers took the de-institutionalisation of a field as a main driver 
to argue the possibility for strategic institutional behaviour. For institutional change to ‘bust 
loose’ and de-institutionalisation to take place, a certain threshold or tipping point which 
disturbs the balance in a field is required.538 These have been referred to as environmental or 
precipitating upheaval or jolts.539 Amongst others brought about through major alterations to 
legal frameworks, political settings, socio-cultural models540 or the dynamics underlying the 
collaboration between field players,541
                                                 
533  Cf. Greenwood/ Hinings (1996); Dacin (1997); Fox-Wolfgramm et al. (1998); Kondra/ Hinings (1998); 
Lawrence (1999); Phillips et al. (2000); Lounsbury (2001); Lawrence et al. (2002); Baum/ Rao (2004); 
Delmas/ Toffel (2004); Van de Ven/ Hargrave (2004); Delmas/ Toffel (2005); Schneiberg/ Clemens (2006). 
 they create ambiguous, if not conflicting, and time-
lagged signals which result in a large degree of uncertainty. Others even described such 
534  Van de Ven/ Hargrave (2004), p. 266. As another example cf. DiMaggio (1988), p. 11. 
535  DiMaggio (1991), p. 287. 
536  Cf. Meyer/ Rowan (1977), pp. 344, 355-357; Rowan (1982), pp. 261-263. De-coupling here is different to 
that proposed by early organisational theorists (cf. Thompson (1967); Lawrence/ Lorsch (1967)) who refer to 
a structural de-coupling of the technical core while institutional scholars speak of ceremonial de-coupling. 
537  Cf. Goodstein (1994), p. 350; Suchman (1995), p. 576. 
538  Cf. DiMaggio/ Powell (1983), pp. 154-156; Jepperson (1991); Oliver (1992); Greenwood/ Hinings (1996), p. 
1024; Tolbert/ Zucker (1996); Beckert (1999); Lawrence et al. (2001); Greenwood et al. (2002); Scott 
(2002); Baum/ Rao (2004); Hinings et al. (2004); Poole/ Van de Ven (2004); Van de Ven/ Hargrave (2004); 
Ebner (2008). For empirical studies cf. Singh et al. (1991); Hoffman (1997). 
539  Cf. Meyer (1982); Newman (2000), p. 603; Greenwood et al. (2002), p. 60. 
540  Some explicitly call this ‘Zeitgeist’ or ideology. Cf. Brint/ Karabel (1991), p. 343; Czarniawska/ Joerges 
(1996), pp. 30-32; Greenwood/ Hinings (1996), p. 1043; Jones (2001), p. 914; Ingram/ Silverman (2002), pp. 
2-7; Rodrigues/ Child (2003), p. 2140. 
541  Cf. Edelman (1990), p. 1417; Fligstein (1991), p. 317; Jepperson (1991), pp. 152-153; Oliver (1992); Baron 
et al. (1986); Haveman/ Rao (1997); Phillips et al. (2000); Kraatz/ Moore (2002); Lee/ Pennings (2002); 
Thornton (2002); Townley (2002); Baum/ Rao (2004), p. 241; Van de Ven/ Hargrave (2004). Others 
described the institutional environment as a faceted ‘multi-level system’ in that not only forces from within a 
field but also those from outside should be mentioned (cf. Seo/ Creed (2002), pp. 240-241; Poole/ Van de 
Ven (2004), p. 384), a depiction which can be compared with the macro-economical forces as depicted in 
business-oriented approaches (see above). 
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situations as organisations being ‘bombarded’542 with forces of change which may lead to 
“institutional war”543. At the same time such ‘turbulent or ill formed’544 organisational fields 
also open up opportunities for organisations to manoeuvre and “strategically put forth 
practices or models that strike external actors as appropriate or effective”545 as well as “niches 
for “outlaw” entrepreneurs”546 to embark on new tracks. The implementation of new laws, for 
example, not only constitutes a threat to a prevailing institutional setting but also opens up 
opportunities such as by leaving scope for interpretation and thus “for bootlegging incidental 
changes into organizations”547, thereby legitimising unorthodox but revitalising 
experiments.548 From this perspective the institutional environment can be seen as a pool of 
resources which serves as a backdrop for strategic behaviour that diverges from established 
actions.549
 
  
An even greater impact for the advancement of NIT, however, was the acknowledgement of 
agency power in form of a self-interested ‘institutional entrepreneur’550. This introduced a 
totally new element and provided researchers with the possibility of integrating strategic 
choice without creating inconsistencies with the fundamental arguments underlying 
institutional theory. It also allowed bringing analysis from an aggregate field to an 
organisational level to explain individual organisational strategies and thus heterogeneous 
behaviour, ‘freeing’ NIT from the notion that institutional forces only result in 
isomorphism.551 Due to this influential power, institutional entrepreneurs have also been 
called “the shock troops of innovation”552 or, more moderately expressed, “fashion setters”553
                                                 
542  Cf. Scott (2004), p. 24. 
. 
Kondra and Hinings classify such fringe players as ‘renegade’ types which, knowingly or 
543  Hoffman (1999), p. 352. 
544  Cf. Fligstein (1991), p. 316; Van de Ven/ Hargrave (2004), p. 264. 
545  Zimmerman/ Zeitz (2002), p. 422. 
546  Suchman (1995), p. 594. 
547  Meyer (1982), p. 533. 
548  Cf. Edelman (1992); Campbell (2004). 
549  Cf. Singh et al. (1991); Whittington (1992), p. 704; Meyer et al. (1993); Suchman (1995); Goodrick/ 
Salancik (1996), pp. 4-5; Oliver (1996); Beckert (1999), pp. 780-785; D’Aunno et al. (2000); Phillips et al. 
(2000); Seo/ Creed (2002), p. 241; Zimmerman/ Zeitz (2002), p. 418; Kumar (2003); Peng (2003), p. 278. 
550  Cf. DiMaggio (1988), p. 14. 
551  Cf. Schulze (1997); Beckert (1999), p. 789; Hoffman (1999), p. 367; Scott (2001), p. 75. For a review on the 
development cf. Jepperson (2002). 
552  Etzioni (1987), p. 179. 
553  Zimmerman/ Zeitz (2002), p. 426. 
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unknowingly, operate outside the institutional norm.554 At the same time research has shown 
that this is also dependent on organisational characteristics in that large organisations, which 
generally are more visible and exposed to their environment and thus more likely to be 
singled out, often become targets of institutional actors while less visible ones are able to 
escape scrutiny.555 Similarly, several researchers indicated that those organisations which 
have been successful in the past are more likely to ‘get away with’ deviating behaviour. 
Particularly these forms of organisational behaviour then serve as a blueprint that is copied by 
other field members and thus leads to change.556
 
 The temporal dimension underlying the 
institutional strategies will be looked at next. 
 
4.3.4.2 Development of Strategic Environmental Responses over Time 
 
Following the fact that change has not only become an integral part of NIT but is generally 
described as taking place as a process that is characterised by phases of de-institutionalisation 
and re-institutionalisation, organisational behaviour has been depicted as developing along by 
generally moving from one template to another.557 Essentially, the development of 
institutional responses to environmental changes over time can be characterised as mirroring a 
“reflection of strategic choice to accommodate the institutional pressures”558. And while it 
was initially still found paradox that legitimacy could be created by organisations 
themselves,559 it is acknowledged by now that organisations can mobilise and successfully 
promote new structures and repertoires of acting. In fact, they are not only capable of 
‘strategically legitimising’560 but, when possessing the legitimacy, of ‘creative 
destruction’561.562
                                                 
554  Cf. Kondra/ Hinings (1998), in particular pp. 753-758. Also cf. Kellog (2006). 
 
555  Cf. Scott (1992), p. 241; Greening/ Gray (1994), p. 490. 
556  Cf. Greenwood/ Hinings (1993), p. 1074; Fligstein (1997); Lawrence (1999); Arndt/ Bigelow (2000); 
Newman (2000); Greenwood et al. (2002); Sherer/ Lee (2002), p. 107; Lewin/ Kim (2004); Van de Ven/ 
Hargrave (2004); Clemens/ Douglas (2005), p. 1207; Lu (2005); Bourdieu (2008), p. 364. 
557  Cf. Greenwood/ Hinings (1996), p. 1026; Hinings et al. (2004), p. 304. 
558  Hinings/ Greenwood (1988), p. 161. 
559  Cf. Hinings/ Greenwood (1988), pp. 124-125. 
560  Cf. Brint/ Karabel (1991); Fligstein (1991), pp. 316, 334; Selznick (1996), p. 273; Greenwood/ Hinings 
(1996); Fligstein (2001), p. 110; Zimmerman/ Zeitz (2002), p. 421; Hinings et al. (2004), pp. 307, 309; 
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The underlying notion of corporate behaviour in institutional approaches can therefore be 
depicted as ranging between an organisation’s passive conformance, or acceptance, and its 
active drive. Even more, these responses again can be distinguished according to their degree 
of activity. While reference to the lifecycle concept (see above) has been made here, too,563 
the most frequently mentioned concept to categorise the development of institutional 
responses in institutional literature is the one established by Oliver. Distinguishing along a 
continuum from passive to active behaviour, Oliver developed a typology of strategic actions 
which organisations may enact as a “repertoire of behaviours”564 in response to pressures 
from the institutional environment. According to Oliver, the most passive institutional 
strategy is that of acquiescing, followed by compromising, avoiding, defying, and 
manipulating as the most active strategy type. Also Suchman, despite only distinguishing 
between three main types of institutional strategies, i.e. conforming, selecting, and 
manipulating, not only sees these as fundamental forms of organisational behaviour but as 
characterising an increasing degree of organisational influence towards forms of pre-emptive 
measures.565 Hinings et al. even find that by “wittingly responding to opportunities in order to 
capture advantage”566 organisations may actually drive change and create a more favourable 
environment themselves – such as by interpreting and translating changes against the 
background of their own position, capabilities, commitments, and history as pointed out by 
others.567
                                                                                                                                                        
Lewin/ Kim (2004); Scott (2004), pp. 11-13. For case study examples on the ‘translation of organisational 
change’ cf. Czarniawska/ Sevón (1996). One of the first empirical studies was conducted by Meyer (1982). 
For subsequent examples cf. Leblebici et al. (1991); Goodrick/ Salancik (1996); Kraatz/ Zajac (1996); 
Delmas/ Toffel (2004). 
 
561  Cf. Beckert (1999), p. 786; Newman (2000), p. 615; Baum/ Rao (2004), p. 241. As this shows, reference to 
Schumpeter has been made here, too (also see above). 
562  Cf. Aldrich/ Fiol (1994); Tolbert/ Zucker (1996); Galaskiewicz (1997); Clemens/ Cook (1999); Dyck/ Starke 
(1999); Kraatz/ Moore (2002); Hinings et al. (2004), pp. 314-317. 
563  Cf. Steger/ Winter (1997). 
564  Oliver (1991), p. 159. 
565  Cf. Suchman (1995), p. 593. 
566  Hinings et al. (2004), p. 311. From this perspective institutional change has also been defined as a “process 
that starts when one or several players perceive that they could do better with an altered agreement or 
contract” (Lamberg et al. (2002), p. 4). 
567  Cf. Greenwood/ Hinings (1996), p. 1048. Also cf. Campbell (2004). At the same time Greenwood and 
Hinings pointed out that organisational characteristics may also hinder organisations from developing the 
necessary “action capability” (Greenwood/ Hinings (1996), p. 1041) to become more active, e.g. when being 
too deeply embedded in historical ties. 
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4.4 Applicability of the Business and the Institutional 
Perspective as a Framework for Analysis 
 
After having analysed both approaches, a row of common as well as different characteristics 
can be determined. First of all, each is distinct with regards to the characterisation of the 
forces which constitute the respective business or institutional environment, the main actors 
and organisational goals necessary for survival in this environment, and hence strategic 
behaviour. To summarise, the focus of business-based approaches lies on a market-oriented 
perspective where organisations’ strategic behaviour is directed at economic and competitive 
market forces, constituting what has here been termed the ‘business environment’. From this 
perspective the organisational goal is to achieve an economically favourable product-market 
position to finally gain a competitive advantage. Transferring this to empirical reality as laid 
out in chapter III, the forces of competition and sustainability, for example, need to operate 
profitable and sustainable to not only retain customers but to satisfy their demands with 
regards to price and service, something not in focus in monopolistic markets. The institutional 
perspective again focuses on drivers from and strategic behaviour directed at the ‘institutional 
environment’, such as regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive ones. Here, the 
organisational objective is to achieve legitimacy as the main criterion for survival and 
success. For incumbents in the European gas industry this means that the forces of 
competition and sustainability also require organisations to satisfy institutional actors such as 
authorities from the European Union as initiators and drivers of change, and society’s 
expectations with regards to their behaviour. To achieve these goals, both perspectives 
propose different forms of strategic behaviour. The following table contrasts these 
differences. 
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Table 2: 568
  Perspective 
 Comparing main characteristics of the Business and the Institutional  
 
 Business Perspective Institutional Perspective 
Characterisation of the 
organisational environment 
Business Forces 
(e.g. competition, substitution) 
Institutional Forces 
(e.g. regulatory, normative, cognitive) 
Main external actors 
Business Agents 
(e.g. existing competitors, new rivals, 
suppliers, customers) 
Institutional Agents 
(e.g. authorities, associations, society) 
Organisational goals Competitive advantage Legitimacy 
Strategic behaviour 
Range of passive and active business 
strategies and tactics 
Range of passive and active 
institutional strategies and tactics 
 
 
At the same time both approaches not only allow taking account of a temporal dimension but 
depict organisational behaviour in response to environmental change as taking pace along a 
continuum which again is constituted by passive to pro-active strategies. This is illustrated in 
the figure below, where each perspective is depicted as an axis which again presents the 
development from passive to pro-active strategies. Based on the underlying notion inherent in 
both approaches that organisations’ responses to environmental change tend to become more 
active over time, organisational behaviour has been portrayed as what has here been termed 
the ‘Business Development Path’ and the ‘Institutional Development Path’ (see figure below). 
                                                 
568  Own figure based on insights gained above. 
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Figure 11:569
 
  Commonalities in portraying organisational behaviour in response to 
environmental change over time 
 
 
 
A final conclusion that can be drawn at this point therefore is that the assumption of the 
applicability and necessity of these two approaches as the fundamental framework for 
empirical analysis, as formulated above, can be confirmed. 
 
Having determined this, another assessment to be made is that both perspectives mainly 
emphasise the impact of external drivers on corporate behaviour and so neglect organisation-
specific characteristics. At the same time statements in both approaches have referred to 
internal factors to enhance their explanation. In order to guarantee a comprehensive analysis, 
such an internal view is introduced in the following part to form a complementary 
perspective. 
 
 
                                                 
569 Own figure. 
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4.5 Complementary Perspective – An Internal View  
to explain Organisational Behaviour in Response to 
Environmental Change 
 
4.5.1 Introduction 
 
“We are impressed by the impact of an organization’s history and its ideology (...), by the role 
that personality and intuition play in decision making. To miss this in research is to miss the 
very lifeblood of the organization.”570 While already formulated by Mintzberg in 1979, the 
fact that organisational factors such as an organisation’s size571, its resources and capabilities 
as well as managerial perception and leadership play a critical role for explaining 
organisational behaviour has also been determined by several studies.572 Fox-Wolfgramm et 
al., for example, found that despite the fact that regulatory forces to comply had become 
stronger across the whole industry and exerted homogeneising pressure, each company’s 
strategic orientation also played an important role with regards to managing these forces over 
the course of time.573 Similarly, Albert had pointed out a decade early that in order to 
understand organisational phenomena one had to take into consideration the underlying 
motives, aims or expectations.574 Research on the oil industry again revealed that commitment 
from top management, strategic intent, vision and clear objectives as well as a change of 
beliefs and attitudes regarding overall benefits were pointed out as key success factors for 
explaining differences in behaviour. Particularly the person of the CEO, his capabilities, 
cognition and perception, able to turn a company from a ‘lame duck’ into a leading one by 
setting targets or even industry standards for others, has been shown to be critical.575
                                                 
570  Mintzberg (1979), pp. 587-588. 
 
Moreover, in addition to this empirical evidence it is also theoretically established by now 
571  As variables for measurement the number of employees or sales may, for instance, be taken in empirical 
research. Cf. Finon et al. (2004), pp. 297-298. 
572  Cf. Pfeffer/ Leblebici (1973), p. 273; Boeker (1989); Grant/ Cibin (1996), p. 185; Dyck/ Starke (1999); 
Siggelkow (2001); Taylor-Bianco/ Schermerhorn (2006). 
573  Cf. Fox-Wolfgramm et al. (1998). 
574  Cf. Albert (1988). 
575  Cf. Grant/ Cibin (1996), p. 185; Green/ Keogh (2000), pp. 252-255; Jenkins (2000), p. 627; Stonham (2000), 
pp. 415-417; Kolk/ Levy (2001), p. 506. 
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that an internal view is essential to complement externally-oriented approaches in order to 
assure a comprehensive analysis. The most prominent approach to representing such an 
internal perspective is the RBV. 
 
 
4.5.2  The Resource-Based View (RBV) 
 
4.5.2.1 Origination 
 
The first to point out the interaction of the external environment with management structures 
were contingency theorists.576 Shortly after, also organisational theorists Cyert and March 
remarked that “the decisions of the firm are not always uniquely determined by its external 
environment”577. Emery and Trist (also see above) determined that in order to reach their 
strategic objectives organisations required ‘distinctive competences’.578 Research in the 
business strategy field again found that market conditions “are clearly not all that matters”579. 
Instead, as pointed out by the researchers, unique endowments, positioning and strategic 
choice likewise determined organisational success.580 Among the first within the Industrial 
Economic discipline were Hatten and Schendel who, based on empirical studies, raised the 
notion of the impact of organisational characteristics and heterogeneity within an industry.581 
Similarly, Rumelt, building on insights from empirical analysis, found that firms within the 
same industry compete with considerably different bundles of resources and apply distinct 
approaches. He remarked that such results “either contradict or stand completely outside the 
neoclassical theory of the firm and the standard models used in industrial organization”582
                                                 
576  Cf. Burns/ Stalker (1961) (e.g. p. 121); Woodward (1965); Lawrence/ Lorsch (1967). 
 and 
referred to Schumpeter and his depiction of innovating entrepreneurs as possessing ‘special 
577  Cyert/ March (1963), p. 20. 
578  Cf. Emery/ Trist (1965), p. 25. 
579  Rumelt (1991), p. 168. 
580  Cf. Tosi/ Carroll (1976), p. 155. Later especially Rumelt (1991). The notion of strategic choice had already 
been emphasised by Child who pointed out that organisations had a room to manoeuvre despite being subject 
of strong environmental influences. Cf. Child (1970); Child (1972); Child (1997), in particular p. 70. 
581  Cf. Hatten/ Schendel (1977); Hatten et al. (1978). Also cf. Cool/ Schendel (1987). 
582  Rumelt (1984), p. 558. 
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information’ which allowed them to be unique and create monopoly rents.583 Dierickx and 
Cool again formulated that the heart of a firm’s competitive position was its ‘bundle of 
assets’584 and Chakravarthy pointed out that the value of future strategic options and the 
differentiation from competitors was fundamentally determined by the accumulation of slack 
resources.585 Essentially, an organisation’s resource endowment reveals to which degree it is 
able to enter markets with above-average return. The creation of a unique competitive 
position again is achieved through the pattern of resource deployment.586 While the RBV has 
been criticised for its one-sided perspective on quasi-rents and for ignoring external drivers as 
emphasised by market-based approaches,587 its interdependency with market-based 
perspectives is acknowledged by now.588 Its contributions as a theoretical framework are laid 
out next.589
 
 
 
4.5.2.2 Fundamentals 
 
4.5.2.2.1 Terminological Delineation 
 
Basically, representatives of the RBV590 see organisational success as dependent on and 
inherent in corporate resources, turning the externally oriented explanatory approaches 
towards the inside of organisations which, in resemblance to the structure-conduct-
performance scheme (see above), has also been described as a ‘resource-conduct-performance 
chain’591
                                                 
583  Cf. Rumelt (1984), pp. 560-561. 
. Especially in times of growing environmental turbulence this perspective became 
584  Cf. Dierickx/ Cool (1989), p. 1504. 
585  Cf. Chakravarthy (1986). 
586  Cf. Hofer/ Schendel (1978), p. 25. 
587  Cf. Peteraf (1990), p. 10; Barney (1991), p. 100. 
588  Cf. Dierickx/ Cool (1989); Amit/ Schoemaker (1993); Peteraf (1993); Teece et al. (1997). 
589  For a discussion on whether the RBV constitutes a ‘theory’ see Priem and Butler (2001) and Barney’s 
response to their article (cf. Barney (2001)). 
590  Among the most prominent and most cited ones are Wernerfelt (1984); Dierickx/ Cool (1989); Peteraf 
(1990/ 1993); Prahalad/ Hamel (1990); Barney (1991/ 1992); Teece et al. (1991). 
591  Cf. Rasche (1994), p. 4. 
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increasingly important.592 Tushman and Anderson, for instance, had pointed out relatively 
early that organisational resources may constitute a limiting factor in that a lack may constrain 
market and/ or product expansion.593 Despite the wide application of the RBV there still is 
neither a commonly acknowledged definition of the term ‘resource’ nor a clear delineation of 
the RBV.594 Based on literature research one could say that the expression ‘RBV’ 
encompasses all concepts that aim to explain organisational success on the basis of the 
existence of unique organisational characteristics.595 While Wernerfelt, as one of the early 
writers, broadly depicted resources as “anything which could be thought of as a strength or 
weakness”596 of a company, it was particularly Barney who progressed the RBV. He defined 
resources as including assets, capabilities as well as processes, corporate attributes, 
information, and knowledge which are controlled by the firm and enable it to develop and 
implement strategies to improve efficiency and effectiveness.597 Later, Barney also included 
luck as a resource for success.598 Collis and Montgomery further classified resources into 
tangible and intangible ones and into organisational capabilities. While tangible resources are 
those which are of physical nature and appear on a company’s balance sheet, intangible ones 
are not seizable and cannot be easily capitalised upon, such as competencies or an 
organisation’s culture and image. Capabilities again refer to human capital which includes the 
employees’ know-how, skills as well as their experience and motivation. According to the 
two authors organisational capabilities are especially critical as they determine the strategic 
value of a company’s resources.599 Makadok again recently defined resources as ‘an 
observable asset’ which can be valued and traded and thus also integrated brands or patents, 
previously categorised as intangible, as strategic assets.600
 
 
An extension of the notion of resources and capabilities is that of ‘core competences’. As in 
the case of categorising resources, different terminologies also exist for this concept as 
                                                 
592  In this respect Hart relatively early pointed out the importance of the ‘biophysical’ environment and 
respective strategies for sustainable development. Cf. Hart (1995). 
593  Cf. Tushman/ Anderson (1986). Also cf. Anderson/ Tushman (1990). 
594  Cf. Rasche (1994), p. 38. 
595  For an overview see Bürki (1996), pp. 27-31; Priem/ Butler (2001), p. 24. 
596  Wernerfelt (1984), p. 172. 
597  Cf. Barney (1991). For Barney’s definition of resources see page 101. 
598  Cf. Barney (2001), p. 50. 
599  Cf. Collis/ Montgomery (1997). 
600  Cf. Makadok (2001). 
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becomes apparent in the various terminologies applied - such as core competences, core 
competencies, core or strategic capabilities. A common trait, however, is that they generally 
enable organisations to transform inputs, which are also accessible to competitors, into 
outputs more efficiently and/ or with greater quality than rivals.601 Others again pointed out 
that they enable organisations to gain strategic control during change.602 Here, the term ‘core 
competencies’ is used as proposed by seminal researchers Hamel and Prahalad who define 
them as “the collective learning in the organization”603 and, as a fundamental characteristic, 
point out their ability to produce several different outcomes.604
 
 This is further enlarged on in 
the following. 
 
4.5.2.2.2 The Meaning of Resources and Capabilities for  
Organisational Behaviour 
 
The basis of organisational behaviour within the RBV is formed by the consideration that 
above-average returns are inherent in internal resources which make organisations specific/ 
heterogeneous and form the basis for strategic behaviour and competitive advantage over 
rivals.605 The heterogeneous resource endowment, as also already pointed out by Penrose606 
who defined the business firm as “a collection of productive resources”607, again is seen as an 
organisation’s strategic success potential. This explains the differences in organisational 
performance of companies within an industry or strategic group.608 Within the RBV 
researchers therefore also speak of rents rather than profits in that they stem from resources 
that are designated to a certain use and lose their value if applied differently.609
                                                 
601  Cf. Lenz (1980b). 
 In this respect 
Grant, for example, pointed out that monopoly rents from market power are actually based on 
602  Cf. Band/ Scanlan (1995). 
603  Hamel/ Prahalad (1990), p. 82. 
604  Cf. Hamel/ Prahalad (1990), p. 81. 
605  In this respect Denrell et al. formulated that “firms are distinguished by the resources they command” 
(Denrell et al. (2003), p. 977). 
606  Cf. Penrose (1959), pp. 75-76. 
607  Penrose (1956), p. 31. 
608  Cf. Barney (1986b), p. 1231; Barney (1991), pp. 99-102; Collis (1991), p. 2; Peteraf (1990), p. 1; Amit/ 
Schoemaker (1992), p. 7; Peteraf (1993), p. 186. 
609  Cf. Rumelt (1987), p. 142; Peteraf (1993), p. 180. 
Chapter IV: Establishing a Theoretical Framework 107 
organisational resources.610 Later, this consideration was extended in that the ownership and 
the effective deployment of such ‘assets’ allowed companies to obtain a competitive 
advantage while functioning as individual isolating mechanisms which protect the erosion of 
profits and competitive advantage.611 Others draw attention to the value of superior 
managerial skills as an isolating mechanism and rent-generating corporate resource.612 
Diversification from a resource-based perspective can then be explained in that it allows firms 
to capitalise on their existing resources and capabilities when expanding into other 
businesses.613 Empirical studies found related diversification where firms ‘stick close to their 
knitting’614 to yield better results than unrelated diversification.615
 
 
In order to provide such benefits, however, and especially as rivals are generally able to 
obtain similar or substitute resources of successful organisations in the market, the 
sustainability of their contribution is dependent on the notion that they are rare, not-
substitutable, “difficult if not impossible to imitate”616 and imperfectly mobile.617 Barney 
again added that their potential must be fully exploitable.618 Endowments fulfilling these 
criteria are inherent in an organisation’s historical development and learning path as these are 
unique, not replicable and thus not imitable while at the same time being highly valuable.619 
From the notion that “history matters”620 Dosi et al. derive that where an organisation can go 
is “a function of where it has been”621
                                                 
610  Cf. Grant (1991), pp. 117-118. 
. Based on such historical decisions made in the past, 
organisations are tied to a certain track which influences its future development, such as 
611  Cf. Rumelt (1984), p. 568; Wernerfelt (1984), p. 173; Teece (1990a); Collis/ Montgomery (1995). Teece 
applied this consideration to compare the structure and organisation of the natural gas industry in the U.S. 
and Germany. Cf. Teece (1990b). 
612  Cf. Castanias/ Helfat (1991). 
613  Cf. Penrose (1959); Yip (1982); Haveman (1992). 
614  Cf. Peters/ Waterman (1982). 
615  Cf. Rumelt (1974). 
616  Teece et al. (1991), p. 19. 
617  Cf. Dierickx/ Cool (1988), p. 7; Peteraf (1993). 
618  Cf. Based on these four characteristics Barney established the so called ‘VRIO-Framework’ as an 
abbreviation for Value-Rarity-Imitability-Organisation Framework. Cf. Barney (1997), p. 173. 
619  Cf. Penrose (1959), p. 48; Cohen/ Levinthal (1990), p. 135; North (1990), p. 76; Reed/ DeFillippi (1990), p. 
91; Barney (1991), p. 107; Collis (1991), p. 20; Teece et al. (1991), p. 27; Dosi et al. (1992), p. 20. 
620  Alt/ North (1990), p. vii. Also cf. Collis (1991), p. 51 
621  Dosi et al. (1992), p. 20. 
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investment commitments which constitute sunk and switching costs.622 Moreover, the fact 
that resources and capabilities are embedded within an organisational specific context and 
thus are strongly interdependent, makes them valuable only within such organisational 
routines or patterns of behaviour which again constitute an organisation’s “most important 
form of storage”623 of operational knowledge.624 Teece similarly remarks that a “firm’s 
performance is a function of deeply engrained repertoires”625. Critically, and together with 
competitors’ bounded rationality and absorptive capacity such constitutions create a situation 
of ‘causal ambiguity’ which leaves competitors uncertain about the real basis of success 
potentials and thus functions as a barrier to imitation.626 Additionally, being able to draw on 
historical experience, as another firm specific characteristic, prepares organisations to better 
assess and opportunise on environmental change and hence create a competitive advantage.627 
At the same time it has been pointed out that such commitments and dependencies may 
constitute lock-ins which make organisations prisoners of their past and thus hinder response 
to environmental change and the creation of future success potential.628 Or they may lead 
organisations into a ‘competency trap’, so that they rather invest in existing businesses than 
develop new ones more appropriate for a changed external environment.629
 
 
Thus, the complementary value of the internal perspective particularly lies in promoting 
internal sources as enabling organisations to encounter environmental threats while exploiting 
opportunities to generate sustainable success and secure survival. In this respect researchers 
pointed out the existence of ‘strategic windows of opportunity’ that have to be considered in 
order to take advantage of ‘commitment opportunities’ and that organisations constantly need 
to augment critical competitive capabilities to be able to act.630
                                                 
622  Cf. Collis (1991d), p. 1; Collis/ Montgomery (1996), pp. 49-50. 
 From a core competence 
perspective those organisations which are able to do so fastest are likely to be the most 
623  Nelson/ Winter (1982), p. 99. 
624  Cf. Doz/ Hamel (1991), p. 6; Amit/ Schoemaker (1992), pp. 12-13. 
625  Teece (1984), p. 106. 
626  Cf. Cohen/ Levinthal (1990), p. 128; Dierickx/ Cool (1990), p. 13; Barney (1991), p. 108; Collis/ 
Montgomery (1996), p. 50. 
627  Cf. Denrell et al. (2003). 
628  Cf. Levitt/ March (1990), pp. 16-22; North (1990), p. 17; Ghemawat (1991), p. 17. Also cf. Ghemawat 
(1993). 
629  Cf. Levitt/ March (1988), p. 322; Teece et al. (1991), p. 32. 
630  Cf. Abell (1978), p. 21; Barney (1991), p. 100; Collis (1991), pp. 3-4; Teece et al. (1991), pp. 19, 30-32. 
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successful ones.631 These considerations also show the interdependency of an organisation’s 
internal situation with its environmental surroundings, and thus with externally oriented 
approaches.632
 
 What this means with regards to complementing business- and institutionally-
based approaches concluded on in the following. 
 
4.6 Conclusion – Requiring an Integrated Explanatory 
Framework 
 
Essentially, the review of the above theoretical approaches has revealed that they are not only 
relevant but essential for being able to conduct a comprehensive empirical analysis of the 
behaviour of European gas incumbents in response to environmental changes as enforced 
through changes in European energy policy over the past decade. That is, the Business 
Perspective is important as it captures such environmental forces, goals and organisational 
behaviour identified as market-related, while the Institutional Perspective covers those here 
addressed as institutional ones. The Resource Perspective on the other hand, apart from 
balancing the predominantly external views, serves as a complementary approach for linking 
the business and the institutional perspective. 
 
These interrelations which simultaneously constitute the explanatory basis for analysis are 
shown in the following illustration. 
                                                 
631  Cf. Prahalad/ Hamel (1990), p. 81. For an extensive discussion on the creation of competitive advantage 
through core competences see Rasche (1994). 
632  In the Strategic Management literature this is addressed within the SWOT framework which serves as the 
basis for fitting organisational Strengths (S) and Weaknesses (W) with environmental Threats (T) and 
Opportunities (O) for developing an appropriate corporate strategy. Cf. Priem/ Butler (2001), p. 25. 
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Figure 12:633
 
  Fundamental theoretical framework - setting the basis for empirical analysis 
 
Having established this as the underlying explanatory framework, a model must now be 
determined which embraces these considerations allows conducting empirical analysis 
accordingly. This will be done in the proceeding chapter, beginning with a review of existing 
empirical studies dealing with the change of the European gas industry.634
                                                 
633  Own figure. 
 
634  This includes literature existing until the year 2005 when beginning this thesis. 
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CHAPTER V DEVELOPING AN INTEGRATED MODEL FOR 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
5.1 Reviewing Relevant Literature 
 
5.1.1 Status of Empirical Industry Studies 
 
5.1.1.1 Insights from Research on European Gas Markets 
 
One of the first and at the same time few publications which focussed on European gas 
markets and organisational behaviour within was issued by Chevalier, who considered 
possible strategic reactions in response to pending liberalisation, in 1992. Being practically 
oriented without specific reference to theoretical approaches, Chevalier assumed that 
companies needed an increased ‘strategic alertness’ and defensive as well as offensive 
strategies to fend off threats from new entrants. As a first defensive ‘reflex’ he found gas 
companies to have established a powerful lobby in Brussels to prevent TPA from being 
implemented. He himself proposed that companies should achieve cost advantages by 
exploiting economies of scale and scope and by reducing prices as much as possible in order 
to defend themselves. For British Gas, within the U.K. as the first European market to be 
liberalised (also see above), such measures lead to a “Mont Blanc of cash flow”635
                                                 
635  Chevalier (1992), p. 182. 
, and may 
thus have served as a role model for other European gas companies. As offensive strategies 
Chevalier proposed the backward integration via acquiring production sites or exploration 
licences from oil companies while also not ruling out mergers with these. At the same time he 
pointed out the difficulty and costliness of such upstream integration, until then only 
successfully pursued by British Gas which in return turned into the only truly ‘Global Gas 
Company’ at that time, again serving as an example for the ‘rest’ of the European gas 
industry. Offensive activities in the downstream area according to Chevalier should embrace 
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segmentation and customer focus measures, differentiation and diversification as well as 
forward integration into services. On the industry level, he detected a tendency towards 
stronger ties between up- and downstream activities and projected an increasing concentration 
in the industry.636 In a paper published in 1999, Percebois looked at the European gas 
deregulation process in general and the role of oil companies in this restructuring process, 
indicating the development towards the emergence of “oil-electro-gas”637 oligopolies. 
Radetzki, in the same year and too with a focus on organisational responses to upcoming 
competitive forces through liberalisation, believed that companies would increasingly merge 
and that strategic alliances would become the most significant aspect of the 21st century 
European gas industry.638
                                                 
636  Cf. Chevalier (1992). 
 But also he did not apply a theoretical basis for his study. Others 
were Ellis et al. One year later they published an article on structural change in European gas 
markets after liberalisation. Believing the SCP model not to be an appropriate approach as the 
empirical situation required an understanding of dynamics involved, they instead referred to 
insights from Institutional Economics and Strategic Management. Being interested in the 
structural change of Europe’s gas markets after liberalisation and their development until 
2020 in dependence of companies’ behaviour, thereby putting the firm at the centre of their 
study, they aimed to analyse how players moulded their market environment. Taking such a 
market-oriented perspective, the authors distinguish between defensive strategies in form of 
market foreclosuring tactics to preserve power and market share, and pro-active strategies to 
increase organisational value by acquiring market share and/ or profitability. As possible 
actions they see the building of market barriers, the carrying out of M&As as well as of 
demergers, and vertical, horizontal, or lateral integration along and across the gas value-chain. 
Based on these possible strategic activities they derive three scenarios which could result as a 
consequence: One where oligopolistic structures are maintained but also new opportunities 
sought, a second that is characterised by vertical integration along the gas value-chain where 
companies try to exploit their monopoly power, and a third one called ‘pull-the-plug scenario’ 
which is characterised by competitive structures that are strongly dependent on actions by 
major gas suppliers like Gazprom. By concluding that ‘how the future structure will look like 
637  Percebois (1999), p. 14. 
638  Cf. Radetzki (1999), p. 23. 
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mainly depends on who wins the struggle for change’639
 
, they adhere substantial power to 
organisational behaviour. 
While the studies looked at above reveal forms of organisational behaviour found in the 
business-oriented approaches determined in chapter IV, the researchers have neither 
considered the likely impact of the other goals of European Energy Policy on organisational 
behaviour nor their impact in form of what above has been classified as institutional forces. 
To do so one has to look at research focussing not only on the gas but also other energy 
industries and geographical markets. This will be done in the following section. 
 
 
5.1.1.2 Insights from Research on the Energy Industry 
 
Particularly studies from the oil industry provide such examples. It was, for instance, found 
that as regulatory and public pressures were increasing, companies began to support 
ecological measures. In this respect British Petroleum was mentioned as having taken a pro-
active first-mover approach by turning its slogan into ‘Beyond Petroleum’ in order to create a 
‘greener image’. It was also pointed out that, over the course of time, this had attracted more 
attention from institutional stakeholders and made the company a subject of public scrutiny 
and criticism. In addition to this general observation, the same study also revealed the 
existence of different types of behaviour although companies were engaged in the same 
industry, a finding that was traced back to differences in national socio-cultural and regulatory 
factors. Thus, while in the U.S. lobbying was commonly accepted as a way to prevent 
regulatory measures from being implemented or the legitimacy of institutions such as the 
IPCC being challenged, companies in Europe on the contrary felt a much stronger pressure 
from their stakeholders “for a constructive approach to secure credibility, legitimacy, obtain 
reliability and a seat at the table”640
                                                 
639  Cf. Ellis et al. (2000), p. 308. 
. Hence, as the lack of social legitimacy was perceived as 
a fundamental threat, approaches were shown to have been much more cooperative and 
640  Kolk/ Levy (2001), p. 503. 
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characterised by voluntary, pre-emptive measures for which governments, as a ‘quid-pro-quo 
deal’, refrained from imposing certain regulations.  
 
An early example of mentioning Institutional Theory and using the example of a gas company 
– but with explicit reference to the U.S. market and without specifically referring to energy 
policy changes – were Ritti and Silver in an article published in 1986. They revealed that as a 
response to accusations by the census bureau the gas company questioned the bureau’s 
legitimacy, a form of behaviour above classified as defiance. As a general outcome of their 
study the authors proposed that as an organisation’s legitimacy and respective resource 
acquisition was essential for survival, they should apply myth-building strategies to secure 
their legitimacy.641 Another, relatively early, example is provided by Russo. By applying TCT 
to analyse companies’ reason for backward integration and diversification in the electrical 
utility industry, he not only included regulators as part of a utility’s task environment but also 
emphasised that companies needed a strategy to react to regulators. He found that as 
companies no longer were able to “include the troublesome exchange partner”642, i.e. 
internalise the regulator, without “costly haggling”643
 
, they brought in relevant actors to 
substitute the lack of integration. While this can be assessed as an institutional strategy as laid 
out above, Russo did not point this out as such or refer to Institutional Theory specifically. 
Only very few examples can also only be found with regards to studies having been built on a 
combination of insights from business-, institutional- and resource-oriented approaches. 
Amongst the few that did consider this was Midttun. He criticised the shortcomings of 
business-based approaches – such as the overemphasised focus on shareholders’ investments. 
Yet again he did so for the energy markets in general, not with a focus on the gas industry. 
Still, he claimed that “the modern corporation has a responsibility to serve the interests of 
multiple stakeholders”644
                                                 
641  Cf. Ritti/ Silver (1986). 
 and pointed out the need to also consider a perspective that 
supplements “the extremely rationalistic Williamsonian position with a range of ‘softer’ 
motivational elements that have also proven to be critical factors in organisational 
642  Russo (1992), p. 16. 
643  Russo (1992), p. 15. 
644  Midttun (2001), p. 18. 
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development”645. For the analyses of corporate strategies in the changing European electricity 
industry, and particularly with regards to DiMaggio and Powell’s mechanisms of institutional 
isomorphism, Midttun himself proposes the application of the ‘new institutional school in 
organisation theory’.646 For other examples though one again has to include studies on the 
American electricity market. Kumar, for instance, in 2003 published an article analysing the 
management of alliances in the independent U.S. power generation industry by referring to 
TCT, SM and at least the notion of institutional legitimacy.647 In an example issued one year 
later, Schneiberg then draws on insights from economic and institutional theory to explain the 
existence of different organisational forms in the American electrical utility industry before 
having been reformed. The strongly institutionally embedded structures were assumed not to 
have provided room for heterogeneity when looking only through an institutional lens.648 
Others again built their analysis on one theoretical pillar while incidentally also referring to 
insights from the other two. Studying the corporate behaviour of the British electricity 
company PowerGen over the period between 1991 and 1996 Jennings, for instance, built his 
analysis on Miller and Friesen’s (1977) strategic archetypes (see above) while at least 
pointing out the importance of managing governmental and regulatory relations and of 
organisational capabilities as being key to continuous profitability. He did not further advance 
analysis in this respect though.649
 
 
From the examples provided by Russo, Midttun and others it can be derived that utilities have 
responded differently to ecological environmental regulation. There are those companies 
which engaged in cross-border transactions, those which ‘diversified out of reach’ into new 
business domains, those which dis-integrated functions as a way to escape institutional 
pressures, or those which adopted voluntary measures such as green certificate trading.650
                                                 
645  Midttun (2001), p. 17. 
 
Szulanski and Amin again mention the example of a utilities company which, as an attempt to 
break with the past, embarked on the exploration of ‘radically different approaches to 
leverage its capabilities’, such as developing an electric car, setting up a consultancy, or 
646  Cf. Midttun (2001), p. 2. 
647  Cf. Kumar (2003). 
648  Cf. Schneiberg (2004). 
649  Cf. Jennings (2001), pp. 391-401. 
650  Cf. Russo (1992), p. 24; Midttun et al. (2001), pp. 412-413; Albrecht (2004). 
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building an energy theme park. Although initially judged as “wild and impractical ideas”651
 
, 
they in the end allowed the company to enhance its legitimacy. Although with no specific 
reference to theory the example indicates the importance of corporate resources for 
organisational legitimacy. 
In addition to the fact of having to look at studies from other sectors to find indications of 
researchers having included insights from several approaches in their analysis, this also holds 
with regards to the temporal dimension. A comprehensive study in this respect was carried 
out by Midttun and others, analysing strategic configurations of European energy companies 
in different phases in response to increasingly complex and dynamic European energy 
markets since liberalisation in 1998. In each phase they found dominant patterns of strategic 
configuration such as a strong tendency towards diversification, but also detected a change in 
behaviour between the two phases, such as towards a larger degree of functional 
specialisation while reducing vertical integration.652 A similar observation was also made by 
others, showing, for example, that while initial strategic behaviour after liberalisation was 
characterised by reactive tactics, such as improving operational efficiency and defending 
themselves against new entrants, a development towards more active behaviour which was 
guided by long-term strategy planning towards ‘corporate reshuffling’ in form of divestments 
could be observed after a while.653
                                                 
651  Szulanski/ Amin (2001), p. 544. 
 This was also detected by researchers having studied 
organisational behaviour after U.K. electricity market liberalisation. Thomas, for instance, 
showed that when facing the possible threat as well as the real fact of increasing competition, 
a first response by incumbents was to defend their traditional core business by integrating 
vertically up- and down the value-chain, often buying their own customers, i.e. distribution 
companies, in order to compensate for the loss of market share elsewhere. Even as they came 
under severe scrutiny from financial institutions to increase their profits - while regulation 
was eroding their core business - and although large sums of money were spent on public 
relations in order to establish an image of a responsible ethical company, the focus was 
primary directed at defending existing businesses by generating short-term commercial 
652  Cf. Midttun (2001); Midttun/ Omland (2004), pp. 273-281. 
653  Cf. Tolmasquim et al. (2001), pp. 355-373. 
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success and increasing shareholder value instead of building new ones.654 Jennings (see 
above) again found that driven by a substantial loss of market share due to increased 
competition and in anticipation of a stricter regulation to come, PowerGen, following a vision 
of creating a globally integrated utility, had aimed for developing long-term growth 
opportunities and new sources of income by building on its existing capabilities and using 
efficiency gains from and expertise in core business to finance and strategically advance the 
new path. The process of developing from a single to a global multi-utility business was 
characterised by a major phase of divisional reorganisation to be followed by the creation of a 
whole new cluster of business units to take advantage of new business opportunities in new 
product and geographical markets.655
 
 
Also research on other European utility markets and companies brought about similar results. 
In response to increasing uncertainty and pressure through competition, it could be shown that 
incumbents became concerned with efficiency and securing profits, a fact which showed as 
tactics of cost cutting and vertical integration.656 Midttun found vertical integration to be 
applied as an active tactic to offensively access new businesses and/ or resources to increase 
market power or to enable differentiation by being closer to the market and so to finally gain a 
competitive advantage from changing constraints.657 A study on electricity companies from 
Germany, Sweden and the U.K. revealed that in the first phase during early market opening, 
when regulators still relied on new entrants to create competition instead of regulatory 
intervention and incumbents still enjoyed a comfortable profit margin, some were “frantically 
buying”658 assets along the whole value chain in order to expand fast. In 2004, nearly one 
third of European respondents to PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (PWC) sector study, e.g., defined 
their gas strategy as having been driven by the aim to gain full capability along the value 
chain.659
                                                 
654  Cf. Thomas (2001). 
 Thomas mentions examples of gas companies having taken the opportunity of 
relatively low gas prices to newly enter or augment their electricity generation business, 
particularly by investing in new and modern CCGT plants. Electricity companies again were 
655  Cf. Jennings (2001), pp. 391-401. 
656  Cf. Kaserman/ Mayo (1991); Ghobadian et al. (1998), p. 80; Jensen (2003), pp. 34-35; Knell (2004), p. 17. 
657  Cf. Midttun (2001), pp. 9-14. 
658  Allas (2001), p. 21. 
659  Cf. PWC (2004a), p. 14. Also cf. PWC (2005), p. 9. 
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shown to have diversified into a variety of unrelated, non-core activities to become multi-
utilities after liberalisation.660
 
  
Research on the oil industry showed that in response to fundamental environmental change 
the major oil companies, in what was called a ‘resistance phase’, initially continued their 
business as usual before striving for growth. This was particularly the case when initial 
efficiency measures turned out not to be sufficient anymore.661 Oil companies then began to 
expand geographically, to engage in related (gas, coal) as well as more unrelated (chemicals, 
solar energy, and nuclear power as a “prudent hedge”662) and even totally unrelated (forestry, 
facilities) businesses. Other research from this industry revealed that oil companies which had 
extended their value chain by integrating into the natural gas pipeline business had achieved 
positive effects on their stock ratings.663 Weston and Siu even see the definition of an energy 
company having changed from one based on coal (50 years ago) to one based on oil (20 years 
ago) and further to one centering on oil-and-gas. For the future they predicted that energy 
companies would turn into gas-and-electricity firms.664 While this only includes energy 
businesses in general, others found a consolidation towards ‘super utilities’ as players 
diversified into businesses not directly related to energy, such as water and 
telecommunications,665 to become multi-infrastructure utilities, and even into facility 
management and financial services. Such developments further drove cross-industry 
integration. At the same time the analysis along a temporal dimension also enabled to reveal 
that for some players these expansions had led onto a path of ‘disastrous diversification’ so 
that in a ‘phase of accommodation’ such businesses were divested again.666
                                                 
660  Cf. Thomas (2001). 
 Others thus 
believe that the integrated business model will become obsolete and that the industry will 
661  Cf. Stonham (2000), pp. 417-418. 
662  Auty (1983), p. 9. 
663  Cf. Edwards et al. (2000). 
664  Cf. Weston et al. (1999), p. 174. 
665  While the telecommunication business as a grid based industry shares some general feature with the energy 
industry, a very specific case for the integration between electricity and telecommunication companies has 
been the consideration to use the transmission grid also for the transportation of telecommunication. Cf. 
Midttun (2001), p. 6. 
666  Cf. Ghobadian et al. (1998), p. 81; Guizot (1998), pp. 31-32; Jenkins (2000), p. 623; Petrovic (2000), p. iii; 
Babu (2001), p. 111; Midttun et al. (2001), pp. 410-411; Thomas (2001); Tolmasquim et al. (2001); 
Dronnikov et al. (2003), pp. 50-51, 86-88; PWC (2003b), pp. 12-18; Knell (2004), p. 17. 
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move to a structure where ‘value-chains belong to a bygone age’ with specialist companies 
focussing on a certain value-chain activity.667 Similarly, the observation of a change of 
behaviour over the course of time was also made with regards to organisations’ phases of 
internationalisation.668 Others researchers in empirical studies on deregulation of U.S. and 
European electricity markets and on change in the oil industry, included a temporal aspect in 
order to show the general importance of moving from rigid to strategic corporate planning and 
of aligning resources and capabilities in order to account for increasing environmental 
dynamism.669
 
 
Notably, while this review has provided evidence for the benefit of considering a temporal 
dimension to capture a change of organisational behaviour over time, it has so far only 
disclosed examples classified as business strategies and tactics. In fact, from an institutional 
lens only few can be found for the gas or even energy industry. Within Ritti and Silver’s study 
(see above) an indication can at least be found of the gas company analysed having moved 
from a position of resistance where it tested the authority’s legitimacy to one where it 
provided its acknowledgement of the respective authority as evidence it was fulfilling 
expectations.670 From a theoretical classification this could be depicted as a tactic of window 
dressing and thus as an organisational move from compromising to avoiding behaviour. Apart 
from this though no further empirical studies on change over time of gas or energy companies 
can be found. At the same time does the adoption of an institutional perspective enable the 
researcher to look at results found in studies on other energy industries as above from a 
different angle. This, for instance, holds with regards to the common development mentioned 
by several researchers in terms of an increasing convergence of oil, gas and electricity 
markets as, for instance, oil majors entered the gas business to compensate for declining 
growth possibilities in oil production while others were depicted as discovering their ‘passion 
for electricity’671 or ‘marrying their electricity and gas activities’672
                                                 
667  Cf. Stonham (2000), p. 414; Keers (2002), p. 12. 
. In addition to this, also 
668  Cf. Ghobadian et al. (1998), p. 81; Maier/ Lukas (1999), pp. 362-366; Midttun et al. (2001), pp. 399-408; 
Seiferth/ Hannes (2002); Finon et al. (2004), pp. 320-321. Also cf. Finon/ Midttun (2004). 
669  Cf. Dyner/ Larsen (2001); Grant (2003). 
670  Cf. Ritti/ Silver (1986). 
671  Cf. Hartmann (2000). Translation by author. 
672  Cf. Midttun (2001), p. 20; Thomas (2001), pp. 121-124; Dronnikov et al. (2003), p. 86; PWC (2003a), p. 11. 
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other players were ‘folding their arms’ around the gas, oil and electricity industry and thereby 
increasingly blurring the lines between these three.673 The diversification into multi-utility 
businesses to achieve growth and the internationalisation to achieve synergies after 
liberalisation has in fact been assessed as a global phenomenon.674 This also is the case with 
the industry-wide waves of M&As which were observed by others.675 From an institutional 
perspective the observation of common forms of behaviour could indicate a homogeneous 
development across the industry, evoked by a common perception676 or even “conscious 
parallelism”677 within the same organisational field, such as by lawyers that “have ascended 
the utility ranks”678
 
 as remarked by Russo. 
Having reviewed the status of empirical research and having revealed that several gaps exist, 
the following part will lay out the status of research from a theoretical perspective while also 
considering insights from other industry studies. 
 
 
5.1.2 Status of Theoretical Research 
 
5.1.2.1 Shortcomings in Prevailing Approaches 
 
Although constituting a jump ahead of conclusions, this section shall be introduced by stating 
that also the review of theoretical work - or other sector studies - has not revealed the 
existence of an appropriate model for analysis. What has been found though is a development 
of theoretical discussion towards the adoption of an integrated perspective. While this will be 
enlarged on in the second part, the development towards an integrated approach has been 
fuelled by critical discussions on the shortcomings of each approach. This will be reviewed 
next. 
                                                 
673  Cf. Midttun (2001), p. 6; Pinnock (2002), pp. 5-6; Scheer (2002), p. 57; Baranes et al. (2003), p. 9; PWC 
(2003a), p. 9; Knell (2004), p. 16; PWC (2004b). 
674  Cf. Midttun (2001), p. 6; Thomas (2001), pp. 126, 129. 
675  Cf. Stonham (2000), pp. 417-418. 
676  Cf. Thomas (2001). 
677  Grant/ Cibin (1996), p. 169. 
678  Russo (1992), p. 14. 
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Fundamentally, shortcomings have been identified for each of the theoretical approaches 
depicted above. Business-based approaches essentially have been criticised for their ‘culture 
of short-sightedness’679 on market criteria and for defining success solely based on economic 
criteria such as profitability and market share maximisation, while neglecting what above has 
been classified as ‘non-market’ drivers.680 Porter, for instance, seeing the industry 
environment and competitive drivers as “the key aspect of the firm’s environment”681 has 
been criticised for excluding political and social forces, and for ‘lulling’ analysts into a 
feeling of security while blinding researchers as well as practitioners regarding the impact of 
these forces on business strategies and their outcomes. Particularly in cases where influences 
from the state are relatively high and companies are not allowed to go out of business, the 
assumption that economic criteria are the essential ones has been pointed out as “absurd”682. 
Or, as paraphrased by a government official in an example deployed by Jacobides: “What you 
economists don’t see, is that (…) there are other interests that can be more important”683. 
Moreover, although some researchers from the business field, amongst others driven by the 
stakeholder approach,684 did consider socio-cultural trends and public policy issues,685 and 
although insights from the Strategic Management literature further extended this early 
approach to include political-legal and social drivers, this remained restricted to a focus on the 
above mentioned business-oriented goals, while neglecting the institutional environment and 
thus the issue of legitimacy.686
 
  
Adopting solely a business-oriented approach can thus be said to leave an explanatory 
vacuum to elucidate certain phenomenon, such as why organisations do not necessarily strive 
for efficiency.687
                                                 
679  Cf. Selznick (1996), p. 272. 
 Also Williamson (see chapter IV), despite having considered government 
structures as embedded in an institutional environment, addressed this with regards to 
680  Cf. Pettigrew et al. (1992); Aharoni (1993), p. 35; Freeman (1999), pp. 164-165. 
681  Porter (1980), p. 3. 
682  Carroll et al. (1988), p. 237. 
683  Jacobides (2005), p. 488. 
684  Cf. Freeman (1984); Rühli/ Sachs (2005). 
685  For an overview cf. Fahey/ Narayanan (1986). 
686  Cf. Haunschild (1993); Aldrich/ Fiol (1994); Bonardi et al. (2005), pp. 409-410. 
687  Cf. Roberts/ Greenwood (1997), p. 350. 
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production, exchange and distribution activities,688 not legitimacy. Others again pointed out 
that possible business benefits needed to be balanced against and may even be offset by the 
costs of legitimacy.689 Even more, the notion that legitimacy and institutional strategies are 
important enough to be considered has systematically been discarded or omitted as being of 
no special importance in Business literature.690 While this shortcoming has increasingly been 
criticised, it has been pointed out as particularly decisive in industries where the firm itself 
often is the ‘legitimacy problem’691. This, for instance, holds for the energy sector or 
industries generally characterised by monopoly power where firms could “ill afford”692
 
 to 
allow institutional stakeholders to exert uncontrolled pressures. 
At the same time similar claims have been raised with regards to institutional approaches. In 
fact, Institutional Theory has been criticised as a “one-sided perspective”693 in terms of 
looking at the external environment from an ‘overarching social view’ and at organisational 
behaviour determined by the organisation’s strive for legitimacy, while ignoring pressures for 
efficiency and competitive advantage arising from the market environment.694 In particular it 
has been commented that from an institutional perspective, economic issues are merely seen 
as a part of society like any other and are not further considered, especially with regards to 
strategic interests.695 Moreover, while some researchers do find that Institutional Theory had 
gained prominence within the field of Strategic Management,696 others have only very 
recently remarked that the majority of research in this field had mainly only dealt with 
institutional environmental forces as a source of constraints on organisational behaviour. 
Moreover, in many cases only the business environment has been seen as the driver of 
organisational development.697
                                                 
688  Cf. Williamson (1993), p. 111. Also cf. Davis/ North (1971), p. 6. 
 Rodrigues and Child, for example, criticise that only little 
689  Cf. Rugman/ Verbeke (2000), p. 383. 
690  Cf. Etzioni (1987), p. 185; Goodrick/ Salancik (1996), p. 3; Mahon/ McGowan (1996), p. 5. 
691  Cf. Mahon/ McGowan (1996), pp. 63-66. 
692  Mahon/ Murray (1981), p. 257. 
693  Beckert (1999), p. 795. 
694  Cf. Roberts/ Greenwood (1997), p. 347; Dacin (1997), pp. 46-47; Martinez/ Dacin (1999), pp. 76, 85. 
695  Cf. Hasse/ Krücken (1999), p. 50. 
696  For an introduction on this topic cf. Ingram/ Silverman (2002). 
697  Cf. Behrman/ Grosse (1990), p. 1; Goodrick/ Salancik (1996), p. 3. 
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attention has been paid to strategic choices of companies operating in highly institutionalised 
environments.698
 
 
From this it can be derived that both approaches lack that part of explanatory power which is 
provided by the respective other approach. In this respect the comparative illustration of the 
main characteristics of each perspective as presented in table 2 above can also be seen as not 
only showing differences of each approach but as also revealing the possibility for 
complementation with insights from the respective other. Guided by such considerations the 
author extended literature review to determine possibilities for such complementation. This 
will be carried out in the following. 
 
 
5.1.2.2 Proposals for Extension  
 
Researchers looking at shortcomings within institutional approaches claim the integration of a 
business-oriented perspective to be crucial. In this respect already Oliver had pointed out the 
interrelatedness of economic accountability and rationalisation objectives with institutional 
pressures, especially in cases where changing institutional forces exert pressures on firms to 
become more ‘business-like’ or ‘economically accountable’.699 Deephouse proposes that 
companies “should be as different as legitimately possible”700. Others again demand that 
Institutional Theory needed to find its place within the ‘old’, economic-oriented 
approaches.701 A large part of research in this field has, in fact, focussed on showing that 
business-oriented behaviour was determined more by institutional rather than by business-
market forces in that the prevailing institutional setting in form of coercive, cognitive or 
normative drivers had forced organisations to adopt a certain business-market strategy and 
thus into a particular direction of development.702
                                                 
698  Cf. Rodrigues/ Child (2003). 
 Studies have revealed that by guiding 
699  Cf. Oliver (1991), p. 161. 
700  Deephouse (1999), p. 147. 
701  Cf. Selznick (1996), p. 276. 
702  Cf. Fox-Wolfgramm et al. (1998); Inzerilli (1990); Haveman (1993a); Sampat/ Nelson (2002), p. 159; 
Ingram/ Silverman (2002), p. 7; Lamberg et al. (2002); Peng (2003); Scott (2004); Thornton et al. (2005); 
Wright et al. (2005). 
Chapter V: Developing an Integrated Model for Empirical Analysis 124 
resource allocation or even destroying organisational property, legally enforced requirements 
not only restricted the range of feasible strategic options available to firms but also worked to 
favour certain strategies over others while weakening established stakeholder relationships. 
This in turn severely influenced economic decision-making and profit generation.703 
Moreover, it has been pointed out that governmental actors may even force companies to 
adopt certain strategies, such as to ‘play the networking game’ in order to be allowed market 
entry.704 Similarly, also normatively and cultural-cognitively defined forces have been found 
to constrain organisations’ market conduct, i.e. when behaviour is institutionalised as taken-
for-granted or socially expected. By arguing that “industries are cultures too”705, Mintzberg 
had already indicated that such forces may present substantial barriers to market development, 
such as by making re-location shifts “awfully demanding”706. Others again recently found the 
change from diversification to that of focussing on a certain business segment to have been a 
result of “negative comments from analysts”707. Similarly, as transaction costs may be 
socially constructed (‘tacit’) or embedded in society so that the need to lower transaction costs 
becomes an institution itself, certain forms of organising may be pursued despite being 
inefficient, a situation which often results in hierarchical failure.708 In such cases decisions 
have been described as having to be made within cognitive straightjackets which restrict the 
pursuing of alternatives. This, for example, has been shown to have been an issue with 
ecological regulation.709 The changing of institutionalised arrangements may therefore 
considerably increase transaction costs.710 In this respect, organisations have also been 
illustrated as ‘efficiency-seeking under institutional constraints’711. At the same time there 
may prevail institutionalised beliefs that business-oriented goals such as seeking efficiency 
are not a legitimate motivation or cases where society values other, i.e. institutional, factors 
over efficiency.712
                                                 
703  Cf. Carroll et al. (1988); Rugman/ Verbeke (2000), pp. 378, 381; Lawrence et al. (2001), pp. 635, 638; 
Sampat/ Nelson (2002), p. 157; Burt et al. (2002), p. 201. 
 Consequently, certain decisions may never come to be analysed from a 
704  Cf. Peng/ Heath (1996); Guilléen (2005), pp. 25-32. 
705  Mintzberg (1988), p. 60. 
706  Mintzberg (1988), p. 60. 
707  Harper/ Viguerie (2002), p. 33. 
708  Cf. Perrow (1981); Cook/ Emerson, (1984), p. 3; Ghoshal/ Moran (1996); Sampat/ Nelson (2002). 
709  Cf. Tenbrunsel et al. (2000). 
710  Cf. Zucker (1987). 
711  Cf. Roberts/ Greenwood (1997), p. 347. 
712  This has, for example, been shown in the case of the airline industry. Cf. Kelly/ Amburgey (1991), p. 592. 
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transaction cost perspective, explaining why certain structures may persist despite being 
inefficient.713 Porac et al., for instance, relate the dominance of vertical integration to the 
existence of a ‘cognitive oligopoly’ which had become an institutionalised frame of reference 
within which players defined their actions rather than considering transaction-cost or market-
based issues.714 By integrating insights from economic and institutional theory, Schneiberg 
recently found cooperative forms of behaviour not to have resulted only from the choice 
between market and hierarchy, but to also have emerged through the influence of institutional 
forces.715 Similarly, institutionalised settings such as the “myth of the innovative society”716 
may demand organisations to be innovative in order to receive legitimacy, even if economic 
profits remain uncertain.717
 
  
Thus, by acknowledging that organisational activities may be the result of ‘social 
constructions of the managerial mind’ and conditioned by institutional forces, the cognitive 
view on competition serves as an important complement to traditional models and as a basis 
for understanding strategic market conduct.718 This becomes even more crucial when 
considering that empirical results built on efficiency-based explanations have only provided 
vague results or have been interpreted ambiguously and are thus argued not be appropriate as 
the sole guide for analysing and understanding organisational actions.719 In fact, this has also 
been supported by other studies which revealed that the market strategies observed were not 
driven by business but institutional drivers in that organisations were forced to adopt certain 
behaviours as indicated above. Tactics of diversification, M&As and international expansion, 
for instance, were shown to have been a response to increasing regulatory constraints and to 
have been pursued as compensation for the withdrawal of institutional protection instead of 
having been driven by a quest for growth or market development.720
                                                 
713  Cf. Fligstein (1990), p. 21; Fligstein (1991), pp. 315-316; Roberts/ Greenwood (1997); Martinez/ Dacin 
(1999), pp. 83-84. 
 By now, several other 
714  Cf. Porac et al. (1989). 
715  Cf. Schneiberg (2004), p. 4. 
716  Apitzsch (2006), p. 13. 
717  Cf. Garcia-Pont/ Nohria (2002), p. 309. 
718  Cf. Barley (1988); Baum/ Oliver (1992); Fligstein (1996); Porac et al. (1989), p. 412; Porac et al. (1995), p. 
204; Burt et al. (2002), p. 171; de Figueirdo/ de Figueirdo (2002); Van de Ven/ Hargrave (2004), p. 295. 
719  Cf. Perrow (1986); Jones/ Hill (1988); Haunschild (1993); Moran/ Ghoshal (1996). With respect to 
internationalisation processes cf. Henisz/ Delios (2002). 
720  Cf. Tregoe/ Zimmerman (1980); Fligstein (1991); Peng/ Heath (1996); Henisz/ Delios (2002). 
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studies found that waves of SAs,721 M&As,722 diversification723 as well as divestments,724 or 
the implementation of certain practices725 were a result of having become shared reality and a 
legitimised way of behaviour within a field and thus increasingly mimicked as a consequence 
of cultural-cognitive or normative forces.726 In such cases organisations were shown to have 
followed others, even when performance declined as a consequence.727 In this context 
researchers also pointed out the role model and first-mover function of large and particularly 
successful organisations.728 It could in fact be shown that M&As or vertical integration were 
pursued in order to ‘borrow’ legitimacy from prestigious organisations in order to compensate 
for the lack of institutional protection when diverging from institutional norms, enabling these 
organisations to mitigate institutional pressures and justify their behaviour by creating the 
belief that it was legitimate.729 One example is the cooperation of a financial and a 
telecommunications company with a major energy company. This cooperation was set up in 
order to benefit from the latter’s experience in dealing with governmental and regulatory 
agencies.730
 
  
The few researchers that have begun to combine insights from economic and institutional 
theory find that organisations may strategically use the institutional environment and the 
notion of legitimacy to their advantage in that institutional forces may serve as a resource to 
establish new organisational forms.731
                                                 
721  Cf. Apitzsch (2006). 
 Others, who integrated insights from institutional and 
722  Cf. Haunschild (1993); Baum et al. (2000). 
723  Cf. Fligstein (1985); Fligstein/ Dauber (1989); Fligstein (1991); Luo/ Chung (2007). 
724  Cf. Nicolai/ Thomas (2006). 
725  Cf. Barley (1988); Mezias (1990). 
726  Cf. Astley/ Fombrun (1983); Oster/ Pickrell (1986); Jones/ Hill (1988); Haunschild (1993); Venkatraman et 
al. (1994); Fligstein (1996); Gimeno/ Hoskisson (1997) in Martinez/ Dacin (1999), p. 87; Hoskisson et al. 
(2000); Phillips et al. (2000); DiMaggio (2001); Powell (2001); Sampat/ Nelson (2002); Dowell et al. 
(2002); Garcia-Pont/ Nohria (2002); Ingram/ Silverman (2002); Teng (2005). 
727  Cf. Abrahamson/ Rosenkopf (1993). The phenomenon of ‘competitive bandwagon pressures’ has 
particularly been observed in industries characterised by oligopolistic structures. Cf. Guilléen (2005), p. 19. 
728  Cf. Haveman (1993b). 
729  Cf. Delacroix et al. (1989); Amburgey/ Miner (1992); Aldrich/ Fiol (1994); Ginsberg/ Baum (1994); Gulati 
(1995); Oliver (1997), p. 711; Osborn/ Hagedorn (1997); Phillips et al. (2000); Rugman/ Verbeke (2000); 
Lounsbury/ Glynn (2001); Peng (2001); Dowell et al. (2002); Kumar (2003); Bansal/ Clelland (2004). 
730  Cf. Butler/ Carney (1986), pp. 170-175. 
731  Cf. Schneiberg (2004), p. 11. 
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resource-based approaches,732 concluded that organisations which do not possess relevant 
resources and capabilities “by default continue to carry out much of the same activities in 
similar ways as before”733 and try to “muddle through”734 instead of actively taking advantage 
of change. Others think that legitimacy should be regarded as critical institutional capital and 
a valuable strategic resource in form of an intangible asset which in extreme cases enables 
organisations “just to survive”735, while in other cases provides the power to not only develop 
active institutional strategies but to ‘nullify’ or at least dampen the vulnerability to market 
forces and even change the rules of the game.736 This has begun to be seen as setting the basis 
for creating economic value and establishing a competitive advantage.737 The implementation 
of legitimation strategies has been shown to enable companies to defend themselves against 
rivals, enhance product-market development and acquire necessary resources.738 Moreover, in 
reference to the arguments of Transaction Cost Theory, which has also begun to be discussed 
in convergence with sociological institutional approaches,739 it should also be considered that 
institutional strategies may allow or at least support the reduction of transaction costs. The 
application of bargaining tactics, for example, may hold the costs arising through regulation at 
a minimum level through.740 Martinez and Dacin again point out that in the presence of 
transaction costs, imitation may be the most efficient way to establish the suitable path of 
action.741
 
 
Others again found that political strategies, such as dealing with regulatory bodies, also 
served as a channel for organising business decisions and achieving market-oriented goals 
such as sales growth and profitability while being able to defend themselves against new 
entrants.742
                                                 
732  Cf. Moldaschl/ Diefenbach (2003). Also researchers from other fields had already pointed out that solely 
adopting a resource-dependence perspective is “woefully inadequate” (Carroll et al. (1988), p. 237). 
 Baron depicted similar examples of companies having enhanced their product-
733  Peng (2000), p. 45. 
734  Peng (2003), p. 285. 
735  Devlin (1991), p. 77. 
736  Cf. Greenwood/ Hinings (1996), p. 1039. 
737  Cf. Dobbin (1999), p. 196; Shaffer/ Hillman (2000), p. 176; Thornton (2002), p. 96. 
738  Cf. Aldrich/ Fiol (1994), pp. 656-658; Goodstein (1994), p. 361; Zimmerman/ Zeitz (2002), p. 425. 
739  Cf. Ipsen (2003). 
740  Cf. Clemens/ Douglas (2005), p. 1206. 
741  Cf. Martinez/ Dacin (1999), p. 90. 
742  Cf. Mahon/ Murray (1980), pp. 134-135; Post/ Mahon (1980); Rugman/ Verbeke (1990). 
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market development strategy through accelerating the regulatory approval process, using 
tactics such as lobbying, establishing relationships with regulatory institutions, providing 
information voluntarily, cultivating the media, or educating the public. He also mentioned 
examples of players having defended their territory against foreign entrants by filing for anti-
dumping petitions to their government. In another case, a company finding opposition from 
local producers when trying to enter their market, sought the help of its home government to 
pressure at state level together with the foreign government for the revision of entry 
barriers.743 Other examples are of companies which established alliances with governmental 
agencies to obtain a first-mover advantage.744 Researchers from other theory fields have 
termed such strategies “nonmarket strategies”745. These have been shown not only to enable 
companies to defend themselves against competitive threats but create market opportunities 
such as by influencing pressure groups and creating the rules of the market to realise a 
competitive advantage.746 By bringing together insights from public affairs management and 
corporate strategy, Keim and others propose to develop political and social strategies as a 
‘sophisticated’ way to manage relationships with regulatory authorities and enable 
organisations to deal with public pressures groups.747 Others have shown how political 
strategies can complement a company’s economic approach748 - former monopolies, for 
instance, are often seen as “perfect examples of companies using defensive political strategies 
to their advantage”749 - or how a legitimate image may translate into economic benefits.750 
Elsbach and Sutton again propose that organisations should engage in impression 
management techniques as these may ‘create unprecedented possibilities to obtain 
resources’.751
                                                 
743  Cf. Baron (1995a), pp. 50-54. For similar examples cf. Miles (1982), pp. 226, 234; Miles/ Cameron (1982); 
Bonardi (2004), pp. 103, 107; Bonardi et al. (2005), p. 410. For a particular focus on international business 
and government relations cf. Chakravarthy (1985); Behrman/ Grosse (1990); Guilléen (2005), pp. 15-34. 
 In fact, such ‘non-market’ strategies could be seen as strategic responses to non-
744  Cf. Rugman/ Verbeke (2000), pp. 382-383. 
745  Baron (1995a), p. 48. 
746  Cf. Mahon/ Murray (1981), pp. 257-261; Mahon/ McGowan (1996), pp. 39-40, 63-66; Baron (1995a), p. 48; 
Baron (1995b), p. 84. 
747  Cf. Mahon/ Murray (1981), Keim/ Zeithaml (1986); Bonardi/ Keim (2005). 
748  Cf. Bonardi (2004); Bonardi et al. (2005). 
749  Bonardi (2004), p. 102. 
750  Cf. Rugman/ Verbeke (2000), p. 383. 
751  Cf. Elsbach/ Sutton (1992). 
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market forces as defined in chapter III and thus as corresponding to what has been called 
institutional strategies in institutional approaches. 
 
Similar findings were made with regards to ecological issues. Here, researchers argue that 
companies do not necessarily face a trade-off between ecological goals and industrial 
competitiveness. Instead, through compliance strategies characterised by using tactics such as 
participating, cooperating, voluntarily going beyond requirements and communicating success 
stories, organisations could offset costs of ecological regulation and even gain competitive 
advantage.752 In this respect and as in the cases depicted above, it has been demanded that 
organisations recognised the environment as a business opportunity instead of “an annoying 
cost or a postponable threat”753. A similar assessment has been made by other scholars who 
pointed out that by not only learning how to deal with ecological requirements but also by 
developing new ‘green capabilities’ and ‘actively innovating ecologically’, companies could 
not only obtain market access but also outperform rivals.754 For a long time, the impact of 
such influences has been seen as a barrier to business growth, at best reduced to protecting 
organisations from regulatory constraints and appeasing ecologically conscious pressure 
groups. The business vision, in contrast, was acknowledged as bringing growth and 
profitability. At the same time, it has been identified as carrying the risk of making companies 
‘run into a green wall’. As likely reasons researchers identified the lack of integrating the 
impact of market and institutional drivers as well as an inadequate resource endowment, and 
the organisational belief that “any of this ‘green stuff’ really makes business sense”755. They 
hence proposed that by making EHS “a true business partner”756
                                                 
752  Cf. Bonifat et al. (1995); Porter/ van der Linde (1995). 
 and aligning EHS goals with 
the corporate vision, a significant contribution to overall success could be achieved. Also 
other academics have very recently begun to point out how non-market strategies could 
enhance business development. Along a similar line Bansal and Clelland remark that even 
governmentally enforced publications of certain data could be turned into a strategic tool to 
753  Porter/ van der Linde (1995), p. 114. The authors also point out comparative advantages on the national or 
state level. Also cf. Liedtke/ Roeder (2006); Roeder/ Bleischwitz (2006). 
754  Cf. Rugman/ Verbeke (1998); Bansal/ Roth (2000). 
755  Shelton/ Shopley (1997), p. 120. 
756  Shelton/ Shopley (1997), p. 119. 
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positively influence stakeholder perception.757
 
 This proposal becomes particularly critical 
when considering their finding on the impact of ecologic environmental legitimacy, e.g. in 
form of an organisational resource, on stock market performance. 
As a general advice, Aldrich and Fiol propose that organisations should be “in harmony”758 
with their institutional and with their market environment for deriving advantages and 
securing their successful survival. Organisations that are have also been described as 
entrepreneurs who take advantage of opportunities which arise in ‘both environments’ and 
still are undiscovered and thus unexploited by others.759 Essentially, research has shown that 
those organisations able to simultaneously ‘play the two games’, i.e. addressing economic 
aspects as well as managing institutional issues, have been more successful than those that 
have not.760 Other examples include companies which were anticipatory in their behaviour, 
driving market development while at the same time optimising institutional conduct.761 
Another example is that of a supplier operating under the same institutional constraints as its 
customer, but by having applied respective institutional tactics, was able to gain a competitive 
advantage that even allowed it to move up the value-chain and become a competitor.762 Also 
studies from other fields of research have indicated the importance of bringing together 
insights from various approaches, pointing out the dependence of organisational success on 
strategies for creating a competitive advantage while at the same time meeting sustainability 
criteria.763 By combining insights from NIT, IO and the RBV, Rodrigues and Child (see 
above) studied organisational co-evolution from a highly institutionalised and closed to an 
open and competitive market environment and particularly emphasise the importance of 
considering the complex interrelationship between the different types of environmental forces 
as well as the underlying temporal dynamics for comprehensively analysing and explaining 
organisational behaviour.764
 
 
                                                 
757  Cf. Bansal/ Clelland (2004). 
758  Aldrich/ Fiol (1994), p. 663. 
759  Cf. Lounsbury/ Glynn (2001), p. 553; Delmas (2002). 
760  Cf. Post/ Mahon (1980). 
761  Cf. Rugman/ Verbeke (2000), pp. 383-384. 
762  Cf. Bonifat et al. (1995), pp. 41-43. A similar example was mentioned by Steger and Winter (1997), p. 66. 
763  Cf. Flagestad/ Hope (2001). 
764  Cf. Rodrigues/ Child (2003). 
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Despite the advancements made in this respect, research proposing the integration of insights 
from both perspectives has only been very recent and thus is not extensive yet. Only relatively 
lately however, the importance of developing market as well as non-market, or business and 
institutional, strategies to address the different types of environmental influences has 
specifically been made. With reference to deregulating industries Bonardi, for instance, 
claims that economic strategies of former monopolies could not be understood if related 
political strategies are not taken into consideration.765 Thus, in a subsequent publication he 
and fellow researchers, in differentiating between influences from economic and political 
markets, argue that strategic management researchers could enhance explanatory value on 
organisational behaviour when considering political markets and strategies.766
 
  
 
5.1.3 Conclusion – Building on Findings from Literature Review to 
develop an Integrated Model 
 
Essentially, the review of theory and empirical reality above allows drawing several 
conclusions which enable the researcher to carry on from here.  
 
The analysis of existing empirical research has revealed that so far only few studies on 
organisational responses to changing European energy policy in European gas markets have 
been carried out. Those that do exist only consider one of the goals of European energy 
policy, in most cases liberalisation. Moreover, analysis has been restricted to being looked at 
through a single theoretical lens. In most cases this has been the business approach. The 
aspect of sustainability, for instance, has in fact only recently begun to be addressed in 
academic studies, but not yet systematically. In particular, no example has been found which 
integrated insights from business-, institutional- and resource-based approaches. In addition to 
this has the majority of scientific work for a long time been mainly based on or aimed at the 
U.S. and U.K. market.767
                                                 
765  Cf. Bonardi (2004), p. 116. 
 And although some research does provide a temporal dimension 
766  Cf. Bonardi et al. (2005), pp. 409-410. 
767  Also cf. Kneissl (2006), p. 15. 
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what is also missing are studies which have been carried out over a longer period of time and 
which allow the analysis of a change in organisational responses over time. On the other hand 
do the insights on forms of organisational behaviour gained from studies on other energy 
sectors such as with regards to strategies and tactics used sustain the assumptions made and 
conclusions drawn from the theoretical analysis in chapter IV, thus confirming their general 
suitability and applicability. This particularly holds for the electricity sector which faced very 
similar influences as European gas markets. Support can, too, be found for the assumption of 
having to build analysis on an integrated approach. 
 
In addition to this, similar conclusions can be drawn from the review of existing theoretical 
work and insights from other industry studies. Here, especially the disclosure of shortcomings 
to each perspective and the development of academic discussion towards the importance and 
benefits of taking an integrated approach to analysis has been crucial. This particularly holds 
when furthermore considering that “organizational phenomena are much too complex to be 
described adequately by any single theoretical approach”768 and that “strategy cannot be 
understood until its complexity is acknowledged”769. In fact, a main value of adopting an 
integrated perspective is that it allows researchers to reveal that certain phenomena of 
organisational behaviour observed are actually driven or motivated by others than those 
normally expected when looking through only one theoretical lens. Moreover, it reveals that 
change should not only be perceived as a threat and risk to traditional ways of organisational 
conduct, but also as a source of opportunities to enhance development. Organisations may, for 
instance, strategically use the ‘institutional environment’ and the notion of legitimacy to their 
advantage to realise business-oriented goals. Or, to use Butler’s and Carney’s words applied 
in a different context earlier on: actors should address “the best of both worlds”770 in order to 
secure their survival and establish a competitive advantage. Similar claims have recently been 
made by others such as Henisz and Delios who recently pointed out that both approaches 
actually had “much to gain”771
                                                 
768  Tolbert (1985), p. 12. 
 from each other. This becomes even more relevant when 
considering that competitive and institutional processes interact with each other and over time 
769  Aharoni (1993), p. 34. 
770  Butler/ Carney (1986), p. 172. 
771  Henisz/ Delios (2002), p. 340. 
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disseminate new forms772
 
 - an aspect which again emphasises the importance of considering a 
temporal dimension as argued above. 
Such insights are especially important for practitioners; even more so for those being part of 
industries where organisations provide particularly ‘important or problematic products’773 
which are under particular scrutiny from changing influences in their environment. This can 
generally be said to be the case of the energy industry. Realising and understanding such 
forces and the power and legitimacy of the various actors towards the organisation is crucial 
in order to anticipate, shape, and respond appropriately. With particular regard to 
‘institutional’ forces some researchers (also see above) have pointed out that the failure to do 
so may increase attention from institutional actors and thereby further reinforce the measures 
already imposed.774
 
 As a closing conclusion it can therefore be derived that not only can 
empirical studies be enhanced by building analysis on an integrated approach but also 
explanatory value and advice for practitioners.  
Still, despite different theoretical and empirical work having indicated these benefits, to date 
no model exists which serves as a framework for analysis. Hence, by developing a respective 
model the author of this thesis not only contributes to an enhancing theory, but also creates a 
basis that allows the carrying out of a comprehensive empirical analysis. This model is 
developed next to serve as the fundament for case study research in the following chapter. 
 
 
5.2 Developing an Integrated Model 
 
5.2.1 Model Framework 
 
Fundamentally, the model building process is guided by the establishment of the business and 
the institutional approach as the two main constituting approaches and by the requirement of 
                                                 
772  Cf. Lee/ Pennings (2002). 
773  Cf. Suchman (1995), p. 590. 
774  Cf. Mahon/ McGowan (1996), pp. 26, 46; Mitchell et al. (1997); Midttun (2001), p. 17. 
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the model having to enable analysis from each lens individually as well as from an integrated 
perspective. This can be satisfied by making each approach form an axis of a two-dimensional 
model where the x-axis represents the institutional and the y-axis the business perspective,775
 
 
taking as a basis the illustration developed in figure 11 above: 
Figure 13:776
 
  Model Framework 
 
 
 
Constituting the external frames and the main fundament of the model this illustration enables 
analysis from a single lens as well as an integrated angle. 
 
The next step in the model building process then is to find a way to depict organisational 
behaviour in response to environmental change over time. Based on the insights from 
theoretical analysis above it can be assumed that over the course of time this process takes 
place as a development from passive to active forms of behaviour, leading to what is 
illustrated as an Institutional and a Business Development Path in the figure above. In order to 
exemplify such paths a classification of behavioural forms of responses is necessary. This 
                                                 
775  This choice has been randomly made and could have also been the other way round. 
776  Own figure. 
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requisite can again be satisfied by taking the development continuums identified in chapter IV 
as an instrument of categorisation. Hence, the business perspective would be represented by 
the classification developed by Miles and Snow, the institutional one by Oliver’s 
categorisation. Significantly, the general suitability of their work for such classifications has 
been supported across literature. Miles’ and Snow’s work is not only frequently referred to in 
research but has been identified as ‘the most enduring strategy classification research tool 
available’777. Furthermore, it is also acknowledged to be of analytical value even if research is 
only “loosely based”778 on their categorisation. Especially the empirical reality of the current 
energy industry requires models to depict phases where incumbents’ behaviour is more 
adventurous than that of defenders but not as risk-oriented as that of prospectors.779 The 
categorisation described above can thus be adopted as the fundament for classifying strategic 
behaviour in response to environmental change over time. Moreover, in addition to the 
examples already mentioned above, other researchers also based their studies on Miles and 
Snow’s typology. Ghobadian et al., for example, applied it to the analysis of public utility 
companies and added a ‘cautious prospector’ as a hybrid of characteristics from analysers and 
prospectors, depicting strategic behaviour that is risk-averse while at the same time showing 
‘forward momentum’ of expansion and growth activities such as entering into joint ventures 
with companies active and experienced within the field the company wants to enter.780
 
  
In fact, the depiction of organisational behaviour in response to environmental change taking 
place as a development from passive to active strategies is also supported by empirical 
findings in the business field. Research on organisational behaviour after deregulation, for 
example, has shown that incumbents initially aim to retain their monopoly position and show 
reactive forms of behaviour.781 Studies have also revealed that deregulation is followed by a 
phase where organisations ‘squeeze profits’ and thus lower industry profitability.782
                                                 
777  Cf. Hambrick (1980), p. 571; Ginsberg (1984), p. 551; Ghobadian et al. (1998), p. S72; Gimenez (1999), p. 
4; Reger et al. (1992), p. 192; Desarbo et al. (2005), pp. 47-49. Gimenez e.g. has researched that between 
1987 and 1994 more than 50 papers had applied the Miles and Snow typology and found no evidence of 
major conceptual criticism. Cf. Gimenez (1999), p. 3. 
 This 
778  Miller/ Friesen (1982), p. 9. 
779  Cf. Ghobadian et al. (1998), p. S80. 
780  Cf. Ghobadian et al. (1998), pp. S81-S82. 
781  Cf. Makhija (2003). 
782  Cf. Bleeke (1990), p. 162. 
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again directly affects incumbents’ formerly stable incomes and thus requires a higher degree 
of organisational activity.783 Such statements are supported by findings which show that only 
when profits are affected or performance gaps occur, change is initiated.784 Desarbo et al. 
again found that while strategies of defence initially tend to focus on efficiency 
improvements, incumbents over the course of time often try to strategically deter entry or 
disadvantage competitors by setting up market barriers via vertical integration.785 Similarly, 
Andersen et al. had earlier pointed out the development component in that organisational 
behaviour is characterised by periods of tentative search before a strategic position is 
established and that a phase of experimentation is followed by one of creation.786 The 
development from analysing to creating behaviour again is supported by studies which show 
that particularly in uncertain and fast-changing environments strategic activities are likely to 
be exploratory first and only later become exploitative ones.787
 
 
The same assessment of suitability holds true for the institutional perspective. Apart from its 
appropriateness as a theoretical approach for analysing the realities determined above, it also 
satisfies the requirement of accounting for a temporal dimension in that strategic institutional 
responses change along with institutional environmental change and can thus be depicted 
along a continuum from passive to pro-active forms of behaviour as just laid out in the 
previous section. While Oliver was the first to develop such a categorisation similar 
distinctions have also been made by subsequent researchers. Suchman, for instance, 
distinguishes between whether legitimacy is being passively granted, such as when the 
external ‘audience’ perceives the organisation as meaningful, predictable, and trustworthy and 
the organisation simply adopts a certain behaviour because it “wants a particular audience to 
leave it alone”788
                                                 
783  Cf. Hollas et al. (2002); Delmas/ Tokat (2005). 
, or whether it actively seeks for protracted intervention from the audience. 
While this implies a varying degree of institutional organisational activity, others even think 
that there are different ‘institutionally specific design archetypes’ in form of ideal types which 
784  Cf. Greiner (1972), p. 40; Miles (1982), p. 237. 
785  Cf. Desarbo et al. (2005), pp. 50-51. 
786  Cf. Andersen et al. (1959), p. 25. 
787  Cf. Regnér (2003). 
788  Suchman (1995), p. 575. 
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are characterised by different forms of behaviour.789 Essentially, recent empirical research has 
also shown that “firms can and do choose more than one strategy or tactic in responding to 
institutional pressures”790
 
. Based on this, Oliver’s original typology is taken as the basis for 
depicting institutional behaviour as developing along a continuum from passive to pro-active 
behaviour. 
These two categorisations constituting the business and institutional strategic continuum will 
be enlarged on in more detail in the following.791
 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Classification of Organisational Behaviour in Response to 
Environmental Change over Time 
 
5.2.2.1 Strategic Continuum of Organisational Behaviour from a Business 
Perspective 
 
 
As already mentioned and illustrated above, Miles’ and Snow’s categorisation embraces four 
main forms of behavioural responses which will now be explained in more detail - beginning 
with the most passive form. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
789  Cf. Kikulis et al. (1992). 
790  Clemens/ Douglas (2005), p. 1207. Also cf. Schneiberg/ Clemens (2006), pp. 206-207. For an earlier 
empirical example cf. Delacroix/ Swaminathan (1991). 
791  With regards to methodological consistency: Kondra and Hinings compare their institutional typologies with 
those of Miles and Snow (1978) and Miles et al. (1978). Cf. Kondra/ Hinings (1998), pp. 753-759. 
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Reactive Behaviour 
 
Characteristically, Miles and Snow described ‘reactive’ organisations as those which are 
unprepared for environmental change, their initial objective thus being survival. Accordingly, 
reactive strategies are characterised by a short-term orientation while potentials for market 
development are ignored and existing capabilities not taken advantage of. Instead, as a tactic 
to deal with environmental upheaval, reactive behaviour shows in the tendency to remain 
loyal to the prevailing position and follow familiar routines and standards even if they are no 
longer appropriate for the new environmental reality.792 These lock-ins, in fact, hinder 
organisations to “respond to messages of the marketplace”793 and develop at the pace and 
scale of the market.794 This can be explained by the fact that incumbents often feel protected 
by their historically grown structures which at least temporarily provide a “cushion from new 
competition”795 and allow them to retain market power while ignoring change despite the 
existence of obvious market threats and ineffectiveness.796 Another explanation is that new 
entrants first have to consolidate in order to become large enough to affect seller 
concentration.797 In fact, research on deregulating industries has shown that initially “nearly 
all new entrants fail”798. Other studies on deregulation again found waves of similar types of 
strategies in form of imitative moves.799 Such type of behaviour is also known as the 
‘following-the-leader’800 phenomenon and has, in fact, been determined as another 
characteristic of reactive behaviour, as particularly in the presence of transaction costs the 
imitation of other players allows them to ‘keep an eye’ on efficiency while first-movers 
absorb the costs and risks of experimentation or discovery.801 Additionally, incumbents may 
also be encouraged to imitate when newcomers have proven to be successful with their 
approach.802
                                                 
792  Cf. Miles and Snow (1978), pp. 81-93; Boisot/ Child (1999), p. 247. 
 As competitive forces, or even the threat of such, tend to increase over time as 
793  Foster/ Kaplan (2001), p. 43. 
794  Cf. Foss (2000), pp. 16-17; Foster/ Kaplan (2001), pp. 41-45. 
795  Makhija (2003), p. 437. 
796  Cf. Johnson/ Thomas (1987), p. 344. For an empirical example cf. Mintzberg (1978), pp. 938, 944. 
797  Cf. Caves/ Porter (1980). 
798  Bleeke (1990), p. 159. 
799  Cf. Bleeke (1990), pp. 160-162. 
800  Cf. Knickerbocker (1973); Bolton (1993). 
801  Cf. Dutton/ Freedman (1985); Lieberman/ Montgomery (1988); Martinez/ Dacin (1999), p. 90. 
802  Cf. Lyles/ Salk (1996); Shenkar/ Li (1999). 
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changing markets also provide opportunities that make it attractive for new entrants to 
overcome market barriers and attack incumbents in their core business, reactive tactics are not 
appropriate to secure survival in the long run. In such cases incumbents have been shown to 
begin to “defend their turfs”803
 
, a form of behaviour that is depicted next. 
 
Defensive Behaviour 
 
Miles and Snow classify defensive strategic behaviour as such, where organisations aim to 
protect their domain as if it was their property while at the same time trying to improve the 
efficiency of existing businesses,804 especially as one of the ‘first contributions’ by successful 
new entrants often is to reduce the incumbent’s market share.805 Studies have also shown that 
an erosion of profits and decrease of performance motivates defensive organisational action in 
that players begin to guard their business.806 In general, several tactics of defence can be 
employed, such as establishing barriers to competition through taking advantage of prevailing 
market imperfections and exploiting assets owned or an existing customer base when facing 
deregulation,807 or by introducing process improvements or engaging in low-cost strategies.808 
Another possibility may be to build on benefits deriving from cross-subsidisation as this 
allows disciplining, even destroying, competitors through using resulting profits to lower 
prices while financing losses out of profits from other businesses and forcing these losses on 
rivals until they leave the market.809 Another option would be the establishment of 
cooperations such as in form of defensive market-extension mergers or JVs,810 or the 
collaboration with other incumbents which are actually competitors, a tactic therefore also 
termed co-optition.811
                                                 
803  Bleeke (1990), p. 163. For empirical examples cf. Johnson/ Thomas (1987), p. 344; Schomburg (1994), p. 
151; Walker et al. (2003); Barnett/ McKendrick (2004), p. 542. 
 Studies found that new entrants, as well as the mere threat of these, 
have lead incumbents into defensive mergers to prevent entry and preserve market share, 
804  Cf. Miles/ Snow (1978), pp. 31-48. 
805  Cf. Caves/ Porter (1980), p. 7. 
806  Cf. Johnson/ Thomas (1987), p. 344; Schomburg (1994), p. 151; Walker et al. (2003). 
807  Cf. Makhija (2003). 
808  Cf. Bleeke (1990), pp. 159-160. 
809  Cf. Caves (1977), pp. 41-42. 
810  Cf. Johnson/ Thomas (1987), pp. 344-345; Chatterjee (1991); Kelly/ Amburgey (1991). 
811  Cf. Aldrich/ Fiol (1994). 
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while newcomers engaged in M&As to rapidly take advantage of economies of scale and 
quickly penetrate the market.812 Additionally, another possibility would be to vertically 
integrate in form of ‘forward defending’ along the value-chain.813 Empirical studies in fact 
showed that during environmental change vertical integration is one of the first strategic 
changes an organisation makes, and that it has been used as a protective measure to retain 
control over raw material inputs and distribution channels to customers.814 A different type of 
defensive tactic is signalling which allows building a ‘reputation of toughness’ by, for 
instance, investing into specific assets which signal commitment to competitors and thereby 
keep them from even trying to enter.815 In the energy sector incumbents also often boosted 
construction plans of power plants to be built in order to frighten-off rivals.816 This too 
includes attempts to delay competitive responses by purposefully creating uncertainty, e.g. 
through public announcements by organisational leaders that the current market situation is 
business threatening.817 Another possibility would be to formulate certain industry standards 
in order to create a situation where competitors, “paralyzed by confusion, complexity, and 
uncertainty, sit on the sidelines”818. More drastic tactics for trying to reduce or eliminate 
competition include attempts to engage in cartels or even try to establish monopolies.819 
Another characteristic of the defensive behaviour is an underlying scepticism towards 
innovation while the focus is kept on routines. In such cases organisations have also been 
described as behaving like “manifestations of rational calculation”820 instead of considering 
new options. One reason behind this is that especially industry leaders are often driven by 
their past success and tend to ‘tenaciously cling to traditional markets’.821
                                                 
812  Cf. Johnson/ Thomas (1987), pp. 344-345. 
 Over time however, 
and as defensive measures often change industry structures, ongoing change leads to 
increasing complexity and transaction costs. This requires organisations, as a “prelude to 
813  Cf. Kirsch/ Trux (1981), pp. 301-302. 
814  Cf. Galbraith (1983), p. 67; Nickerson et al. (2001), pp. 259-260; Leiblein/ Miller (2003). 
815  Cf. Williamson (1994) and very recently Buehler/ Schmutzler (2008). 
816  Cf. Rossert (1996), p. 6. 
817  Cf. Foss (2000), p. 17. 
818  Bryan (2002), p. 24. Also cf. Butler/ Carney (1986), p. 169. 
819  Cf. Katz/ Kahn (1966), pp. 127-131. In this respect, the authors pointed out that “the paradox of the private 
enterprise type of economic system is that its dynamic reduces the number of competitors and ultimately 
may lead to public regulation as the enterprise becomes a quasi-public institution” (Katz/ Kahn (1966), p. 
130). 
820  Dutton/ Freedman (1985), p. 44. 
821  Cf. Miles (1982), p. 237. 
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creativity”822, to become ‘divergent thinking’ in that they look to take advantage of threats 
and opportunities,823
 
 identified by Miles and Snow as ‘analysing’ behaviour as is explained 
below. 
 
Analysing Behaviour 
 
Analysing behaviour, as a ‘step beyond’ defensive behaviour, is classified as such conduct 
where organisations look to exploit new market opportunities while at the same time 
defending existing businesses in terms of ‘having one foot in the traditional and the other in a 
new business’.824 This has thus also been assessed as an ‘intermediate type’825 of 
organisational behaviour. Kirsch and Trux, for example, compared this with the behaviour of 
an ‘architect’ building something new on existing fundaments.826 Initially though, when 
facing change, organisations tend to orientate towards known solutions as they are “motivated 
to transform ill-defined problems into a form that can be handled with existing routines”827. 
Others, in fact, found that disruptive changes are often “delayed until the costs of not 
restructuring become high enough to justify the widespread structural modifications that may 
be required”828. Snow and Hrebiniak pointed out that such behaviour is “usually not viable in 
the long run”829, others again remarked that solely “sticking to tried-and-true paths”830 neither 
creates a competitive advantage nor secures survival. Consequently, in many cases the only 
available strategy to earn above-average return and confront threats is to not to put ‘all eggs in 
one basket’ and increase risk while at the same time accepting potential losses.831
                                                 
822  Foster/ Kaplan (2001), p. 49. 
 For 
organisations this indicates the need to become more active and search for new ways, 
especially as the previously most attractive domains may become the least attractive ones due 
to environmental changes and vice versa. It has, for instance, been shown that at a later stage 
823  Cf. Foster/ Kaplan (2001), p. 46. 
824  Cf. Miles/ Snow (1978), pp. 68-80. Also cf. Miles (1982), p. 238. 
825  Cf. Hambrick (1980), p. 572. 
826  Cf. Kirsch/ Trux (1981), p. 302. 
827  Miles/ Snow (1978), p. 156. 
828  Miller/ Friesen (1984), p. 208. 
829  Snow/ Hrebiniak (1980), p. 325. 
830  Szulanski/ Amin (2001), p. 545. 
831  Cf. Kirsch/ Trux (1981), pp. 303-304; Dutton/ Freedman (1985), pp. 42-43; Foss (2000), p. 18. 
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after market opening the identification of new opportunities for market development is much 
more crucial than conserving capital.832 Also companies which have once operated in a 
restrained regulatory context are likely to, at one point, begin “to look beyond their 
borders”833. This has been shown in cases after deregulation where firms, as competition was 
increasing, began to consider a ‘repertoire of responses’ such as remaining vertically 
integrated or, on the contrary, divesting value-chain activities in order to adjust strategies to 
meet new market demands.834 For ‘strategic analysing’ to be successful however, 
organisations must not only be able to evaluate and select from a variety of alternatives, but 
must learn to think ‘out-of-the box’ to create new rules instead of merely breaking existing 
ones, such as by changing a ‘hierarchy of experience’ with one of “imagineering”835.836 
Taking such an approach opens up a number of possibilities which may function as launching 
pads that allow adaptation and even the change of direction in uncertain environments.837 This 
again forms another characteristic of analysing behaviour in that targets are set for others in 
the market, thus taking a leadership function which may allow influencing overall industry 
development. At the same time, and although analysers other than defenders are not 
emotionally tied to a certain domain,838 it has been pointed out that the “dancing around”839 
too many alternatives also carries the danger of resulting in disadvantageous delays. Hence, 
companies are required to learn how to manage market risks and invest in new development 
strategies as even successful players cannot only rely on tactics of ‘managing for survival’ 
which do not guarantee long-term performance.840 This again indicates the importance of 
organisational leaders and their capabilities and could be described as moving from a status of 
making “seat-of-the-pants decisions”841
                                                 
832  Cf. Bleeke (1990), p. 162. 
 and ‘muddling-through’ to becoming pro-active and 
innovative with regards to countering threats and taking advantage of arising opportunities. 
Several researchers have, in fact, pointed out that strategic development should not focus on 
833  Reger et al. (1992), p. 189. 
834  Cf. Miller/ Chen (1994), p. 17; Delmas/ Tokat (2005), pp. 442, 445. 
835  Szulanski/ Amin (2001), p. 549. 
836  Cf. Hamel/ Prahalad (1991); Coyne/ Subramaniam (1996); Hamel (1996); Harper/ Viguerie (2002); Epstein 
(2003). 
837  Cf. Williamson (1999). 
838  Cf. Kirsch/ Trux (1981), p. 303. 
839  Burgelman (1994), p. 45. 
840  Cf. Dyner/ Larsen (2001). 
841  Miller/ Friesen (1982), p. 5. 
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limitations from competitive forces but on “entrepreneurial discovery”842 for creating 
sustainable competitive advantage.843
 
 This type of behaviour has been characterised as 
‘prospective’ by Miles and Snow as is presented next. 
While so far the first three categories established by Miles and Snow have been enlarged on, 
the fourth, ‘prospective’, has been replaced with the term ‘create’ in order to emphasise the 
types of strategies and tactics behind such forms of behaviour as laid out in the following. 
 
 
Creative Behaviour 
 
Fundamentally, prospective behaviour is characterised by the continuous search for 
innovations to extend the existing business.844 Achieving growth has not only been shown to 
be particularly important in industries where firms are of similar size and competition is 
intense,845 but also when facing environmental change. Such constellations can, for example, 
occur when former monopolies are deregulated. In such situations, organisations are then 
confronted with the question of which direction to grow and which strategy to adopt.846 
Empirical studies have shown that a common way to do so is by exploiting arising 
opportunities through product and/ or domain extensions, such as by diversifying into new but 
related industries in terms of matching new ventures to the present shape of business and by 
developing new businesses to increase global reach.847 In this respect Bryan pointed out that 
incumbents particularly had several high-potential opportunities in that they could take 
advantage of their experience to adjust their core businesses or build related ones which 
allowed the capturing of economisation advantages.848
                                                 
842  Jacobson (1992), p. 785. 
 Miles showed that diversification into 
new areas had especially been chosen by incumbents as it freed them from their symbiotic 
relations of the domains traditionally shared and thus was seen as a major opportunity for 
843  Cf. Child/ Kieser (1981); Wildemann (1996), p. 39; Harper/ Viguerie (2002), p. 35. 
844  Cf. Miles/ Snow (1978), pp. 49-67. 
845  Cf. Cool/ Dierickx (1993), p. 49. 
846  Cf. Ansoff (1988), p. 81. 
847  Cf. Hambrick (1983); Ghobadian et al. (1998), p. S74; Bryan (2002), p. 19; Harper/ Viguerie (2002). 
848  Cf. Bryan (2002), p. 23. 
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establishing a competitive advantage.849 Another characteristic of such a more risk-oriented 
strategic behaviour is that by “pushing back the boundaries”850 of traditional industry areas 
and being first to market, such players are able to take advantage of uncertainty and open up 
windows of opportunity to ‘embrace change’851 and make “order out of chaos”852. Critically, 
they are thereby able to determine market and product development, even drive change 
themselves.853 In this respect researchers remarked that an organisation’s corporate strategy 
should not be handled as a portfolio of businesses, but as one of initiatives. This particularly 
holds for areas where the organisation enjoys significant advantages of familiarity which 
allow it to thrive despite environmental uncertainty.854 Hence, value creation and survival are 
“intimately associated with the ability to continually create innovative business strategies”855. 
Through learning by doing cooperative arrangements and vertical integration have in many 
cases therefore been the preferred mode of operation to innovate more rapidly. For being able 
to do so, several researchers emphasise the importance of improving capabilities and getting 
better knowledge of up- and downstream activities while at the same time being able to 
balance power asymmetries and securing reliability of supply.856 Others have also pointed out 
that learning could take place via vertical co-specialisation in that actors learn from each other 
by becoming active outside their own boundaries, thereby fundamentally changing an 
organisation’s core business and its core capabilities.857 Following similar considerations 
Mintzberg proposed three fundamental types of ‘re-conception strategies’ which organisations 
may pursue to re-organise their core business:858
                                                 
849  Cf. Miles (1982). 
 Re-combination, re-location, and re-
definition. Fundamentally, the strategy of re-combination is directed at generating synergies 
and possibilities of cross-subsidisation by diversifying into activities of related or unrelated 
industries and by building on commonly applicable capabilities. Despite being the strategy 
that least changes the organisational core it still characterises pro-active behaviour and has 
850  Ghobadian et al. (1998), p. S81. 
851  Cf. Ghobadian et al. (1998), p. S74. 
852  Courtney (2001), p. 42. 
853  Cf. Mintzberg (1978). 
854  Cf. Bryan (2002), pp. 19-20. 
855  Szulanski/ Amin (2001), p. 538. 
856  Cf. Pearce (1982), pp. 25-26, 29-31; Porter (1983), pp. 375-403; Harrigan (1985b), pp. 28-35; Jacquemin 
(1987), p. 123; Porter/ Fuller (1989), pp. 375-390; Scherer/ Ross (1990), pp. 94-96; Sydow (1992), p. 293. 
857  Cf. Jacobides (2005), p. 484. Also cf. Floyd/ Lane (2000); Floyd/ Wooldridge (2000). 
858  Cf. Mintzberg (1988), pp. 54-65. 
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been assessed as “very effective”859. In shifting the centre of gravity, re-location strategies are 
closer to affecting the organisational core business in that they change strategic positioning. 
Such shifts can take place vertically along the value-chain, between functions such as when 
changing from a production to a marketing focus, or as a shift into a new business of the same 
or a different stage of the value-chain. A possible fourth form is the re-location around a core 
theme which directs the organisation from a narrow to a de-focussed, i.e. broad, orientation. 
Even more active and “fundamentally creative”860 are re-definition strategies which, in 
affecting the whole value-chain, essentially change how business is defined and conducted. 
While businesses may simply be re-defined “by a stroke of the pen”861, e.g. in that 
organisations from the railroad or airline industry start to define themselves as being in the 
‘transportation business’, Mintzberg pointed out that it is rather the application of “some 
dramatic innovation”862 which enables the company to shift the basis of competition.863, such 
as by using tactics of expanding, shifting, splitting, usurping, (re-) creating or re-combining 
activities. To emphasise the importance of such behaviour Kirsch and Trux added the ‘risk-
diversifying’ organisation and the ‘innovator’ to Miles and Snow’s category.864
 
  
At the same time it must be considered that such forms of behaviour require substantial 
resource endowments, and that in many cases trade-offs must be made, particularly when 
facing threats and opportunities during environmental change.865 Pro-active behaviour 
therefore not only includes ‘creating’ but also, in reference to Schumpeter’s notion of 
‘creative destruction’ (see above), ‘destructive’ strategies. Still, these are also critical in that 
they detain a company from “drifting rudderless into oblivion”866
                                                 
859  Mintzberg (1988), p. 58. 
 when facing too many 
opportunities. It has, in fact, been pointed out that particularly during transition phases to a 
deregulated environment, companies endanger themselves by overextending and should thus 
rather focus their resources on a very few strategically important environmental opportunities 
860  Mintzberg (1988), p. 56. 
861  Mintzberg (1988), p. 58. 
862  Mintzberg (1988), p. 56. 
863  Cf. Mintzberg (1988), pp. 56-59. 
864  Cf. Kirsch/ Trux (1981), pp. 299-306. 
865  Cf. Hofer/ Schendel (1978), p. 4. 
866  Szulanski/ Amin (2001), p. 551. 
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in order to secure ‘strategic freedom’ as a basis for competitive advantage.867 Similarly, it was 
shown that even the most broadly diversified companies over the course of time, often after a 
“brief flirtation”868 with diversification, prefer to follow a strategy of focussed diversification 
by divesting or ‘dumping’ many of the formerly integrated businesses to return to their core 
business869 The destroying of parts of the previous business model and the strategic exit of 
certain businesses has actually been shown to be a “natural part of competing in high-velocity 
environments”870, especially as “increased size alone does not guarantee performance”871 
Another tactic in this respect is the outsourcing of activities. Also this often takes place as a 
development process from contracting out ancillary activities first to then include those which 
are closer to the core business.872 The organisational aim to create its environment and take 
advantage of opportunities has therefore also been described as a process where organisations 
are looking to “make themselves more like the market”873 while at the same time letting old 
businesses “die a timely death”874. Fundamentally, while the development of opportunities 
must not result in a decision of ‘either-or’,875 organisations pro-actively creating their 
possibilities must accept that this is accompanied by a change of their identity.876
                                                 
867  Cf. Mahon/ Murray (1980), pp. 131, 135; Harper/ Viguerie (2002), pp. 35-37. 
 
868  Miles (1982), p. 239. 
869  Cf. Miles (1982), pp. 239-248; Pearce (1982), p. 28; Bleeke (1990), p. 160; Burgelman (1994), p. 50. 
870  Burgelman (1994), p. 51. 
871  Weston et al. (1999), p. 173. 
872  Cf. Hinterhuber et al. (1996), p. 99; Morgan (2003), pp. 37-38. 
873  Foster/ Kaplan (2001), p. 42. 
874  Foster/ Kaplan (2001), p. 42. 
875  Cf. Delmas/ Tokat (2005), p. 457. 
876  Cf. Kirsch/ Trux (1981), pp. 304-305. 
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Figure 14:877
 
   Continuum of organisational behaviour in response to increasing 
environmental change from a Business Perspective 
 
 
 
 
5.2.2.2 Strategic Continuum of Organisational Behaviour from an 
Institutional Perspective 
 
Similarly as in the case of the Business Perspective a categorisation representing the 
institutional one is required. As indicated above, this is provided by the one developed by 
Oliver and will be presented in the following. 
 
 
Acquiescive Behaviour 
 
According to Oliver, the most passive form of strategic behaviour is that of acquiescence 
which implies that organisations accede to institutional pressures by either adopting tactics of 
following their habit, imitating, or complying. The notion of organisations ‘following their 
habit’ implies that they ‘remain aloof’ to institutional forces and follow known routes by 
reproducing institutionalised actions despite pressures to change, for instance when having 
                                                 
877  Own figure based on findings from above. 
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become so “enamored with their own legitimating myths”878 that they do not respond 
strategically.879 Others pointed out that this may also be the case when governments issue 
confusing and conflicting information so that there is “no particular reason to take any 
announcement seriously”880 anymore. Imitating refers to the copying of institutionalised 
practices or successful or known and trusted behaviour. By complying, organisations 
consciously obey and accept imposed rules by choosing to “follow the letter and the rule”881 
and incorporating institutionalised values, norms and requirements. Particularly in cases 
where legal coercion is high and non-conformity to laws or governmental mandates is strictly 
penalised acquiesce behaviour may be the organisation’s best choice or ‘smallest evil’, 
especially when having to gain access to relevant resources.882 The latter also explains the 
difference to complying as a more active form of organisational behaviour in that it 
characterises a conscious and strategic decision in expectation of certain benefits, such as 
access to resources and legitimacy, or the reduction of vulnerability to institutional 
pressures.883 Compliant behaviour again is likely to be reduced when organisations are not 
continuously rewarded or threatened, such as when not being legally forced to collect and 
publish possibly sensitive data.884 While Oliver finds that imitation in form of mimetic 
isomorphism may happen consciously as well as unconsciously,885 others add that it often 
only presents a ‘structural incarnation’ of existing ‘recipes’ which emerge in tandem with new 
ones. Moreover, although imitation presents one of the least disruptive changes, it is no 
guarantee for long-term legitimacy and survival as organisations often make ‘copying 
mistakes’ or fail due to complexity.886
 
 
 
 
                                                 
878  Suchman (1995), p. 595. 
879  Cf. Oliver (1991), p. 152; Ingram/ Simons (1995); Greenwood/ Hinings (1996); Lawrence et al. (2001). 
880  Peng/ Heath (1996), p. 514. 
881  Clemens/ Douglas (2005), p. 1206. 
882  Cf. Oliver (1991), pp. 164-168; Bansal/ Roth (2000). Empirically this was shown by Goodstein (1994) as 
one of the first. Also cf. Pfeffer/ Salancik (1978) or Hannan/ Freeman (1989). 
883  Cf. Oliver (1991), p. 153. 
884  Cf. Lawrence et al. (2001), pp. 633-635. 
885  Cf. Oliver (1991), p. 152. 
886  Cf. Kondra/ Hinings (1998), p. 756; Lawrence (1999), pp. 165-166; Rivkin (2000); Baum/ Rao (2004); 
Lawrence/ Suddaby (2006). 
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Compromising Behaviour 
 
Moving beyond compliant behaviour has been shown to emerge when organisations realise 
that following ‘the letter of the law’ is not sufficient in the prevailing environmental setting as 
pressures become too influential and strong.887 Even those organisations that were “born 
subordinate”888 after a while have been found to start realising their opportunities and trying 
to take advantage of them strategically.889 This, together with the loss of organisational 
freedom and autonomy when passively acquiescing as well as the fact that organisations find 
“unqualified conformity unpalatable or unworkable”890, makes slightly more active behaviour 
such as compromising on compliance more likely. While this, on the one hand, still 
characterises the organisational will of conforming to institutional requirements it likewise 
presents “the thin edge of the wedge”891 in organisations’ resistance to institutional pressures 
as they seek to follow their own interests. In this respect, compromising can also be described 
as “partial conformity”892. This includes tactics of balancing where companies aim to serve 
different requirements most effectively such as by ‘playing off’ parties against one another or 
‘achieving panty’ amongst organisational interests. Especially when these conflict, balancing 
tactics are applied to achieve an acceptable compromise. An even more active tactic would be 
to pacify institutional expectations, such as by fulfilling at least minimum requirements or 
appeasing and placating institutional sources.893 This could also be achieved by apologising as 
an instrument of impression management (see above) in that the organisation ‘blames’ the 
necessity to change on institutional forces which present ‘unparalleled challenges’ or 
‘conflicting and confusing pressures’. Doing so the organisation can not only deny its 
responsibility but present change as an unavoidable environmental response or adaptation to 
institutional pressures.894
                                                 
887  Cf. Hinings/ Greenwood (1988), p. 106; Brint/ Karabel (1991), pp. 346-347; Van de Ven/ Hargrave (2004), 
p. 271. 
 As a third tactic within compromising behaviour Oliver proposes 
that organisations may also start bargaining or allying with institutional agents on the 
888  Brint/ Karabel (1991), p. 347. 
889  Cf. Brint/ Karabel (1991), p. 347. 
890  Oliver (1991), p. 153. 
891  Oliver (1991), p. 153. 
892  Oliver (1991), p. 164. 
893  Cf. Oliver (1991), pp. 153-154. 
894  Cf. Arndt/ Bigelow (2000), pp. 504-505. 
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conditions of compliance to get at least some form of concession such as by transferring own 
personnel to regulatory agencies as advisors in order to achieve an acceptable compromise.895 
Others add that by communicating openly with relevant institutional agents, companies could 
find out those requirements most important to these stakeholders and achieve a mutually 
agreeable solution and consensus as the least disruptive procedure.896 Research on strategic 
behaviour in deregulating industries, for example, has shown that in response to arising 
change and uncertainty, incumbents after a while began to negotiate with regulatory agencies 
such as for the continuation of existing regulations in order to delay deregulation and gain 
time for adaptation.897 In fact, several researchers advise that especially in situations of state 
dependence the importance of ‘regulatory bargaining’ should be carefully managed.898 
Bargaining tactics may also be helpful when “managers wish to avoid having their 
organizations remade in the image of the environment”899
 
 and thereby maintain legitimacy. 
 
Avoiding Behaviour 
 
Instead of simply passively acquiescing to or compromising on imposed institutional 
influence and as a third type of strategic behaviour, organisations may then look to avoid 
pressures. Oliver defines this as the “attempt to preclude the necessity of conformity”900 by 
pursuing tactics of concealment, buffering, or escaping. Concealment depicts behaviour 
where the organisation ‘disguises nonconformity behind a façade of acquiescence’ such as by 
ceremonially pretending that it was implementing expected institutional norms, rules or 
requirements, making symbolic gestures of compliance, by ‘paying lip service, or by 
engaging in ‘window dressing’ tactics. Here, activities are displayed that are institutionally 
expected but are not part of normal routines.901
                                                 
895  Cf. Oliver (1991), pp. 154, 164-168. 
 Other researchers have thus termed such 
896  Cf. Clemens/ Douglas (2005), p. 1212. 
897  Cf. Mahon/ Murray (1980), pp. 133-134; Snow/ Hrebiniak (1980), pp. 325-326. 
898  Cf. Butler/ Carney (1986), p. 167; Carroll et al. (1988), pp. 236-237. 
899  Suchman (1995), p. 589. 
900  Oliver (1991), p. 154. 
901  Cf. Edelman (1977); Oliver (1991), pp. 154-156, 164. 
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forms of behaviour one of ‘cheap response’902. Suchman pointed out that in order to reduce 
inspection, companies should try to ‘simply make sense’ and that by embedding new actions 
in networks of already legitimised institutions or ‘cynically revising their core mission 
statement’, they could manipulate their own appearance in order to signal allegiance and give 
off a false appearance of conformity. At the same time he found that there may actually be 
circumstances where the institutional audience specifically desires only a symbolic, 
superficial response, characterising a special situation requiring organisations to be aware of. 
To buttress achieved legitimacy, Suchman therefore proposes to provide periodic evidence of 
ongoing performance to avoid unexpected incidents which may reawaken scrutiny, either by 
downplaying concerns, making behaviour seem natural and inevitable by providing “matter-
of-fact-explanations”903, or manipulating language. Other tactics include the stockpiling of 
goodwill and support, such as trust and esteem as well as distinguishing between ‘elite’ and 
‘popular’ support so that regulatory backing does not obscure looming public doubts.904 Also 
others point out that by ‘acting the innocent’ organisations may build façades which lead to 
the creation of ‘organisations of hypocrisy’.905 Buffering, as the second tactic, again refers to 
the organisation’s endeavour to minimise examination, i.e. the degree to which it is inspected, 
scrutinised, or evaluated by suspicious institutional actors. This can be achieved by de-
coupling from institutional attachments as already pointed out by Meyer and Rowan and 
subsequently by Oliver and others.906 Suchman again recommends that in cases where 
organisations aim to repair legitimacy, they can offer a normalising account which 
disconnects the ‘harming’ element from the rest of the organisation such as by denying, 
excusing, justifying, or explaining the disrupting issue. At the same time he emphasises that 
organisations in any case should avoid panic as those which too ‘franatically try to reestablish 
legitimacy may dull the very tools that, if used with patience and restraint might have saved 
them’.907
                                                 
902  Cf. Ingram/ Simons (1995), p. 1479. 
 Also other researchers found that organisations used ‘justification’ as a measure to 
claim that change was essential in order to guarantee survival and for being able to provide 
the same if not better output quality also in the future, thereby acknowledging responsibility 
903  Suchman (1995), p. 596. 
904  Cf. Suchman (1995). 
905  Cf. Brunsson (1989) who actually called the title of his work ‘The Organization of Hypocrisy’. 
906  Cf. Meyer/ Rowan (1991), pp. 41, 59; Oliver (1991), pp. 155, 168; Bansal/ Clelland (2004), p. 95. 
907  Cf. Suchman (1995), p. 599. 
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for change but not for possible negative outcomes. As possible other options the researchers 
propose that organisations could play down change in that they give the impression of being 
well prepared, or, as a stronger alternative, hide or keep secret strategic change.908 Clemens 
and Douglas even found organisations to have manipulated tools of measurement in order to 
avoid the discovery of non-compliance.909 Oliver again draws attention to the fact that 
especially in cases where dependence on public approval and scrutiny is high, de-coupling 
may actually raise suspicion and reduce the organisation’s access to resources, legitimacy and 
support.910 Motivated by the wish to evade institutional pressures towards conformity an even 
“more dramatic avoidance response”911 is to escape, either by exiting the sphere of forces or 
notably change goals, activities and strategies. The basis of such behaviour can be found in 
organisations’ ability to, at least to a certain degree, select the environment it operates in by 
looking for a more “amicable venue”912
 
 of activity. 
 
Defying Behaviour 
 
The fourth form of strategic behaviour, defiance, again constitutes an unequivocal rejection of 
institutionalised norms and expectations and refers to situations where organisations either 
dismiss, challenge, or attack institutional influences, especially when these are not well 
understood or are in conflict with organisational interests and when the expected punishment 
is low or organisations have little to lose.913 By ignoring pressures or deciding that costs of 
responding are not ‘worth the effort’ or that authorities do not have the necessary resources 
and/ or will to enforce regulations, organisations may explicitly dismiss requirements and try 
to avoid any discussion with institutional actors,914 e.g. by ‘sitting out the issue on the 
sidelines’ and ‘wait and see’ what happens.915
                                                 
908  Cf. Arndt/ Bigelow (2000), pp. 506-507. 
 The unwillingness to work with regulators has 
been pointed out to be more pronounced, when regulatory pressures are directed at means 
909  Cf. Clemens/ Douglas (2005), p. 1212. 
910  Cf. Oliver (1991), p. 155. 
911  Oliver (1991), p. 155. 
912  Suchman (1995), p. 589. 
913  Cf. Oliver (1991), pp. 156-157. 
914  Cf. Clemens/ Douglas (2005), pp. 1206, 1212. 
915  Cf. Mahon/ McGowan (1996), p. 39. 
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rather than at ends.916 Also lengthy issuing processes promote organisational abstaining from 
conforming to institutional expectations, particularly when high conformance costs are 
involved.917 Generally, firms have been found more willing to work with authorities when 
they are involved in effective cooperative ventures with them.918 When challenging 
institutional pressures, organisations try to “make a virtue of their insurrection”919, meaning 
that behaviour is not only directed at consciously departing from what is institutionally 
expected but turning this into an advantage. Organisations are particularly likely to challenge 
institutional forces when they are able to demonstrate that they are already ‘doing more than 
necessary’ and that their deviating actions are already above the norm of what is actually 
expected.920 Possible measures to try and dominate institutional agents include legal 
manoeuvring, overwhelming agencies with useless papers or delays, and strategically using 
administrative processes or revolving door hiring practices as observed by researchers from 
other fields.921 In situations, where institutional requirements are particularly negative and 
discrediting, or anticipated to become severe constraints, where organisations see their rights, 
autonomy, or privileges seriously questioned, they have been shown to attack institutional 
sources as a more aggressive tactic. This includes rather rude forms of behaviour like 
assaulting, belittling and vehemently denouncing institutionalised values and those that 
formulate them. In cases of increasing public criticism, for example, one reaction may be to 
attack the media source spreading this criticism.922 Challenging and attacking activities may 
also include confronting institutional agents in court with the attempt of prosecution for 
overly burdensome requirements, or by attacking them publicly by initiating media campaigns 
together with other actors affected.923 Lawrence at the same time pointed out that such tactics 
require respective organisational resources, abilities and especially legitimacy to do so.924
 
 
 
                                                 
916  Cf. Tenbrunsel et al. (2000), p. 854. 
917  Cf. Lu (2005), p. 4. 
918  Cf. Clemens/ Douglas (2005), p. 1211. 
919  Oliver (1991), p. 156. 
920  Cf. Oliver (1991), pp. 156-157. 
921  Such as Bernstein (1955); Stigler (1971); Owen/ Braeutigam (1978); Russo (1992), pp. 14, 16. 
922  Cf. Oliver (1991), pp. 156-157. 
923  Cf. Clemens/ Douglas (2005), p. 1206; Schneiberg/ Clemens (2006), p. 206. 
924  Cf. Lawrence (1999), pp. 171-172. 
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Manipulative Behaviour 
 
The most active strategic response on Oliver’s scale is characterised by manipulation, defined 
as “the purposeful and opportunistic attempt to co-opt, influence, or control institutional 
pressures and evaluations”925 to alter and re-create institutional pressures to the organisation’s 
own advantage. While Oliver was the first to point out such possibilities of active and 
strategic forms of ‘manipulation’, shortly after other researchers also found that organisations 
should not only perceive institutional forces as constraints to be obeyed, but actively ‘seek 
response’ and direct the environment onto a more favourable course such as by spreading 
rumours, publicly questioning the compatibility with existing norms, provoking legal and 
regulatory barriers as well as suppressing or disseminating inaccurate information to 
undermine the newcomer’s cognitive legitimacy and socio-political approval.926 Oliver, as the 
first of the three tactics, mentions the notion of co-opting in form of coalition building with 
institutional agents such as by bringing in powerful constituents into the organisation or at 
least forming potent alliances with them in order to neutralise institutional opposition and 
display the organisation’s worthiness.927 This also includes initiatives of teaming with well-
established and successful organisations in order to gain legitimacy and through this the 
power to manipulate.928 By installing organisational members in the sources exerting the 
institutional pressures, e.g. establishing monitors or ‘watchdogs’, hiring ombudsmen, even by 
replacing institutional agents, or by starting ‘grievance procedures’ and selectively confessing 
that certain elements were not in order, organisations can restructure in a way visible to 
institutional agents in order to take influence and gain or re-gain legitimacy.929 Likewise, 
through shaping values and criteria, organisations can impact institutional sources and even 
create new institutional requirements, e.g. via the lobbying of government officials and/ or 
regulatory agencies, or the organisation of other field actors with similar interests, to make 
sure that “the rules of the game are enforced in a favourable way”930
                                                 
925  Oliver (1991), p. 157. Italicised by author. 
. Lobbying, for instance, 
926  Cf. Cummings/ Worley (1993), p. 495; Aldrich/ Fiol (1994), pp. 656-658; Mahon/ McGowan (1996), p. 42; 
Van de Ven/ Hargrave (2004), p. 267. 
927  Cf. Oliver (1991), pp. 157-158. Also cf. Clemens/ Douglas (2005), p. 1206. 
928  Cf. Phillips et al. (2000), p. 31; Zimmerman/ Zeitz (2002), p. 425. 
929  Cf. Suchman (1995), pp. 597-599. 
930  Butler/ Carney (1986), p. 169. Also cf. Fahey/ Narayanan (1986), pp. 172-173. 
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could be applied to stop regulations from being passed or at least softened. Another 
possibility would be to try and implement a new institutional agent or drive a wedge between 
existing ones to mitigate institutional hazards and make deviating behaviour become 
legitimised.931 Thus, instead of opposing, organisations should rather ‘trap’ institutional 
agents to serve their own interests.932
 
 
In addition to this, researchers also found that organisations were seeking to improve their 
relation with institutional agents by voluntarily participating in programs sponsored by 
institutional stakeholders, or by collaborating with institutional agents and signalling a 
proactive attitude.933 In this respect more recent research points out the criticality of 
possessing respective skills and organisational structures such as departments authorised to 
manage these relations.934 While tactics of co-opting and taking influence already present a 
highly active form of behaviour, they at the same time constitute an important framing 
process to prepare change and gain legitimising support for more active and deviating 
behaviour. Among this is taking control which characterises the most active form on the 
strategic continuum. This especially refers to ‘preventive’ tactics of manipulation such as 
voluntarily going beyond requirements in order to take the lead before institutional actors do 
and even stricter constraints are imposed.935 Moreover, by purposefully seeking attention 
from the source of authorisation and showing compliance beyond requirements, organisations 
may at the same time bypass other requirements normally demanded and thereby gain 
legitimisation,936 e.g. by adopting voluntary environmental strategies that seek to reduce 
impacts beyond regulatory requirements.937
                                                 
931  Cf. Miles/ Cameron (1982); Mezias (1990); Oliver (1991), pp. 157-159; Mahon/McGowan (1996), pp. 64-
65; Lawrence et al. (2001), pp. 624-625; Henisz/ Delios (2002), p. 349; Holburn/ Vanden Bergh (2002), pp. 
58-60; Zimmerman/ Zeitz (2002), p. 425; Bonardi et al. (2005), pp. 398-399; Clemens/ Douglas (2005), p. 
1212; Jacobides (2005), pp. 487-488. 
 Others again depict manipulative tactics as part of 
creative behaviour which consigns to pre-emptive tactics in form of ‘anticipatory 
932  Cf. Austvik (1997), pp. 1004-1005. 
933  Cf. Delmas/ Toffel (2004), p. 216; Bonardi et al. (2005), p. 410. 
934  Cf. Sharma/ Vredenburg (1998); Delmas/ Toffel (2005), p. 8; Rühli/ Sachs (2005), pp. 225-226. 
935  Cf. Mahon/ Murray (1981), pp. 257-261; Oliver (1991), pp. 166-167; Rugman/ Verbeke (2000), p. 381; 
Sharma (2000); Bonardi et al. (2005), p. 407. 
936  Cf. Scott (1987a), pp. 502-507. 
937  Cf. Sharma (2000). 
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subordination’ trying to ‘curry favour’ with key state officials by showing behaviour that is 
believed to gain approval such as taking sponsorship or fuelling scientific research.938
 
 
Essentially, this most active form of strategic behaviour implies that organisations take 
advantage of new opportunities and shape the environment according to their interests. This 
has been indicated by the notion of the institutional entrepreneur (see above) which again 
allows them to ‘carve out’939 and invade niches already occupied, re-combine available 
institutional practices, or even create new ones through ‘radical combination’.940 In this 
respect organisations function as role models which set the agenda for others.941. In order not 
to get caught in a ‘legitimacy trap’ however, the creation of such new practices requires 
organisations to generate new beliefs until the divergent behaviour becomes institutionally 
legitimised again.942 Thus, as institutional change is “organized around debates about the 
appropriateness of particular organizational forms”943 and faces a liability of newness 
especially in the beginning,944 organisations must first ‘debug’ the innovative behaviour and 
gain legitimacy as the most critical resource – particularly as access to other resources may 
otherwise be refused.945 Here, impression management may also be applied to downplay the 
newness of the innovation and the organisation’s entrepreneurial activities and portray 
familiarity to ‘satisfy the myths of legitimacy’.946 Suchman pointed out that innovative 
behaviour often requires the pre-emptive intervention in the institutional environment to 
develop the necessary support tailored to the organisation’s distinct needs. Among this is the 
pro-active promulgation of new explanations of social reality through cultural manipulation, 
including the moulding of constituents’ tastes, image advertising, and the displaying of 
success through “attention-grabbing”947
                                                 
938  Cf. Brint/ Karabel (1991), p. 346; Suchman (1995), pp. 592-593; Zimmerman/ Zeitz (2002) (who also refer 
to business-related activities as will be enlarged on below); Lawrence/ Suddaby (2006). 
 demonstrative events using strategic communication 
and lobbying tactics. Moreover, by acting together and jointly proselytising such as in form of 
939  Cf. Baum/ Rao (2004), p. 243. 
940  Cf. Rao/ Singh (1999); Baum/ Rao (2004); Campbell (2004). 
941  Cf. Goodstein (1994), p. 359; Fligstein (1997); Zimmerman/ Zeitz (2002), p. 425. 
942  Cf. Van de Ven/ Hargrave (2004), p. 286. 
943  Hinings et al. (2004), p. 312. 
944  Cf. Baum/ Rao (2004), p. 239. 
945  Cf. Van de Ven/ Hargrave (2004), p. 271. 
946  Cf. Aldrich/ Fiol (1994); Arndt/ Bigelow (2000); Lounsbury/ Glynn (2001); Scott (2001). 
947  Suchman (1995), p. 592. 
Chapter V: Developing an Integrated Model for Empirical Analysis 157 
‘lobbying associations’948, this form of “collective evangelism helps to build a winning 
coalition of believers”949 and enables organisations to create legitimacy for change and 
establish new forms of behaviour. Similarly, by building on Aldrich and Fiol (see above), 
Baum and Rao propose that institutional entrepreneurs should follow a certain procedure in 
order to win stakeholder support for new practices such as by establishing frames which 
match the institutionalised setting while at the same time allowing new behaviour. As the 
basis of this procedure they see the development of a common understanding and trust of 
which an important instrument is the utilisation of rhetoric which they determine as a 
“powerful weapon against the vicious cycle of social barriers to innovation”950. Among this is 
the utilisation of qualitative narratives to create a “dramatic imagery”951 such as 
entrepreneurial story telling,952 or a continuous ‘making and re-making of stories’953 which 
can be applied to familiarise stakeholders with change, build credibility and gain 
acceptance.954 In this respect, newspapers, magazines, leaders’ biographies, consultants, 
training courses or other forms of communication networks have been found to serve as 
valuable sources for distributing such narrative recipes. Often, special reports are also created 
to emphasise the importance of a certain topic. Thus, apart from its entertainment value the 
utilisation of language in form of story telling or gossiping works as a creative device to 
establish a favourable environment and a new identity to jolt movements or a ‘new logic’955 
which again supports organisational change.956
                                                 
948  Cf. Baum/ Rao (2004), p. 246. 
 
949  Suchman (1995), p. 592. 
950  Aldrich/ Fiol (1994), p. 663. 
951  Hinings et al. (2004), p. 314. Also cf. Covaleski/ Dirsmith (1988), p. 583. 
952  In this sense entrepreneurial story telling differs from that mentioned above in that is is directed at creating 
new forms instead of defending existing ones. Cf. Elsbach/ Kramer (1996). 
953  Cf. Lounsbury/ Glynn (2001), p. 560. 
954  Cf. Elsbach (1994). 
955  Cf. Scott et al. (1999). 
956  Cf. Edelman (1977); Aldrich/ Fiol (1994); Suchman (1995); Abrahamson (1996); Elsbach/ Kramer (1996); 
Sevón (1996), pp. 60-65; Ruef (2000); Lounsbury/ Glynn (2001); Van de Ven/ Hargrave (2004), pp. 277-
282. 
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Figure 15:957
 
  Continuum of organisational behaviour in response to increasing 
environmental change from an Institutional Perspective 
 
                                                 
957  Own figure based on findings from above. 
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5.2.3 Deriving Stylised Development Paths illustrating Organisational 
Behaviour in Response to Environmental Change over Time from 
an Integrated Perspective 
 
Having determined classifications for analysis from both perspectives and bringing together 
all the considerations from above, a two-dimensional matrix model can be built. This is 
illustrated in the following figure. 
 
Figure 16:958
 
 Integrated Model Framework 
 
 
 
This allows depicting organisational behaviour from each perspective over time. Following 
the insights gained from above, it can be assumed that organisational development after 
environmental upheaval generally takes place as one where strategic behaviour develops from 
passive to becoming more active over time. Transferring this onto the matrix, organisational 
behaviour would show as a development path. In the case that the strategic behaviour found is 
predominantly determined by institutional strategies and tactics, this would show as a 
                                                 
958 Own figure. 
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development path along the x-axis and could be termed ‘institutional path’. Such 
developments may either be the result of organisations having been forced there by 
institutional constraints, or because their focus and resources were directed at the institutional 
environment. Dacin, for example, indicated that this may happen when organisations perceive 
institutional forces as a larger threat or opportunity than drivers from the business 
environment.959
 
 Such a case is illustrated through the grey path in the figure below (arrow 
number 1). In contrast, the other extreme would be a ‘business path’, showing as a 
development along the y-axis, here depicted by the yellow arrow (number 2). In this case, 
behaviour is mainly determined by business strategies. In the case that organisations paid 
attention to influences from ‘both’ environments and mutually used strategies to achieve the 
respective ‘other’ goals, i.e. business strategies to maintain or gain legitimacy and 
institutional strategies to accomplish business goals, the development path would show as a 
diagonal arrow through the matrix, here shown in orange (and labelled number 3). This could 
also be termed an ‘integrated path’. 
While these paths present rather straight developments, other courses are also possible, such 
as when development starts along one axis but then turns towards the other as organisations 
move from one strategic pattern to another.960 This is shown by the divergence of 
development which at one moment in time changes direction onto another path, here depicted 
as changing to the respective other colour and arrows becoming dotted. For example, a 
development which started as a business path and then diverted to an institutional track -as 
institutional forces grow stronger, the issue of maintaining or gaining legitimacy becomes 
more prevalent and organisational behaviour thus dominated by institutional strategies-961
                                                 
959  Cf. Dacin (1997). 
 
would show as a yellow arrow first and then become a grey dotted one. A contrasting 
development path would result when behaviour is first determined by institutional strategies 
before becoming business oriented. This, e.g., may be observed in phases of “market-oriented 
960  The change between strategic patterns has been pointed out particularly by Huff. Cf. Huff (1982), p. 122. 
Also Grant claimed that when facing radical environmental change, organisations may be forced to 
drastically change their scope. Cf. Grant (2002), p. 444. 
961  This possibility has recently been indicated by other researchers. Cf. Lamberg et al. (2002); Clemens (2005), 
p. 1207. 
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institutional transitions”962. In this case the path would be grey first and then become dotted 
yellow. Research has shown that while organisations focus more on the institutional 
environment in the early phase of institutional transition, which is often characterised by a 
relatively high degree of uncertainty, in later phases, where the institutional setting has 
become more stable but the market environment more competitive, ‘business-supporting’ 
behaviour becomes more important. Peng, for example, found that as new, market-supporting 
institutions pressure firms to engage in market competition, they develop respective strategies 
which enable them to “navigate the turbulent waters of institutional transitions”963. Also 
others found that organisations over time respond by moving to establish competitive 
positions and set out to realise market-based opportunities.964 Another reason for companies 
to change onto a market path may be given when institutional strategies do not bring expected 
results or when the costs of responding to institutional pressures are not worth the effort as 
pointed out by Clemens and Douglas.965 At the same time companies may also be found to 
consciously violate institutional norms or use the institutional setting to respond to market 
forces and enhance business development as determined above. This may show in tactics 
where, at first, ties with critical institutional players such as government officials or regulators 
are established, while later business strategies, such as the setting up of WOS or acquiring 
other players, become more critical.966 In fact, and supporting the idea of this model, “such 
market-oriented institutional transitions can be conceptualised as moving from one primary 
mode of exchange to another mode”967. Similarly, it may also be the case that development 
changes onto an integrated path (illustrated as dotted orange arrows). While such deviations 
generally imply that the initial path taken is not further followed, it still continues to exist and 
may thus serve as a basis onto which companies may turn back onto later on. Institutionalised 
practices, for example, which have not disappeared completely, therefore still exert influence 
although institutional developments have already taken on “lives of their own”968
                                                 
962  Peng (2003), p. 278. 
, an aspect to 
be accounted for in empirical research. In case such changes of direction took place several 
963  Peng (2003), p. 277. 
964  Cf. Hinings/ Greenwood (1988), pp. 155-156; Hoffman (1997), p. 290; Lu (2005), p. 5; Schneiberg/ 
Clemens (2006), p. 207. 
965  Cf. Clemens/ Douglas (2005), p. 1206. 
966  Cf. Peng (2003), p. 289; Clemens (2005), p. 1211; Guilléen (2005), pp. 15-34. 
967  Peng (2003), p. 278. 
968  Suchman (1995), p. 593. Also cf. Hinings et al. (2004), p. 317. 
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times, development would show as a ‘zic-zac’ path through the model, illustrated here as a 
turquoise arrow that after the first change of direction turns into a number of dotted ones, 
leading to what has here been labelled path number 4. At the same time it must be considered 
that such ‘zic-zac’ paths may also be the result of companies having been “thrown off course 
amid the obstacles and challenges”969 and having become ‘strategically confused’. Especially 
after having been subject to a “jungle of conflicting requirements”970, such as when the 
regulatory changes introduced are unclear and the organisational environment is characterised 
by uncertainty, organisations face the danger of becoming ‘lost in chaos’ over the course of 
development. Another risk is that of becoming trapped in an endless circle of exploration971 
and paralysed when “scrambling to diversify”972 due to engaging in too many and especially 
unrelated activities. Research on organisational behaviour after deregulation has even shown 
that there is a danger of players ‘unintentionally’ harvesting their core business.973
 
 The 
following figure illustrates the possible organisational development paths just described 
above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
969  PWC (2003b), p. 14. 
970  Scott (1983), p. 105. 
971  Cf. March (1994). 
972  Tregoe/ Zimmerman (1980), p. 18. 
973  Cf. Courtney et al. (1997); Szulanski/ Amin (2001), pp. 542-545; Bryan (2002), p. 22. 
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Figure 17:974
 
 Stylised organisational development paths 
 
 
 
5.3 Summary and Conclusion – Applicability of the Model for 
Analysing Incumbents’ Behaviour in Response to European 
Gas Industry Change 
 
Summarising the above, one of the most fundamental outcomes to be drawn from the 
preceeding reviews is that so far no empirical study exists which analyses organisational 
behaviour of European gas companies in response to European Energy Policy changes over 
time from in a comprehensive way. As determined above, such an inclusive analysis would 
have required an integrated approach. The same holds true with regards to the review of 
theoretical work and studies from other industries. In fact, although academic and empirical 
researchers, based on the shortcomings of each approach, have begun to discuss and provide 
                                                 
974  Own figure derived from considerations from above. 
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some evidence for the benefits of taking an integrated perspective, no model so far exists 
which would enable analysis and explanations of organisational behaviour in such 
environmental settings as in the European gas. 
 
As a consequence of this and based on the different insights gained, a model was created in 
order to satisfy the requirement of accounting for organisational behaviour in response to 
what above has been termed ‘market’, or ‘business’, and ‘non-market’, or ‘institutional’, 
environmental influences. Essentially, the specific set-up of the model well allows mapping 
organisational strategic responses to environmental changes and the resulting development 
path. At the same time it enhances explanatory value by providing the researcher with a 
framework to look at and explain organisational behaviour through each lens individually as 
well as from an integrated perspective. Still, while these paths characterise examples of 
developments possible to be observed, it has to be pointed out that theoretically there may be 
numerous different adaptive scenarios that unfold over time. While “a complete enumeration 
of strategic actions is impossible”975 though, it is also acknowledged that there not necessarily 
is one ‘best path’976. Moreover, being aware that “as with all stage models, there are problems 
of presenting them as cut and dried”977 and as organisational development in ‘real life’ is 
often “not nearly as orderly as the model implies”978
 
, this conceptualisation only presents a 
characteristically ideal model. Nevertheless, it serves as a fundament to integrate both 
perspectives and visualise organisational behaviour and thus forms a sound basis for the 
analysis of organisational behaviour in the changing European gas industry. 
In this respect the focus of interest lies on finding out whether there is one specific path taken 
by European gas incumbents as organisations which have been subject to similar 
environmental influences often tend to “travel the same paths”979
                                                 
975  Simerly/ Li (2000), p. 38. 
, or whether several different 
paths can be observed. Another contribution is to explain these findings. Flier et al., for 
976  Cf. Dutton/ Freedman (1985), p. 50. This has also been concluded on by Volberda et al. ((2001), p. 223). 
Sahlin-Andersson, for example, found that there may be cases where imitation is an organisation’s best 
choice. Cf. Sahlin-Andersson (1996). 
977  Hinings et al. (2004), p. 317. Also cf. Kikulis et al. (1992), p. 363. 
978  Cummings/ Worley (1993), p. 63. 
979  Mahon/ McGowan (1996), p. 40. 
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example, having analysed the strategic renewal behaviour of British, Dutch and French 
financial incumbents since the implementation of EU banking regulations by applying three 
single-lens theories along with a co-evolutionary perspective, found that, despite having 
adopted similar activities due to a shared industry mind-set, companies’ development paths 
turned out to be different in that some were more pro-active in their strategic behaviour than 
others. The authors assigned this to differences in the national institutional context in terms of 
the implementation of regulation, but also found managerial capacity and leadership to 
determine such strategic renewal processes.980
 
 Apart from this finding their example supports 
the approach of having included an internal perspective for enhancing explanatory value. 
Fundamentally though, one of the most critical conclusions to be derived is that the model 
satisfies all the requirements formulated after the analysis of empirical reality in chapter III. In 
essence this is: 
 
 Allowing the classification of different types of environmental forces and actors in 
form of business and institutional ones. 
 Bringing together a “juxtaposition of two seemingly irreconcilable theoretical 
worlds”981
 Explaining organisational behaviour in response to environmental change. 
. 
 Taking account of the temporal dimension to account for development over time, a 
topic identified as requiring more research in both streams982 and for organisational 
research in general.983
 Being applicable to reflect empirical reality. 
  
 Closing explanatory gaps, thereby enhancing and bringing forward academic research. 
 Providing advice for practitioners. 
 
Before applying this to empirical reality, however, an appropriate methodological approach 
must be established. This is done in the following chapter. 
                                                 
980  Cf. Flier et al. (2003). 
981  Midttun (2001), p. 13. 
982  Cf. Burgelman (1994), p. 24; Peng et al. (2005). 
983  Cf. Pettigrew (1992), p. 11; Grant/ Cibin (1996), pp. 167, 186; Mahon/ McGowan (1996), p. 41. 
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CHAPTER VI METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
 
6.1 Deriving the Research Instrument 
 
Fundamentally, while research can be distinguished from other means of gathering 
knowledge, such as learning, there is no agreement on what encompasses a sound scientific 
method.984 Depicted as a mode for dealing with empirical material and a tool or technique to 
collect and analyse data,985 the most important postulate that determines the method chosen is 
that each has it advantages and disadvantages and that there is neither an adequate nor an 
inadequate one in itself. Instead, it must always be approached within the setting of the 
research situation.986 Similarly, Jensen defines ‘methodology’ as “a theoretically informed 
plan of action in relation to an empirical field”987. According to Yin, the final type of research 
strategy chosen is determined by three distinctive characteristics:988
 
 
1. The form of research questions developed 
2. The extent of control the researcher has over events 
3. The degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events 
 
The first characteristic refers to the way in which research questions are asked. A basic 
categorisation can be made by assigning types of ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘how’, and ‘why’ 
questions. While the first three forms (who, what and where) favour survey strategies and 
archival analysis, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions present themselves to favour experiments or 
case studies as well as histories. The reason for this subdivision is based on the fact that ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ questions are more explanatory in nature and specifically concerned with 
operational aspects which need to be observed over time.989
                                                 
984  Cf. Bonoma (1985), p. 200. 
 As the research question 
985  Cf. Alvesson/ Deetz (2000), p. 4. Also cf. Schwandt (2001). 
986  Cf. Downey/ Ireland (1979), p. 630; Ghauri (2004), p. 116. 
987  Jensen (2002), p. 258. 
988  Cf. Yin (1994), p. 7; Yin (2003), p. 5. 
989  Cf. Yin (2003b), pp. 5-6. 
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developed in this thesis is a ‘how’ question, the research strategies of survey and archival 
analysis do not have to be elaborated on any further. The remaining possibilities in question 
as research strategies for this study according to the distinction above thus are experiments, 
historical analysis and case study research. This distinction can be further deepened by 
referring to the extent of control the researcher himself has over behavioural events and the 
degree of focus put on contemporary events in contrast to historical events (see enumeration 
above). The characterisation of ‘control over behavioural events’ means that when carrying 
out experiments the researcher is able to directly, precisely, and systematically manipulate 
behaviour. This statement is valid for laboratory as well as for field experiments which take a 
phenomenon from its context, and where the focus of attention can be directed towards only 
few variables of interest while other parameters can be controlled for. Out of the three 
remaining research strategies, only experiments allow for control over behavioural events, 
historical analysis and case studies do not. Surveys again are limited in their ability to reveal 
the relationship between a phenomenon and its context. Applying these considerations to the 
situational context of this work it becomes evident that the researcher - due to the complexity 
and dynamic forces which have influenced the European gas market, its organisations and 
consequently the setting of analysis and research - is not able to take control over behavioural 
events. Consequently, experiments are not a suitable research strategy applicable in this work. 
Hence, the third characteristic laid out above must be looked at. Asking whether the degree of 
focus is on contemporary rather than on historical events, the remaining suitable research 
strategies are either historical analysis or case studies. A historical approach should be chosen 
if its distinctive contribution is made by dealing with a past of which no relevant persons are 
alive to report. Case study research on the other hand explicitly focuses on contemporary 
events where behaviours cannot be influenced. Nevertheless, historical methods and case 
study research remain closely connected as they make use of the same techniques such as 
analysing primary and secondary documents. Allowing for the inclusion of contemporary 
events, the case study’s distinctive advantages are the immediate observation of events as well 
as the consideration of a wide variety of empirical evidence, including documents, artefacts 
and interviews.990
                                                 
990  Cf Yin (2003b), pp. 6-8. 
 As becomes apparent from the process of exclusion just described and as 
illustrated in figure 18 below, the research strategy to be applied in this thesis should be based 
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on case study analysis. Under these considerations the method of conducting interviews with 
organisational members has been ruled out in order to ensure highest levels of objectivity in 
this study, especially as one drawback of this technique is that interview partners may try to 
‘re-write history’ by presenting themselves in a better light.991 Moreover, when conducting 
interviews, the researcher takes the role of a participant instead of remaining an observant 
who is not able to take influence,992
 
 as is the case when relying on external documents. 
 
Figure 18:993 Deriving the appropriate research instrument 
 
                                                 
991  Cf. Miles (1979), p. 597. Scapens also pointed out that the transcription of interviews is time and resource 
consuming. He thus even advised PhD students to be selective when doing so (cf. Scapens (2004), p. 270). 
992  Cf. Scapens (2004), pp. 263-264. 
993  Own illustration based on explanations from above. 
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6.2 Qualitative Case Study Research 
 
6.2.1 Definition and Value of Case Studies 
 
Yin, as the most cited writers on case study research,994 defines a case study as “an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, in particular 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly defined”995. Especially 
when considering the characteristics of the prevailing research setting, case studies constitute 
the most suitable tool as they allow the analysis and deepening of the understanding of a 
complex and difficult to quantify research phenomenon. At the same time they enable the 
researcher to maintain holistic and meaningful peculiarities of organisational ‘real-life events’ 
which are difficult or even impossible to analyse outside their natural setting. Moreover, case 
study analysis goes beyond the mere provision of a static snapshot. It enables a holistic view 
by cutting across the temporal and contextual dimensions of events to guide the researcher 
from largely uncontrollable observations to generalisable inductive conclusions by not only 
allowing the evaluation of processes but also the analysis of outcomes. This can be done by 
tracking the chronological sequence of events in order to show and explain strategic 
organisational transformation in complex and rapidly changing environments.996 Apart from 
already having been applied extensively within the area of business policy, strategic 
management and organisational theory in general, indepth qualitative case studies have also 
proven to be a valuable tool within Institutional Theory to analyse and explain heterogeneous 
strategic behaviour.997 And, last but not least, case study research has been proposed as a 
particularly suitable method of analysis for Ph.D. students.998
 
  
Having determined case studies as the most appropriate research method another distinction 
can be made between a quantitative and a qualitative research design, both of which have 
                                                 
994  Cf. Berry/ Otley (2004), p. 236. 
995  Yin (2003a), p. 13. 
996  Cf. Ginsberg (1984), p. 550; Bonoma (1985), pp. 199, 202-204; Yin (2003a), pp. 1-2; Yin (2003b), pp. xi, 
xvii. Ghauri (2004), pp. 111-112. Very recently also pointed out by Viellechner/ Wulf (2010), pp. 11-12. 
997  Cf. Schneiberg/ Clemens (2006), pp. 215, 217. 
998  Cf. Berry/ Otley (2004), p. 249. 
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their place in organisational research.999 Although case studies have by now been 
acknowledged as a research method in their own right and a popular tool in economics and 
management literature,1000 they are often wrongly equated with qualitative research. The latter 
suffers from being perceived as ‘soft’, non-numerical, non-statistical and too subjective, while 
quantitative work is automatically equated with objectivity. But even apparently objective 
data in a way is interpreted subjectively by the researcher as well as the reader.1001 Moreover, 
and particularly true for this work, are organisational strategies much too multi-dimensional 
and contingency-dependent to be analysed solely quantitatively. In addition to this there are 
“many aspects of organizations which do not easily lend themselves to quantitative 
interpretation”1002. Also the empirical setting is much too wide to be captured and measured 
statistically. Furthermore, case study research as a form of the textual operationalisation of 
strategy has been assessed as especially useful for theory building.1003 Although not the 
primary aim of the thesis, this constitutes an additional benefit as the theoretical analysis 
carried out above has revealed a research gap and thus a possible starting point for subsequent 
research on theory building. Another benefit of case studies is that they allow a variety of 
methods to be applied and may be a mix of quantitative as well as qualitative methods,1004 
thus supporting their value as a research technique. Similarly, quantitative and qualitative 
research should not be seen as competing but as complementary,1005
 
 a perspective also taken 
in this thesis. Still, the major part of analysis is based on qualitative analysis as this has been 
identified as the most suitable and valuable approach in this work as is explained in the 
following. 
 
                                                 
999  Cf. Downey/ Ireland (1979), p. 630; Yin (2003b), p. Xii; Ghauri (2004), p. 109. 
1000  The case study approach has already been a popular method in psychology, sociology as well as political and 
educational science. Cf. Yin (2003a), p. 1; Yin (2003b), p. xi. It has also been pointed out that a difference in 
research cultures may be the reason researchers using quantitative or qualitative methods. The European 
academic research setting for example is believed to be generally more receptive towards qualitative 
research. Cf. Marschan-Piekkari/ Welch (2004), p. 7. 
1001  Cf. Downey/ Ireland (1979), p. 632; Marschan-Piekkari/ Welch (2004), pp. 5-8; Scapens (2004), pp. 257-
258; Welch/ Welch (2004). 
1002  von Bertalanffy (1973), p. 46. 
1003  Cf. Hambrick (1980), pp. 569-570. 
1004  Cf. Yin (1981), p. 58; Yin (2003a), pp. 14-15, 97; Ghauri (2004), pp. 109, 112. For examples cf. Hofstede et 
al. (1990). 
1005  Cf. Miles (1979), p. 595; Usunier (1998), p. 134. 
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6.2.2 Value of Qualitative Case Study Research 
 
Simply expressed, qualitative research, despite its characteristics or distinction to quantitative 
research not being entirely clearly defined,1006 provides an answer to ‘messy problems and 
complex issues’1007. Qualitative research methods not only enable the studying of a 
phenomenon in its natural setting, but make qualitative data very context specific and 
therefore more ‘real’ and ‘holistic’.1008 Particularly when analysing organisational behaviour 
qualitative analysis is to be the preferred research method as it offers “a far more precise way 
to assess causality in organizational affairs than arcane efforts like cross-lagged 
correlations”1009, especially as quantitative approaches to modelling strategy have neither 
always turned out useful nor worked as smoothly as assumed due to their inability to delineate 
the underlying logic of the phenomenon to be analysed.1010 While ‘hard’, i.e. quantitative, 
data does reveal relationships, it is particularly, if not only, ‘soft’, i.e. qualitative, data that 
allows an explanation of these relationships. In fact, those researchers focussing only on very 
few variables while keeping all other constant have been accused of obscuring issues more 
than clarifying them and thus increasing confusion.1011
 
 
Qualitative data in contrast allows the researcher to preserve a chronological flow where 
critical and only minimally suffers from retrospective distortion as formulated by Miles.1012 In 
this work this is extremely valuable due to the complexity characterising the research setting 
which makes it difficult to isolate variables (as became particularly clear in chapter III), a fact 
which can be counteracted by qualitative case study inquiry. While the use of qualitative data 
to analyse an organisation’s environment had already become important to organisational 
research early, also case-based research is commonly used by now.1013
                                                 
1006  Cf. Schwandt (2001), p. 214. 
 Some already even 
1007  Cf. Wrigth (1996), p. 70. Also cf. Hopf (1993), p. 19. 
1008  Cf. Miles (1979), p. 590; McClintock et al. (1979), p. 612; Van Maanen (1983), p. 9; Denzin/ Lincoln 
(1994), p. 4; Marschan-Piekkari/ Welch (2004), p. 17. 
1009  Miles (1979), p. 590. 
1010  Cf. Mintzberg (1979), pp. 583-584; Ginsberg (1984), p. 551. 
1011  Cf. Mintzberg (1979), pp. 587-588. 
1012  Cf. Miles (1979), p. 590. 
1013  Cf. Downey/ Ireland (1979), p. 630; Berry/ Otley (2004), p. 250. 
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speak of the globalisation of qualitative research.1014 At the same time there are still frequent 
calls for more research “of this kind”1015 which has also generated “some of the most 
provocative work”1016. Within Institutional Theory, for instance, case studies have been used 
to analyse organisational change and show the influence of taken-for-granted assumptions on 
organisational activity.1017 To enhance research in CSR practices again, qualitative data 
analysis has been applied.1018 Finally, the application of qualitative methods not only is 
determined by the nature of the phenomenon researched, but also by the researchers’s 
ideology and the philosophical foundation of the adopted research approach.1019
 
 By using 
qualitative case studies, this thesis also contributes to enhancing the general status of 
academic research. Before doing so though, the type of case study to be applied as well the 
process of conducting them need to be explained as is done in the following. 
Generally, case studies provide a flexible approach suited to different types of research 
questions.1020 Three fundamental types of case studies can be distinguished:1021 descriptive, 
exploratory and explanatory ones. The first type, as the name already indicates, is used for 
describing phenomena in their context. While descriptive research has in 1979 already been 
considered to have been the norm in organisation theory for a long time,1022 and although 
providing helpful information,1023
                                                 
1014  Cf. Alasuutari (2004), p. 17. 
 it is not sufficient for the purpose of this work as 
conclusions are also to be drawn here. In such cases the application of exploratory or 
explanatory studies is advised. The exploratory type is appropriate when looking to formulate 
questions and hypotheses for a subsequent study, for ascertaining the feasibility of desired 
research procedures, or for developing a new theory and allowing its subsequent quantitative 
testing. Collecting data and field work are thus done beforehand, often intuitionally, in order 
1015  Marschan-Piekkari/ Welch (2004), p. 7. 
1016  Vernon (1994), pp. 144-145. 
1017  Cf. Burns et al. (2003). 
1018  Cf. O’Dwyer (2004), p. 391. 
1019  Cf. Berry/ Otley (2004), p. 233. 
1020  Cf. Ghauri (2004), p. 109. 
1021  Cf. Yin (2003b), p. xvii. Other types of case studies to be distinguished are those which support quantitative 
studies or those which prepare carrying out quantitative research. As this study is based on qualitative 
analysis though, these other types are not enlarged on further. 
1022  Cf. Mintzberg (1979), p. 583. 
1023  Cf. Scapens (2004), p. 259. 
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to determine theory via direct observation. Hence, when considering the aim and requirements 
of this work, this case study type does not seem appropriate. Keeping this in mind, analysis 
here is mainly built on explanatory cases as these not only enable the researcher to explain 
how things have happened, but to develop an explanatory causal path which shows critical 
cause-and-effect relationships. While the distinction between exploratory and explanatory 
cases is not always clear-cut, especially the latter reveal the “real potential of case study 
research”1024, supporting the argument for their application. Mintzberg even finds that all 
interesting research is explorative in the end.1025
 
  
Having set the type of case study to be applied, the number of cases has to be determined 
next, based on the research problem and objective formulated. Here, a distinction can be made 
between single and multiple designs. Single studies should be conducted in extreme or unique 
cases where all conditions necessary to test, confirm, challenge or extend a well-formulated 
theory are met, or to represent revelatory cases in terms of pilot studies where observation 
previously was not possible. As this is not the case here, a multiple design, consisting of two 
or more cases, must be used, especially as no ‘critical incidence case’1026 existed as 
determined from literature review (see above). While each is analysed separately, cases 
should be selected so that they replicate each other in that they pose the same question and 
study the same phenomenon. This enables the researcher to compare results which are either 
very similar or totally different.1027 Using more than one single case not only allows 
examining different dimensions and levels of the research variables, but also makes results 
more robust as the evidence from multiple studies is more compelling. Through this 
particularly powerful conclusions can be drawn, especially for extending theory.1028 Within 
the field of institutional research, for example, the incorporation of “comparisons over time, 
across groups, and across settings within case studies of institutional change”1029
                                                 
1024  Scapens (2004), p. 260. Scapens pointed out here that this may even be the main objective of research. Cf. 
Scapens (2004), p. 262. 
 has been 
1025  Cf. Mintzberg (1979), p. 584. 
1026  Cf. Viellechner/ Wulf (2010), p. 11 
1027  Cf. Yin (2003a), pp. 39-53; Yin (2003b), pp. 3-6; Ghauri (2004), p. 114; Scapens (2004), p. 263. 
1028  Cf. Bonoma (1985), p. 204; Yin (2003a), pp. 39-53; Ghauri (2004), p. 114; Scapens (2004), p. 263. 
1029  Schneiberg/ Clemens (2006), p. 220. 
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pointed out as being particularly valuable to enhance understanding within institutional 
theory. The process of carrying out case study research is explained next. 
 
 
6.3 Process of Conducting Qualitative Case Study Research 
 
6.3.1 Requirements 
 
Fundamentally, as cases should not just be chosen for convenience or the accessibility of data 
but must fit the theoretical framework chosen and variables identified, the researcher has to 
justify the selection of each case and the purpose it serves.1030 At the same time he also needs 
to be ‘pragmatic’ as, for instance, “the most appropriate company may be too far away or 
refuse access”1031
 
. Still, to make case study analysis, or any kind of research valuable, the 
researcher is responsible for ensuring its quality. Yin proposes to determine this by making 
certain that the case study design 
► is based on the appropriate operational measures (‘Construct Validity’), 
► considers the cause-and-effect relationships (‘Internal Validity’), 
► generalises the findings beyond the actual study and theory (‘External Validity’), and 
► ensures its repetitiveness in that other researchers analysing the same topic achieve the 
same results (‘Reliability’)1032.1033
 
  
                                                 
1030  Cf. Yin (2003b), p. 10; Ghauri (2004), pp. 112-114. 
1031  Ghauri (2004), p. 113. 
1032  Some argue that this is impossible as no two researchers have the same insight, attentiveness or take the 
same notes. Cf. Berry/ Otley (2004), p. 245. 
1033  Cf. Yin (2003a), pp. 34-37. Scapens argues that as reliability demands the researcher to be independent and 
validity to reflect objective reality, these criteria are unsuitable for case analysis. He proposes to instead 
speak of ‘procedural reliability’ to indicate that cases are based on sound and appropriate methods and 
procedures. He also suggests to exchange external validity with‘transferability’ to imply that findings can be 
transferred to other cases, and internal validity with ‘contextual validity’ to ‘prove’ credibility of the study 
and the conclusions drawn. Cf. Scapens (2004), pp. 268-270. Here, the terms depicted above are used as they 
are commonly used and as their meaning is known. For an illustration showing the connection between 
reliability and validity cf. Jensen (2002), p. 267. 
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While these four criteria can be said to be commonly acknowledged as fundamental for 
valuable research, there is less agreement with regards to case study analysis which has been 
criticised due to its limited ability to generalise.1034 Another reason is the above mentioned 
difference between quantitative and qualitative research. While validity has especially been 
granted to quantitative studies, it has been pointed out that it is not the method itself, but the 
researcher’s procedure which determines validity.1035 Others claim that validity and reliability 
naturally are in conflict and that the latter needed to be violated intentionally for the 
researcher to obtain in-depth understanding,1036 and that when conducting studies, researchers 
had to accept methodological trade-offs such as between accuracy and contextual richness.1037 
One way to counteract such issues is to draw upon ‘triangulation’, an approach which can be 
traced back to 1959. It refers to the application of various methods and the collection as well 
as the analysis of different data from multiple angles on the same phenomenon. This not only 
ensures validation but also reduces the likelihood of misinterpretation to produce a more 
holistic and contextual picture of the research objective,1038
 
 as pointed out as critical above. 
The concept of triangulation thus also forms the basis of this thesis, ensured through a multi-
method approach to data collection. The practical procedure of conducting research and the 
design of the case studies are looked at in the following. 
 
6.3.2 Choice of Cases and Data Base 
 
Conducting qualitative research and particularly case studies is “not the easy option”1039 but 
“difficult and demanding, frustrating and elusive”1040. There neither is a uniform set of 
procedures for data collection and analysis nor a common design for conducting case 
studies.1041
                                                 
1034  Cf. Hambrick (1980), p. 570. 
 Nevertheless, certain general principles which have to be accounted for can be 
found. A main prerequisite is that a common unit of analysis is established in that cases share 
1035  Cf. Lund (2005), p. 121. 
1036 Cf. Miles (1979), p. 596. 
1037  Cf. Weick (1979), p. 35; Bonoma (1985), p. 199. 
1038  Cf. Ghauri (2004), p. 115. 
1039  Scapens (2004), p. 276. 
1040  Berry/ Otley (2004), p. 251. 
1041  Cf. Yin (2003a), pp. 19-28. 
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some features which make them comparable and predict similar processes that account for 
positive outcomes beforehand (replication logic). This can be done by first determining the 
relevant target population and then its accessibility for finally selecting the cases to be 
studied. Other than in the case of statistical sampling, qualitative case studies are chosen 
systematically for their specific purpose (see above) in that they either predict similar results 
(literal replication), e.g. organisations from different industries following the same or similar 
strategies, or contrasting results, but for predictable reasons (theoretical replication). Even 
cases which do not fulfill needed criteria and are therefore not chosen can still provide 
valuable information which can be used (e.g. competitive data). In a next step data is collected 
and compiled. Based on this, cases are written up before being analysed and conclusions 
drawn in the final step.1042 It has been criticised though that qualitative researchers often do 
not reveal their method of data collection.1043
 
 In order to counteract this criticism, the 
composition of the data base is addressed in the following. 
While Yin has emphasised that the case study method does not imply any specific form of 
data collection,1044 the main sources for primary data collection can generally be distinguished 
between the researcher’s active searching and his passive but direct observation. This can 
include verbal reports such as from personal interviews, especially when information is not 
available otherwise,1045 archival reports, physical artifacts and data gathered at trade 
meetings. Also the personal review of organisational processes or interaction with 
management, external stakeholders and industry experts serves as a basis for data collection. 
For reasons of triangulation (see above), this qualitative collection can be supported through 
quantitative data such as financial, market performance and competitive information.1046 
Here, analysis is based on externally available corporate documents such as annual, financial 
or other accessible reports, press releases, letters to shareholders, public presentations, 
corporate speeches (as “actors rarely, if ever, remain silent as they make policy”1047
                                                 
1042  Cf. Bonoma (1985), p. 205; Yin (2003a), pp. 47-48, 153; Ghauri (2004), pp. 112-113. 
), 
conference material, and other information available on corporate websites. These kinds of 
1043  Cf. Zalan/ Lewis, p. 15. 
1044  Cf. Yin (2003b), p. 4. 
1045  Cf. Schmalensee (1988), p. 649. 
1046  Cf. Thomas (1974), p. 37; Downey/ Ireland (1979), pp. 633-635; Bonoma (1985), p. 203; Yin (2003a), p. 86. 
1047  Schneiberg/ Clemens (2006), p. 210. 
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data sources not only provide clear-cut facts but also organisational stories from which 
insights can be drawn. Despite, at times, being criticised as biased due to having been created 
by organisations as the research subject themselves, it can be countered that these official 
documents have to follow certain standards for being able to be made public, even more in the 
case of publicly listed companies. In fact, these data sources have been considered as ‘very 
useful’1048 for obtaining qualitative and quantitative data. Others deemed the reliance on such 
artefacts sometimes even necessary.1049 Especially Annual and Financial Reports, despite 
being issued by companies themselves, have been assessed as objective because of being 
publicly reviewed by several sources. Moreover, the higher the strategic credibility of such 
documents is, the more attractive the organisation becomes. In this respect they have been 
depicted as “narrative disclosures”1050 in terms of being used as an effective communication 
tool to display and send certain messages and pictures to different stakeholders. Some 
researchers thus also consider the ‘shape’ of Annual Reports in that they include graphics, 
photos and the language used in their analysis. Others count the number of report pages or the 
frequency of key words or topics mentioned in order to assess the importance and actuality of 
a topic.1051 As these documents mainly report on performance though, ‘Letters to 
Shareholders’ are drawn upon as an additional source. These are not only subject to public 
review, but are used by organisational leaders to communicate directly with stakeholders and 
thus reveal how they perceive certain issues. This again allows the researcher to draw 
conclusions.1052 Still, in order to enhance data quality, information from newspapers, journals 
and magazines is also drawn upon. While prone to subjectivity by the journalist, this at the 
same time provides a way to reflect on the researcher’s own interpretation of corporate data, 
such as on performance measures as well as statements made by organisational members in 
public. This has been pointed out as valuable particularly when analysing organisational 
change.1053 Moreover, taking into account historical documents is particularly helpful when 
tracing strategic patterns over a longer period of time,1054
                                                 
1048  Cf. Ghauri (2004), p. 116. 
 as is required in this work. Apart 
1049  Cf. Ginsberg (1984), p. 555; Point/ Tyson (1999), p. 558; Scapens (2004), p. 267. 
1050  Point/ Tyson (1999), p. 556. 
1051  Cf. Point/ Tyson (1999), pp. 556-562. For examples cf. Newell (1988). 
1052  Cf. Ginsberg (1984), p. 552; Point/ Tyson (1999), p. 556; Schneiberg/ Clemens (2006), p. 210. 
1053  Cf. Katz/ Kahn (1966), p. 261; Foss (2000), p. 17. 
1054  Cf. Mintzberg (1979), p. 582. 
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from these benefits, the advantage of using externally available data lies in the possibility of 
replication, identified as being of central importance for case study quality. At the same time 
it is also more time and cost effective, a very valuable aspect when considering that this has 
been determined as one of the most critical constraints to case study research. In fact, several 
researchers have based their analysis solely on such data sources within qualitative case 
studies. Examples include analyses of how environmental change, created through regulatory 
adjustments like deregulation, influenced corporate strategic behaviour and organisational 
change.1055 Finon et al. again also drew conclusions from companies’ mission statements.1056 
Mintzberg even included anecdotal data.1057
 
 
Internal, i.e. not publicly available, information in contrast, has not been utilised as it is 
difficult to gain access to. But even if this had been granted, there are restrictions in many 
cases to make results public due to reasons of commercial confidentiality, internal politics, or 
care for privacy of individual persons such as organisational leaders. Thus, the exclusion of 
certain information is a necessary cost of conducting research.1058
 
 
 
6.3.3 Conducting Analysis 
 
As data does not speak for itself,1059 it requires thorough analysis and “detective work”1060 to 
track down patterns. In addition to this, it is not only fundamentally dependent on the 
researcher’s ability to judge and draw conclusions,1061 but also on his “total immersion and 
commitment”1062. Thus, the interpretation and analysis of qualitative data has not only been 
described as “perhaps the most difficult task while doing research”1063
                                                 
1055  Cf. Smith/ Grimm (1987); Zajac/ Shortell (1989); Meyer et al. (1990); Kelly/ Amburgey (1991); Barr et al. 
(1992); Thomas et al. (1993); Rajagopalan/ Spreitzer (1996); Fox-Wolfgramm et al. (1998); Midttun/ 
Omland (2004), p. 273. 
, but has also even been 
1056  Cf. Finon et al. (2004), p. 311. 
1057  Cf. Mintzberg (1979), p. 587. 
1058  Cf. Gummesson (1991); Berry/ Otley (2004), p. 247. 
1059  Cf. Blau (1963), p. 6. 
1060  Mintzberg (1979), p. 584. 
1061  Cf. Beutel (1988), p. 59. 
1062  O’Dwyer (2004), p. 404. 
1063  Ghauri (2004), p. 117. 
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claimed to be “a mysterious, half-formulated art”1064 in form of a “creative and literary 
act”1065. Miles and his team, who were early researchers to use case studies, felt that they 
“could not escape the suspicion that others did not know much more than we about the arcane 
process of making valid sense of large amounts of qualitative information”1066. Especially the 
design of multiple case studies has been pointed out to be resource and time consuming with 
no short cuts possible. While the researcher needs sufficient data in order to conduct 
meaningful analysis, he at the same time faces the danger of being overloaded with a sheer 
range of phenomena which makes the process seem endless. Hence, as case study design and 
analysis do not follow a simple straight process and researchers are advised to not take it 
‘lightly’, a way must be found to be able to synthesise large amounts of different data. This is 
particularly critical as computer software cannot only not ‘replace thinking’ or the 
formulation of conclusions, but by many researchers has not been found helpful for case study 
analysis.1067 Moreover, while sounding logical, several writers have emphasised the 
importance of ensuring that data collection and analysis are interwoven right from the start so 
that the conclusions drawn clearly stem from the case study (‘Logical Positivism’1068).1069
 
  
After having collected data the process of analysis can be further split into the three steps of 
data reduction, data display and data interpretation. The first step refers to the identification of 
key topics and patterns which in a second step should then be clearly presented before 
conclusions can be drawn in a last step.1070 Generally, several different techniques exist which 
allow “Transforming a ‘Messy’ but ‘Attractive’ ‘Nuisance’”1071, such as the complex research 
setting faced in this case, into meaningful results. Among these practices is “logical 
compound synthesis”1072
                                                 
1064  Miles (1979), p. 593. 
 which synthesises findings into ‘a plausible logical story’. An 
essential part of this process is the development of chronologies, the coding of data according 
to concepts established and its clustering, so that cases are categorised according to common 
1065  Scapens (2004), p. 274. Also cf. O’Dwyer (2004), pp. 391, 393, 405. 
1066  Miles (1979), p. 595. 
1067  Cf. Yin (1984), p. 26; Miles (1979), p. 590; Yin (2003a), p. 39; Berry/ Otley (2004), p. 237; Ghauri (2004), 
p. 117; O’Dwyer (2004), p. 395; Scapens (2004), pp. 263, 270, 272. 
1068  Cf. Yin (2003b), Box 21 on p. 163. 
1069  Cf. Ghauri (2004), pp. 117-120. 
1070  Cf. O’Dwyer (2004), pp. 393-403. 
1071  O’Dwyer (2004), p. 391. 
1072  Itami/ Numagami (1992), p. 133. 
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characteristics or dimensions. Other possibilities include the setting up of matrices in order to 
explain interrelationships between identified factors, decision-tree-modelling by grounding a 
description of real-world decisions, or pattern matching as a comparison between predicted 
and empirically based patterns.1073 As each has its advantages and disadvantages, it has been 
proposed to use a mix of them to allow an extensive analysis,1074 an approach that is also 
applied here. While cases based on common features are constructed, story telling allows the 
development of the chronology needed. Matrices or pattern diagrams again provide an 
overview over relationships found. At the beginning of the process however, following the 
nature of the phenomenon studied, codes need to be assigned through descriptive coding. This 
not only reduces large volumes of data and brings the researcher deeper into analysis, but 
supports the development of a cognitive map which helps to elaborate analysis. Moreover, it 
lays the fundament for inter-case analysis when doing multiple case studies. Codes need to be 
made meaningful by developing patterns which allow conclusions to be drawn.1075 This is 
carried out further below. Pattern matching again reveals whether the assumed paths can be 
empirically proven and has the advantage of not requiring statistical tests.1076
 
  
In order to further increase internal validity, research case studies must be absolutely rigorous 
and fair with the presentation of data, a requirement that can be satisfied by including 
confirming as well as competing ‘rival’ explanations.1077 In addition to this, it has been 
pointed out that a successful interpretation not only suffices with the observation of 
phenomena, but needs to be established in context of their meaning. This again in large parts 
depends on the researcher’s style of investigation and his integrity with regards to the 
consideration of the extent and quality of evidence.1078 Also more profound issues such as the 
usage of tabular displays, a researcher’s language skills, his intuition, but also luck as well as 
the notion of “knowing your data intimately”1079 are critical to successful analysis.1080
                                                 
1073  Cf. Ghauri (2004), p. 118. 
 Here, 
these requirements are not only satisfied by the research techniques just mentioned, but also 
1074  Cf. Ghauri (2004), p. 121. 
1075  Cf. Miles/ Huberman (1994). 
1076  Cf. Ghauri (2004), p. 121; Scapens (2004), pp. 270-273. 
1077  Cf. Yin (2003b), p. 122; Viellechner/ Wulf (2010), pp. 11-14. 
1078  Cf. Yin (2003b), p. 110; Berry/ Otley (2004), p. 246. 
1079  O’Dwyer (2004), p. 404. 
1080  Cf. Mintzberg (1979), p. 587; Jennings (2001), p. 400; Scapens (2004), p. 272. 
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by the chosen methodological approach in that several theoretical approaches have been 
applied which allow critical analysis and the look through different lenses. Viellechner and 
Wulf, for example, in their approach - which is similar to that applied here - propose to create 
evolutionary case write-ups of 20-30 pages and carry out within (intra-case) as well as cross-
case (inter-case) analysis in order to avoid jumping to conclusions.1081 Similarly, in order to 
respond to the challenge of analysing change, Schneiberg employed comparative case 
studies.1082 Longitudinal case studies again have been determined as essential for profoundly 
complex studies and have especially been applied to find out which patterns enable the 
description of the strategy process.1083 Meyer et al., for instance, analysed the evolution of the 
American clinic industry over a period of 30 years in order to determine change on the 
organisational and field level.1084 Allas looked at the development of European electricity 
companies over a phase between 1995 and 2000.1085 While there is no commonly accepted 
approach to carrying out qualitative research, case study research has been described as 
essentially being based on ‘telling an interesting story’ which is authentic, plausible and 
critical.1086
 
 Before doing so, the research set-up created for this thesis is laid out in the 
following. 
 
6.3.4 Research Set Up 
 
Fundamentally, as can be derived from the above findings, some basic structures are 
conditioned by empirical reality. On the one hand this refers to the temporal frame. With the 
year 1998 constituting the start of liberalisation and thus the trigger for elementary structural 
change, it also marks the beginning of period of analysis. The year 2007 again flags a 
‘landmark’ with regards to full market opening. Moreover, the 3rd liberalisation package was 
presented at the end of that year. The year 2008 has thus been chosen as the finishing point of 
analysis. Covering a research decade from 1998-2008 not only includes a period where the 
                                                 
1081  Cf. Viellechner/ Wulf (2010), pp. 13-14. 
1082 Cf. Schneiberg/ Clemens (2006), p. 219. 
1083 Cf. Mintzberg (1987); Schneiberg/ Clemens (2006), p. 219. 
1084  Cf. Meyer et al. (1990). 
1085  Cf. Allas (2001). 
1086  Cf. Berry/ Otley (2004), p. 247; O’Dwyer (2004), p. 403; Scapens (2004), pp. 272, 274. 
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most essential alterations have been made with regards to European Energy Policy, but 
provides the researcher with a sensible period for analysing the consequences of this change 
over the course of time. On the other hand, and despite the size of the European market and 
the large number of market players active within, the choice of cases for analysis is in 
addition partly set by the focus of the research topic in that companies must be incumbent 
European companies active in the European gas market. Under these pre-conditions large 
global players such as Gazprom, the world’s largest gas producer, could not be included in 
case analysis. Some freedom of choice is hence only granted in form of choosing among 
incumbents from Member States of the European Union. At the same time the researcher is 
always subject to resource and time constraints (see above) and hence can only analyse and 
discuss a few selected companies.1087 Here, four cases have been chosen as the basis for 
analysis. In order to ensure methodological quality (see above), these have not been 
determined randomly out of the basic population possible, but from Germany, France and 
Italy as the largest, most advanced and influential European countries.1088 Moreover, similar 
courses of industry developments have been expected there.1089
 
 In addition to this, each of the 
three countries has a relevant incumbent with monopoly power: In the case of France this is 
Gaz de France (GdF) which later became GDF SUEZ, and in Italy SNAM (Società Nazionale 
Metanodotti) which became part of Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (E.N.I.). In Germany again the 
main gas incumbent used to be Ruhrgas. As this was incorporated by E.ON, which again is 
the result of the merger between two traditional Germany utilities as is enlarged on in the case 
study, E.ON has been selected as a case example for Germany. Following the fact that there is 
no focal gas incumbent anymore, RWE has been chosen as a second German case example in 
order to avoid, or at least reduce, possible bias. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1087  As also particularly mentioned by Midttun et al. (2001), pp. 391-392. 
1088  The U.K. has not been considered due to already having liberalised its energy markets well before the rest of 
Europe (see chapter III). 
1089  Cf. Rossert (1996), pp. 5-8. 
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The following four companies thus constitute the case examples for this research:1090
 
 
 Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) 
 E.ON 
 Gaz de France (GdF) 
 RWE 
 
Having explained the selection of case studies, the next step is to lay out the procedure of 
examining these. First of all, each is analysed according to the following structure which 
again is based on what was determined in the theoretical analysis: After a brief introduction to 
company history and its initial set-up, the development of corporate strategic behaviour over 
the course of time is looked at first from a Business Perspective, then through an Institutional 
lens to be followed by an analysis from an Integrated Perspective. As definitions of such 
behavioural classification schemes must be based on key characteristics for identification and 
comparison, especially when analysing strategic change,1091
                                                 
1090  In alphabetical order. 
 the identification of strategic 
behaviour is also pre-conditioned by the criteria theoretically established and empirically 
proven as laid out above. Here, key words as applied in literature are referred to and later used 
for the identification of empirical analysis. These are summarised in the tables below. 
1091  Cf. Keim/ Zeithaml (1986), p. 837. 
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Table 3: 1092
 
  Criteria for the measurement of organisations’ business behaviour 
Strategic 
Behaviour 
Characteristics 
React 
- Short-term orientation 
- Ignore change and with this arising opportunities 
- Remain loyal to existing products, markets, activities, and positioning 
- Risk-averseness 
- ‘Follow the leader’-orientation 
Defend 
- Scepticism towards innovation 
- Protect domain while improving efficiency such as via process improvements 
- Establish market barriers by exploiting assets owned, low-cost strategies, cross-
subsidisation, or signalling investments 
- Defensively vertically integrating and/ or engaging in mergers, acquisitions and JVs 
- Co-opt with rivals 
- Engage in cartels 
- Establish monopolies 
Analyse 
- Exploit while at the same time still defending existing businesses 
- Identify opportunities 
- Become more open to taking risks 
Create 
- Continuous search for innovation 
- Strive for growth via product-market extensions such as through related as well as 
unrelated diversification, e.g. via SAs. 
- Developing innovative business strategies 
- Pushing back traditional industry boundaries 
- Shift the ‘centre of gravity’, i.e. build a new core business and change the basis of 
doing business 
- Being a first-mover and driving industry development 
                                                 
1092  Own table based on findings from chapters IV and V. 
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The following table shows the measures for determining an organisation’s institutional 
behaviour. 
 
Table 4: 1093
 
  Criteria for the measurement of organisations’ institutional behaviour 
Strategic 
Behaviour 
Characteristics 
Acquiesce 
Follow habit 
- Blind adherence to taken-for-granted rules due to being unaware of institutional 
influences and pressures to change 
- Not responding strategically but reproducing institutionalised actions 
Imitate 
- Copy institutionalised practices or successful, known or trusted behaviours 
Comply 
- Consciously obey and follow ‘the letter and the rule’ 
- Incorporate institutionalised values, norms or requirements 
Compromise 
Balance 
- Play off actors against one another 
- Achieve panty with institutional actors 
- Negotiate openly 
Pacify 
- Fulfil minimum requirements/ appease or placate 
- Apologise 
- Deny responsibility/ blame environmental pressures 
- Justify by claiming that change is essential for survival 
- Play down change 
- Hide/ keep secret change 
Bargain 
- Ally with institutional agents, e.g. transfer personnel 
Avoid 
Conceal 
- Disguise non-conformity through ceremonial adoption, pretending, symbolic 
gestures of compliance, window dressing, paying lipservice, acting the innocent 
Buffer 
- Decouple to reduce extent of external inspection, scrutinisation and evaluation 
- Deny, excuse, justify change 
Escape 
- Alter or even exit the domain of pressures 
- Alter goals and activities 
                                                 
1093  Own table based on findings from chapters IV and V. This table is more extensive as the characterisation of 
institutional behaviour is particularly based on verbal expressions and language. 
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Defy 
Dismiss 
- Ignore institutional pressures 
- Avoid arguments with institutional agents 
- Adopt wait-and-see attitude and sit-out requirements 
Challenge 
- Make a virtue of insurrection 
- Argue of already ‘doing more than necessary’ in that deviating actions are above 
what is actually required 
- Legal manoeuvring by overwhelming agencies with useless paperwork, delaying 
procedures, using administrative processes for own advantage 
Attack 
- Threaten, assault, belittle and denounce institutional pressures and those who insert 
them 
- Confront institutional agents in court 
- Attack publicly by initiating media campaigns 
Manipulate 
Co-opt 
- Coalition building with institutional agents 
- Bringing in powerful constituents into the organisation 
Influence 
- Impact perception of institutional agents and stakeholders 
- Lobby and ‘curry favour’ 
- Re-interpret requirements to own advantage 
- Spread rumours 
- Suppress or disseminate inaccurate information with regards to own, respectively 
competitors’ behaviour 
- Publicly question institutional requirements 
Control 
- Drive wedge between different if not implement new institutional agents (install 
organisational members in organisations exerting institutional pressures) 
- Provoke legal/ regulatory barriers 
- Voluntarily participate in or even go beyond institutional measures 
- Image advertising and issuing qualitative narratives such as via corporate 
documents to distribute stories 
- Anticipatory engagement such as through sponsorships or selectively fuelling 
research 
- Collaborate with institutional agents 
- Being an ‘institutional entrepreneur’ by creating new institutional expectations not 
actually intended by institutional agents 
 
Based on these criteria strategic organisational behaviour is identified for each year of the ten-
year research period, i.e. 1998-2008, and marked as a dot in the matrix. When connecting 
these dots, the organisation’s development path becomes apparent. The fact that 
organisational development can be depicted in this way, i.e. as a path which consists of 
individual strategic action patterns that may change from re-active to pro-active, has also been 
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pointed out and empirically applied by other researchers.1094 Within the field of business 
research the determination of change and heterogeneity, for example, has been measured by 
the number of countries internationalised or the number of business areas diversified into. 
Researchers within institutional theory again have, amongst others, counted the number of 
companies having adopted certain tactics, of cases brought to court, or the frequency of 
certain terms used. Also the emergence of new publications relating to the prevailing topic of 
change as well as their relative importance has been used as measures. Legitimacy, or its 
breach, becomes reckonable through the ‘noise’ it creates, e.g. in form of public criticism as 
actors complain and debate, authorities issue warnings and start investigations, or by the 
traces it leaves in popular press, legal records, trade journals and other documents.1095 Thus, 
in order to better reveal the ‘dramaturgy with which an organisation conducts its affairs’1096, 
especially direct and indirect verbatim quotes, derived from corporate as well as secondary 
sources, are used in order to enhance reliability. The prevailing direction or focus of paths, i.e. 
whether business, institutional or integrated – or ‘zic-zac’ – is determined as described in 
chapter V.1097
 
 
After having determined individual strategic development paths through intra-case analysis, 
these results then are compared and further analysed by inter-case analysis to enhance 
explanatory power. Also this is pre-determined by findings from previous chapters in terms of 
the external and internal drivers looked at. From these two types of analyses first conclusions 
are drawn. In order to further augment explanatory value these are complemented with 
findings from industry analysis which is conducted subsequently to case research. Finally, by 
also bringing in the results from this industry analysis and current research, chapter VIII 
closes with an overall discussion of findings. Additionally here, more recent developments 
and findings are integrated. As “it is always possible to derive new inferences from the data, 
to carry the interpretation a step further, to make additional comparisons, to use information 
                                                 
1094  Cf. Ginsberg (1984), pp. 551, 554; Grant/ Cibin (1996), p. 185; Scallon/ Sten (1997), pp. 145-163. 
1095  Cf. Schneiberg/ Clemens (2006), pp. 201-202, 212, 215. 
1096  Cf. Ritti/ Silver (1986), p. 28. For an example cf. O’Dwyer (2004), p. 403. 
1097  This includes a company’s actual focus and direction of resource employment but also its environmental 
perception or attitude. Scallon and Sten, for example, used the notion of attitude to categorise companies into 
different behavioural groups. Cf. Scallon/ Sten (1997), pp. 145-163. 
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to refine the analysis, and to view the research from a broader perspective”1098, and as hence 
“the analysis of research findings never reaches a final state of completion”1099, the researcher 
at some point has to draw a final stroke as otherwise there is the danger of the work becoming 
a ‘never-ending story’. What should be done though is to be ‘creative’ with regards to 
analysing beyond one’s data and break away from the expected to describe something 
new.1100
 
 This, in fact, is transposed in the following chapter containing the empirical analysis. 
For reasons of consistency, case study analysis follows the same pattern: 
► Introduction 
► Analysis of development from a Business Perspective 
► Analysis of development from an Institutional Perspective 
► Analysis of development from an Integrated Perspective and mapping development 
path on the matrix established above 
 
Accordingly, and following the approach depicted above, for each case analysed a business, 
institutional, or integrated path should be determined. This is carried out in the following 
chapter - with cases presented in alphabetical order. 
                                                 
1098  Blau (1963), p. vii. 
1099  Blau (1963), p. vii. 
1100  Cf. Mintzberg (1979), p. 584. 
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CHAPTER VII EMPIRICAL STUDY – INTRA-CASE ANALYSIS 
 
 
7.1 ENI 
 
7.1.1 Introduction 
 
While ENI, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi,1101 celebrated its 50th anniversary on February 15, 
2003, its roots go back much further to 1926 when the Italian government created Azienda 
Generali Ialiana Petroli (Agip) as a state-owned oil company. Having discovered a major 
natural gas field in Northern Italy in 1948 Agip was merged with Società Nazionale 
Metanodotti S.p.A. (SNAM), Italy’s distribution company, and other state-owned energy 
businesses in 1953 to create ENI with the aim of developing hydrocarbons and natural gases. 
Apart from its engagement in the energy field via its 36 subsidiaries, ENI was also active in 
the engineering services, the chemical, the real estate and the soap business, a diversification 
which in most cases had been politically driven. Several years later, after a phase of financial 
difficulty, these businesses were divested in order to form ENI into an energy company 
focussed on the oil and gas sector. Another major change was initiated when ENI became a 
joint stock company in 1992 and went public via Initial Public Offering (IPO) in November 
1995.1102
 
 
When starting this study, ENI was an integrated company active in different energy 
businesses. Upstream activities, of which 80% is carried out globally, were and still are 
carried out by Agip S.p.A. By 2001, ENI had established operations in 70 countries, its main 
geographic regions of activity including Europe, Africa, the Americas as well as Asia and 
Oceania.1103
                                                 
1101  In the following the term ENI will be used. Here, information has been taken from three main corporate 
documents provided by ENI: Annual Reports (labelled ‘a’), Fact Books (‘b’) and Financial Forms 20-F (‘c’). 
 Transportation activities are still conducted via SNAM and subsidiaries. These 
1102  Cf. Grant/ Ritter (2007), pp. 1-5. 
1103  Cf. ENI (2001a), see second page (no page number provided); ENI (2001c), pp. 10-11. 
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had been created in 1941 by Ente Nazionale Metanom, Agip, the Salsomaggiore S.p.A. 
Company, and Società Anonima Utilizzazione e Ricerca Gas Idrocarburati (Surgi) with the 
aim of constructing and operating natural gas pipelines in order to distribute and sell gas. At 
that time they owned 95% of the Italian pipeline grid1104 and several storage sites in Italy.1105 
In addition to these domestic midstream facilities, ENI also has ownership stakes in 
international long-distance pipelines such as TTPC, together with Gazprom in Blue Stream to 
bring gas from Russia to Turkey, or with the National Oil Company of Libya in Greenstream, 
a pipeline bringing gas from Libya to Italy. Retail distribution to commercial and residential 
consumers again is carried out through Italgas, Italy’s largest, publicly traded local 
distribution company in which ENI held a majority share at the beginning of the study. Via 
stakes in local distributors such as Tigaz in Hungary, Adriaplin in Slovenia, and Distribuidora 
de Gas Cuyana in Argentina, ENI was also already present in retail distribution across 
national borders. Moreover and apart from its engagement in the gas business, ENI was also 
active in the production and sales of electricity through its subsidiary EniPower SpA, the 
refining and marketing of petroleum products via EniChem SpA, a leading producer of 
petrochemicals, as well as in the segment of oilfield services and engineering via Saipem 
SpA, a world leader in offshore and subsea oil and gas pipeline laying, drilling and platform 
installation services.1106
 
 
 
7.1.2 Analysis of Development from a Business Perspective 
 
Fundamentally, business behaviour has to be characterised as reactive. Despite having 
mentioned the threat from increasing competition through market opening already since the 
beginning,1107
                                                 
1104  Cf. ENI (2004a), p. 36. 
 and that as a response ENI was looking to ‘pro-actively manage the 
consequences of the Italian gas market liberalisation’ and grow internationally to compensate 
1105  Cf. ENI (2002a), p. 14. 
1106  Cf. ENI (2001a); ENI (2001b); ENI (2001c). 
1107  Cf. ENI (2002c), p. 4; ENI (2003c), pp. 4-5; ENI (2004c), pp. 4-5; ENI (2005c), pp. 4-5; ENI (2006c), pp. 4-
5; ENI (2007c), pp. 4-5; ENI (2008c), pp. 5-6; ENI (2009c), pp. 5-6. 
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for losses resulting from regulatory change,1108 opportunities for market development were 
not taken advantage of. Instead, ENI remained loyal to its existing businesses. This becomes 
particularly apparent from the fact that the focus of activities was laid on the global upstream 
business, while potentials for benefiting from change in European markets were mainly 
ignored. Similarly, despite having initiated an even ‘more aggressive upstream growth 
strategy’1109 in 2000, including, amongst others, the acquisition of a 28% stake in UK based 
Lasmo Plc which not only provided access to production facilities in the U.K., but also to the 
Netherlands, North Africa (Morocco), Venezuela, Pakistan, Indonesia, where it obtained 
access to the world’s largest liquefaction plant (Bontang) for LNG being shipped to Japan, 
and Turkmenistan for the first time, ENI in 2004 still pointed out that its “long-term 
development strategy is mainly upstream driven”1110.1111 The focus on E&P activities can also 
be derived from the fact that ENI continuously enforced initiatives to discover natural gas, 
such as in Australia where it acquired exploration permits and discovered natural gas in 2001, 
participated in a consortium that was constructing a pipeline to the coast in 2002, and entered 
into contracts with local industrial consumers for the supply of gas in 2005. Similarly, via the 
acquisition of a stake in the North Caspian Sea PSA from British Petroleum and Statoil, 
access was gained to a production site in Kazakhstan which was confirmed to be one of the 
largest oil discoveries in the past 30 years. The fact that plans were made to reinject gas in 
order to increase oil production1112 also shows the focus of ENI’s operations on the upstream 
segment at that time. The assessment of ENI’s reactive behaviour is further supported by the 
fact that these engagements were not directed at taking advantage of changes in the European 
market, as a large part of upstream discoveries made were determined for electricity 
generation in local plants at places of production. This also holds with regards to activities 
further down the gas value-chain such as with the development of LNG capacities with 
shipments going to Japan instead of Europe.1113
                                                 
1108  Cf. ENI (2002a), p. 8; ENI (2003a), pp. 10-13, 27; ENI (2004a), pp. 12-13; ENI (2005a), p. 12. These were 
also stated as goals in the following years (cf. ENI (2006a), p. 11; ENI (2007a), pp. 9-10; ENI (2008a), p. 10; 
ENI (2009a), pp. 10-11) thus presenting no change and supporting the finding of passive behaviour. 
 Likewise, the renewed engagement, through 
1109  Cf. ENI (2002a), p. 8. 
1110  ENI (2005a), p. 14. 
1111  Cf. ENI (2002a), pp. 17-18; ENI (2002b), pp. 12, 23-24, 26. 
1112  Cf. ENI (2003a), pp. 11-13, 16-22. 
1113  Cf. ENI (2002b), pp. 23-24; ENI (2003a), p. 22; ENI (2005a), p. 24; ENI (2005b), p. 24; ENI (2006a), p. 24; 
ENI (2006b), p. 27; ENI (2007a), p. 25. 
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the acquisition of a 50% stake in a consortium with the licence to explore possibilities for 
developing natural gas, in Saudi Arabia in 2004, where ENI has been operating since the early 
1970s, was restricted in that the gas discovered had to be sold on the Saudi Arabian market 
for local use instead of being utilisable for export to European markets.1114 A similar situation 
can be found with regards to the Indian market where ENI in 2005 obtained stakes for the 
right to explore and develop natural gas from two production blocks in the Indian Ocean, the 
production also having to be sold locally. Its global upstream orientation was further 
reinforced through the signing of a MoU with the Indian Oil & Natural Gas Corporation in 
order to jointly develop E&P opportunities as well as to share information on global projects 
with the possibility of exchanging equity interests in up- and midstream engagements. This 
was done in 2007 when ENI swapped interests for a stake in an Indian offshore field while 
itself provided a stake in an offshore permit in the Congo.1115 In 2006, ENI further extended 
its international production by becoming active in Mali and East Timor for the first time, 
having been awarded full operatorship of five exploration licenses in East Timor while having 
acquired a 50% stake in five onshore exploration licenses in Mali.1116 In the same year a 
similar ‘strategic landmark agreement’ was struck with Gazprom, extending supply contracts 
to 2035 and increasing the residual life of ENI’s supply portfolio to 23 years. Also this deal, 
despite Gazprom being a major supplier to Europe (see chapter III), was struck with the aim 
of augmenting ENI’s global sales.1117 One year later then and ‘in line with focussing on its 
core areas’ as pointed out by ENI itself,1118 further upstream acquisitions were made in the 
Gulf of Mexico as well as in the Congo and Alaska. In addition to these, an agreement was 
signed for the purchase of a 30% stake in one of the richest gas E&P areas in Australia.1119 
This also holds when considering the take-over attempt of Gas de Portugal made in 2003. 
This had initially been refused by the European Commission and later only allowed under the 
condition that the natural gas transport network, storage sites and an LNG regasification plant 
had to be spun off, leaving ENI only with upstream gas and oil refining activities.1120
                                                 
1114  Cf. ENI (2004c), p. 24; ENI (2005a), p. 24. 
 
1115  Cf. ENI (2005c), pp. 26-27; ENI (2006a), p. 24; ENI (2006c), p. 31; ENI (2007a), p. 23. 
1116  Cf. ENI (2007a), pp. 21, 25; ENI (2006c), p. 26, 31. 
1117  Cf. ENI (2007a), pp. 8-9, 31-33. 
1118  Cf. ENI (2008a), p. 5. 
1119  Cf. ENI (2008a), pp. 22-30. 
1120  Cf. ENI (2004a), p. 31; ENI (2005a), p. 31-32, 35; ENI (2006a), p. 34; ENI (2007a), pp. 35-36. 
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Finally, the assessment that ENI’s “aggressive growth strategy”1121 initiated in 19991122
 
 did 
focus on the upstream business also shows when looking at the increase of daily production 
volumes as well as when comparing capital expenditures for the upstream E&P segment with 
those for the G&P business. Not only have those in G&P declined for three consecutive years, 
i.e. between 2004 and 2006, while those for E&P only did so from 2003 to 2004 and 
otherwise continuously increased, but has the ratio between the two extremely grown. In 
1999, expenditures for E&P were already 3.6 times higher than those for G&P, but ENI spent 
5.3 times more on E&P than on G&P in 2008 (see figure below). These examples support the 
evaluation of ENI’s mainly reactive behaviour. 
Figure 19:1123
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Apart from these operational figures ENI’s organisational structure also supports the above 
finding in that, by merging Snam SpA, Somicem SpA and AgipPetrol, it restructured into an 
‘energy company with a focus on the oil and gas business’ between 2001 and 2002,1124 thus 
shortly after gas market liberalisation. Additionally, the integration of EniTechnologie in 
2006 was carried out with the predominant aim of establishing partnerships with companies 
of producing countries to access resources and increase its reserve replacement ratio.1125
                                                 
1121  ENI (2001c), pp. 11, 14. 
 
Other evidence is provided by the fact that capital investments into the G&P segment as well 
as the increase of shares in Italgas to become the sole owner of the company were initially 
1122  Cf. ENI (2004a), p. 8. 
1123  Own figure based data on from Annual Reports. 
1124  Cf. ENI (2002a), pp. 7, 22; ENI (2003a), p. 12. 
1125  Cf. ENI (2005a), pp. 74-76; ENI (2006a), pp. 97-99; ENI (2007a), p. 116; ENI (2008a), p. 11. 
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mainly directed at the domestic market,1126 thus qualifying only as reactive behaviour. This 
can even be found in concrete statements such as with regards to the re-organisation of 
marketing activities in the Italian market in order to be able to “react promptly and efficiently 
to market requirements”1127. A similar assessment can be made with regards to ENIpower 
which had been established early as a separate entity to own and operate ENI’s power 
stations. Promoted as being ‘more market oriented with greater development potential’1128, 
electricity sales, in fact, increased from 4.8 TWh in 2000 to 29.93 TWh in 2008.1129 While 
these characteristics normally indicate a form of growth strategy in form of horizontal value-
chain extension, this does not hold here as later statements reveal that the growth in electricity 
generation had been used as a way to ‘get rid of’ gas volumes as demanded by the release 
programme (see above).1130
 
  
A change in behaviour could only be observed recently, apparently triggered by increasing 
competitive threats from different types of rivals such as other large international oil and gas 
majors as well as ENI’s own clients like electricity producers for example. Particularly 
mentioned in this respect was Russian producer Gazprom who, in exchange for access granted 
to Russian production and transportation facilities, was expected to be entering the Italian 
market and start selling gas to Italian consumers.1131 Driven by the experienced and further 
projected decline of margins and the fact that ENI needed to amortise its significant upstream 
investments (see above),1132 defensive measures were adopted, showing, for instance, in the 
fact that production growth objectives were decreased from 6% in 2001 to 3% in 2008 while 
at the same time aiming to increase direct sales of natural gas volumes produced.1133
                                                 
1126  Cf. ENI (2003b), p. 41; ENI (2004a), p. 32; ENI (2005a), p. 38; ENI (2005c), pp. F-78 – F-79; ENI (2006a), 
pp. 35-36; ENI (2007a), pp. 37-38. 
 To do so 
ENI has recently begun to become more active in other European markets such as Spain, 
Portugal, France and Germany, hoping to leverage the opportunities from ongoing 
liberalisation. Other than before, this also included possibilities for take-overs which in 2005 
1127  ENI (2003b), p. 46. Italicised by author. Also cf. ENI (2004b), p. 47. 
1128  Cf. ENI (2002b), p. 11. Italicised by author. 
1129  Cf. figures in respective Annual Reports. 
1130  Cf. ENI (2006a), p. 11. 
1131  Cf. ENI (2007a), pp. 8, 31, 37, 120; ENI (2008a), pp. 23-24, 28-29, 33-39; ENI (2008b), pp. 39-40. 
1132  Cf. ENI (2008b), p. 11; ENI (2009a), p. 9; ENI (2009b), p. 11. 
1133  Cf. ENI (2002a), p. 8; ENI (2003a), p. 13; ENI (2004a), p. 12; ENI (2005a), p. 12; ENI (2006a), p. 11; ENI 
(2007a), p. 9; ENI (2008a), p. 9; ENI (2009a), pp. 10-11; ENI (2009b), p. 62; ENI (2009c), p. 10. 
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still had been thought of only as “an option not a necessity”1134. In France, this resulted in the 
acquisition of a 27.8% stake in Altergaz, the main independent operator in the French gas 
market, with whom it also bought a stake in a regional French gas company with access to 
250,000 customers. In the German market again ENI used measures such as direct marketing 
and increasing sales via its subsidiary Gasversorgung Süddeutschland GmbH (GVS), one of 
Germany’s largest regional energy companies acquired together with German Energie Baden-
Württemberg (EnBW) as an equal JV in 20021135. In 2008, ENI also acquired Belgian 
Distrigaz to benefit from its central location for sales to neighbouring markets and became 
active in the Turkish market.1136 Following this geographical sales expansion, gas sales into 
European target markets gradually increased, having almost doubled from 18 to nearly 32 
bcm between 2005 and 2008.1137 Nevertheless, while the above indicates a development 
towards more active behaviour in that possibilities for expansion were sought, this happened 
only relatively recently and more out of a necessity of defence than out of pro-actively 
developing opportunities. This also becomes apparent from the fact that additional sales 
markets to monetise equity gas had to be found, most of which however were outside of 
Europe. The need to monetise equity reserves, then, also explains the acquisition of stakes in 
British North Sea production sites and in pipeline infrastructure such as Interconnector U.K. 
Ltd. through which ENI gained access to infrastructure facilities such as the Bacton terminal, 
the Interconnector pipeline and the trading hub at Zeebrugge, thereby opening up additional 
sales channels.1138
                                                 
1134  ENI (2006a), p. 10. 
 Showing the increase of gas sales by ENI’s European affiliates from 2002 
to 2008, the following figure illustrates this development. 
1135  Cf. ENI (2003a), p. 28. 
1136  Cf. ENI (2008b), p. 55; ENI (2009a), pp. 38-39; ENI (2009b), p. 59. 
1137  Cf. figures in Annual Reports from 2005 to 2008. 
1138  Cf. ENI (2006a), p. 34; ENI (2009a), p. 40; ENI (2009b), p. 51. 
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Figure 20:1139
 
 Development of gas sales of ENI’s European subsidiaries (in bcm) 
 
 
An indication towards more active behaviour in terms of analysing or creating opportunities 
can only be attributed to recent activities such as plans to use depleted gas fields as storage 
facilities in form of an additional business opportunity. This also shows in statements such as 
having started to consider “the development of gas storage facilities as a core element of the 
gas business”1140 and as ‘another strategic stage in the process of strengthening its leadership 
in the European storage business’1141. At the same time several facts supports the assessment 
that ENI’s business behaviour has over the course of time only developed from reactive to 
defensive: Not only did the sales share of the G&P business decline from around 20% in 2005 
to 16% in 2008 but it was still only seen as a pillar to provide stability to returns and cash 
generation. The same can be said with regards to the electricity business which, despite 
capacity having increased fivefold between 2000 and 2008, is merely used as an additional 
output for gas resources rather than ‘creatively’ as a strategic activity.1142
                                                 
1139  Own figure based on data from ENI (2005a), p. 31 and ENI (2009a), p. 37. The gap is likely to be even 
slightly higher as only from AR 2005 onwards are sales to domestic affiliates reported separately, accounting 
for only 0.07 bcm in 2005 and 0.05 bcm in 2007 and 2008. Cf. ENI (2007a), p. 34; ENI (2009a), p. 37. 
 Its mainly defensive 
1140  ENI (2009a), p. 65. 
1141  Cf. ENI (2007b), p. 52; ENI (2008b), p. 56; ENI (2009a), p. 65; ENI (2009c), pp. 27-30. 
1142  Figures are based on own calculations. Cf. ENI (2002a), pp. 8, 27; ENI (2009b), pp. 51, 60-61. 
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behaviour also becomes apparent from strategy statements of continuously delivering 
efficiency and financial discipline, in 2004 even ‘focussing’ on enhancing efficiency while in 
2007 still ‘tightening’ financial discipline.1143
 
 
 
7.1.3 Analysis of Development from an Institutional Perspective 
 
In contrast to its passive market development, ENI’s institutional behaviour was much more 
active. Strikingly, the ‘least active’ one was avoidance behaviour, characterised especially 
through tactics of concealment. This becomes particularly apparent with regards to security of 
supply measures. While ENI continuously pointed out plans to substantially upgrade transport 
capacity of important cross-border transit pipelines,1144 the analysis of relevant figures 
actually reveals that only a slight increase was made between 2002 and 2003,1145 a finding 
which is also supported by the results from an investigation made by the European 
Commission and as later mentioned by ENI itself.1146 In fact, capacity of critical import routes 
has only recently been substantially increased.1147
                                                 
1143  Cf. ENI (2005c), p. 4; ENI (2008a), p. 2. 
 The figure below, depicting the under-
utilisation of Italian import capacity in comparison with theoretically available capacity, 
illustrates this discrepancy well. Thus, when considering these facts, the announcements by 
ENI turn out to be ‘symbolic gestures of compliance’ and attempts to ‘disguise its non-
conformity’ to institutional requirements. 
1144  Cf. ENI (2004c), pp. 32-33; ENI (2005c), p. 36; ENI (2006a), p. 35; ENI (2007a), pp. 35-37. 
1145  Cf. ENI (2003b), pp. 42-46; ENI (2004b), pp. 43-46. 
1146  Cf. ENI (2007a), p. 187. 
1147  One example is that of the TTPC pipeline (see above) as well as other assets. Cf. ENI (2009b), pp. 50, 62-63. 
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Figure 21:1148
 
 Comparison of available import capacity with real imports 
 
 
 
This finding is also supported by the fact that ENI was fined €4.5 million for complying 
belatedly with authorities’ requirements of enhancing competition following an investigation 
on the functioning of the gas market which had confirmed an unsatisfactory level of 
competition due to ENI’s vertically integrated structure. Similarly, inquiries were also made 
with regards to ENI and its subsidiaries abusing their dominance over access to the 
regasification terminal at Panigaglia and for not making progress on the required capacity 
upgrade, also here results confirming an alleged abuse. In what can also be assessed as 
symbolic gestures of compliance, ENI responded by submitting proposals and reports 
ensuring that they would incite more competition by upgrading capacity of respective 
infrastructure facilities. Authorities decided however that this was not sufficient and started a 
procedure for the default of compliance with law. Apart from these examples ENI’s window 
dressing attempt becomes even more pronounced when considering a requirement set by the 
European Commission. This not only demanded ENI to make available the gas volumes set 
free due to the cancellation of the territory clause with Gazprom (Gazexport), but to also 
upgrade the TAG pipeline along with the deadlines of third parties’ decision to build LNG 
terminals in Italy for transportating gas from these facilities. In fact, only the proposal 
                                                 
1148  Taken from Natural Gas Market Review of IEA (2007), p. 232. 
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submitted in 2004 to sell 9.2 bcm to third parties in form of a gas release programme until 
2008 was judged as adequate to close procedure, still fining ENI the above mentioned 
amount. ENI again filed claim against these decisions,1149 indicating another form of active 
institutional behaviour that is enlarged on in the following section. The tactic of window 
dressing can also be found in the case of sustainability issues as ENI defined initiatives to 
expand its presence in the renewables and alternative energy sector such as photovoltaic and 
biomass power as part of its ‘environmental’ strategy,1150 while figures reveal that total 
capacity aimed for remained restricted to 45 MW.1151 In addition to the examples mentioned 
so far and also constituting a form of avoidance behaviour, but qualifying as a more active 
tactic on the theoretical scale, was that of buffering as already displayed in 2001. This shows 
as attempts to excuse behaviour in that ENI not only termed the regulatory cap set by 
authorities as an ‘allowed’ revenue, thus saying that it was not its ‘choice’, but that it 
explicitly justified it as a regulatory evaluation which “should not be read as an indication of 
the market value”1152
 
. 
Even more characteristic is ENI’s defying behaviour. In response to increasing pressures such 
as antitrust thresholds on imports from outside the EU and sales to final customers, and the 
enforcement to sell excess volumes to third party importers, ENI attacked these institutional 
requirements as inefficient and argued it could have sold these volumes ‘much more 
efficiently’.1153
                                                 
1149  Cf. ENI (2004a), pp. 35, 149; ENI (2004b), p. 49; ENI (2005a), pp. 33-34; ENI (2006a), pp. 33-38; ENI 
(2007a), pp. 36-37, 187; ENI (2008a), p. 203. Also cf. IEA (2007), pp. 233-234. 
 Likewise, but particularly striking, is its defying behaviour in form of 
confronting institutional sources in court, showing in the finding that ENI filed legal claims 
right from the beginning. In response to the assessment by the Italian Antitrust Authority 
(IAA) that its subsidiary SNAM had abused its dominant market position, for instance, an 
appeal was made against the imposed fine of €2 million, not only claiming that it had not 
1150  Cf. ENI (2006a), pp. 12, 95. 
1151  Cf. ENI (2009b), pp. 60-61. 
1152  ENI (2001c), p. 55. Also ENI (2002c), p. 53. 
1153  The antitrust threshold allowed no single operator to have a market share larger than 75% of imported or 
produced natural gas fed into the national grid from 2002 on. This percentage was set to further decline by 
annually 2%-age points until reaching 61% in 2009. Moreover, operators could not sell more than 50% of 
their supply to final consumers effective from January 2003. Cf. ENI (2002c), pp. 5-6, 54; ENI (2003a), pp. 
29-30. 
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violated any rules but also pointing out that the Authority’s fine went against DIR/98/30.1154 
Similarly, already in December 2000 SNAM and several of ENI’s other DSOs appealed 
against a decree which had foreseen an additional tax on the use of natural gas in electricity 
generation, threatening to challenge the decision in court in case the request was 
implemented.1155 In 2001 again, an inquiry was started by the IAA based on the grounds of a 
competitor’s complaint accusing ENI of having only provided partial access to its 
transmission system while giving priority to Italian purchasers with which it entered supply 
contracts outside the country to import volumes (see figure 21 above). The authority judged 
this as an infringement to rules but, admitting on the lack of clarity of regulations and ENI’s 
announced willingness to augment transmission capacity outside Italy, only imposed a 
symbolic fine of €1,000 in 2002 in return for a report to be submitted by ENI on the measures 
taken to eliminate its infringing behaviour.1156 A less favourable early experience was made 
with regards to storage tariff proposals submitted by ENI’s subsidiary Stoccagi Gas Italia for 
the first regulatory period. While the Authority had left operators free to define their tariffs it 
rejected those proposed by Stoccagi Gas Italia and instead set rates 50% lower than those 
applied at that time. ENI immediately made an appeal against the Authority’s decision but 
nevertheless had to reimburse customers a total sum of €16 million before the legal settlement 
would be clarified.1157 Also subsequent storage tariff proposals were repealed by authorities. 
ENI continued to official appeal against these decisions, too, but was finally rejected for good 
on this matter in 2006.1158
                                                 
1154  Cf. ENI (2002a), p. 116; ENI (2002c), p. F-36. The outcome of this legal case was still pending in 2008. Cf. 
ENI (2009a), p. 222. 
 Similarly, also decisions and rulings by the Authority for 
Electricity and Gas were appealed or attacked in court by ENI or its subsidiaries, such as 
against grid access regulation, storage services, or reference prices for non-eligible customers. 
Different to the above cases however, there seems to have been a learning process as ENI, 
after having been confronted with the finding of non-compliance of not having provided the 
full information and data requested, decided to better ‘spontaneously transmit’ the requested 
information. It was nevertheless fined €10 million (out of a possible range between €25,000 
1155  Cf. ENI (2002a), p. 115. The same was done regarding a price cut imposed by Lombardian authorities 
against which ENI filed a claim. Cf. ENI (2001c), p. 56. 
1156  Cf. ENI (2002c), pp. 7, 52, F-44; ENI (2003a), p. 30. 
1157  Cf. ENI (2002c), pp. 17, 57. 
1158  Cf. ENI (2004a), pp. 35-37, 149-150; ENI (2005a), p. 150. 
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and €150 million) in 2006 for late fulfilment. Still, while also filing a claim against this 
decision ENI, other than before (see above), at the same time accrued financial provisions for 
a possible negative outcome on its behalf.1159
 
  
Apart from this already aggressive form of ‘attacking’ behaviour, even more active tactics can 
be found from early on. As part of its “strategy of cooperation with municipalities and 
utilities”1160, for instance, ENI worked together with influential constituents such as industry 
associations or other authorities right from the beginning. Moreover, in 2001 it set up separate 
regional companies to manage respective institutional stakeholder relationships and published 
a Community Relations Report.1161 Other forms of manipulative instruments applied to take 
influence can be found with regards to ENI’s strategic approach to addressing the issue of 
sustainability. Amongst this are tactics such as setting up its own CSR unit in 2002, having 
adjusted management systems to its HSE governance model by 2003, or early pointing out the 
UN Global Compact Initiative which itself had only been established in 2000. Others are the 
mentioning of its active engagement in institutional associations such as CSR Europe whose 
aim it was to agree on common actions and policies to implement a sustainable development 
process. Moreover, ENI also emphasised its active participation in the design and 
implementation of new rules in the HSE area as well as in the development of responses to 
the question of climate change within the European system of emission trading. In this 
respect, it, at an early stage, had also begun to engage in CDM initiatives in Africa as well as 
setting up a protocol for transparent reporting on the EU emission trading scheme.1162
 
 
While these activities already reveal a substantial degree of active behaviour, ENI’s 
manipulative tactics became even more pronounced over the course of time. With regards to 
environmental and sustainable issues this particularly shows in the increasing degree of 
structural organisation in that projects such as the management of greenhouse gases and clean 
fuels were to be handled by a specific subsidiary (EniTechnologie SpA). Those related to 
CDM and JI measures were to be organised as an own portfolio. Furthermore, in addition to 
                                                 
1159  Cf. ENI (2005a), p. 35; ENI (2006a), pp. 36-38, 172; ENI (2007a), p. 39. 
1160  ENI (2001c), p. 30. 
1161  Cf. ENI (2001c), p. 56. 
1162  Cf. ENI (2005a), pp. 48-50. 
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the publications already mentioned above, ENI in 2005 announced the publication of a 
‘sustainability paper’1163 which was followed by a Sustainability Report in 2006 “to 
communicate more effectively with stakeholders”1164. In 2007 it called attention to its joining 
the FTSE4 Good and DJSI, and in 2008 specified that it had been selected the world’s most 
sustainable company of the oil and gas sector within the DJSI listing.1165
 
  
In response to the fading of its former monopoly position, ENI attempted to take influence by 
‘currying favour’ and claiming that it had once ‘rendered Italy an important service’1166. Even 
more, it aimed to take control by voluntarily doing more than necessary by going beyond 
requirements. It not only separated sales and distribution activities (having Italgas SpA 
establish Italgas Più SpA as the new company responsible for sales and customer 
management)1167 as required by unbundling requirements (see chapter III), but by transferred 
transmission, dispatching and regasification activities to Snam Rete Gas SpA about six 
months earlier than actually demanded by requirements of the First Liberalisation 
Package.1168 Additionally, ENI set up a legally separate transmission company, SNAM Rete 
Gas, which owns the pipelines used by ENI, and offered it to the market.1169 Moreover, it 
established an independent but 100% owned storage affiliate, Stoccagi Gas Italia, in 
November 2000 and transferred the ownership and management of storage assets to it.1170 
Even more crucially, ENI ‘sold’ these structural reorganisations to the public as a pro-active 
decision to reposition its domestic market presence in the new open European energy 
environment and thereby ‘manipulated’ it in order to gain legitimacy. Also with regards to the 
requirements of the second liberalisation package and its translation into national law,1171
                                                 
1163  Cf. ENI (2006a), p. 13. 
 ENI 
pro-actively moved forward by reducing its stake in Snam Rete Gas and demerging Italgas. 
The latter’s shares in Italian downstream suppliers were transferred to Italgas Più and to parts 
1164  ENI (2007a), p. 13. 
1165  Cf. ENI (2008a), p. 11; ENI (2009a), p. 9. 
1166  Cf. ENI (2003a), p. 11. 
1167  Cf. ENI (2003b), p. 27. 
1168  This was translated into Italian law by Decree No. 164 in May 2000. Cf. ENI (2002a), p. 25. 
1169  ENI kept a majority stake (59.75%) in this company though. Cf. ENI (2002a), pp. 6, 21, 25; ENI (2002c), p. 
F-68. 
1170  Cf. ENI (2001c), p. 17; ENI (2002a), p. 17; ENI (2002c), p. F-68; ENI (2003b), p. 55. 
1171  Cf. ENI (2004a), p. 36; ENI (2004c), pp. 65-66; ENI (2005a), p. 28. 
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of foreign DSOs, such as Tigaz, which were thereby incorporated into ENI.1172 In doing so, 
Italgas was ‘freed’ to manage the distribution business while the integration of Più granted 
ENI access to about five million customers in Italy. The demerger of Italgas again was 
initiated with the aim of “integrating commercial and development policies within ENI 
natural gas business”1173. As a form of image advertising and thus manipulative behaviour the 
above mentioned strategic agreement with Gazprom again was promoted as “a fundamental 
step towards the security of energy supplies to Italy”1174
 
. 
 
7.1.4 Analysis of Development from an Integrated Perspective 
 
Fundamentally, the above reveals that ENI’s development path has initially been dominated 
by its active institutional behaviour. In fact, ENI used institutional change as a basis for 
business behaviour in that it took unbundling and the required cuts on capacity revenues as an 
opportunity to improve Snam Rete Gas’ operating result and change its pricing system to 
provide more attractive offers to customers.1175 This can be assessed as a defensive measure 
in form of a low-cost strategy to keep rivals out of the market. Another example is that of 
“economically exploiting”1176 assets owned such as through flared gas projects. Also its tactic 
of attacking authorities in court as laid out above and the willingness of engaging in ‘complex 
and lengthy legal claims and administrative procedures’1177 served as an instrument to defend 
its territory. Moreover, in the beginning ENI already used the notion of sustainability and its 
engagements in this area as a tool to gain shareholders’ trust, such as by considering 
sustainability criteria in the evaluation of investment projects while integrating these into its 
corporate strategies in order to give value to those intangible assets that distinguish it from its 
competitors.1178
                                                 
1172  Cf. ENI (2006a), p. 39; ENI (2009c), p. 112. 
 In fact, ENI’s focus on institutional issues also remained the prevailing one in 
the following years, showing in the continuous application of institutional strategies for 
1173  ENI (2005a), p. 32. 
1174  ENI (2007a), pp. 31, 37. 
1175  Cf. ENI (2001c), pp. 55-56. 
1176  ENI (2007a), p. 11. For concrete projects cf. ENI (2009c), pp. 24-27. 
1177  For an example cf. ENI (2005a), p. 36; ENI (2006a), pp. 36-37; ENI (2007a), p. 38; ENI (2008a), p. 132. 
1178  Cf. ENI (2004a), p. 14. 
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business considerations. Also its upstream focus and low degree of internationalisation in 
downstream markets along with its strong dependence on the domestic market - which show 
as passive business development - have been indicated by others, depicting ENI as tired as ‘an 
athlete at the end of a long and strenuous race’.1179
 
 
So far there has been only little evidence of a development towards an integrated perspective 
in form of simultaneously using business strategies to enhance institutional development. 
Exceptions are the announcement that it was looking to deploy natural gas as ‘a strategic 
response to problems posed by interrelations of energy development and the environment’1180 
and having identified “environmental and climate emergencies”1181 as great strategic 
challenges to be addressed with sustainable development not only seen as lying ‘at the heart 
of priorities’ but as a key element to successfully manage the complexities of large, integrated 
energy companies.1182
 
  
Accordingly, ENI’s development paths show as a passive business and dominating active 
institutional one. The indications of a development towards an integrated perspective again 
are illustrated as two dotted arrows diverging from the business and the institutional path 
towards an integrated one which is here indicated in transparent purple – as shown in the 
following figure. 
                                                 
1179  Cf. Grant/ Ritter (2007), pp. 1, 6-7, 17. 
1180  Cf. ENI (2006a), p. 95. 
1181  ENI (2007a), p. 120. 
1182  Cf. ENI (2006a), pp. 12-13; ENI (2008a), p. 11. 
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Figure 22:1183
 
 ENI’s development paths between 1998 and 2008 
                                                 
1183  Own figure based on results from case study analysis. 
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7.2 E.ON 
 
7.2.1 Introduction 
 
E.ON was founded in 2000 as E.ON Energie AG following the merger of VEBA and VIAG, 
two German conglomerates which, amongst others, were engaged in the energy business.1184 
Following the “logical continuation”1185 of previous conduct, the energy and speciality-
chemistry business (Degussa AG) were identified as the new company’s core operation. 
Engagement in the energy business was mainly constituted by activities in the electricity 
segment though while the gas – as well as the water business – was only briefly referred to as 
a complementary segment to “flank”1186 electricity activities. E.ON’s upstream activities were 
performed by the subsidiary VEBA Oil & Gas GmbH which was primarily active in the oil 
business. At that time gas production was carried out in the Netherlands, the U.K., Argentina 
and Syria. Driven by the natural depletion of deposits in addition to the generally increasing 
competition for resources, VEBA acquired a subsidiary of Wintershall in 1999 with the aim of 
generating synergies and becoming active beyond distribution in gas-to-power conversion 
activities.1187 Downstream, E.ON’s engagement was mainly characterised by majority 
shareholdings in Contigas (98.7%) and Thüga (57.3%) and in smaller stakes in regional and 
local distributors (DSOs). Via PreussenElektra VEBA also held controlling stakes in German 
regional suppliers such as Avacon which included the operative business of one of the largest 
German gas companies Ferngas Salzgitter. Outside Germany, VEBA had acquired a minority 
share in the Latvian gas utility Latvijas Gaze in alliance with Ruhrgas in 1997.1188
                                                 
1184  VIAG stands for ‘Vereinigte Industrie-Unternehmungen Aktiengesellschaft‘, VEBA for ‘Vereinigte 
Elektrizitäts- und Bergwerks-Aktiengesellschaft‘. While VIAG’s business consisted of providing services 
within the energy, telecommunication, aluminium, chemicals and packaging industry, VEBA had been 
founded as an electricity and mining company and at the time of merger was engaged in the areas of 
electricity, chemicals, distribution and property management. 
  
1185  E.ON (2001), p. 28. 
1186  E.ON (2002), p. 70. 
1187  Cf. VEBA (1998), pp. 37-39; VEBA (1999), pp. 40-43; VEBA (2000), pp. 42-45; VEBA (2001), pp. 42-45; 
E.ON (2001), p. 91. 
1188  Cf. VEBA (1999). 
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7.2.2 Analysis of Development from a Business Perspective 
 
Fundamentally, E.ON’s market development is characterised by very active behaviour right 
from the beginning. This already shows in the fact that the new company was guided by a 
pacesetting initiative called ‘fast forward’, emphasising the aim to not only defend its 
domestic position, but also to actively shape the global competitive arena to enhance 
shareholder value as the primary goal and create new opportunities provided by 
liberalisation.1189 To achieve this, E.ON simultaneously followed an efficiency- and growth-
oriented corporate strategy right from the beginning.1190 Facing liberalisation and decreasing 
electricity prices, for instance, initial activities in the year of the merger were directed at 
creating synergies1191 by consolidating existing businesses in order to benefit from cross-
selling opportunities and economies of scale on a vertical line from generation to sales, on a 
horizontal axis between the electricity and gas business as well as on a diagonal scale across 
geographical markets. Particularly the gas business was aimed at expansion, e.g. by 
optimising gas procurement through producing a larger share of the gas sold within the 
company and by developing the necessary infrastructure.1192 Also with regards to its 
geographical extension E.ON right from the beginning focussed on those regions which 
provided synergies due to their geographical proximity, establishing wholly owned 
subsidiaries in the Czech Republic (E.ON Bohemia), Hungary (E.ON Hungary), and the 
Netherlands through E.ON Benelux.1193
                                                 
1189  Cf. VEBA (1999), p. 26; VEBA (2001), pp. 8-13, 26, 30; E.ON (2001), pp. 43-45. Italicised by author. 
 The years between 2000 and 2002 are specifically 
characterised by expansion into Northern and Eastern Europe. In this period E.ON not only 
took a controlling stake in Swedish Sydkraft through which operations in Scandinavian 
countries and Poland were to be extended, but at the same time increased its stakes in 
Hungarian and Slovenian power producers. Furthermore, it became active in Ireland for the 
first time. Another important milestone was the acquisition of the integrated U.K.-based 
1190  An example of early internal restructuring is the merging of separate sales and trading divisions into E.ON 
Sales & Trading as a new corporate unit to focus on the wholesales business. Cf. E.ON (2002), pp. 26-29. 
1191  This had also been a major aspect of the VEBA-VIAG merger with cost synergy potential of the energy 
division calculated to amount to €700 mil. 
1192  Cf. E.ON (2001), pp. 43-45; E.ON (2002), p. 71; E.ON (2003), p. 166; E.ON (2004), pp. 20-25, 33. 
1193  E.ON Polska is also mentioned in the enumeration (cf. E.ON (2001), p. 31) but not mentioned again 
separately as the other WOS. Neither is it listed in the listing of the following Annual Report (cf. E.ON 
(2003), p. 164). 
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utility Powergen which made E.ON the second-largest energy provider in the world. This not 
only provided E.ON with access to conventional- and renewables-based power plants and to 
final customers, but also to long-term gas supply contracts following Powergen’s acquisition 
of TXU Europe’s UK retail business operations and of a wholly owned power and gas 
supplier (LG&E) in the U.S., the world’s largest energy market.1194 While these expansions 
were mainly directed at the electricity generation and supply business in the beginning, the 
gas business, already early recognised as a growth industry,1195 was soon gaining increasing 
attention. This shows in the expansion of downstream engagements.1196 In its home territory, 
for example, E.ON took full control of Thüga which again acquired HEIN GAS, a DSO with 
its own pipeline and storage facilities and owner of several regional and local utilities. At the 
same time E.ON also incorporated regional suppliers like Contigas, thereby significantly 
extending access to 130 utilities and its end customers. Critically, both companies had been 
engaged in the energy market since the middle of the 19th century and thus possessed relevant 
organisational experience. Moreover, through Thüga E.ON gained influence over supply in 
Italy.1197
 
 
The “strategic breakthrough for E.ON”1198 in the gas business was however achieved through 
the acquisition of Ruhrgas AG. While this €10.2 billion take-over had already been initiated 
in 2001, it could not be finalised before the year 2003 due to an initial rejection by the 
German Federal Cartel Office and the following requirement to dispose of stakes in 
subsidiaries. Additionally, substantial gas volumes had to be offered on the open market (Gas 
Release Program) in order to enhance competition.1199 In January 2003 then, E.ON had 
reached out-of-court agreements with the nine competitors who had filed complaints against 
the ministerial approval and was able to finalise the acquisition of Ruhrgas AG which then 
was rebranded into E.ON Ruhrgas in July 2004.1200
                                                 
1194  Cf. E.ON’s Annual Reports of years 2000-2004. 
 When acquired by E.ON, Ruhrgas was 
one of Europe’s leading gas companies with its core business in the up- and midstream 
1195  Cf. E.ON (2001), p. 5. 
1196  The growing importance of the gas business also shows in the fact that only from the year 2001 on gas (and 
water) sales are mentioned separately in the Annual Report. Cf. E.ON (2001) and following. 
1197  Cf. E.ON (2004), pp. 25, 83; E.ON (2005), pp. 37, 67. 
1198  E.ON (2003), p. 5. 
1199  Cf. E.ON (2003), p. 37. 
1200  In the following, the term Ruhrgas will be used. 
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segment, and one of the world’s largest gas importers with established long-term supply 
contracts, excellent industry contacts and equity interests in transportation and storage 
facilities across Europe. This backward integration was an important strategic move for E.ON 
as it not only served as an entry barrier to defend the domestic market but also as a strategic 
compliment to the existing business.  
 
Having become the world’s largest electric and gas utility after the acquisition of Ruhrgas and 
Powergen,1201 E.ON established a new organisational structure in 2004. Five market units, 
one for Central Europe, one for Pan-European Gas, one for the U.K., one for Nordic regions, 
and one for the US-Midwest, were organised around the Corporate Center E.ON AG. While 
each unit was responsible for its geographical market, Ruhrgas operated under the Pan-
European market segment where the upstream segment was headed by E.ON Ruhrgas E&P, 
the midstream business of gas purchasing, sales, and storage by E.ON Ruhrgas AG which 
also owned and maintained the transmission system. Transportation services again were 
marketed by Ruhrgas Transport. Downstream shareholdings across Europe were mainly 
managed by E.ON Ruhrgas International, while Thüga’s focus was directed at German 
utilities and the Italian market.1202 Essentially, this reorganisation shows the drive towards 
more efficient structures. Moreover, by taking advantage of the European enlargement 
process and the opening of these markets, the year 2004 is characterised by a rapid 
penetration of further Eastern European markets with E.ON acquiring regional distributors in 
Bulgaria. At the same time Ruhrgas took a majority stake in a Romanian and Hungarian TSO 
(Distrigaz North and MOL Gas). This not only facilitated the transportation of gas supplies 
from Siberia to European markets of consumption, but provided Ruhrgas with access to the 
Romanian network which again allowed it to bypass the Russian route, thus contributing to 
efforts of diversifying supplies. In addition to these expansion activities E.ON and Russian 
Gazprom in 2004 signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to further deepen their 
partnership. Recently, the engagement in Russia and the cooperation with Gazprom were 
further strengthened by signing long-term contracts for the supply of 400 bcm until 20361203
                                                 
1201  Cf. E.ON (2003), p. 43. 
 
1202  Cf. E.ON (2005a), p. 66. 
1203  Cf. E.ON Ruhrgas (2008), p. 55. 
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and for jointly building power stations in Russia. Even more, after long lasting negotiations an 
agreement was finally reached in October 2008 regarding the participation in production from 
the gas field Yushno Russkoje, with more than 600 bcm one of the world’s largest deposits. 
While this allowed Ruhrgas to obtain a stake of 25% minus one share, Gazprom acquired 
Ruhrgas’ share in ZAO Gerosgaz1204.1205 In addition to supplies from Russia, Ruhrgas also 
drove to develop other sources by obtaining stakes in gas fields or production companies, 
such as in the U.K. and Norway. These commitments were to substantially contribute to the 
company’s goal of sourcing 15-20%, around 10 bcm, from its own deposits in the long-
term.1206 Moreover, upstream engagements were also complemented by several major 
investments in the midstream gas business via the expansion of pipeline and storage capacity 
across Europe. Among these was the establishment of a project company together with BASF 
in 2005 in order to build the ‘North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP)’, a 1,200 km long 
offshore pipeline sourcing the gas from the Siberian gas field Yushno Russkoje and bringing 
it from Vyborg through the Baltic Sea to Greifswald. Due to its importance for European gas 
supply, the NEGP is supported by the EU as a key project through the TEN-E list (see above). 
This serves as another example for E.ON’s behaviour of strategically taking advantage of 
opportunities arising from change. Midstream engagement was further extended by 
participating in the expansion of the Interconnector pipeline between Belgium and the U.K. in 
order to stabilise European supply security.1207
 
 
While the development depicted above reveals a geographic expansion in Northern and 
Eastern Europe, E.ON soon also directed its attention towards Western and Southern Europe, 
engaging in the generation and final distribution segment in the Netherlands and attempting to 
take-over Endesa, Spain’s largest utility company, in 2006. This move would not only have 
opened up the Spanish market, but also would have provided access to Latin America as well 
as France, Italy Poland and Turkey via stakes owned by Endesa’s subsidiaries. While the EU 
Commission had given unconditional approval for the acquisition, the Spanish government, 
                                                 
1204  This at the same time means that E.ON’s share in Gazprom declined from the 6.4 to 3.5%. Cf. E.ON (2010), 
p. 68. 
1205  Cf. E.ON (2008), pp. 25, 68. 
1206  Cf. E.ON (2002), p. 70; E.ON (2007), pp. 92, 95; E.ON (2008), pp. 75, 94-95. 
1207  Cf. E.ON Ruhrgas (2008), p. 56; E.ON Ruhrgas (2009), p. 47. 
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rejecting a foreign take-over, imposed several restrictions against which E.ON filed an appeal. 
The Commission once more confirmed that the conditions imposed by Spain did not conform 
to EU law, enabling E.ON to submit a €41 billion take-over bid. In the meantime, the Spanish 
construction company Acciona had acquired a 20% stake in Endesa and concurred with Enel 
on joint control. Finally, in April 2007, E.ON agreed with Enel and Acciona to withdraw its 
offer and instead acquire Endesa’s subsidiaries in Italy and France as well as Enel’s in Spain, 
thereby gaining access to the above mentioned stakes in Poland and Turkey.1208 Further steps 
to expand internationalisation were taken by attempting to take-over the Belgian distributor 
Distrigaz which Suez was forced to sell following its merger with GdF (see GdF/Suez case 
study). This would have allowed E.ON to become more independent from Russian supplies 
due to Distrigaz’ sourcing in the Netherlands, Norway and Algeria. In addition to that, 
Distrigaz was also relatively strong in the LNG business1209 and would have not only 
provided E.ON with access to this activity, but at the same time would have enforced its 
midstream business. While Distrigaz in the end was sold to ENI, E.ON received drawing 
rights for 770 MW from three nuclear facilities in Belgium of which 270 MW were to be 
supplied in the Netherlands (see GDF case study),1210
 
 thus strengthening E.ON’s international 
electricity business. 
Apart from this geographical market extension, E.ON’s pro-active business development 
behaviour also shows in the seeking of further growth opportunities along the gas value-chain 
as well as in the horizontal diversification into new business areas. This included the 
construction of nuclear power plants in Sweden and in the U.K. via a JV with RWE as well as 
investments into the midstream gas business and renewables sector, both of which had been 
identified as gaining increasing importance. Along the gas value chain the focus of activities 
was directed towards extending the storage and trading segment, complementing the 
transportation activities mentioned above. The trading function, for instance, was significantly 
enhanced by purchasing a 75% stake in Dalmine Energie, one of Italy’s largest independent 
energy traders and by combining European energy trading operations into a strategically 
                                                 
1208  Cf. E.ON (2007), pp. 15, 70; E.ON (2008), p. 77. 
1209  Cf. Alich/ Flauger (2008). 
1210  Cf. Suez (2008a); Suez (2008b). 
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focussed company, E.ON Energy Trading (EET) which was to operate as an independent 
market unit in order to seize new growth opportunities and generate additional earnings.1211 
Ruhrgas again, having already been experienced in trading before the merger,1212 established 
‘Choice Market’, a virtual trading platform where gas could be offered or sold via the 
Internet.1213 In 2008, E.ON Gas Storage was established as a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Ruhrgas in order to bundle the company’s European storage activities.1214 Another crucial 
strategic move was the entrance into the LNG business. Although Ruhrgas, through a 78% 
share in the German LNG Terminal Company, had already been in the possession of an 
operating license for a terminal to be built in Wilhelmshaven since the 1970s, LNG not only 
constituted a new field of engagement but a central pillar of gas sourcing. Similarly, a MoU 
had already been signed with Algerian producer Sonatrach for analysing opportunities to 
bring Algerian LNG into Europe. In 2007, first regasification capacities were booked at an 
LNG terminal in the U.K. under long-term contracts running until 2029, providing Ruhrgas 
with the possibility to supply its subsidiaries as well as third parties. Further stakes were taken 
in existing or planned terminals such as in Africa (Equatorial Guinea), where E.ON and the 
Nigerian oil company NNPC recently agreed to cooperate on extracting and transporting 
natural gas to Europe as well as capturing gas so far still being flared. Moreover, by 
participating in the construction of other European terminals (e.g. Rotterdam, Le Havre, or on 
the Croation Isle of Krk), or even West Africa, Ruhrgas strategically developed entry into the 
LNG business. Furthermore, by engaging along the whole LNG chain in shipping, trading, 
and regasification enabled E.ON to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities (also see chapter 
III) and supported its aim of increasing the share of LNG in its supply portfolio from 10 to 
17% by 2020.1215
                                                 
1211  Cf. E.ON Ruhrgas (2009), pp. 26-27. 
  
1212  Ruhrgas was one of the founding shareholders of the North West European Hub Service Company GmbH 
established in 2002. Cf. Ruhrgas (2004), p. 16. 
1213  Cf. E.ON (2008), pp. 79, 101; E.ON Ruhrgas (2009), p. 23; VIK (2007), pp. 29-30. 
1214  Cf. E.ON (2009a), p. 50. 
1215  Cf. E.ON (2007), pp. 66, 70, 94; E.ON (2008), pp. 92-95; E.ON (2009a), pp. 49, 80; E.ON (2010), pp. 58-
63. 
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A similar expansion has taken place with regards to renewable energy sources which were 
assessed to “have an enormous, as-yet-untapped potential in numerous applications”1216 such 
as wind power, biomass or marine energy.1217 In fact, what had begun as R&D projects soon 
developed into global businesses. In line with the strategic importance given to the gas 
business and in the light of increasing competition for natural resources, one of the earliest 
initiatives in this area was the engagement in the production of biogas. This resulted in the 
establishment of E.ON Bioerdgas in 2007 as a subsidiary especially set up for the generation 
of biomethane in natural gas quality,1218 also to be used by E.ON Gas Mobil in the 
transportation sector where CNG was gaining increasing importance (also see chapter III).1219 
Moreover, in order to develop the full economic and environmental potential of biogas, E.ON 
is currently building Europe’s largest biomethane production facility and is investing in 
further facilities across Europe.1220 Another large part of its renewables generation portfolio is 
formed by wind energy. While, initially, the tactic was to acquire wind parks, E.ON recently 
also started growing organically in this area by building its own assets in cooperation with 
experienced partners. The latest project, for example, was the creation of the world’s largest 
offshore wind farm (London Array) on the British Coast, and is carried out together with 
Danish Dong Energy and Masdar, an investor from Abu Dhabi specialised in investments in 
the renewables energy sector.1221 Further major investments were made by engaging in the 
solar energy project Desertec. Generally, the importance attributed to the renewables division 
can be seen in the extent of investment volumes of €6 billion between 2008 and 20101222 as 
well as in the organisational structuring into independent geographical renewable business 
units in addition to a special environmental corporate unit called Market Unit Climate & 
Renewables, enlarging the company’s market units to ten.1223
                                                 
1216  E.ON (2008), p. 82. 
 
1217  Cf. E.ON (2007), pp. 56-57, 86; E.ON (2008), pp. 60, 80-83, 105; E.ON (2009a), pp. 14-17; 52-54, 79. As 
also pointed out by external sources. Cf. Traufetter (2007), p. 146; Czycholl (2009); Mühlstein (2009), p. 20. 
1218  In 2008, E.ON Bioerdgas GmbH was sold to E.ON Climate&Renewables GmbH. Cf. E.ON Ruhrgas (2009), 
pp. 14-15, 47. 
1219  Cf. Ruhrgas (2004), pp. 42-43 (page reference to binding); E.ON Ruhrgas (2007), p. 71. The industry had 
actually been obliged to supplement natural gas used as a motor fuel with 10% of biogas until 2010 and 20% 
by 2020. Cf. E.ON Ruhrgas (2008), p. 22. 
1220  Cf. E.ON (2008), pp. 68-70, 93, 97. 
1221  Cf. E.ON (2009a), pp. 19, 71. Also cf. Backfisch (2008). 
1222  Cf. E.ON (2009a), pp. 70-73; E.ON (2010), pp. 148-163. 
1223  For an overview cf. E.ON (2009a), pp. 42-43. 
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7.2.3 Analysis of Development from an Institutional Perspective 
 
Strikingly, E.ON’s institutional behaviour also reveals a pro-active approach in dealing with 
European energy policy changes. This already becomes apparent when just looking at formal 
aspects such as relevant documents and the attention paid to respective topics. In this respect 
it can be seen that while European energy policy issues played an important role in annual 
reports right from the beginning, they have gained even more weight over the course of time 
as, for instance, can be derived from the number of pages dedicated to respective topics or the 
way of it being presented. As early as 2004 and until then not often found in other documents, 
thus indicating E.ON’s pro-active drive, a figure shows the triangle of European Energy 
Policy goals as presented in chapter III. This is headed with the remark that E.ON not only 
supported these, but would play an active role in shaping European Energy Policy by taking 
“rapid-response measures”1224.1225 Moreover, concrete statements formulated in 2001, such as 
looking to take influence and seeking “involvement in the political opinion-forming 
process”1226, also reveal its early pro-active behaviour. This is further supported by the fact 
that the main form of behaviour is that of ‘window dressing’, found early on and with regards 
to all three energy policy goals. That is, instead of ‘just’ acquiescing or compromising, E.ON 
straight from the beginning claimed that it wanted to engage ‘in a systematic, constructive, 
objective and informed dialogue with leaders from politics and the legal business’1227, and 
develop relationships of trust with institutional as well as financial investors such as by 
regularly feeding the media with relevant information.1228 It even used its foreign subsidiaries 
such as E.ON Hungary as positive examples, drawing attention to the fact that this subsidiary 
not only had “made substantial contributions to paving the road to deregulation”1229, but was 
“a champion of fair competition”1230 who attempted to ‘exert influence through participating 
in the forming of government directives’1231
                                                 
1224  E.ON (2007), p. 68. 
. In fact, already VEBA had claimed that it had 
1225  Cf. E.ON (2005a), p. 54. Also cf. E.ON (2007), p. 4; E.ON (2008), p. 7. 
1226  E.ON (2002), p. 15. 
1227  Cf. E.ON (2003), p. 38; E.ON (2004), p. 46; E.ON (2005), p. 34. A similar statement can also be found in 
Ruhrgas’ Annual Reports. Cf. Ruhrgas (2004), p. 30. 
1228  Cf. E.ON (2003), pp. 48, 53. 
1229  E.ON (2002), p. 47. Also cf. E.ON (2002), pp. 38-39, 45-47. 
1230  E.ON (2002), p. 47. 
1231  Cf. E.ON (2002), p. 47. 
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been ‘supportive of liberalisation from the beginning’1232. While this indicates E.ON’s 
support of changes made, looking at its actual behaviour reveals a different picture, 
translating into avoidance behaviour as becomes apparent from applying tactics of window 
dressing. With regards to liberalisation measures, this, for example, shows in the fact that 
authorities had to impose several legal proceedings before E.ON became cooperative. E.ON 
then took advantage by selling this ‘cooperation’ as well as the opening-up of its gas price 
calculation and the reduction of the number of its tariff zones as pro-active and voluntary 
measures that were enhancing competition and transparency1233 while in reality having been 
forced to do so by Authorities. Also the creation of the energy retailer ‘E as in Easy’, which 
was heavily promoted, can be characterised as window dressing as it enabled E.ON to present 
itself as a price-oriented supplier and not as one that ‘rips-off’ customers.1234 
Characteristically, window dressing tactics can also be found in the cases of the goals supply 
security and sustainability. With regards to the first, E.ON had explicitly drawn attention to 
the fact that it was sharing the importance attributed to the issue of supply security, and that it 
contributed to achieving this goal by making necessary investments and implementing 
measures to facilitate gas exchange.1235 At the same time, however, evidence was found of 
E.ON having created barriers for third parties to access its grid, and of not being supportive of 
projects of European interest as determined by the Commission’s sector inquiry.1236 Similarly, 
while having emphasised the willingness to ‘constructively work with political leaders 
beyond complying with law’, e.g. having already implemented a Climate Protection Action 
Program in 2000, and having pointed out that it was Germany’s biggest operator of renewable 
generation assets, the share of renewables in its production portfolio only accounted for less 
than 10% at that time.1237 This can thus be assessed as window dressing behaviour. Another 
tactic applied was that of concealment in form of paying lip service, such as by claiming it 
was “well aware of the special responsibility it shoulders”1238
                                                 
1232  Cf. VEBA (2000), pp. 9-10. 
, or that energy utilities had “an 
1233  Cf. Anonymous (2005c), p. 7; E.ON (2006), p. 73; Balzer/ Student (2006a), pp. 66-73; Bundesnetzagentur 
(2006), pp. 23-24, 100-102; E.ON Gastransport (2006); Flauger (2006a), p. 14; Prinz et al. (2007), p. 6. 
1234  Cf. E.ON (2008), p. 113. This has also been recently assessed by secondary sources. Cf. Focht (2008a), p. 8. 
1235  Cf. E.ON (2005a), pp. 54, 70. 
1236  Cf. European Commission (2007l), pp. 15-16. 
1237  Cf. E.ON (2001), pp. 11, 51, 55. 
1238  E.ON (2005b), p. 58. 
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obligation towards society as a whole”1239. Other tactics revealing avoidance behaviour were 
that of escaping. By proposing to build an integrated European energy market, E.ON, for 
instance, agreed to open up its grid to competition and transfer grid ownership to a separate 
subsidiary (E.ON Gastransport) in order to get away from further inquiries and thereby buffer 
itself from non-compliance.1240
 
 
Another striking feature to be found with regards to E.ON’s institutional behaviour is the 
rapid movement towards more active behaviour in form of defiance and even manipulation, 
again holding for all three goals of European energy policy. Also here, several tactics were 
applied. A major one of these was the attacking of authorities, commenting not only that law 
makers had “once again”1241 initiated and enacted regulatory constraints, but blaming 
authorities of having constrained action through a “months-long political tug-of-war”1242 
while itself had “repeatedly pointed out”1243 the need for a stable regulatory environment. It 
thus argued that it could “hardly be blamed for passing along government-mandated 
changes”1244 such as taxes on or subsidies for renewable energy, and even claimed that 
renewables should be more market-based to decrease the financial burden on consumers. 
Other examples of attempts to take influence can be found in E.ON’s accusation of authorities 
in statements such as ‘making it clear to political leaders’ that measures to enhance 
competition, security of supply, or sustainability would be disadvantageous to economic 
development.1245 The notion that the “legislative tampering with the country’s recently 
liberalized power market would be economically harmful”1246
                                                 
1239  E.ON (2005b), p. 7. 
, for instance, had already been 
made in 2000. Similarly, and assumingly along with increasing institutional pressures, 
‘attacks’ on authorities further increased. E.ON, for example, publicly criticised that 
governmental coercion by the European Commission was an inacceptable intervention in 
market economy and entrepreneurial freedom. The threat of ownership unbundling, for 
1240  Cf. E.ON (2007), p. 88. Also cf. Kögler (2007), p. 32; Bundesnetzagentur (2006), p. 30; Bundeskartellamt 
(2008a); Bundeskartellamt (2008b). 
1241  E.ON (2005a), p. 54. Italicised by author. 
1242  E.ON (2005b), p. 8. 
1243  E.ON (2005b), p. 8. 
1244  E.ON (2005b), p. 9. 
1245  Cf. E.ON (2001), p. 55; E.ON (2002), p. 62; E.ON (2003), p. 60; E.ON (2005a), p. 55; E.ON (2005b), p. 8. 
1246  E.ON (2001), p. 55. 
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instance, was seen as an illegal expropriation and as being in clear contradiction to 
competitive politics and liberalisation,1247 while the reduction of network charges was 
criticised as being based only on a “one-sided interpretation”1248 by authorities.1249 While 
threatening to take legal action in this respect E.ON had already filed an appeal against the 
allocation of CO2 certificates within the Trading System in 20041250 as well as against a 
prohibition decree issued by the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) in 2006.1251 With regards to 
increasing enforcements to augment security of supply, E.ON referred to the principle of 
subsidiarity (see chapter III) and claimed that responsibility here, first of all, lay with gas 
companies and only ‘if necessary’ with member states and “only as a last resort, by the EU 
itself”1252 thereby telling authorities to ‘keep out of its business’. Further forms of ‘attacking’ 
behaviour can also be found with regards to sustainability issues in that E.ON criticised the 
aim of replacing natural gas by preferring renewables such as wind power or solar energy 
while the deployment of biogas was hindered by market barriers.1253
 
 This behaviour can be 
attributed to the fact that E.ON itself was only weakly positioned in the field of solar energy 
while having stronger stakes the biogas business (see above). 
Even more pro-active were E.ON’s attempts to manipulate institutional agents and sources by 
co-opting tactics and by trying to not only take influence but control. The first of these tactics 
is especially characterised by bringing in powerful constituents. One of these was the former 
German Chancellor Schroeder who was made chairman of the NEGP (see above).1254
                                                 
1247  Cf. E.ON (2007), p. 63; E.ON Ruhrgas (2009), pp. 40-41. 
 While 
this can be assessed as particularly relevant in relation to security of supply issues, other 
examples of this tactic can be found with regards to the matter of sustainability. Here, E.ON 
set up several joint initiatives with global corporate players as well as industry experts and 
prestigious institutes to gain legitimacy for projects such as CCS. Essentially, this tactic 
became particularly critical in order to maintain the acceptability for increasingly expensive 
1248  E.ON (2007), p. 23. 
1249  Cf. E.ON (2007), p. 24; E.ON (2008), p. 65; E.ON Ruhrgas (2009), pp. 40-43; E.ON (2009a), pp. 7, 38. 
1250  Cf. E.ON (2005b), p. 53. 
1251  Cf. Bundesnetzagentur (2006), pp. 29-30; E.ON (2007), p. 97; E.ON Ruhrgas (2008), p. 59. 
1252  E.ON (2005a), p. 54. 
1253  The amended REL demanded that 20% of total electricity production had to come from renewable energy 
sources by 2020, requiring grid operators to feed in biogas, an aspect challenged by E.ON as it would 
increase consumer prices. Cf. E.ON (2005b), p. 52. 
1254  Public press therefore created the name ‘Gerdprom’. Cf. Thumann (2006). 
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natural gas in face of the growing popularity of renewable energies. In cooperation with 
different partners of well-known reputation E.ON therefore started several initiatives across 
different sectors which were later grouped under the ‘climate protection initiative 
Erdgas.ON’.1255 In 2008, this was accompanied by the new communication campaign ‘We do 
natural gas’1256. Similarly, launched as “rapid-response measures”1257 and as ‘an important 
signal for fair competition’1258, E.ON also explicitly communicated the auctioning of storage 
capacity, the publication of relevant key information and the facilitation of cross-border flows 
by cooperating with relevant institutions.1259 Such measures of image advertising have 
continuously been accompanied by lobbying work1260 and further supported by ‘using’ the 
publication of special reports. In this respect, apart from the inclusion of its subsidiaries in the 
DJSSI having already been pointed out in 2000,1261 the term ‘sustainability’ as well as its 
operational implementation was explicitly mentioned for the first time in the AR of 2003 as 
an example referring to its success of having increased the efficiency of supply. Moreover, 
E.ON emphasised that it not only shared stakeholders’ interests in sustainable development 
but particularly that it voluntarily committed itself to corporate responsibility, such as by 
making public respective reports like one on Corporate Social Responsibility in 2004.1262
                                                 
1255  Cf. E.ON Ruhrgas (2008), pp. 10-31; Ruhrgas (2009), pp. 16-17. 
 In 
the following years, E.ON not only continued pointing out its support for climate protection 
measures, but added supplementary instruments such as funding research initiatives, 
establishing a CSR council in 2005, as well as having enlarged its CR department by 2007. 
Also explicitly mentioned was the fact that its CR report had received the highest rating 
possible (A+) from the Global Reporting Initiative and for the first time was included in the 
DJSW and STOXX indices. In addition to that, the roll-out of an improved CR strategy and of 
one even better embedded in corporate strategy was announced for 2008, not only clearly 
1256  In German this campaign is called “Wir können Erdgas“. 
1257  E.ON (2007), p. 24. 
1258  Cf. E.ON Ruhrgas (2009), p. 23. 
1259  Cf. E.ON (2007), pp. 24, 68; E.ON Ruhrgas (2008), pp. 45, 53; E.ON (2008), pp. 31, 90; E.ON Ruhrgas 
(2009), pp. 22-23; E.ON (2009a), p. 38. Also cf. Ontras (2009a); Ontras (2009b); NetConnect Germany 
(2009); Reutersberg (2008), pp. 4, 8-9, 12. Also cf. European Commission (2007a), p. 260; Focht (2008b), p. 
9. 
1260  Lobbying work had also played a major role in ‘convincing’ authorities of the benefits of the merger with 
Ruhrgas. Cf. Student (2002), pp. 41-44. 
1261  Cf. E.ON (2001), pp. 11, 51, 55; E.ON (2003), p. 60. 
1262  Cf. E.ON (2004), pp. 72-73; E.ON (2005a), p. 32. Italicised by author. 
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defining goals and measures but implementing a specific programme called ‘E.ON 
Environmental Champions’. In 2006, E.ON was also included in the Carbon Disclosure 
Leadership Index for the first time.1263
 
  
Tactics of exerting control again have been applied particularly recently by voluntarily going 
beyond enforced requirements, especially with regards to liberalisation measures. While in 
2003 having criticised that legal unbundling disproportionately interfered with organisational 
procedures,1264 E.ON three years later specifically pointed out that they had implemented all 
unbundling requirements half a year before legally demanded.1265 In 2007, it explicitly 
emphasised supporting enforced competitive measures as implemented in the 3rd 
Liberalisation Package and even argued this as being to the advantage of everyone. Along a 
similar line, the emissions trading system was praised as a ‘good idea’.1266 This form of 
behaviour can be explained by the fact that E.ON had increasingly become subject to 
inquiries by authorities (also see above) and was trying to guard against this by becoming pro-
active before even stricter rules were implemented or sanctions imposed. In response to the 
antitrust proceedings initiated against E.ON and GdF, for example, E.ON in 2007 suggested 
to the Commission to divest its transmission system and release some of its generating 
capacity.1267 Bernotat himself admitted that in the face of massive political demands from all 
areas and all parties, this step was done in order to reduce opportunities for criticism and 
attack. For the same reason, i.e. to soothe regulators, E.ON decided to sell Thüga, the group 
where it had bundled its stakes in more than 100 local utilities and which had developed into 
the largest network in Germany. Doing so it hoped for a ‘quid pro quo’ offer by the FCO for 
being able to expand in other areas.1268 Similarly, E.ON recently took the initiative and 
transferred grid ownership rights to E.ON Gastransport, as well as making voluntary 
investments into grid infrastructure.1269
                                                 
1263  Cf. E.ON (2007), pp. 25, 58; E.ON (2008), pp. 61, 73; E.ON (2009a), p. 12. 
 
1264  Cf. Immenga et al. (2003), pp. 46-48. 
1265  Cf. E.ON (2007), p. 24. 
1266  Cf. E.ON (2007), p. 58; E.ON (2008), pp. 65-66. 
1267  Cf. E.ON (2008), p. 65. 
1268  Thüga was bought by a consortium of 50 local utilities and became the 5th largest energy company in 
Germany substantially increasing competition and showing the growing re-communalisation (see above). Cf. 
Bundeskartellamt (2008c); Flauger (2009a); Flauger (2009b); Gassmann (2009a); Weil (2009). 
1269  Cf. E.ON (2009a), p. 50. 
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7.2.4 Analysis of Development from an Integrated Perspective 
 
Essentially, E.ON’s business and institutional behaviour can be characterised as highly active. 
From a business perspective it not only started to defend its established competitive position 
straight away, but also prioritised this through the active development of existing businesses 
while at the same time analysing and quickly taking advantage of opportunities arising from 
change. Even more, over only a short course of time E.ON pro-actively drove change itself, 
its course of development thus showing as a path that reaches from the ‘analysing’ to the 
‘creating’ box. An analogous development path can be determined in the case of its 
institutional behaviour. Having already applied active strategies early, behaviour even became 
pro-active within a short period of time with E.ON using institutional change to its advantage.  
 
Even more, the analysis above revealed that E.ON actually followed an integrated path right 
from the beginning, showing in the fact that it used business strategies to support institutional 
development and vice versa, such as when implementing the trading platform Choice Market 
(see above) not only as a market opportunity but also as an instrument for stimulating gas 
trade.1270 Also the awareness of continuously having to be active to maintain legitimacy while 
also gaining acceptance for its business model among key stakeholders to lay “the 
groundwork for sustaining our business success into the future”1271
                                                 
1270  Cf. E.ON Ruhrgas (2008), p. 54; Focht (2006), p. 6. 
 reveals this integrated 
path. This is depicted in the following figure. 
1271  E.ON (2007), p. 58. 
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Figure 23:1272
 
 E.ON’s development path between 1998 and 2008 
                                                 
1272  Own figure based on results from case study analysis. 
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7.3 GdF 
 
7.3.1 Introduction 
 
Gaz de France (GdF) was established on April 8, 1946 as a public industrial and commercial 
entity (EPIC)1273 in the course of the nationalisation of the French gas (and electricity) sector 
following which it obtained 84% ownership of gas facilities as well as exclusive monopoly 
rights on import and transportation activities.1274 Since the 1970s GdF has also been the 
owner of two LNG terminals: Fos-Cavaou (1972), in partnership with Total, and Montoir-de-
Bretagne (1980).1275 In the 1990s GdF had become engaged in the E&P business by taking 
control of German EEG in 1994 and acquiring licenses to participate in the development of 
fields in the British North Sea in 1998. These steps again had required GdF to set up the 
necessary infrastructure, making it the owner and operator of the French transmission grid, of 
an interconnected long-distance pipeline as well as of storage sites and LNG receiving 
terminals. An exception was the transmission network in south-western France which it 
operated jointly with Total.1276 Midstream distribution and customer service activities again 
were carried out jointly with EdF, the national electricity company, until 2004. Outside 
France GdF was operating as a shareholder in infrastructure systems such as the MEGAL and 
B.O.G. pipelines in Germany and Austria, respectively, and storage sites such as in Germany 
(together with Ruhrgas), Switzerland and Belgium. Via its marine engineering affiliate Gaz 
Transport, its engineering and consulting subsidiary Sofregaz (Société Francais d’Études et de 
Réalisation d’Équipements Gaziers) and other ventures it was furthermore engaged in Turkey, 
Bolivia, India, China, the U.S. or Canada.1277
                                                 
1273  This abbreviation stands for the French denotation ‘Établissement public à caractère industriel et 
commerical’. Cf. GdF (2006), p. 6. 
 At the time of the beginning of the study GdF 
was thus engaged along the whole gas value-chain.  
1274  Estrada et al. (1988), p. 122. Only few LDCs existing before 1946, such as in Bordeaux, Grenoble and 
Strasbourg were excluded and remained in ownership of municipalities. Estrada et al. (1995), p. 98. 
1275  Cf. CEER (2005), p. 39. 
1276  Cf. Reference Documents from 2005 to 2008 under the section ‘History’ (no page number given). 
1277  Cf. Annual Reports 1986-1989. 
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7.3.2  Analysis of Development from a Business Perspective 
 
Basically, following the analysis of GdF’s development from a Business Perspective, 
behaviour must be characterised as passive, as opportunities having arisen from changes to 
European energy policies were not taken advantage of. GdF neither extended existing 
businesses and activities nor developed new ones. Instead, it upgraded engagement in the 
global upstream business, taking over a British and two Dutch upstream companies in 2000, 
the latter of which provided it with its first offshore E&P capacity as well as making it an 
operator of Noord Gas Transmission, the main Dutch underwater pipeline. In the same year 
GdF added a part of Statoil’s oil and gas reserves in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea to 
its portfolio by taking a 20% stake in the Njord field and a 12% stake in the popular Snohvit 
field. In 2001, it agreed with Sonatrach and Malaysian Petronas to acquire a permit for 
extracting gas from the Algerian Ahnet basin, with production beginning earliest in 2007. 
Similarly, an agreement was found with Dana Petroleum and Wintershall four years later for 
GdF to become active in Mauritania with operations starting a year later in 2005. Also 
extending its German upstream production, Production Exploration Deutschland GmbH 
(PEG) was taken over in 2003, starting first deliveries in 2004. Despite incessant efforts to 
increase extraction from PEG’s fields, even going into tight-gas exploration, production 
continuously declined. Sales only increased due to a common rise of gas prices. In Egypt, 
engagement was reinforced through the purchase of a 45% participation in a licence for 
activities in an Egyptian field operated by Vegas Oil & Gas in 2007. Soon after, LNG 
shippings from there as well as from India, via GdF’s strategic partner Indian Petronet LNG, 
were started. Around that time GdF also renewed its contract for LNG deliveries from Algeria 
until 2019. In order to be able to take these volumes, GdF had begun to build a new LNG 
receiving terminal (Fos Cavaou) in 2004 to become operational in 2007, characterising at 
least the extension of activities in the European but still domestic market. Apart from this 
however, activities continued to focus on the upstream business, renewing existing and 
entering into new supply contracts with Gazprom for the purchase of additional volumes of 
Russian gas while also looking to globalise sourcing options from Africa (Nigeria) and the 
Middle East (Qatar, Iran), the Caspian Sea as well as from more remote regions such as the 
Caribbean and South America via tactics such as acquiring stakes in liquefaction plants. 
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Activities in the mid- and downstream segments again were also only carried out outside 
European territory, such as by obtaining further distribution permits in Mexico in 2000 and 
acquiring a majority stake in two major TSOs, Energia Mayakan (67%) and Transcanada des 
Bajio (100%). In the downstream segment again activities remained restricted to the national 
territory and to offering only more personalised products to its customers.1278
 
 The finding that 
GdF initially remained loyal to existing businesses, markets, and products and ignored 
opportunities for change thus constitutes reactive behaviour. 
An indication of a development towards more active behaviour as defined according to theory 
can only be observed to have begun around 2005 as GdF realised the need to defend its 
position as can be derived from the tactics applied. In order to limit its loss of market share, 
which had fallen from 73% in 1999 to 64.5% in 2005 and further to 55% at the end of 
2007,1279 for instance, GdF began to strengthen its engagements in the downstream segment 
by offering specialised products also to household consumers as well as amplifying these 
efforts by its services division (Cofathec) with its European subsidiaries (e.g. Cofathec Projis 
in France, Cofathec Servizi in Italy, Cofathec Heatsave in the U.K. or Cofathec Benelux in 
Belgium). Moreover, by providing global multi-energy services, including the construction of 
power plants, and by offering new products such as financial engineering, energy 
management and facility services, this segment was seen as a strategic complement of vertical 
integration. In addition to this, the Services segment was also identified as important due to its 
experience in energy generation from wood, geothermal and combustible sources as well as in 
the area of natural gas vehicles (NGVs).1280 Another indication of an increasing degree of 
activity can be derived from the appearing of a rumour of a “multibillion-pound merger”1281
                                                 
1278  Aggregated information from across Annual Reports (termed Reference Documents here) 2004-2007. 
 
with British Centrica in 2005, a deal which would have provided GdF with commercial 
experience as being a private gas retailer, while Centrica would have strengthened powers to 
defend itself against new entrants. Both companies would also have benefited from larger 
financial resources to jointly develop upstream projects. Other examples include the move of 
becoming the major shareholder in Distrigaz Sud, the central gas distributor in Romania 
1279  This is according to GdF’s own data. Cf. GdF (2006), p. 87; GdF (2008a), p. 100. 
1280  Aggregated information from across Reference Documents 2004-2007. 
1281  Anonymous (2005d), p. 12. 
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possessing a more than 13,000 km long grid and around 900,000 customers in 2005,1282 the 
divestment of DSOs in South America (Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil), or the merging of the 
Hungarian distributors Egaz and Degaz in 2006, and of EEG and PEG at the end of 2007 with 
the goal to benefit from synergies and expand within Europe.1283
 
  
A crucial step taken in this respect was the merger with Suez into GDF SUEZ, here also 
referred to as ‘the Group’, in 2005. Fully completed in summer 2008, the French government 
retained a share of 35% in the new company.1284 While Suez had actually been looking to 
grow its LNG business and benefit from the development of converging its gas and electricity 
businesses and thus increase competitive pressure on GdF,1285 the merger allowed both 
companies to strategically complement each other’s portfolios. This becomes fundamentally 
apparent in the electricity segment where Suez, especially following the acquisition of 
Electrabel,1286 was particularly strong in that it possessed nuclear and renewable energy 
capacities.1287 These enabled GdF to add ‘an electricity component’ to its offerings for 
eligible customers by gaining a licence to supply electricity.1288 Moreover, as an activity 
“essentielle pour le développement du Groupe”1289, it had also started to build up its own 
production portfolio, such as by acquiring power plants in the U.K., Spain and Belgium.1290
                                                 
1282  Cf. GdF (2005), p. 33. 
 
Amongst this also was France’s first CCGT plant and Belgium’s second largest electricity 
producer (which was renamed Segebel). Additionally, GdF signed a three-year electricity 
purchase contract with EdF for the commercialisation of its electricity engagements, and 
entered into pure, i.e. not gas-related, electricity sales contracts and partnerships with large 
consumers such as industrial customers. From a joint perspective again, the merger enabled 
1283  Cf. GdF (2007), pp. 77-78; GdF (2008a), pp. 41-42. 
1284  Cf. GDF SUEZ (2009a), pp. 36-37, 120-121. In order for the merger to be approved by the European 
Commission Suez had to divest Distrigaz and GdF to transfer its stake in Segeo, a pipeline operator, to Suez’ 
former transmission and storage company Fluxys. For more detailed explanations cf. GdF (2006), pp. 129-
131 and GdF (2007), pp. 123-124. 
1285  Cf. Suez (2002), p. 4; Suez (2004), p. 33; Suez (2005), p. 38. 
1286  Suez had only shortly before the merger, after strong pressure from one of its major shareholders (an 
American investment company), acquired a 49.9% stake in Electrabel. Cf. Anonymous (2005e). 
1287  Cf. Suez (2002), p. 39. 
1288  GdF had been taking ‘advantage of the favourable legislation that guaranteed a certain electricity price sold 
by cogeneration’ since 2000 but then only did so as a service provider for designing, financing and 
structuring such projects. Cf. GdF (2006), p. 56. 
1289  GdF (2005), p. 14. 
1290  Cf. GDF SUEZ (2008a). 
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the Group to actively seek synergies.1291 Another indication for GdF’s increasing active 
behaviour was the attempt to acquire a 49.9% stake in the German local utility Stadtwerke 
Leipzig (SWL) in order to increase its engagement in electricity generation as well as to 
invest in a biomass R&D centre in Leipzig in 2007.1292 As a Group, plans were also made to 
extend engagements to coal and biomass activities in Germany and the Benelux region as well 
as to the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. These were implemented mainly 
via partnerships with other European energy companies such as with Spanish Iberdrola, 
Scottish & Southern Energy, or Total and French AREVA in the United Arab Emirates. At 
the same time new growth opportunities for natural gas were sought in the Middle East, for 
hydroelectric power production in Brazil. In 2008, GDF SUEZ acquired First Light, an 
American electricity company possessing over 15 power plants and a gas field in the U.S.1293 
Similarly, also GdF’s renewable activities were further enhanced by Suez’ engagement in this 
segment. From 2006 onwards, it pointed out that it had initiated its renewable strategy by 
setting up a separate subsidiary termed ‘GDF Future Energies’ in order to group the new wind 
power activities, GdF had built France’s first wind farm, and expand its renewable electricity 
business in the domestic territory as well as across Europe.1294 Furthermore, backed by the 
merger while officially still operating on its own, GdF also began to expand its storage 
business, developing salt caves in England, taking majority stakes in the two Romanian 
storage operators Depomures (59%) and Amgas (65%), and through a partnership with Acea 
entered the Italian storage market for the first time.1295 Together with Societé Generale, a 
major French financial institute, a separate trading company, Gaselys, was set up in order to 
optimise sourcing by balancing long-term contracts with short-term purchases and as an 
instrument for ‘intervening in European gas and electricity markets’ to complement activities 
along the whole value chain in order to enhance competitiveness.1296
                                                 
1291  Cf. GdF (2005), pp. 14-16, 21; GdF (2006), pp. 56, 357; GdF (2007), pp. 39-40, 59, 303; GdF (2008a), pp. 
29-30, 60, 308. 
 At the end of 2008, a 
new subsidiary, Storengy, was especially created to manage the storage business. Moreover, 
in the further development of its Eastern European engagement, GdF has recently considered 
1292  Cf. GdF (2008a), p. 338. 
1293  Cf. GDF SUEZ (2009a), p. 342; GDF SUEZ (2009b), GDF SUEZ (2009c). 
1294  Cf. GdF (2007), p. 40; GdF (2008a), pp. 3, 28, 53. 
1295  Cf. GdF (2008b). 
1296  Cf. Gdf (2006), pp. 48-49; Gdf (2007), p. 51; Gdf (2008a), pp. 51-52. 
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building a pipeline that would connect Romania with Bulgaria and Hungary also. Still, despite 
having been active in the LNG business for decades (see above), a separate subsidiary, 
Elengy, was set up as late as the end of 2008 to manage terminal activities.1297
 
  
 
7.3.3 Analysis of Development from an Institutional Perspective 
 
Fundamentally, GdF’s institutional development is characterised by passive behaviour with 
regards to all European energy goals and respective changes as is presented in the following. 
Acquiescing behaviour can, for instance, be found in complying with the requirements of the 
liberalisation directives, showing in the unbundling of gas distribution activities into a 
separate department termed Gaz de France Réseau Distribution (GRD), and into the 
establishment of EDF Gaz de France Distribution (EGD), an administrative branch together 
with EdF to continuously carry on work on technical matters such as grid construction, 
maintenance, project management. EGD also was to become responsible for managing the 
downstream business after the full market opening in 2007 while regular meetings were set up 
with customers to provide them with “une information claire et pédagogique”1298 regarding 
the functioning and services of the new subsidiary. In 2002, GdF purchased the transmission 
network from the French State which it now owns and operates and with which it has the 
respective authorisation to carry out gas transmission activities. Both departments were then 
transferred to a wholly owned subsidiary and renamed from Gaz de France Réseau Transport 
into GRT gaz to be operating independently of GdF’s other gas business effective of January 
2005.1299
                                                 
1297  Cf. GdF (2008a), pp. 29, 53; Anonymous (2008e), p. 16; GDF SUEZ (2009a), pp. 28-29, 48; GDF SUEZ 
(2009d), p. 61. 
 In 2007, also distribution activities were legally unbundled and transferred into a 
wholly owned separate entity called Gaz de France Réseau Transport (GrDF). Along with the 
SUEZ merger, GrDF became a subsidiary of the new Group in January 2008, receiving its 
own management structure, IT systems and GdF’s distribution assets as well as related rights 
and obligations, such as concession contracts tying municipal customers to the company. In 
1298  GdF (2005), p. 31. Also specific websites were created to comply with transparency requirements. Cf. 
Carrière/ Balard (2004), p. 520. 
1299  Cf. GdF (2006), p. 76. 
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addition to this latest reorganisation, British and German storage activities as well as those of 
transmission in Germany (via GDF-DT and Mégal subsidiaries), Belgium (via SEGEO 
subsidiary) and Austria (via BOG subsidiary) were also transferred to the Infrastructures 
Division.1300 In the course of this restructuring, GdF also unwound its partnership with Total 
to become the sole operator of the transmission grid (and thus sole shareholder in CFM (see 
above)), while Total remained responsible for transmission in Southwestern France 
(becoming shareholder of Gaz du Sud-Ouest (see above)). In the same period, and also in 
conformance with regulatory requirements, GdF initiated a gas release programme in the 
southwest of France where competition was more restricted (see above).1301 While there are 
no indications of it having been enforced to do so, the assessment of passive behaviour is also 
supported by the fact that the company generally continued to follow its habit, and only after 
the implementation of directives, participated in consultations and dialogues (“a alors 
participé”1302) and had not engaged in any legal proceedings at that time as explicitly 
mentioned in its 2005 Reference Document.1303
 
  
A change towards more active behaviour, characterised by tactics of defiance and 
manipulation, can only be observed from 2005 onwards. This is likely to be attributable to the 
increasing pressures which were “significantly affecting the revenues and profits of Gaz de 
France as well as the way in which it conducts business”1304.1305 While GdF, based on the 
contract with the French state (see above), had been able to cover all its costs in the past, the 
continuous decrease of rates as set by European regulation made it begin to complain about 
losses of €750 million made (between November 2004 and April 2006). In particular, a 
development can be seen with regards to the tactics applied in this respect. After initially 
merely having mentioned that “all modifications to rates must fall within the principles set by 
the law and respect the economic equilibrium of the company”1306
                                                 
1300  Cf. GdF (2008a), p. 31; GdF (2008d). 
, that TPA might make GdF 
unable to fulfil all its delivery requirements and that it was intending to keep a “constructive 
1301  Cf. GdF (2005), pp. 1, 7, 15, 24-26, 28-29; GdF (2008a), pp. 14, 29-32. 
1302  Carrière/ Balard (2004), p. 519. 
1303  Cf. GdF (2006). 
1304  GdF (2007), p. 17. 
1305  Cf. GdF (2006), pp. 17-18, 80-81; GdF (2007), pp. 13-14, 32, 84-85; GdF (2008a), pp. 13-14, 32, 88-89; 
GDF SUEZ (2009a), pp. 21-23. 
1306  GdF (2006), p. 132. 
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dialogue”1307, GdF’s behaviour over the course of time became more active. This, for 
instance, shows in GdF threatening to confront institutional sources in court, e.g. by making 
regulations “subject to discussion with the public authorities”1308.1309 According to the 
theoretical classification depicted in chapter V, this can be characterised as a tactic of ‘attack’. 
The development towards more active behaviour also shows in the fact that GdF began to 
mention particular changes as influences which “could substantially change the Group’s 
integrated organization”1310, such as the ‘Troisième Paquet législatif’ (Third Liberalisation 
Package), the pending threats of ownership unbundling, or the creation of an ISO. Ignoring 
these would have characterised less active tactics within behaviour of defiance. Apart from 
the generally increasing institutional pressures, GdF had also become subject to gas market 
investigations by the Commission due to an alleged infringement of EC rules. It was accused 
of having abused its dominant position and having applied restrictive business practices such 
as the long-term reservation of transport capacity, the underinvestment in respective 
infrastructure capacity as well as anti-competitive agreements with E.ON. The latter 
accusation resulted in a hearing where GDF SUEZ (which it had become in the meantime) 
agreed “to provide the European Commission with its full cooperation in the course of the 
proceedings”1311. While this indicates the tactic of ‘collaborating with institutional agents’, 
GdF at the same time announced that it would ‘assert its rights in full’, characterising more 
defiant behaviour. Also later on no real pro-active behaviour can be observed. Instead, in an 
attempt to take influence, GdF emphasised the aim to “facilitate the involvement of all 
stakeholders (…) and reinforce its legitimacy as an operator of public Services with respect to 
the regulator, the French State, local communities, customers and all of the gas 
community”1312 to provide all the stakeholders with a “satisfactory perspective”1313
                                                 
1307  GdF (2006), p. 36. Also GdF (2007), p. 38. 
. 
Simultaneously it remarked that it would comply with legal requirements and seek 
productivity gains in order to establish GrDF’s identity and legitimacy, and to position itself 
1308  GdF (2008a), p. 13. 
1309  Cf. GdF (2006), pp. 16-18, 53-55, 61-64, 69-70; GdF (2007), pp. 12-13, 38, 64-65, 67-68, 73-74; GdF 
(2008a), pp. 12-13, 58, 66-67, 69-70, 77-78. 
1310  GdF (2007), p. 14. 
1311  GDF SUEZ (2009a), pp. 400, 466. Also cf. GdF (2008e); GDF SUEZ (2009a), p. 488. 
1312  GdF (2006), p. 64. 
1313  GdF (2008a), p. 72. 
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as a ‘recognised benchmark distributor’,1314 a tactic qualifying as a form of image advertising. 
This also holds true with regards to statements such as promising to “scrupulously 
implementing measures guaranteeing the proper application of the texts in force”1315, making 
a ‘positive noise’ by pointing out that it had already implemented regulated TPA to its 
transmission grid and LNG terminals in August 2000 “since it was a direct application 
disposition of the directive”1316, and that it had hired an ombudsman as an “amicable last 
resort”1317
 
 to show willingness to settle disputes with authorities. 
A similar development of behaviour can be observed with regards to the issue of security of 
supply. While initially having only been mentioned with regards to own supplies, a change 
can be observed in relation to the merger by pointing out its importance in terms of 
“strengthening geostrategic challenges related to the security of European energy 
supplies”1318 of ‘France and Europe’. Similarly, GdF particularly later pointed out its 
engagement in building essential infrastructure, such as LNG terminals or the Medgaz 
pipeline connecting Algeria and Spain (see above) as contributions to securing European 
supplies.1319
 
 
What is striking with regards to sustainability issues again is that GdF had already early 
installed and pointed out respective measures, such as in 1987 and 1988 in form of sponsoring 
environmental contests, participating in respective exhibitions and creating a special media 
prize for industry and environment. It had also nominated its CEO Vice President of the 
French Committee for Environment, formed an Environment Committee in 1992 (the year of 
the climate conference in Rio), formalised ‘pro-environmental’ activities into company-wide 
Corporate Environment Plans since 1993, and published its first Environmental Annual 
Report in 1999. In the year 2000, it began to engage in the Carbon Prototype Fund. Moreover, 
while initially the term ‘environment’ was utilised, this changed within Annual Report 2000/ 
2001 to include ‘sustainability’, such as when the first Sustainable Development Action Plan 
                                                 
1314  Cf. GdF (2006), pp. 64-65; GdF (2007), p. 69; GdF (2008a), pp. 71-72. 
1315  GdF (2007), p. 14. Also cf. GdF (2008a), p. 14. Italicised by author. 
1316  GdF (2008a), p. 31. Also cf. GdF (2008a), pp. 64, 69. 
1317  GdF (2006), p. 52. 
1318  GdF (2008a), p. 135. 
1319  Cf. GdF (2006), p. 36; GdF (2007), p. 38; GdF (2008a), p. 38; GDF SUEZ (2008b); GDF SUEZ (2009e). 
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(SDAP)1320 was mentioned. Furthermore, and despite having only been approved in 2004 and 
implemented for the following period until 2006, after an update programme had already been 
initiated in 2000, it was particularly specified that the indicators used in the SDAP had been 
externally verified. By 2003 even, GdF had not only created a Sustainability Development 
Department and a respective committee, but also a concrete Sustainable Development Plan to 
implement and supervise the Group’s sustainable development policy. Additionally, in the 
same year it had also become a member of the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD), entered into a partnership with the WWF, and engaged in the 
French Environment and Energy Agency (AERES)1321 in 2004. Still, while this could be 
assessed as manipulative behaviour from a theoretical perspective in that GdF was seeking to 
take influence through these measures, it at the same time has to be taken into account that 
these initiatives were only recently explicitly mentioned, the earliest being in Reference 
Document 2006.1322 This, therefore, indicates that the strategic and thus manipulative impact 
of these tactics had not been realised then, and was supported by the fact that concrete 
measures were only briefly indicated then.1323 The same holds with regards to the seemingly 
more concrete actions already taken in 2005. This, for example, includes the creation of an 
Environmental Balance Sheet or the mentioning of its partnership with ‘Comité 21’, a group 
to promote sustainable development in France, as instruments to communicate with 
stakeholders in order to discuss its Sustainable Development Policy with representatives from 
relevant institutions. GdF also explicitly pointed out that this policy had not only been drawn 
up in conformity with the 2002 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines of the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), but was also a ‘tangible proof of commitment’ to the United Nations Global 
Compact. In 2006/ 2007, it further remarked that it had not only been listed on relevant 
sustainability indices such as the DJ Stoxx and the Climate Disclosure Leadership Index, but 
also emphasised that it had won prizes for the best sustainable development report.1324
                                                 
1320  In 2006, this has also been abbreviated with PADD (cf. GdF (2007), p. 88), according to the French ‘Plan 
d’actions en faveur du development durable’. Cf. GdF (2005), p. 40. Here the term SDAP will be continued 
to be used as also applied in the following documentation. Cf. GdF (2008a), p. 90. 
 
However, while these measures would normally qualify as manipulative tactics, they in this 
1321  This stands for the French denotation ‘Agence de l'Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l'Energie’. 
1322  Cf. GdF (2007), pp. 88-89. 
1323  Cf. GdF (2005), pp. 38-41; GdF (2006), pp. 82-83; GdF (2007), pp. 86-88; GdF (2008a), p. 90. 
1324  Cf. GdF (2006), pp. 63, 85; GdF (2007), p. 88; GdF (2008a), pp. 90-94. 
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case have to be classified as tactics of ‘window dressing’. In fact, GdF itself in 2007 still 
described its behaviour as ‘reactive’1325 as policies were constraining firms to become 
“answerable”1326 and admitted that it was only ‘partially basing its reputation on its social 
responsible corporate image’1327
 
. 
This has begun to change only very recently in that GdF was aiming to go “beyond the 
response to regulatory requirements”1328. Indications for more pro-active forms of behaviour 
show in that GDF SUEZ explicitly mentioned the definition of sustainability set by the so-
called Brundtland Commission in 1987, one of the first global documents on sustainable 
development,1329 and in the signing of voluntary agreements with relevant stakeholders on 
CSR measures in 2008.1330
 
 
 
7.3.4 Analysis of Development from an Integrated Perspective 
 
In assessing both development paths determined above, it can be concluded that each 
remained mainly passive and only recently showed signs of more active behaviour. From a 
Business Perspective, this is revealed in the predominant focus on the global upstream 
business instead of taking advantage of changes in its business environment. The Institutional 
Path again is characterised by forms of acquiescing behaviour in that GdF did not strategically 
respond to institutional forces. Indications of change can only be found after 2005, the year of 
the announcement of the merger with Suez. From a Business Perspective, this, amongst 
others, showed in the extension of activities along the natural gas value-chain or in the 
engagement in the electricity segment. Despite these signals, behaviour can still not be 
classified as pro-active from either perspective. Business behaviour is still predominantly 
characterised by defensive forms of behaviour. This, e.g., shows in the prevailing scepticism 
towards innovation and measures of domain protection as well as the focus on improving 
                                                 
1325  Cf. GdF (2008a), p. 92. 
1326  GdF (2008a), p. 34. 
1327  Cf. GdF (2007), p. 14; GdF (2008a), p. 14. Emphasis added. 
1328  GdF (2008a), p. 96. Also cf. GdF (2007), p. 90. 
1329  Cf. WCED (1987). 
1330  Cf. GDF SUEZ (2009a), pp. 123-125. 
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efficiency instead of building new businesses. At best, GDF SUEZ’ behaviour can be 
assumed to become ‘analysing’, in that new options are considered while the focus remains 
on known businesses and markets, such as France and Benelux as core markets. New growth 
areas are rather seen to by lying outside of Europe, such as in Brazil, Thailand, the U.S. and 
the Middle East.1331
 
 A similar assessment can be made for the company’s institutional 
behaviour which shows signs towards avoidance behaviour. At the same time no predominant 
orientation or development along either perspective can be determined.  
Similarly, also indications of a more integrated perspective only showed very recently. In 
2008, for instance, GDF SUEZ declared that it not only had voluntarily incorporated 
initiatives to improve security of supply, maintain competitive prices and achieve 
sustainability, but that it simultaneously considered that stakeholder needs and expectations 
are compatible with economic performance.1332
 
 
Accordingly, the development of organisational behaviour has to be depicted as consisting of 
a passive business and a passive institutional path while the indication towards an integrated 
perspective is shown as diverging dotted arrows that lead into an integrated path indicated in 
transparent green. This is depicted in the following exhibit. 
                                                 
1331  Cf. GDF SUEZ (2008c); GDF SUEZ (2008d); GDF SUEZ (2009a), p. 49; GDF SUEZ (2009f). 
1332  Cf. GDF SUEZ (2009a), pp. 123-125. Italicised by author. 
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Figure 24:1333
 
 GdF (SUEZ)’s development paths between 1998 and 2008 
                                                 
1333  Own figure based on results from case study analysis. 
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7.4 RWE 
 
7.4.1 Introduction 
 
RWE was founded in 1898 as a local utility in Essen, North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), under 
the name ‘Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk AG’. In 1990 it was renamed ‘RWE 
Aktiengesellschaft’ and today is mainly referred to as RWE.1334 One hundred years after its 
founding and thus at the beginning of European energy market liberalisation, RWE was a 
30% municipally-owned diversified energy company which was organised into five main 
divisions: Energy, Petroleum & Chemicals, Environmental Services, Industrial Systems and 
Construction & Civil Engineering. Accounting for around 30% of total revenue and 50% of 
profit, RWE Energie was responsible for electricity production and gas supply of which the 
latter only had a share of less than 10% while electricity sales made up more than half of its 
income. In fact, gas accounted for only 3%, coal and nuclear power for 40% and 17% of the 
sales, respectively. Gas production was headed by RWE DEA while engagement in gas 
import, transportation, distribution, and supply was carried out through its 75% stake in 
German TSO Thyssengas.1335
 
 
 
7.4.2 Analysis of Development from a Business Perspective 
 
Strikingly, RWE’s business development was characterised by diverse expansion in the first 
years of liberalisation, with RWE having acquired 25% in the Hungarian gas supplier Tigaz 
as soon as January 1998, and, two months later set up cooperation agreements with Polish 
energy suppliers Zaklad Energetyczny Krakow (ZEK) and Stoleczny Zaklad Energetyczny 
(STOEN). In October of that year it also took a 75% stake in the American coal producer 
Consol. This expansion was accompanied by a structural reorganisation of RWE Energie, 
reducing the number of regional suppliers from twelve to eight by bundling them into four 
grid- and four supply regions. Even more crucial was the initiation of the merger with VEW, 
                                                 
1334  Cf. Schweer/ Thieme (1998), p. 261. 
1335  Cf. RWE (2001), pp. 60-95; RWE (2002), pp. 68-85. 
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at that time Germany’s sixth largest energy company, which was finalised in 2000 to create a 
subsidiary called ‘RWE Neu’ (‘RWE New’). Similarly, in the year before, i.e. 1999, 
development was mainly characterised by different acquisitions and structural reorganisation, 
as manifested in the take-over of American Turner Corporation in the building sector, in the 
securing of a share in the Berlin water works together with French Vivendi and the German 
financial company Allianz, as well as the full acquisition of Lahmeyer AG along with which 
all energy related technical services were integrated into the newly founded subsidiary Tessa. 
Also in 1999, RWE Trading, with trading offices in London and Essen and sales offices in the 
Netherlands, Poland and later in the U.S., was established as “the market’s eye”1336, 
presenting the interface between production, wholesale markets and sales. In fact, and “guided 
by the needs of the market”1337, RWE Trading was the only trading company in the German 
market then, offering derivates from all energy sectors. Nevertheless, its function remained 
restricted to trading for price hedging purposes,1338
                                                 
1336  RWE (2002), p. 79. 
 thus not constituting a form of creative 
behaviour yet. Around the same time and building on a multi-utility concept of energy, water 
and environmental activities RWE then re-structured its industry segment, too. Business 
segments and resources again were bundled into the core and non-core business units. The 
core area comprised of an area termed ‘Energy and Energy Related Services’ including RWE 
Dea, RWE Plus, RWE Trading, RWE Net, or Tessag, of a section called ‘Environment’ with 
RWE Umwelt, and of the ‘Water’ business. As non-core business units RWE addressed those 
areas not related to energy, environment or water activities, such as telecommunications, with 
e.g. E-Plus, chemicals, medical engineering, or construction and facility management. Many 
of these were divested in 1999, redeeming around €3.75 billion. In fact, the divestment of 
non-core businesses was also continued in 2000, when RWE decided to sell Hochtief and 
Heidelberger Druck, two well-known and well-established traditional German companies, as 
well as the non-related energy activities of Harpen and RWE Dea’s petrol stations, refineries 
and chemical activities to become a pure oil and gas E&P company. In 2001, facility 
1337  RWE (2001), p. 71. 
1338  Initially, only relatively small amounts of gas were traded in comparison to electricity, with gas trading 
having only started in 2000. Cf. RWE (2001), pp. 65-66; RWE (2002), pp. 41, 79; RWE (2003), p. 76. 
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management as well as energy- and medical engineering activities of RWE solutions were 
also sold.1339
 
 
A major expansion step was taken with the acquisition of U.K.-based Thames Water which 
provided RWE with operating licenses in Chile, and of American Water Works as a fourth 
strategic pillar to supplement the existing core businesses. Managed under Thames Water, 
RWE became the world’s third-largest water company, planning to generate further synergies 
within its multi-utility concept to contribute to overall Group results. Following the merger of 
RWE Umwelt with the recycling activities of VEW, RWE also became number one in 
Germany and number three in Europe in the recycling business. Activities in the renewable 
segment again were to be organised by Harpen, thus becoming a separate organisational unit 
termed ‘Harpen Renewables’.1340 Along with this, the Group’s organisational set-up was 
significantly restructured, integrating Lahmeyer into RWE AG with the remaining energy-
related businesses of the Industrial Systems area put under the lead of the newly founded 
‘Tessag Technische Anlagen und Services AG’ while energy and environmental activities 
were organised into then twelve independent corporate units (RWE Power, RWE Dea, RWE 
Gas, RWE Plus, RWE Rheinbraun, RWE Net, RWE Trading, RWE Thames Water, RWE 
Umwelt, RWE Systems, Harpen Renewables and Tessag, later becoming part of RWE 
Solutions) under the umbrella of RWE AG as a holding.1341
 
 
While the above mainly characterises activities in the years 1998-2000, the years 2001 and 
2002 were especially characterised by a major phase of acquisitions along and across the 
entire value-chain. In the upstream gas market, this included the acquisition of U.K.-based gas 
producer Highland Energy which became part of RWE Dea UK as well as the purchase of 
several E&P licenses for activities in the Norwegian Sea, off the Egyptian coast and the 
Canary Islands, and for the extension of the development of gas reserves in the North of 
Germany.1342
                                                 
1339  Cf. RWE (2001), p. 37; RWE (2002), p. 42; RWE (2003), p. 5. 
 The midstream gas business was strengthened by taking over 40% of the 
1340  Cf. RWE (2001), in particular pp. 1, 4-5, 15, 21; RWE (2002), in particular pp. 15-17, 26, 37, 84, 86-89. 
1341  For illustrative overviews cf. RWE (2001), pp. 12-15; RWE (2002), p. 37; RWE (2003), ‘A brief portrait’ 
(no page number given). 
1342  Cf. RWE (2002), pp. 99, 101-102; RWE (2003), pp. 38, 48, 83-87. 
Chapter VII: Empirical Study – Intra-Case Analysis 238 
Slovakian natural gas storage company Nafta in expectation of a significant gas trading point 
(hub) to develop in Eastern Europe,1343 as well as 97% of the Czech transportation company 
Transgas, a move that was presented as having taken over ‘nearly the whole Czech gas 
industry’, advancing RWE from a mainly German utility to becoming part of the ‘European 
gas league’. Organisationally integrated under the roof of RWE Gas, the joint coordination 
with Transgas’ pipeline, sourcing, trading, storage, and transportation activities was 
anticipated to generate savings of €100 million each year from 2007 onwards.1344 In addition 
to this, acquisitions were made in the downstream business, having taken over Dutch Obragas 
as well as smaller stakes in eight regional utilities in Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Poland, 
or Slovenia).1345 Attempts had also been made to obtain a majority stake in a further Dutch 
gas utility, Intergas N.V., but this was rejected by the Dutch government.1346 Nevertheless, the 
expansions made until then resulted in a substantial augmentation of natural gas purchasing 
volumes from 15 bcm in 2001 to 40 bcm in 2002. While accounting for the Group’s single-
largest cost position, it at the same time improved its bargaining position and allowed the 
renegotiation of contracts with producers and suppliers to obtain better conditions.1347 On 
domestic grounds, the focus was put on the downstream segment by merging regional 
suppliers to gain critical size and by increasing shares in German municipal utilities such as 
Thyssengas in order to increase the degree of vertical integration along the gas value chain 
and benefit from synergies.1348
                                                 
1343  Cf. RWE (2002), pp. 40, 84. 
 In the electricity segment, RWE acquired 49% of an Austrian 
electricity company as well as stakes in a power plant in Portugal and set up RWE Plus 
Belgium to expand sales in the Benelux region. Through RWE Plus’ subsidiary RWE 
Powerline, attempts were also made to market electricity via the Internet. Furthermore, in 
following its multi-utility approach, large-scale moves were taken in the coal business, having 
1344  Cf. RWE (2003), pp. 6, 20-21, 86. This was supported by setting up a portfolio management system centrally 
managed by RWE Transgas from Prague in order optimise purchasing activities and the negotiation position 
with international suppliers. Cf. RWE (2006), p. 67. 
1345  Cf. RWE (2002), pp. 11-12, 40, 84; RWE (2003), p. 6; RWE (2004), p. 86. 
1346  Cf. RWE (2002), pp. 40, 84. Afterwards not mentioned anymore. 
1347  Cf. RWE (2003), p. 47. This also assigned a new role to RWE Systems as a Group-wide supporter of 
procurement processes, instead of just administrating data (see above). Additionally, a JV company, Eutilia, 
was created together with ten other large European energy suppliers with the goal of installing an Internet-
based purchasing portal in order to benefit from group procurement volumes. For further supporting the 
development of e-business activities, RWE set up RWE Com GmbH & Co. oHG as an individual unit. Cf. 
RWE (2001), p. 85. 
1348  Cf. RWE (2003), pp. 47, 84, 86; RWE (2004), p. 49. 
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bought another 50% of Dutch SSM Coal (later transferred to RWE Trading following which it 
became Europe’s largest coal trader) as well as facilities to produce coal-seam based methane 
gas to be used in a power plant set up through RWE Rheinbraun’s American subsidiary 
Consol.1349 Behind these moves was the aim to expand its energy business as well as the 
possibility of diversifying risks to support overall Group performance.1350 In the renewables 
segment again, Harpen started operations of its first wind power park in 2001 and controlled 
24 hydro-electric plants in France, Italy, and Portugal while R&D investments into fuel cell 
technology were also increased.1351 In the following year, RWE made another large scale 
acquisition by taking over British Innogy, the second-largest electricity and third-largest gas 
supplier in the U.K. Together with Thames Water this enabled RWE to implement the multi-
utility concept also in the U.K. and benefit from synergies.1352 By increasing its stake in 
additional water companies, this engagement was also extended to the domestic market as 
well as to China and Spain. In Slovakia and Poland shares were taken in regional electricity 
companies. The electricity business again was further extended by acquiring 49% of a 
Slovakian (VSE) and 85% of a Polish electricity supplier (STOEN). Also the national 
electricity business was to be strengthened by increasing or acquiring stakes in local and 
regional utilities in Germany while RWE Rheinbraun started operating the world’s most 
efficient lignite power plant. Along with this ‘electricity strategy’ Harpen was assigned to the 
electricity business and not only acquired the Spanish wind power specialist AERSA but also 
built Italy’s first wind park.1353
 
 
Strikingly, while the above depicts the development path until 2002 and is characterised by 
tactics of creative behaviour, the phase until 2005/ 2006 is characterised by little if any 
expansion activity. In 2003, for example, only the acquisition of the remaining 25% of 
Thyssengas from Shell is worth mentioning. Instead, several of the previously acquired 
businesses were sold again in the years after such as Heidelberger Druck and Hochtief 
                                                 
1349  The Consol Energy group operates 56 subsidiaries in the U.S., Canada and Belgium. Cf. RWE (2001), p. 
142. 
1350  Cf. RWE (2001), pp. 67-69. As also stated in RWE (2003), p. 38. 
1351  Cf. RWE (2002), pp. 64, 84. 
1352  Cf. RWE (2003), pp. 21-22, 78. In addition to that, RWE Gas and the British National Grid Transco set up a 
logistics JV Viavera to provide services round transportation contracts to traders and sellers. Cf. RWE 
(2003), p. 86. 
1353  Cf. RWE (2003), pp. 9-10, 33-34, 45-48, 64, 77-79, 92. 
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(following the decision made in 2000), RWE Umwelt, and further stakes in 
telecommunication companies. Among these divestments even were activities of the energy 
business, like American Consol Energy, the U.S. trading business despite its positive 
contribution to overall Group performance1354 as well as activities in Portugal, Switzerland, 
Italy and Turkey. Furthermore, the water businesses outside Continental Europe were spun off 
while those in Europe and America, in expectation of positive growth contribution, were first 
retained and invested into in 2003 and 2004. In 2005 again, RWE announced plans to sell its 
U.K. and U.S. water business, too. Along with this, the number of leading organisational 
entities was reduced from thirteen to six.1355
 
  
Following this phase, behaviour became slightly more active again, especially with regards to 
activities in the gas market and renewables sector, showing in form of ‘analysing’ behaviour. 
While in 2006 an attempt was made to take over the German regional gas company Saar 
Ferngas, which, however, did not turn out successful,1356
                                                 
1354  Cf. RWE (2004), pp. 49, 98-99.  
 RWE was more successful in 
entering the LNG business, acquiring stakes in an LNG terminal to be built in Rotterdam 
(NL) and Croatia as well as in entering into an agreement with American Excelerate Energy 
to market the LNG supplied by Excelerate to Teeside in the U.K. After these moves, further 
expansion was required in order to quickly gain the critical mass for being able to compete on 
an international level. Plans were therefore announced in July 2007 to build jointly with 
Excelerate an import terminal for LNG tankers on the German North Sea coast for the re-
gasified LNG to be fed-in into the German grid starting in 2010. In order to manage the 
Group’s midstream business a new company, RWE Gas Midstream GmbH, was established in 
January 2007, handling gas supply for RWE Energy and RWE Power, commercial sales for 
RWE Dea as well as transportation, storage, LNG, and wholesaling. Moreover, plans were 
also made to integrate RWE Trading activities ‘as soon as the development of the Continental 
European gas trading market provided a sensible basis’. This seemed to have been the case in 
April 2008, when RWE Gas Midstream and RWE Trading were combined to create RWE 
Supply&Trading GmbH as a separate division, pooling gas purchasing activities for the 
1355  Cf. RWE (2004), pp. 100-105; RWE (2005), pp. 28, 65; RWE (2006), pp. 4, 9, 11, 21, 34-37. For a depiction 
of the organisational structure see the figure on the second page of AR 2005 (no page number given). 
1356  Cf. RWE (2007), pp. 5, 36, 97; RWE (2008), p. 57. 
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Group with the energy trading business for electricity, gas, oil and CO2. RWE Supply & 
Trading then directly acquired a 50% interest in Excelerate Energy, an important move as 
Excelerate operated special LNG tankers which allowed the regasification of LNG on board, 
thus not requiring facilities to be built onshore while enabling flexible transportation, at that 
time constituting a substantial technological advancement.1357 Another major step for 
extending its international transportation activities was taken at the beginning of 2008, when 
RWE, through RWE Gas Midstream, became the sixth partner in the Nabucco Gas Pipeline 
International Ltd. project, the consortium planning and building one of the most important 
infrastructure projects to secure gas supplies to Europe.1358 The development of the midstream 
business was becoming particularly critical to RWE in order to market the increasing gas 
volumes produced by RWE Dea from newly acquired sites in the Caspian Sea (Kazakhstan), 
North Africa (Egypt) as well as the Middle and Far East, even more as in-house production 
was to be tripled by 2013 in order to reduce dependence on gas procurement while increasing 
utilisation of gas in electricity generation. At the same time supply contracts with Gazprom 
were extended until 2035. In order to bring these volumes to market, a plan was announced at 
the beginning of 2007 to build a gas pipeline from the Czech Republic to Belgium to be 
connected to the German network. Simultaneously, RWE was looking to grow further in the 
Netherlands but decided to sell the Dutch gas grid companies acquired before (see above) as 
regulation prohibited further expansion. Instead, a major strategic move was made by 
acquiring Essent, the leading energy utility in the Netherlands with engagements in Germany 
and Belgium, allowing RWE to create scale economies and expand into the Benelux region. 
Around the same time a German as well as a Dutch Internet-based supplier were acquired 
with the aim to provide loyalty or ‘green’ offers to consumers through special CRM 
programmes. Initially mainly directed at selling electricity, the marketing of gas was planned 
as well, especially in reaction to the loss of customers following the increasingly fierce 
competition in core gas markets.1359 Also the advancement of storage facilities was mentioned 
in ARs 2007 and 2008 but not further enlarged on.1360
                                                 
1357  Cf. RWE (2008), pp. 28-29, 42, 56, 60, 106-107, 111; RWE (2009a), pp. 56, 59-60, 75, 113. 
 More explicit in contrast was the recent 
geographical expansion when RWE entered Turkey in 2008 through its own local company 
1358  Cf. RWE (2009a), pp. 59, 113. 
1359  Cf. RWE (2007), pp. 19-22, 35-39, 86; RWE (2008), p. 57; RWE (2009a), pp. 65-67, 81. 
1360  Cf. RWE (2008), pp. 28, 110; RWE (2009a), pp. 80, 112-113, 116-117, 141. 
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and signed a MoU to acquire a stake in a Turkish-based electricity producer. Furthermore, the 
gas and renewables business in Turkey was analysed for potential engagement as well as an 
entry into the Russian region considered.1361
 
  
In addition to this RWE also began to invest into the renewables segment in 2007 and 2008 
by establishing RWE Innogy. Until then, RWE Innogy had been responsible for the U.K. 
business (see above) and was regarded as a specialist company representing the whole group 
in this field. Becoming operational in 2008, RWE Innogy followed a growth strategy right 
from the beginning. The aim was to more than triple its generation base to 4.5 GW by 2012 
and to become one the three largest offshore wind farm operators in Europe by 2013. To 
achieve this, several activities were initiated, including the construction of two wind farms on 
the Welsh coast together with a Scottish partner and the acquisition of a 50% stake in the 
Greater Gabbard wind park off the South Eastern English coast as well as of the Spanish wind 
power operator Urvasco Energía (renamed into Iberian Removables Corporación). 
Furthermore, RWE Innogy acquired stakes in the North Sea Windpower 3 offshore farm, 
renamed Innogy Nordsee 1, with plans to make it Germany’s largest offshore wind park. In 
addition to this, wind activities were extended to Italy where a 50%-50% JV was set up with 
Fri-El Green Power. At the same time plans were made to enter the wind business in Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. This growth strategy was in fact built on a €25 billion 
investment programme, the largest in the company’s history. At the end of 2008, Innogy 
bought a minority stake in British Quiet Revolution, a company specialised in the 
development and construction of small wind power installations such as for household use. 
Due to these massive expenditures however, RWE Innogy initially was not able to earn its 
capital costs, thus making negative value contribution to overall Group results. Nevertheless, 
further smaller acquisitions, especially in entrepreneurial companies with promising 
technologies, were envisaged.1362
                                                 
1361  Cf. RWE (2008), pp. 28, 38, 41, 58; RWE (2009a), pp. 37, 112. 
 While the focus within the renewables portfolio was put on 
wind power in the beginning, further plans were made to progress electricity generation from 
biomass, resulting in biomass projects with Fri-El Green Power in Italy and the acquisition of 
UK-based Helius Energy Alpha Ltd. with rights to build and operate a biomass power station 
1362  Cf. RWE (2008), pp. 12-13, 39-40, 55, 106; RWE (2009a), pp. 55-56, 60, 75, 81, 98-99. 
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fired with wood residuals. RWE Rheinbraun again had begun to use wooden pellets as a cost-
efficient alternative to oil and gas while RWE Dea started exploring possibilities for making 
use of methane hydrates. In 2008 again, RWE was chosen as a strategic investor to build and 
operate nuclear power plants in Bulgaria and Romania, and set up a JV with its competitor 
E.ON to analyse possible engagements for building plants in the U.K.1363
 
 A striking strategic 
step taken was the divestment of Thames Water. Characterising the leaving of the water 
business in Europe, one of RWE’s former core pillars (see above), at the same time plans 
were made to go public with the water business in North America. 
 
7.4.3 Analysis of Development from an Institutional Perspective 
 
Noticeably, when analysing RWE’s institutional behaviour over the course of time, it is 
prominent that at the beginning of analysis, it is characterised by the most active tactics 
according to the continuum determined in the theoretical analysis. While this shows with 
regards to all three goals of European energy policy, the most active one in form of seeking to 
take control can be found in response to liberalisation measures. Here, RWE ‘did more than 
necessary’, i.e. as required by regulation, by not only functionally but also legally and 
organisationally separating its gas grid from its production and sales activities. Furthermore, 
in what can be assessed as a tactic of image advertising, it explicitly pointed out that it was 
“the only integrated power company in Europe which by founding RWE Net has 
accomplished this step (…)”1364 and “the first German utility company to comply with the 
demand for complete unbundling of the energy business in organisational terms as well”1365 
before this became enforced by law. In addition to this, and likely to have been applied as a 
support of such controlling tactics, RWE also sought to coopt with powerful constituents such 
as regulatory authorities early on.1366
 
  
                                                 
1363  Cf. RWE (2008), p. 106; RWE (2009a), pp. 54, 112, 120-121. 
1364  RWE (2002), p. 82. 
1365  RWE (2002), p. 36. 
1366  Cf. RWE (2002), p. 8. 
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With regards to sustainability matters, for instance, this is not only revealed in RWE having 
already pointed out in 2000/ 2001 to “have taken the increasingly stringent requirements for 
environmental conservation and climate protection proactively on board”1367, but also in its 
teaming up with well-known allies like German glass manufacturer Schott Glas with whom 
RWE established a JV (RWE Schott Solar) to advance growth in solar technology. The 
success of such tactics shows in the fact that RWE Schott Solar became market leader in this 
segment in Europe and operated the world’s most modern solar technology factory at that 
time.1368 To support this manipulative imaging tactic a new label was launched (‘Avanza’) in 
order to increase overall brand awareness while at the same time serving as an ecological 
brand for electricity produced from renewables.1369 In fact, RWE has been offering a ‘green’ 
tariff to develop renewable energies since 1996.1370 Further attempts to take influence also 
show in the early and continuous mentioning of having already been listed on the DJSI since 
1999, of having joined e7, an initiative of leading global utilities promoting sustainable 
energy projects in 2002, and the UN initiative Global Compact in 2003 as well as of having 
published an Environmental Report that was soon after replaced by a specific Corporate 
Responsibility Report.1371 Additionally, initiatives were accompanied by continuous 
“lobbying work”1372 and imaging in that RWE not only claimed it was contributing its 
expertise to the discussion but was even helping to shape planned policies such as in case of 
the emissions trading scheme.1373
 
 
While this pro-active behaviour constitutes the first phase of RWE’s development, the 
following years, constituting the phase between 2003 and 2006, are characterised by a 
development towards more passive behaviour again. The year 2003, for instance, having 
already shown signs of influencing tactics as just depicted above, is also typified by 
avoidance behaviour. RWE, in light of a generally increasing public ‘displeasure’ of energy 
companies, tried to buffer from such influences by making the excuse that the responsibility 
                                                 
1367  RWE (2001), p. 64. Italicised by author. 
1368  Cf. RWE (2003), p. 64. 
1369  Cf. RWE (2001), p. 70. 
1370  Cf. Mez (2001), p. 219. 
1371  Cf. RWE (2003), p. 65; RWE (2004), pp. 19, 73; RWE (2005), pp. 75, 197. 
1372  RWE (2004), p. 62. 
1373  RWE (2004), p. 62. Italicised by author. 
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to make the right decisions “lies in the hands of policymakers”1374. Similarly, in an attempt to 
justify RWE’s behaviour, CEO Roels in 2004 claimed to have ‘time and again repeated in 
talks with policymakers and public authorities’ that a secure supply with energy was not for 
free.1375 The years 2004 and 2005 then show an even larger degree of more passive behaviour 
in that RWE, although “not always easy”1376, aimed to balance interests by trying to “do 
justice to the well-founded interests of all stakeholder groups relating to RWE as best as we 
can”1377. CEO Roels again, by uttering his ‘personal understanding’, attempted to pacify 
stakeholders.1378 Even more passive behaviour during this time shows in form of 
acquiescence as RWE imitated other companies in filing an appeal after having obtained 
fewer CO2 emissions than applied for, or in implementing the regulatory requirements such as 
the entry-exit model.1379 It also claimed of wanting to continue as before “regardless of 
political requirements”1380
 
, thus ignoring institutional change. 
From 2006 onwards, development again is characterised by a tendency towards more active 
behaviour. Related to the issue of security of supply, for instance, statements such as that 
Europe could not “afford to be insular”1381, that it was “high time that right decisions are 
taken for tomorrow’s infrastructure”1382 and that “we must stop pointing fingers and initiate 
an all-encompassing dialogue”1383 can be assessed as forms of window dressing or 
justification. This becomes even more apparent when considering that RWE did not invest 
into respective projects but instead claimed that it was “up to policymakers and society to 
create reliable conditions to safeguard”1384 investments. The same holds true in relation to the 
notion of sustainability. While claiming to “accept political decisions”1385
                                                 
1374  RWE (2004), p. 6. 
 RWE challenged 
discussions on climate protection as ‘unfortunately being rarely unbiased and constructive 
1375  Cf. RWE (2005), p. 6. 
1376  RWE (2006), p. 91. 
1377  RWE (2006), p. 91. 
1378  Cf. RWE (2006), p. 7. 
1379  Cf. RWE (2005), p. 57; RWE (2006), pp. 32-36. 
1380  RWE (2006), p. 79. 
1381  RWE (2007), p. 6. 
1382  RWE (2007), p. 6. 
1383  RWE (2007), p. 127. 
1384  RWE (2007), p. 128. Also cf. RWE (2008), p. 51. 
1385  RWE (2008), p. 16. 
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while not paying attention to economic facts’1386 and authorities’ decisions of achieving 
supply security without using coal and nuclear power (two energy sources heavily deployed 
by RWE)1387 while simultaneously aiming for competitive energy prices as non viable, thus 
even demanding an end of ‘over-subsidisation of renewables’1388. Over the course of time, 
more manipulative tactics can be found again. In order to improve legitimacy RWE, for 
instance, tried to positively coopt public perception by referring to the support of powerful 
constituents such as in the case of the laying of the cornerstone of its new and the world’s 
most efficient lignite-power plant (see above). Here, RWE not only emphasised that such 
investments were “extremely important to Angela Merkel”1389, but also that “the German 
government was certain to send a representative to the groundbreaking ceremony for this 
environmental milestone”1390 for the planned commissioning in 2020. Similarly, with regards 
to research on CCS RWE declared it was cooperating with powerful constituents.1391 Another 
manipulative tactic applied was that of referring to and bringing in powerful constituents. In 
2007, for example, RWE published an interview with Prof. Dr. Klaus Töpfer, a former 
German environmental minister,1392 in its Annual Report and marketed him as ‘a well-known 
environmental expert and former Executive Director of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) on climate protection’. Likewise, by choosing Prof. Vahrenholt as 
Chairman of the Board of Directors for the newly established RWE Innogy and presenting 
him as being highly prestigious “through his past entrepreneurial activity and work in the field 
of energy policy”1393, a powerful constituent was directly established within the organisation. 
One year later, i.e. 2008, also a former member of Greenpeace was brought in to represent the 
renewable business to relevant stakeholders.1394
                                                 
1386  Cf. RWE (2007), p. 6. 
 Other examples include those of RWE 
looking to take influence and control developments by applying instruments of image 
advertising and story telling. Starting with the Annual Report of 2006, RWE began to 
explicitly point out several individual areas relevant for the sustainability issue, including 
1387  Remark by author. Cf. Annual Reports. 
1388  Cf. RWE (2007), p. 75. 
1389  RWE (2007), p. 122. 
1390  RWE (2007), p. 124. 
1391  Cf. RWE (2007), pp. 132-133, 140. 
1392  Remark by author. 
1393  RWE (2008), p. 55. 
1394  Cf. Wildhagen (2009a), pp. 102-104. 
Chapter VII: Empirical Study – Intra-Case Analysis 247 
Climate Protection, Social Responsibility, Stakeholder Dialogue, Systematic Sustainability 
Management, or Resource Efficiency. In addition to this, an extra section called ‘RWE 
Special’ on ‘Energy of the future’ was included, reporting measures on promoting efficiency 
in households, renewable energy and climate protection such as CDM or CCS projects. It 
furthermore included an extra section on renewables that was presented under sustainability 
considerations with RWE promoting itself as “The Energy Efficiency Company”1395 claiming 
to ‘set a good example’ by offering bonuses to energy saving household consumers via 
campaigns called “Climate protection begins at home”1396 or “Save Energy Now”1397.1398 
From 2007 onwards, even more concrete action fields were added, such as one concerning 
security of supply.1399 Another indication for the above assessment is provided by the fact that 
despite already having been highly ranked on respective sustainability indices or despite 
having become the first power company in Germany that joined the World Bank’s Prototype 
Carbon Fund (PCF), such achievements were only remarked on by RWE in 2008. Then it was 
particularly emphasised that RWE had been ‘the only German company included in the DJSI 
without interruption since 1999’1400 and had not only been listed on the Carbon Disclosure 
Project’s Climate Leadership Index1401 but had immediately ranked best in class in the 
utilities category in 2006, again only later promoted as an initiative within its sustainability 
strategy in 2007.1402 In addition to this qualitative proof, evidence for the increased attention 
to and activity in this area can also be found in the amount of pages dedicated to the issue of 
sustainability in Annual Reports: While in 2005 it was only two pages, it was four or more 
afterwards.1403
 
 
A similar tendency towards more active forms of behaviour can also be observed with regards 
to regulatory measures to increase competition which initially particularly referred to tactics 
of defiance. This, for instance, shows in publicly challenging authorities that the debate on 
                                                 
1395  RWE (2007), p. 122. 
1396  RWE (2007), p. 123. 
1397  RWE (2007), p. 125. 
1398  Cf. RWE (2007), pp. 110, 119-140. 
1399  Cf. RWE (2008), pp. 131-135; RWE (2009a), pp. 139-145. 
1400  Cf. RWE (2009a), p. 145. 
1401  This project was initiated by a group of large institutional investors aiming to make companies’ CO2 
emissions and climate protection strategies transparent to the financial market. Cf. www.cdproject.net. 
1402  Cf. RWE (2008), p. 136; RWE (2009a), p. 145. 
1403  See respective Annual Reports from the years 2005 to 2008 and as mentioned before. 
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prices and monopolistic profits “can’t be all that alarming”1404 as energy prices had remained 
“roughly the same”1405 as before liberalisation, and that despite enforcements to facilitate 
TPA, “competition will not be able to change fundamental factors such as rising commodity 
prices, grid fees, taxed and levies for climate protection”1406. RWE also publicly criticised 
that ownership unbundling would not ‘be of help’1407 as it “has not been proven empirically 
and is questionable from a scientific point of view”1408. Similarly, it complained that 
regulatory approval procedures were taking too much time and, for example, that measures 
were not effective.1409 Even more, it strongly ‘opposed’ installed regulations as these went 
“against the EU’s requirement to allow prices in the European energy sector to be determined 
according to the principles of free markets”1410, again publicly threatening that this would 
isolate Germany and put at risk required investments. Moreover, with regards to the FCO’s 
accusations of RWE having applied inappropriate methods to factor CO2 costs into electricity 
prices for industrial consumers, RWE not only ‘firmly rejected’ this claim but even accused 
the FCO of having neglected the ‘fundamental principles of competitive price determination’ 
and announced that it would challenge possible sanctions in court, being confident that 
arguments would hold in legal proceedings.1411 Only one year after, however, much more 
passive compromising behaviour can be observed again in this matter as RWE, in what can be 
assessed as a pacifying tactic, instead ‘opted for an agreement over protracted litigation’ and 
showed willingness to auction power products from its depreciated coal-fired plants to 
industrial customers in return for the FCO dropping its case.1412
                                                 
1404  RWE (2007), p. 127. 
 In a similar attempt to pacify 
after having become subject to an abuse procedure initiated by the EU Commission in 2007 - 
for having hindered access to the natural gas transmission grid in order to achieve an 
allegedly dominating market position in the gas supply business - RWE agreed to re-organise 
its gas grids by downsizing the long-distance pipeline infrastructure in order to avoid 
protracted litigation. It even considered selling its German gas grid to a third party if the 
1405  RWE (2007), p. 127. 
1406  RWE (2007), p. 129. 
1407  Cf. RWE (2007), pp. 33-34. 
1408  RWE (2008), p. 52. 
1409  Cf. RWE (2007), pp. 30, 39, 75; RWE (2008), p. 53. 
1410  RWE (2007), p. 31. Also cf. RWE (2008), pp. 52-53. 
1411  Cf. RWE (2007), pp. 31-32, 83. 
1412  Cf. RWE (2008), p. 53. 
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Commission on the countermove would drop its investigations.1413 RWE even admitted that 
the European Commission was right to “urge us to accelerate integration”1414, a tactic which 
can be assessed as an attempt to pacify. In 2008 then, active defiant behaviour can be found 
yet again with RWE threatening to be willing to take legal actions to accelerate regulatory 
approval processes. Similarly, it further publicly attacked institutional sources in that EU 
regulations were hindering investments and distorting competition.1415 At the same time 
examples of manipulative behaviour in form of co-opting and influencing tactics can be 
found. Finding, for instance, that due to a ‘lack of trust prevailing in the industry’, time had 
come “to turn the damaged relationship between the energy industry, policymakers and 
consumers back into constructive cooperation”1416 RWE committed itself to ‘acting more 
constructively and jointly’ by establishing close contact with stakeholders. This also shows in 
the change of attitude towards regulatory enforcements such as welcoming the Third 
Liberalisation Package and believing the ITO to constitute a “workable solution”1417. 
Likewise, as a ‘clear commitment to competition’, it specifically installed customer friendly 
offers and measures to increase transparency.1418 Attempts to take influence again are 
revealed in the establishment of powerful constituents such as lobbyists to ‘fight in Berlin’1419 
for the company’s interests, or the financing of projects of European interest at prestigious 
institutions.1420
 
 
 
7.4.4 Analysis of Development from an Integrated Perspective 
 
Essentially and as revealed in the analysis above, RWE’s development path can said to be 
constituted by different phases of behaviour. Valid for the business as well as for the 
institutional one, each began with an active phase mainly characterised by creative and 
                                                 
1413  Cf. RWE (2008), p. 103; RWE (2009a), p. 56. As also pointed out in public press. Cf. Anonymous (2007g), 
p. 6. 
1414  RWE (2007), p. 129. 
1415  Cf. RWE (2009a), pp. 25, 49-50, 54-55. 
1416  RWE (2008), p. 26. 
1417  RWE (2009a), p. 51. 
1418  Cf. RWE (2009a), p. 141. As a specific example cf. www.rwetransparent.com. 
1419  Cf. RWE (2009a), p. 24. 
1420  Cf. RWE (2009a), pp. 54-58, 96-100. 
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manipulative tactics holding until 2002/ 2003. This has been illustrated by respective arrows 
along the business and institutional axis. At the same time no dominant focus on either type of 
environmental forces can be determined. Instead, RWE during that time and thus relatively 
early had adopted an integrated perspective, not only being aware that “commercial success is 
not the only benchmark of performance”1421 but that a ‘clean image’ was critical for positive 
stakeholder attention which put communication skills ‘to the test’.1422 Another example is that 
RWE, in fact until 2003 and thus also supporting the period assessed above, had also declared 
that sustainable development formed ‘an integral part of corporate strategy’1423 while 
investors praised its sustainability reporting.1424 Conspicuously, when looking at the years 
afterwards, the analysis above has revealed a second phase of development which constitutes 
the period between 2003 and 2005/ 2006 and which is characterised by passive forms of 
behaviour. This actually holds true for both dimensions and in the figure below illustrating 
RWE’s development path has been illustrated as a ‘reverse’ development with each arrow 
pointing in the other direction. Even the phase which seems to mark the beginning of a third 
period towards more active behaviour, again having started after 2006 as laid out above, has 
to be looked at under the consideration that behaviour was passively driven by external 
factors rather than by RWE having taken advantage and orchestrating change itself. This, for 
example, shows in moves of naming its 2008 Sustainability Report ‘Our Responsibility’ in 
order to ‘do justice’ to requirements, thus just satisfying them, or in looking to operate within 
familiar framework conditions.1425 Such behaviour, revealing more passive behaviour than 
pro-active advancement, becomes even more pronounced through statements by RWE of 
‘waiting for EU resolutions on the 2008 climate package to be translated into national 
law’1426
                                                 
1421  RWE (2003), p. 61. 
. Similarly, it tried to justify itself by pointing out a study analysing the impact of 
political influences on corporate decisions which had found that energy companies were 
increasingly prone to politically motivated demands constraining their future room of 
manoeuvre and that “political decisions in the field of energy policy have a significant impact 
1422  Cf. RWE (2003), p. 26. 
1423  Cf. RWE (2002), pp. 64-65; RWE (2003), pp. 48-49; RWE (2004), pp. 63-65; RWE (2005), pp. 22-23, 90-
91. 
1424  Cf. RWE (2003), p. 27; RWE (2004), p. 19. 
1425  Cf. RWE (2009a), pp. 22, 35, 139. Italicised by author. 
1426  Cf. RWE (2009a), p. 37. Italicised by author. 
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on the options available to the RWE Group”1427. The notion of externally enforced active 
behaviour also becomes apparent with regards to other activities, like its participation in CDM 
and JI projects, the construction of CCGT plants, or the use of new methods like Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) technology1428. This also holds for its subsidiaries such 
as RWE Dea’s research on underground CO2 storage facilities which were actually initiated 
because emission certificates were not allocated for free anymore and were turning into an 
increasing cost factor.1429 Under these considerations, its newly implemented ‘Strategy 
Agenda 2012’, which again was guided by the principle of ‘More Growth, Less CO2’,1430 or 
the new campaign termed ‘The energy to lead’ to illustrate the realignment of RWE as a 
forward-thinking and -acting company that is ‘responsible and innovative at the same 
time’,1431 have to be assessed as window dressing tactics. This is also valid for the claim that 
the enhancing of efficiency did not pose “the only item on the agenda”1432 as well as the 
emphasis that RWE had not only been “rising to the challenges of sustainable management 
for years”1433, but that sustainability management had become ‘firmly cemented’ and 
dialogues with stakeholder a part of daily routine.1434 While such activities have also been 
judged as ‘elegant ways of softening ecological constraints’ in secondary literature,1435 those 
with regards to investments into infrastructure projects, such as the Nabucco pipeline, have 
been assessed as an institutional tactic of RWE selling it as its support to increase European 
security of supply and market liquidity.1436
                                                 
1427  RWE (2008), p. 40. 
 At the same time tactics such as lobbying and the 
bringing-in of powerful constituents progressed RWE’s development in the renewable 
business, thus supporting its integrated perspective. When mapping these findings onto the 
matrix, RWE’s course of development reveals as what above has been termed ‘zic-zac’ path. 
In order to facilitate identification, each deviation has been marked with the respective phase 
1428  This technology allows converting coal into a gaseous state to create synthesis gas from which CO2 is 
separated and electricity generated in steam and gas turbines. Connected to this site also is an algae 
harvesting plant that is planned to be ‘fed’ with the CO2 produced in the IGCC plant in order to convert it to 
biomass which again could be further applied in future biogas plants. Cf. Michelatsch (2009), p. 9. 
1429  Cf. RWE (2008), p. 40; RWE (2009a), p. 40. 
1430  Cf. RWE (2008), p. 28. 
1431  Cf. RWE (2009a), p. 40. 
1432  RWE (2009a), p. 25. 
1433  RWE (2008), p. 131. 
1434  Cf. RWE (2008), p. 131. 
1435  Cf. Flauger (2009c). 
1436  Cf. Czakainski/ Lamprecht (2008), pp. 48-49. 
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as depicted above. The indication towards a renewed integrated path is depicted as a 
transparent blue arrow. 
 
Figure 25:1437
 
 RWE’s development paths between 1998 and 2008 
 
                                                 
1437  Own figure based on results from case study analysis. 
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CHAPTER VIII COMPARING FINDINGS, DETERMINING 
EXPLANATIONS and VALIDATING RESULTS 
 
 
8.1 Inter-Case Analysis – Commonalities and Differences 
 
8.1.1 Incumbents’ Development Paths 
 
Before comparing the four cases in detail, several general findings can be determined. 
Primarily, research has shown that incumbents’ behaviour over the past decade has been 
significantly influenced by changes of European Energy Policy and gas industry 
transformation. What can be observed is that incumbents not only in some form adapt to these 
changes, but that this process is characterised by the fact that organisational behaviour has 
become more active over the course of time. Even more, strategic behaviour by now can be 
identified as being or becoming pro-active as incumbents take advantage of arising 
opportunities to drive change themselves – instead of being driven by it. This holds for 
incumbents’ business as well as their institutional path. These findings can be seen in the 
illustration below where the four individual development paths determined from case study 
analysis have been merged into one matrix. 
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Figure 26:1438
 
  Comparison of individual development paths 
 
 
 
Apart from these commonalities the figure above also reveals the differences in development 
paths. Prominent here is that despite the general trend just depicted above, each incumbent’s 
individual development path is distinct from the others. While that of GdF (SUEZ) has been 
mostly passive and is thus situated in the left bottom corner of the matrix, that of E.ON has 
been mainly pro-active as shown by the position in the right top corner of the matrix. ENI’s 
development path again is characterised by predominant active institutional strategies while 
business behaviour has been more passive. Another different path is that of RWE, where both 
paths started off actively before ‘re-developing’ as behaviour became more passive again, to 
recently once more showing a tendency of pro-active strategies. At the end of the analysis 
period of RWE’s path hence shows as a zic-zac course. 
 
After having compared incumbents’ overall development paths the same will be done in the 
following two sections with regards to their business as well as institutional behaviour. 
                                                 
1438 Own figure based on above case results. 
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8.1.2 Incumbents’ Business Behaviour 
 
Fundamentally, the comparison from a business perspective emphasises the findings made 
above. Looking at M&A deals of European incumbents over the study period, for instance, 
reveals E.ON as the top bidder before Suez, GdF, and RWE and thus sustains the finding of 
its pro-active lead. 
 
Figure 27:1439
 
 M&A deals by European incumbents (1998-2007) 
 
 
 
The finding of E.ON as the most pro-active incumbent is also supported by assessments in 
secondary literature where it has been depicted as being ‘very active’ and ‘giving 
direction’,1440 or as having been the only foreign energy company that was able to enter the 
‘walled off’ French market.1441
                                                 
1439  Own figure based on data from Lévêque/ Monturus (2008), p. 297. Suez has been coloured in transparent 
green to indicate the later merger with GdF. 
 This also holds with regards to its strategy of vertically 
integrating along the gas value-chain to re-inforce its upstream as well as midstream business 
1440  Cf. Maier et al. (2006), p. 4; Flauger (2010a), p. 29. 
1441  Cf. Alich/ Flauger (2009a); Alich/ Flauger (2009b). 
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such as treating storage and trading as strategic activities.1442 The positioning of GdF in front 
of RWE despite GdF’s more passive business development can be explained by the fact that 
indeed RWE was restrictive in this respect as revealed from case study findings and that GdF 
especially recently made more large-scale acquisitions in terms of value as indexed in the 
figure above. While ENI has not been part of the study and thus is not mentioned, this on the 
other hand can also be seen as an indicator for its passive business behaviour as determined in 
the case study. The assessment of GdF as the most passive player even finds support in its 
own statements in that it set out to follow instead of shaping fundamental trends in the 
European energy industry.1443 A similar statement can be found by RWE. While stating of 
‘being capable of taking a leadership role’ it admits not having such a position yet.1444
 
  
Apart from the support for E.ON’s leadership position, the figure above at the same time 
indicates that M&As have been a business tactic that has been commonly applied. This 
becomes even more pronounced with regards to the extension along and across the value-
chain. While all four companies are engaged along the whole gas value-chain and vertically 
integrated, they have also all diversified horizontally into other energy businesses. This is 
particularly predominant in the case of electricity which again is not restricted to power 
generation from natural gas but also includes nuclear power and renewable energies. 
Moreover, diversification into the electricity business has not only focussed on production 
activities. All four incumbents in fact further integrated down the electricity value-chain to 
also sell and market the power produced. This has been depicted in the following figure: 
 
 
                                                 
1442  Cf. Grant/ Ritter (2007), pp. 7-8; Gassmann/ Yacoub (2010). 
1443  Cf. GdF (2006), p. 56. Also cf. GdF (2007), p. 59; GdF (2008a), p. 82. 
1444  Cf. RWE (2008), pp. 22-23. Italicised by author. 
Chapter VIII: Comparing Findings, Determining Explanations and Validating Results 257 
Figure 28:1445
 
 Towards a common industry business model 
 
 
 
8.1.3 Incumbents’ Institutional Behaviour 
 
Strikingly, the finding of an increasing resemblance of strategic behaviour also holds when 
comparing cases from an institutional perspective. This becomes particularly evident when 
looking at the tactic applied when communicating on sustainability issues, a topic that has 
become increasingly critical for incumbents’ legitimacy. As the following table well shows do 
incumbents apply the same instruments to display their engagement in this area. All four, for 
                                                 
1445  Own figure. 
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example, in some form publish an environment and sustainability report, engage in carbon 
disclosure projects, and are members of the UN Global Compact Initiative.  
 
Table 5:1446
 
 Application of common institutional instruments to report on sustainability 
 
 
 
As already revealed by case study research it has been particularly ENI which has been active 
in this respect. In fact, while E.ON’s institutional behaviour was identified as the most pro-
active above, ENI has recently been ranked leader with regards to its communication on 
sustainability via its corporate website.1447
                                                 
1446  Own figure based on case study findings. 
 Here it has not only installed an extra tab on 
‘sustainability’ but under this has implemented further riders termed ‘environment’, ‘our 
commitment’, ‘stakeholder’, ‘people’, and ‘communities’. Additionally, two extra tabs 
display ‘case studies’ and ‘news’. Extensive information and further subjects on these topics 
can be found under each tab. Under ‘our commitment’, for example, ENI particularly reports 
on sustainability which again has been separated into six distinct areas: results and objectives, 
areas for improvement, its sustainability model, valuation by sustainability indices, 
international guidelines, and interviews. Also here additional sub-categories can be found, 
amongst which is a conceptual sustainability model, ENI’s sustainability process as well as 
the planning process to advance its sustainability strategy are presented (see following figure). 
1447  Cf. Halda (2009), p. 69; Lundquist (2010). 
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Figure 29:1448
 
 ENI’s sustainability planning tactic – An outstanding process 
 
 
 
ENI’s procedure thereby can be assessed as an outstanding tactic. This is also supported when 
comparing the other incumbents’ behaviour in this respect. None has in fact installed a 
distinct category on sustainability. GDF SUEZ has implemented a tab termed ‘commitment’ 
but there only lists general topics, such as its ‘vision’, ‘environment and climate’, ‘stakeholder 
expectations’, ‘corporate responsibility’, ‘sustainable urban development’, and ‘diversity’. 
Moreover, the section ‘environment and climate’ only includes one subcategory on 
biodiversity where GDF SUEZ illustrates results from a study comparing CO2 emissions by 
European utilities. This though shows the company as the third lowest emitter before E.ON – 
and RWE as the largest emitter of CO2.1449 RWE again only has a general tab on 
‘responsibility’. Under this it reports on sustainability and climate issues but by far not as 
differentiated as that of ENI. In its 2009 Responsibility Report, for instance, RWE does list 
‘climate protection’, ‘energy efficiency’, ‘security of supply’, and ‘environmental protection’ 
as key areas for action of its corporate responsibility strategy,1450 but today still refers to the 
implementation of a sustainable business as a ‘challenge’,1451
 
 not an opportunity. 
These findings hence support the assessments derived from intra-case analysis above. If this 
also holds when comparing cases from an integrated perspective is determined next. 
 
                                                 
1448  ENI (2011). 
1449  Cf. GDF SUEZ (2011).  
1450  Cf. RWE (2010), pp. 19-20. 
1451  Cf. RWE (2011). 
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8.1.4 Incumbents’ Integrated Behaviour 
 
Taking the comparatative matrix from above (figure 26) as the starting point, another critical 
observation that can be derived but so far has not been mentioned is the fact that independent 
from their individual course of action all paths develop towards the right hand top corner of 
the matrix. This supports the finding that business as well as institutional behaviour has 
become pro-active over the course of time. Even more conspicuous when adopting an 
integrated perspective though is the fact that development paths may consist of independent 
business and institutional paths as in the cases of ENI and GdF, or in form of integrated ones 
like those of E.ON and, at least initially, RWE. Having stated this at the same time draws 
attention to the fact that also ENI’s and GdF’s, and recently RWE’s again, have turned 
towards becoming ‘integrated paths’ (as shown by the dotted arrows). In sum, this again 
indicates that behaviour is becoming increasingly similar – an outcome which is supported by 
the common application of business and institutional strategies and tactics as just laid out 
above and as illustrated in the figure below. 
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Figure 30:1452
 
 Development over time – Convergence of behaviour 
 
 
 
At the same time the adoption of an integrated perspective enhances analysis in that it reveals 
that the behaviours observed have to be explained by considering the respective other 
perspective, such as when business development is not a result of business but institutional 
forces. One example is ENI’s establishment of EniPower SpA for the development of CCGT 
plants. While this actually constitutes a form of business extension ENI used this as an 
institutional tactic to escape the regulatory ceilings imposed by using these plants as an outlet 
for its natural gas resources (see case study). A contrasting example could be GDF SUEZ’ 
tactic of displaying its CO2 emissions as the lowest before its rivals (see above). This 
institutional tactic could also be used to enhance business development by demonstrating its 
competitive advantage in this respect. 
 
Moreover, as has been already indicated by case study research and analysis above, the 
developments observed may be an outcome of whether environmental drivers functioned as 
constraints on or as drivers of behaviour. Two extreme examples in this respect are GdF’s and 
                                                 
1452  Own figure based on above case study results. 
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E.ON’s development: While GdF’s business as well as institutional development has been 
constrained by environmental change, that of E.ON has in both cases been pro-actively 
enhanced. In ENI’s case again institutional behaviour was more active than its business 
development, and RWE’s path is characterised by a zic-zac course. What the drivers behind 
these different development paths are will be determined in the next section. This is done by 
building on the explanatory factors derived from the analysis in chapters IV and V. 
 
 
8.2 Explanatory Discussion of Case Findings – Determining 
Drivers of Development 
 
8.2.1  Business Environmental Drivers 
 
8.2.1.1 Supply and Demand Situation 
 
Looking at external factors and in particular national market and industry structure the 
analysis reveals that the underlying development of the natural gas demand and supply 
situation followed the same trend in the three countries in that primary production declined 
while consumption increased. Differences can be found with regards to the extent of these 
changes though. Looking at the period between 1997 and 2008, it can be seen that France, 
where some of the first European natural gas discoveries had been made in 1957,1453
                                                 
1453  Cf. Sauvage (2008), p. 27. 
 started 
from a relatively low production level of 2 million tons of oil equivalent (toe) while that in 
Germany accounted for 16 million toe and in Italy for nearly 18 million. While production in 
these three countries in this period declined by more than 60%, 30% and 52%, respectively, 
consumption increased by 10% in Germany, 11.8% in France, and 6.4% in Italy. In absolute 
terms Germany is the largest consumer with nearly 57 million toe, Italy the second-largest 
with almost 37 million toe, and France the third-largest with close to 32 million toe (2008 
figures). Their dependency on imports amounts to around 81%, 87% and 96%, respectively. 
In order to derive some possible explanations with regards to incumbents’ behaviour, these 
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figures have to be put in relation to overall consumption of primary energy as this gives an 
indication of the maturity of the market. This data again shows that while natural gas already 
had a relatively large share in the Italian and German primary energy consumption mix in 
1998, there was hardly any utilisation in France.1454 Having faced a relatively saturated 
national market and the need to find new sales markets thus also explains why E.ON and 
RWE took advantage of liberalisation by internationalising while GdF, when becoming more 
active, first started to develop the domestic market. The same holds true in ENI’s case as 
revealed in the case study. At the same time GdF had also always faced strong competition 
from nuclear power as an even more environmentally friendly form of energy1455 with 47% of 
European nuclear power being produced in France, where it had a share of nearly 80% in 
electricity generation, compared with about 20% in Germany and none in Italy.1456 In 2008, 
GDF SUEZ recently pointed out the impact of the possible revival of nuclear energy in 
Germany and Sweden as going against the development of the natural gas industry.1457 By 
2008, natural gas still only accounted for 15% in the French energy mix, compared with 38% 
in Italy and 22% in Germany.1458
 
 
 
8.2.1.2 Incumbents’ Market Power 
 
Apart from the threat through substitute forms of energy as just mentioned above, another 
possible explanatory factor requiring to be looked at more closely is the competitive situation 
in the respective domestic industry. From a theoretical modelling point of view, Italy can be 
classified as the most competitively oriented, followed by Germany and France, the latter of 
which was categorised as one based on a ‘national public interest’ orientation and thus as the 
least competitive.1459
                                                 
1454  Own calculations based on data from Eurostat (2010) databasis. 
 While this provides a first indication on the situation, several other 
1455  This had also already been pointed out by Chevalier in 1992. Cf. Chevalier (1992), p. 182. 
1456  Data from Eurostat (2010). 
1457  Cf. GDF SUEZ (2009a), pp. 28-29. For discussions on Germany cf. Delhaes/ Thelen (2006), pp. 30-31; 
Franke (2007), p. 18. 
1458  Own calculations from Eurostat (2010) databasis. Updated in 2010 as only then substantial data for 2008 
available. 
1459  Cf. Arentsen (2004), pp. 96-98. 
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factors also have to be considered to determine the competitive condition as explained in 
chapter III. Thus, when looking at the split of buying and supplying power of European gas 
incumbents in 2001, it can be seen that while ENI’s SNAM and GdF accounted for 15% and 
around 11% of European gas imports, respectively, neither E.ON nor RWE are directly 
mentioned due to their small share.1460 This at the same time indicates a disadvantage with 
regards to buying power. A similar picture arises from the supply situation in 2001 with GdF 
making up 95%, ENI Gas & Power 84% while E.ON and RWE are not mentioned. The fact 
that Ruhrgas alone accounted for 14% of imports and 54% of downstream supply, however, 
supports the importance of its acquisition by E.ON, which at the time of its founding had a 
market share of 33%.1461 In fact, E.ON accounted for more than half of domestic bulk and 
retail purchases by 2004, i.e. after the merger, and was well on its way to become a major 
player in the gas market,1462 as also determined in the case analysis. Despite this similarity in 
incumbents’ market power, a distinction can be made with regards to the number of 
competitors in the field. In this respect particularly Germany stands out as a market where 
historically a number of several players have been engaged along the value-chain, compared 
with monopoly-dominated Italy and France. This is especially evident in the downstream 
segment where there were about 700 different LDCs segmenting the German market while 
GdF with its import state monopoly and ENI’s Italgas alone accounted for 95% and 50% of 
local supplies at that time.1463 And while there were still around 400 LDCs in Germany in 
2002,1464 GdF in 2007 was still serving 95% of private consumers in France.1465 Moreover, 
more than 96% of public competitive bidding for new natural gas concessions had still been 
won by GdF in 2005,1466
                                                 
1460  Cf. DRI-WEFA (2001), pp. 81-82. 
 indicating the continuously strong position in its domestic market. 
Taking into account these figures, it can then be assumed that German players were much 
more accustomed to dealing with competitors, explaining why E.ON and RWE had become 
active right after liberalisation, while GdF, despite also having experienced threats from oil 
1461  Cf. E.ON (2001), p. 16. 
1462  Cf. Finon (2004), p. 215. 
1463  Cf. Chevalier (1992), p. 176; Estrada et al. (1995), pp. 98-102. 
1464  Cf. Finon (2004), p. 215. 
1465  Cf. GdF (2008a), p. 30. 
1466  Cf. GdF (2006), p. 66. 
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companies,1467
 
 was protected by its monopoly power – as was ENI, thus facing no direct 
competition and need to become active. 
 
8.2.1.3 Degree of Rivalry 
 
Still, in addition to the number of competitors in a market, their position relative to each other 
should be considered, too, in order to enhance explanatory power. In this respect especially 
E.ON and RWE serve as good examples as both were direct competitors to each other and 
have been analysed as case studies. In fact, their rivalling behaviour has also been described 
as ‘power play rivalry’ that “has pushed RWE and E.ON to the vanguard of European 
energy”1468. One prominent example is their internationalisation and diversification strategy. 
While RWE, notably due to the acquisition of Thames Water, was initially seen as the pioneer 
with its multi-utility approach, E.ON’s main focus on the energy market and in particular the 
take-over of Powergen in contrast were believed to be disadvantageous with E.ON having 
even been assessed as being in danger of turning into ‘acquisition prey’ itself.1469
 
 As was 
shown by case study analysis though these assessments did not turn out true. This finding, in 
addition to its contextual relevance, also supports the importance of adopting a long-term 
perspective for analysis and thus the methodological approach adopted here. 
In terms of corporate behaviour it was, in fact, the temporal perspective which revealed that it 
was E.ON that took the lead, leaving RWE behind as a ‘follower that envied its rival’, as 
similarly assessed by others.1470
                                                 
1467  Elf and Total had not only been interested in importing and transporting the gas from their global upstream 
production (cf. Estrada et al. (1988), pp. 122-123) but had even offered the French finance ministry to take 
control of GdF (cf. Chevalier (1992), p. 181). 
 At the same time, E.ON’s pioneering behaviour made its 
rivals life ‘more difficult’. The move of E.ON ‘voluntarily’ selling its electricity grid, for 
example, was judged as having put RWE at a loss to argue the necessity of ‘clinging to’ its 
1468  Anonymous (2003). 
1469  Cf. Anonymous (2001a); Student (2002), pp. 108-115; Flauger (2010a), p. 29. Also see the front cover of 
Finance magazine issue of September 2004. Cf. Finance (2004). 
1470  Cf. Flauger (2009d); Bozem (2007), p. 123. 
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grid against regulatory authorities, making it look like the ‘stubborn odd man out’.1471 In fact, 
RWE later copied E.ON’s move when it sold its gas grid to escape infringement by the EU 
commission (see above). Another example is E.ON’s tactic of bringing in powerful 
constituents, such as in the case of German Chancellor Schroeder. While this in media was 
judged as “a move that raised eyebrows across Europe”1472, it lead RWE to install Joschka 
Fischer, Germany’s former foreign minister, to promote the Nabucco pipeline project.1473 
This is another example of RWE’s imitating behaviour. Apart from explaining the companies’ 
individual behaviour, this type of ‘power play’ is likely to have contributed to the fact of both 
companies’ strategies and tactics becoming more similar over the course of time. This, 
amongst others, shows with regards to the renewables business where both, E.ON and RWE, 
were described as ‘investing noisily’1474, e.g. having set up specific subsidiaries (E.ON 
Climate & Renewables and RWE Innogy) with similar portfolios and investment volumes 
(see case study). Other examples include their publicly uttered scepticism regarding the 
feasibility and practicability of certain projects,1475 their escape to the U.K. to jointly build 
nuclear power plants,1476 or their tactic of ‘fighting back in Brussels and hiring the odd 
politician for support’1477
 
. 
 
8.2.1.4 New Entrants 
 
Another industry-related aspect that might have been beneficial for German companies is the 
early influence of international players such as from leading British companies which had 
entered German territory in 1825 even before natural gas found its way into the market.1478
                                                 
1471  Cf. Wildhagen (2009b), pp. 58-59; Flauger (2010a), p. 29. 
 
While this on the one hand presented a competitive threat to German companies such as RWE 
1472  Anonymous (2006h), p. 14. 
1473  Cf. RWE (2009b); Fechtner (2009); Student (2009), pp. 8-9. 
1474  Cf. Anonymous (2007h). 
1475  Cf. Seiwert et al. (2009), pp. 40-47. 
1476  Cf. Otzen (2007b), p. 14; Flauger/ Heilmann (2009a); Flauger/ Heilmann (2009b); Goffart (2009); Otzen 
(2009b), p. 4; Schürmann (2009a); Schürmann (2009b). 
1477  Cf. Anonymous (2007h). 
1478  Cf. Wehrmann (1958), pp. 30-38; Schulze-Berndt (1989), in particular pp. 83-100; Spreckelsen (2008), pp. 
72-73. 
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or VEW as E.ON’s predecessor, it on the other hand allowed them to gain valuable learning 
experience for dealing with foreign rivals today. Considering these arguments, ENI generally 
could have been expected to be more active, too. Although not as early and as dynamic as in 
Germany, there also were some important moves by foreign competitors in the Italian market. 
Examples include Spanish Gas Natural which, by acquiring two major Italian distributors, 
tried to reach its target of accessing 300,000 Italian customers, or Exxon-Mobil and Qatar 
Petroleum which started to jointly build an important LNG terminal in Italy,1479 thus 
threatening ENI’s domestic territory. In addition to this, switching rates were highest in Italy 
(around 30% compared with less than 10% in France or even 5% in Germany).1480
 
 This 
contributes to the explanation of ENI using its global upstream business to balance possible 
losses in the midstream business. The fact that other gas suppliers active in Italy were forced 
to buy their gas from ENI (see case study) again supports the finding of passive business 
activity in that ENI might not have felt the need to increase downstream sales due to its 
comfortable position. 
At the same time this helps to explain ENI’s active institutional behaviour of trying to fight 
regulatory measures in court (see case study) in form of a tactic to defend its business and 
thus market position. Here, the value of adopting an integrated perspective becomes apparent 
again. This is also supported by other legal procedures ENI pursued. When in 2002, for 
instance, authorities of the Sicilian Region introduced an environmental tax on pipeline 
owners in this region, Snam Rete Gas, in order to protect its interests, filed a claim with 
national authorities. These, although acknowledging the tax burden as an operating cost for 
TSOs, subjected the inclusion of the tax in tariffs. Until November 2002 the accrued 
payments for ENI, respectively Snam, had accumulated to a total of €97 million. ENI then 
filed a claim with the European Commission in this matter with the aim of opening a 
proceeding against Italian authorities. In December 2003, the European Commission ruled 
that the tax was contrary to European energy rules as well as to common custom tariffs as it 
modified the equality of customs expenses on commodities imported from third countries and 
                                                 
1479  Cf. Capgemini (2004), pp. 11-12. 
1480  Cf. Goerten/ Clement (2006), p. 6. 
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thus led to a distortion in access and a violation of competition rules.1481 In July 2004, the 
Commission formally requested to cancel the tax and comply within two months. As Italian 
authorities did not, the Commission passed the case to the Court of Justice which declared the 
tax illegitimate and arranged for the repayment. While the Sicilian Region presented recourse 
against this decision in April 2005, it was finally ruled that instalments had to be repaid to 
ENI two years later.1482 Apart from serving as an example for ENI’s active institutional 
behaviour, it also shows how ENI used institutional forces to its advantage. While this 
initially was not the case with regards to its business behaviour, this began to change as was 
shown in the case study. This development can also be clarified by the fact that ENI was 
facing a growing level of competition in domestic territories. By 2006, already 182 
independent companies were operating in the Italian market,1483
 
 a development which 
explains ENI’s need to become more pro-active. 
An increasing level of trading activities and competition can also be observed in the French 
market where new suppliers such as German E.ON and Verbundnetz Gas, Italian ENI, or the 
three Spanish companies Gas Natural, Iberdrola and Endesa Energia had entered.1484
                                                 
1481  Cf. ENI (2001c), pp. 57-58; ENI (2002a), pp. 31-32, 124-125; ENI (2003a), pp. 31-32. 
 GdF 
itself, for example, pointed out of facing more and more competitive threats from external 
players like Gazprom which in 2005 had already declared that it was aiming to take advantage 
of liberalisation to gain a market share of 10% in the French market, a statement it repeated 
again in 2008. In fact, by directly supplying large industrial customers in France and by 
looking for acquisition opportunities, Gazprom, despite claiming to see GdF as a key partner 
for its plans, turned from being a supplier to GdF to becoming a direct competitor. From this 
perspective, the move of becoming the major shareholder in Distrigaz Sud (see case study) 
can be characterised as a defensive tactic as this engagement allowed GdF to control a critical 
import route for Russian gas to Europe. In addition to this, competitive threats from Gazprom 
also emerged in the midstream segment because part of its expansion plans included the goal 
of becoming a leader in the global LNG business and consequently a rival to GdF here, too. 
As one tactic of defence GdF started to cooperate with Gazprom, such as by swapping a LNG 
1482  Cf. ENI (2005a), pp. 147-148. 
1483  Cf. IGU (2008), p. 24. 
1484  Cf. CRE (2009a), pp. 64-105; CRE (2009b), pp. 35-36. 
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cargo owned by a joint company of GdF and Sonatrach with gas delivered by Gazprom for 
sales on the French market.1485 Other indicators are GdF’s interest in participating in 
Gazprom’s NEGP project (also see E.ON case study),1486 or its enabling of Gazprom to 
become an equity partner in a new LNG terminal in North America.1487
 
 
Apart from the growing rivalry from traditional gas players GdF also increasingly became 
confronted with competitive threats from electricity companies. An example is domestic rival 
EdF whose CEO Gadonneix, delicately also the former head of GdF (see above) and thus 
knowing the company well, recently announced to significantly grow EdF in the gas business. 
By even aiming to make it the second main pillar of EdF’s business,1488 also EdF therefore 
developed towards becoming a dual-offer supplier and hence a direct competitor to the Group. 
In order to “limit EDF’s exploitation of the competitive head start it enjoys from brand 
confusion with Gaz de France”1489 and to clearly differentiate between both companies, GdF 
had installed a new logo that illustrates its gas activities as its core business.1490
 
 
In conclusion, similar to the cases mentioned above, the finding of converging behaviours and 
business models can be found here, too. Whether this also holds from an Institutional 
Perspective is analysed in the following section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1485  Cf. GdF (2008c), p. 14. 
1486  Cf. European Commission (2007l), p. 15. 
1487  Cf. Anonymous (2005g); De Monicault (2007); Anonymous (2008e). 
1488  Cf. Flauger (2007a). 
1489  GdF (2008a), p. 56. 
1490  Cf. GdF (2007), pp. 53-57; GdF (2008a), pp. 12, 53-57. 
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8.2.2  Institutional Environmental Drivers 
 
8.2.2.1 Regulatory Setting 
 
Having busted loose change (see chapter III), the impact of regulatory influences is looked at 
first. In this respect it should be considered that although energy policy changes were 
introduced on a supra-European level, the consideration of the subsidiarity principle had left 
room for “Institutional Diversity”1491 in that Member States in the beginning had some 
freedom in the interpretation and implementation of regulations. In the case of a “subsidiarity-
oriented European deregulation”1492, for example, governments initially had the freedom to 
choose between regulated and negotiated TPA (also see chapter III). As a consequence of 
such room for choice, the early European market resulted in “a series of juxtaposed and 
entrenched national markets”1493, each of which was characterised by a “strong national 
bias”1494. Similarly, based on the “national style argument”1495, Midttun developed a 
conceptual model of European market development and identified several approaches1496
 
 in 
order to explain differences in firm behaviour with regards to national politics. As the case 
studies looked at in this thesis all fall into the ‘Continental European Contestable Semi-
Integrated Market’ approach, a closer look must be taken at possible national differences in 
order to explain the results obtained above. How this has influenced the companies’ 
development is determined in the following paragraphs. 
                                                 
1491  Midttun et al. (2001), p. 375. 
1492  Midttun et al. (2001), p. 375. 
1493  Finon (2004), p. 187. 
1494  Arentsen (2004), p. 75. 
1495  Midttun/ Omland (2004), p. 290. The assessment of economic nationalism being strongest in France has also 
been pointed out elsewhere. Cf. Anonymous (2000a), p. 3. 
1496  These have been classified according to the degree of market opening along the horizontal axis and the 
geographical expansion along the vertical axis. Cf. Midttun (2001), p. 4. 
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Governmental Attitude towards Liberalisation 
 
A first prominent example is the difference in the degree of market opening. While Germany 
and Italy had fully opened their markets right from the beginning, France had only done so by 
20%, having ignored the required minimum level of 33% as long as possible, even accepting 
a fine by the EU Commission for non-compliance.1497 From this perspective, the statements of 
compliance with regulations depicted above as well as the claim by two organisational leaders 
of ‘GdF remaining pro-active’ (also see case study assessment) and continuing its “stratégie 
d’anticipation de l’évolution des marches européens”1498 can be seen as an attempt of window 
dressing, thus confirming the assessment of an underlying tendency of more active 
institutional behaviour. As a consequence of the belated market opening, GdF, under the 
argument of reciprocity, was not allowed entry into the territory of Member States who had 
opened their markets to a much larger extent. At the same time RWE and E.ON had already 
been “impatiently queuing up to enter the French market”1499 in 2001. In fact, while national 
market protectionist regulations as intended by the French government on the one hand 
protected GdF from increasing competition in its domestic territory, it on the other hand 
constrained the company from becoming active and taking advantage of entering other 
European markets.1500 GdF itself described the access to other European markets being 
“difficult due to the strong presence of historic market participants”1501. Fundamentally, the 
French energy sector has always been characterised by a high degree of state intervention,1502 
for some even serving as the ‘modèle d’excellence’1503 in terms of a “leading exponent of 
“economic nationalism””1504
                                                 
1497  France only opened its market in July 2004. 
 and a “typical example of government intervention in a market 
1498  Carrière/ Balard (2004), p. 519. To be translated as ‘strategy of anticipating the development of European 
markets’. Translation by author. 
1499  Anonymous (2001b). 
1500  Cf. Pederson (2001), pp. 194-195. 
1501  GdF (2006), p. 51. 
1502  When taking the size of state-owned companies in relation to GDP as a ratio, for instance, it is highest in 
France, and higher in Italy than in Germany. Cf. Anonymous (2007i), pp. 11-12; Anonymous (2007j). 
1503  Cf. Chevalier (2009), p. 48. 
1504  Anonymous (2006i). 
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economy”1505
 
. This, amongst others, also shows in the fact that by law the French state had to 
retain a stake of at least 70% in GdF (see case study). 
Additionally, due to the ‘principe de spécialité’ GdF was only allowed activity in the French 
gas sector, restricting it from engagement in the French electricity sector. This restriction was 
only changed in 2004.1506 While energy planning had been a priority State interest as early as 
the 1920s,1507 France’s current president Sarkozy still openly declared that ‘liberalisation 
existed to create national champions, not to destroy jobs’1508. Others addressed such 
arguments by French politicians as “an easy scapegoat for unpopular liberalisation”1509. 
Moreover, although the merger with GdF had already been discussed between the two CEO’s 
and the French ministry at the beginning of 2000, the government decided not to authorise it 
following substantial pressure by powerful trade unions1510 and massive public resistance 
against the necessary privatisation of GdF.1511 It was not until a hostile takeover bid by Italian 
Enel,1512 that the deal was finally permitted, even governmentally pushed through against 
ongoing public protests and internal boardroom discussions.1513 In comparison to such 
disputes and despite a 200-page strong document of objections created by the EU, the need to 
win the approval from EU authorities was regarded as a ‘walk in the park’. Support from 
other stakeholders could, in fact, only be gained after heavy lobbying work,1514 and by 
marketing the deal as a merger of equals which was crucial to secure European supplies and 
to jointly fend off Gazprom with its “l'appétit d'un monster”1515
                                                 
1505  Estrada et al. (1988), p. 117. Also cf. Brühl/ Oei (2006), p. 335. The French protectionist attitude against 
foreign take-overs was described by some as making even ‘yoghurt a strategic industry’ (cf. Anonymous 
(2005h)). 
. From an organisational 
1506  This has also been specifically pointed out by Finon et al. (2004), pp. 301-302. 
1507  Cf. Estrada et al. (1988), p. 117. 
1508  Cf. Anonymous (2004b). 
1509  Anonymous (1999b). Also cf. Anonymous (2005i); Anonymous (2006j); Mönninger (2006), p. 24. 
1510  Cf. Anonymous (2007k); Alich (2008a). 
1511  Cf. Beckmann (2007), pp. 4-5. 
1512  Apparently, this offer was triggered due to a ‘veteran French corporate advisor’ having persuaded Enel’s 
CEO to become engaged in the takeover of Suez instead of just bidding for Suez’s subsidiary Electrabel, 
arguing that it enabled Enel to increase in scale and by obtaining access to several nuclear power plants 
support Italy in reducing its CO2 emissions. Cf. Anonymous (2007k). 
1513  Cf. Alich (2006); Anonymous (2007l); Huet et al. (2007); Jeudy (2007); Ollier (2007); Thibault (2007). 
1514  Cf. Alich (2008b); Anonymous (2006k); Anonymous (2006l). 
1515  De Monicault (2007). 
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resource perspective, the merger enabled the realisation of synergies worth €1.1 billion.1516 
Thus, while governmental involvement had initially constrained market expansion, this move 
finally made it possible, characterising a governmentally orchestrated merger and “une belle 
victoire patriotique”1517, enabled by aggressive French energy politics and “a new president 
keen to remodel the French economy”1518. Moreover, having been created in Sarkozy’s 
‘palace d’Elysée’, it presented a “typically French solution”1519 with the French government 
keeping more than one third of ownership in the new GDF Suez, thereby making Mestrallet a 
‘tool’ of Sarkozy who in turn is seen as the ‘real’ CEO in the Elysée palace.1520
 
 As indicated 
in the case study, this holds as an explanation for the change of GdF’s behaviour from 2005 
on onwards. 
A similar explanation can be found in ENI’s case. While the Italian government did not get 
involved initially, this changed with E.ON’s takeover bid for Endesa. It not only made Italian 
Enel openly support Gas-Natural in its counter-bid after having claimed a few months before 
of not getting engaged in the ‘takeover battle’,1521 but the Italian government to create its own 
national energy giant by merging ENI with Enel. Romano Prodi, the candidate for presidency 
at that time, argued that this engagement was a crucial counterweight to other European 
national monopolies.1522 Since then, involvement by the Italian government has generally 
become stronger, president Berlusconi even aiming to become a central figure in the 
international energy business and support ENI in its market expansion as was mentioned with 
regards to ENI’s and Gazprom’s cooperations.1523
 
 As in the case of GdF this therefore 
supports the observation of ENI’s recently increased business development activity. 
                                                 
1516  Cf. Anonymous (2006k); Mestrallet (2007); Ollier (2007). 
1517  Anonymous (2007m). 
1518  Carson (2007). 
1519  Anonymous (2007n). 
1520  Cf. Anonymous (2006l); Alich (2007), p. 19; Anonymous (2007j); Anonymous (2007n); Beckmann (2007), 
p. 5; Meier/ Ruch (2008), p. 3; Nikionok-Ehrlich (2008), p. 4. This had required a change of the law 
dictating a minimum of 70% of state ownership (see above). Cf. Brühl/ Oei (2006), p. 335. At the same time 
the Socialist candidate for upcoming elections at that time, Ségolène Royal, declared to renationalise GdF 
when being elected. Cf. Anonymous (2006m). 
1521  Cf. Flauger et al. (2006), p. 14. 
1522  Cf. Wörmann (2006), p. 15. 
1523  Cf. Anonymous (2007o); Jung/ Kaffsack (2009). 
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In Germany, in contrast, state engagement has generally been seen rather critically,1524 thus 
leaving more room for pro-active corporate development. At the same time, the German 
market also has historically been characterised by a high degree of municipal engagement 
which in fact turned out “to be one of the most stubborn obstacles to European 
liberalisation”1525 and particularly hindered RWE’s expansion. Moreover, the German 
government had become involved in ‘questions of national interest’, too, such as in the case 
of E.ON’s takeover of Ruhrgas which only became possible due to the overruling by the 
German Ministry of Economics and Technology where E.ON had filed for ministerial 
approval, as the FCO and other authorities had rejected the deal.1526
 
  
 
Governmental Attitude towards Sustainability 
 
In addition to the factors just depicted, national differences must also be taken into account 
with regards to sustainability issues. While emission reduction requirements as well as the 
current and future share of renewables in electricity generation were roughly the same in all 
three countries,1527 Germany was special in that it had established regulatory measures such 
as a renewables energy law or special grid access orders which guaranteed preferential 
treatment to renewables, such as in the case of transportation requests feeding in gas from 
biomass.1528
                                                 
1524  As, for instance, stated by the director of the energy department of the federal ministry for trade and 
technology: “Liberalisation in Germany currently means that we are nationalising the private energy industry 
again, only this time it is not the German state that acts as the owner” (Immenga et al. (2003), p. 44). 
Translation by author. 
 Again, it was especially E.ON which took advantage to extend its activities in 
this field, while RWE behaved more passively and only recently increased engagement as 
1525  Heren (1999), p. 6. 
1526  The Ministry had granted permission on the account that the merger would support the company in 
competing internationally and securing access to supplies, thus being in the interest of the general public (cf. 
Monopolkommission (2002)), as had been used as an argument by E.ON (see above). This approval was 
criticised as ‘one of the most controversial mergers in German economic history’ (cf. ZEW (2003), pp. I-II) 
as it would turn the German market into a duopoly where E.ON and RWE would have market-closing 
dominance (cf. Anonymous (2002a); Anonymous (2002b); Mez (2002); Schwintowski (2002)). 
1527  Emission reduction (characterising the necessary reduction until 2020 compared with 2005 level): 4% in 
Germany and France, 13% in Italy; current share of renewables in electricity generation: 15% in Germany, 
13% in France and 14% in Italy; future share: 17, 18 and 23% in Italy, Germany and France, respectively. 
Cf. Eurostat database (2010). 
1528  Cf. Bundesnetzagentur (2006), p. 125. 
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shown in the case studies. Italy and France, in contrast, initially had not implemented such 
strict laws. Hence, ENI and GDF SUEZ were not required to become active, a finding which 
supports the passive behaviour determined in the case study. In France, this has begun to 
change though as a new environmental law supporting the development of renewables and 
efficiency measures was passed following the increasing pressures from EU regulations.1529
 
 
Taking this into account helps to explain GDF SUEZ’ increasing degree of institutional 
behaviour as revealed in case study research. 
Essentially, the above has disclosed the existence of several national differences in the 
beginning of European Energy Policy changes. When furthermore accounting for a temporal 
dimension, it becomes apparent that these dissolved over the course time as energy policy 
regulations have become mandatory at EU level, leaving no space for national divergences 
anymore. This also holds true with regards to other structures, such as the development of 
electricity generation from renewable energy sources which by now is financially supported 
in all three countries.1530
 
 As a consequence, companies are facing the same regulatory 
framework in this respect. This, too, supports the finding of a development towards 
converging behaviours. 
 
8.2.2.2 Normative and Cultural-Cognitive Situation 
 
Another factor to be considered from the institutional environment are normative forces, such 
as those exerted from authorities or ‘society at large’ (see chapter III). These have been 
particularly prevalent in France, showing in form of a general public attitude of believing in 
and supporting economic patriotism (also see above). This, for instance, becomes apparent in 
the fact that “French people see the market as a jungle to be feared if it cannot first be tamed 
by the state”1531
                                                 
1529  Cf. Nikionok-Ehrlich (2010), p. 5. 
, and is reflected in a general preference for protected markets, for vertically 
integrated companies, and in an underlying attitude described as “who cares what the 
1530  Cf. PWC (2009a), pp. 48-51, 62-63. 
1531  Anonymous (2001c). 
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European Commission thinks”1532. That such normative forces did impact GdF’s behaviour 
can also be derived from the fact that in 2006 heavy suburbial riots had prevented it from 
increasing prices during cold weather in fear of new unrest.1533 At the same time, GdF had 
taken advantage of such an attitude itself by having initiated massive protests against cost 
reduction measures.1534 Recently, similar developments could be observed in Germany and 
Italy, too. In Germany, the growing public resistance against many sources of energy 
production has been described as a situation where ‘everything that produces electricity is not 
welcome anymore’1535. Even more, the majority of the Germans would in fact currently opt 
for a partial nationalisation of energy companies. German politicians, again, have used the 
bad public image of energy companies to improve their political standing.1536 This then helps 
to explain E.ON’s and RWE’s attempts to gain legitimacy, pro-actively as in the case of 
E.ON, or because of having been forced to by these developments as in the case of RWE. In 
Italy, too, an increasing local resistance to large-scale projects such as building pipelines or 
LNG facilities can be observed, already having forced Italian Enel to set up a deal with GdF 
in order to be able to supply the Italian market.1537
 
  
Furthermore, apart from clarifying individual case study findings, the impact of these 
influences also helps to explain the detected development towards converging behaviours. 
Still, while all of the above factors do provide some explanatory insights, they have not been 
able to explain all of the developments observed in the case studies. As pointed out as 
relevant in both streams of theory, organisational characteristics must also be considered as is 
done in the following section. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1532  Anonymous (2001c). As another indication of this attitude may hold the fact that two years after the first 
directive had been passed it was not officially translated into French law. Cf. DRI-WEFA (2001), p. 6. 
1533  Cf. Anonymous (2006b), p. 4. 
1534  Cf. Berschens (2007b). 
1535  Cf. Anonymous (2005f), p. 16; Augter (2008), pp. 23-26; Grosse-Halbuer/ Wildhagen (2008), p. 27; Ruch 
(2008); Flauger/ Stratmann (2009a). 
1536  Cf. Flauger (2009b). 
1537  Cf. Jensen (2003), pp. 31, 35-36. 
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8.2.3  Internal Environment – Organisational Drivers 
 
8.2.3.1 Corporate History 
 
Founded in 1898 as the first energy monopoly in the German Reich following the 
advancements made with regards to the invention of electricity, RWE not only is the oldest of 
the four companies but also the one with the largest historical heritage, having pioneered 
important developments in the energy industry which amongst others also granted it a 
monopoly position in Germany for some time. Being able to look back on a more than 100-
year old company history and having already faced many different changes in its 
organisational environment, it could gain experience that is likely to have been beneficial in 
more recent times, too, such as dealing with strict energy policy laws, building networks and 
relationships with stakeholders or cross-border cooperations with other energy providers.1538 
At the same time and as pointed out in the theoretical analysis, it must be considered that 
experiences from the past may also constrain development. RWE’s reluctance to build gas-
fired power plants, for instance, was related to the fact that its memory of a doubling Dutch 
gas price in 1980 was “still haunting”1539
 
 it. 
Also E.ON, despite having only been founded in 2000, can be classified similarly, following 
its origin from the merger of VEBA, which also was the single largest shareholder of RAG 
which later became Ruhrgas, and VIAG as two traditional German conglomerates founded in 
the 1920s. Moreover, VIAG and VEBA, through their subsidiaries not only represented two 
of the largest vertically integrated energy companies in Germany, but had made similar 
learning experiences as RWE over the course of time. At the same time the development of 
RWE, VIAG and VEBA has been related in that they not only were competitors but also held 
shares in each other’s businesses. These, in fact, still exist today and have recently become 
subject to political pressures.1540
                                                 
1538  For a detailed depiction of the 100-year old history of RWE cf. Schweer/ Thieme (1998). 
 In addition to this did E.ON after the acquisition of Ruhrgas 
1539  DRI-WEFA (2001), p. 64. 
1540  Cf. Mechnig (2008), p. 167. For a detailed overview over VIAG’s historical development and its relationship 
with RWE cf. Pohl (1998). For examples of existing interconnections cf. Chevalier (1992), p. 180; Zimmer 
et al. (2007), pp. 46-47. 
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benefit from its experience in the gas market and its connections within, such as the long-
established sourcing relationship with Russian Gazprom with whom deliveries from deposits 
as far away as Siberia have been upheld since the start of supply in 1973.1541 Even more, in 
1998 the majority of those contracts was extended until 2020 and Ruhrgas was the first 
Western company allowed to obtain a stake in OAO Gazprom. Other examples of Ruhrgas 
having benefited E.ON include the signing of a MoU with Gazprom for taking a share in a 
Norwegian production field and the engagement in the construction of the NEGP.1542 To be 
evaluated as similarly crucial is Ruhrgas’ early engagement in business areas like 
methanhydrat production or the founding of an initiative to promote the fuel cell as possible 
business extensions (also see chapters II and III).1543 Apart from this E.ON (including 
Ruhrgas)1544
 
 and RWE, are publicly listed companies, a fact which has generally granted 
them more operational freedom than would have been the case under governmental 
ownership. 
In these two cases such historical ties and ownership structures are likely to have benefited 
both companies in terms of a well-founded and broad starting position compared with that of 
GdF and ENI which, founded in 1946 and 1953, are relatively young enterprises in 
comparison. Another characteristic of ENI and GdF is that both were created and owned by 
the government. While Midttun and Omland in their analysis on the energy sector found that 
neither public nor private ownership were related to organisational structure or 
performance,1545 corporate behaviour generally can still be expected to be influenced by such 
characteristics. It has, for instance, been shown that capital markets have reacted cautiously 
regarding too much political influence on entrepreneurial freedom.1546 The impact of 
corporate ownership becomes particularly obvious in GdF’s case which only had an 
obligation to earn an adequate, not maximum, return on investment.1547
                                                 
1541  This contract had already been signed in 1970 with Sojuzgaexport (which was later integrated into Gazprom) 
and was special in so far that Sojuzgaexport supplied Ruhrgas with natural gas as part of payment for 
pipelines ‘bought’ from Mannesmann. Cf. Ruhrgas (2005), pp. 36-37. 
 Although ENI was 
1542  Cf. E.ON (2004); E.ON Ruhrgas (2009). 
1543  Cf. Ruhrgas (2003). 
1544  Cf. Radetzki (1999), p. 18; Oostvoorn/ Boots (1999), p. 7. 
1545  Cf. Midttun/ Omland (2004), pp. 293, 295. 
1546  Cf. Anonymous (2006n). 
1547  Cf. Radetzki (1999), p. 19. 
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also established as a state-owned company (see case study), the Italian government remained 
a relatively passive owner in that issues were “resolved within the ENI ‘family’ anyhow”1548. 
GdF again, established as the central organ of the market,1549 had already been made a 
political tool early (also see above) in that it was forced to account for sensitive counter-trade 
arrangements and was used as a ‘scapegoat’ in the political scenery.1550
connaître
 That this did constrain 
its development, showing as the passive development determined in the case study, can be 
derived from examples which indicate that it possessed the potential for much more active 
behaviour early on. One example is its early institutional orientation, e.g. showing in 
statements from 1986 when it had already claimed of wanting to ‘better get to know its 
institutional agents’ (“Le Gaz de France s’efforce de mieux faire  et de renforcer son 
image auprès de ses agents, des ses clients, des décideurs, des organismes socio-économiques, 
des établissements d’enseignement et des médias.”1551). Only shortly after, this was 
supplemented by ecologically-related activities, such as sponsoring a ‘Company and 
Environment’ contest, creating a Media prize called ‘Industry and Environment’ in 1987/88, 
and nominating its CEO as the Vice-President of the French Committee for Environment in 
1992. In addition to these institutional measures, the notion of making “the public and 
industrial customers aware of the possibility, notably for natural gas, to reconcile the 
requirements of modern life and environmental protection”1552 also reveals an early 
orientation towards the market as GdF was looking to promote the utilisation of natural gas in 
a country that had mainly relied on nuclear power (see above). Moreover, GdF back then had 
already pointed out of following an “outward-looking policy”1553 with regards to its 
international business development. More recently though GdF still uttered concern in its 
Annual Reports, saying that the remaining governmental stake after privatisation might limit 
its internationalisation goals.1554
 
 
                                                 
1548  Estrada et al. (1988), p. 257. 
1549  Cf. Körting (1963), pp. 564-565. 
1550  Cf. Estrada et al. (1988), p. 252. 
1551  GdF (1987), p. 15. 
1552  GdF (1989), p. 17. Italicised by author. 
1553  GdF (1989), p. 28. 
1554  Cf. GdF (2006), p. 17; GdF (2007), pp. 13-14; GdF (2008a), p. 13. 
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On the other hand, state ownership also benefited GdF in that it enabled it to early gain 
experience. An example is the LNG business where the first contract with Sonatrach had been 
orchestrated by the French and Algerian government (also see chapter II). This was soon 
followed by contracts with Dutch Gasunie as well as with Russian, Norwegian and Nigerian 
companies.1555 In fact, this could have been used by GdF as an institutional tactic to promote 
the support of European security of supply. Moreover, while governmental ownership had 
already enabled its rival EdF to go on an “acquisition spree around Europe”1556, it also 
benefited GdF with regards to the SUEZ merger mentioned above to become one of Europe’s 
largest gas companies in terms of assets, pipeline length and employees.1557 With regards to 
future development, however, government ownership may become a constraint again. While 
even the French public has begun to criticise the French government for only being interested 
in its own political advantage and not for creating value,1558 it in particular has not been well 
received by investors who, for instance, criticised SUEZ of having ‘landed in bed with the 
government’ after the merger with GdF.1559
 
 
 
8.2.3.2 Tangible Resources 
 
Financial Assets 
 
In addition to the issues just mentioned, company ownership also turned out to be an 
important constraining factor with regards to financial assets, a critical success factor 
specifically in the capital intensive gas industry, as the following comparison between the 
cases reveals. Here, it especially shows that GdF’s advancement was constrained because the 
French state did not possess sufficient financial resources to fund its development.1560
                                                 
1555  Cf. Sauvage (2008), p. 27. 
 This 
only began to change when the French government decided to make GdF a limited liability 
company (société anonyme (SA)) at the end of 2004 with the first listing of shares (IPO) 
1556  Bonardi (2004), p. 102. 
1557  Cf. Estrada et al. (1995), pp. 98-99. 
1558  Cf. Anonymous (2007p); Anonymous (2007q); Berschens (2007b); Pfaff (2008). 
1559  Cf. Anonymous (2007p). 
1560  Cf. Anonymous (2000b), p. 4; Pederson (2001), p. 191; Finon et al. (2004), p. 338. 
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taking place in July 2005.1561 To do so, a new law on the governance of the energy sector was 
established in December 2006. This enabled the privatisation of GdF if the French state kept a 
minimum ownership of one third of the company’s capital. The Conseil Constitutionnel 
decided that a transfer to the private sector would effectively be possible as of July 2007.1562 
Remaining obliged to having to provide public services, GdF contracted with the French state 
for a period between 2005 and 2007 to make available stable and secure supplies, adhere to 
tariff developments, protect the environment and engage in R&D activities. Despite these 
obligations this step enabled the company to open up around 30% of its capital to private and 
international investors1563 which in fact provided the basis for expansion as revealed in case 
study research, when GdF’s business behaviour showed a larger degree towards more active 
development. This became even more pronounced after the merger with SUEZ which 
significantly increased GdF’s financial ‘firepower’1564. The fact that it was able to calculate 
with net capital expenditures of €30 billion for the three-year period 2008-2010 to finance its 
expansion,1565 supports the finding of the criticality of the merger with SUEZ. The importance 
of organisational ownership and of possessing sufficient financial resources for development 
also becomes apparent with regards to the acquisition of SWL (see case study) which was 
evaluated as an “excellent offer”1566 by SWL’s CEO and by analysts as a ‘strategic price’1567
 
, 
something GdF would not have been able to pay under the previous ownership structure and 
resource situation. 
E.ON and RWE, in contrast, apart from their largely private ownership having provided more 
room for entrepreneurial activity as indicated above, also benefited from the access provided 
thereby to financial resources. In this respect, it has been pointed out that E.ON’s success was 
fuelled by its large ‘war chest’, i.e. financial resources, which have not only been valued as 
the industry’s benchmark but even as the ‘measure of all things’1568
                                                 
1561  Cf. GdF (2008a), pp. 23-24. For information on the IPO cf. GdF (2007), p. 298. 
. This not only enabled its 
early international expansion, including the planned €29 billion cash take-over of Endesa, but 
1562  Cf. GdF (2007), p. 32. 
1563  Cf. GdF (2005), p. 6. 
1564  Cf. Wildhagen et al. (2007), p. 74. 
1565  Cf. GDF SUEZ (2009d), p. 29. 
1566  Schroeter (2007c), p. 5. Translation by author. 
1567  Cf. Flauger (2007b), p. 15. Translation by author. 
1568  Cf. Wildhagen et al. (2007), p. 74. Translation by author. 
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also to bear a €2.4 billion write-off of Powergen’s value. Moreover, despite the recent 
financial crisis E.ON has been able to extend its credit line, having €12.5 billion at its 
disposal.1569 ENI again, as shown not to have been constrained by the government’s 
ownership stake benefited from relatively high margins and income in the upstream 
segment,1570
 
 thus explaining the development observed. 
Apart from financial resources and according to theoretical insights, there are likely to have 
also been other corporate resources which have influenced development. Essential ones are a 
company’s tangible assets such as gas resources, pipelines, storage sites, LNG terminals, and 
power plants. While a detailed comparison of every asset goes beyond the scope of this thesis, 
only the major ones are determined in order to further enhance analysis. 
 
 
Value-Chain Assets 
 
In this respect GdF and ENI can be said to have started off from an advantageous position due 
to their vertical ownership of activities along the gas value-chain. Here, particularly upstream 
and midstream resources played an important role. ENI’s SNAM, for example, not only 
possessed the domestic grid but also participated in the building and financing of import 
pipelines to secure Italian gas supply. In addition to this it had gained experience with 
national and foreign rivals such as Edison, a private Italian electricity producer, gained 
ownership over some domestic gas fields in 1992, and three years later even established a JV 
with Gazprom to build a pipeline to transport Russian gas to its power plants in order to 
bypass SNAM, even considering the latter to become a possible customer of this gas as well. 
Gazprom in fact was so keen to expand its market share that it was willing to abstain from its 
exclusive supply relationship with SNAM.1571 Through its take-over of Distrigaz ENI had 
also become the owner of the Belgium gas infrastructure system and had gained access to 
essential electricity infrastructure strategically well positioned in central Europe.1572
                                                 
1569  See financial figures in respective Annual Reports. 
 
1570  See Annual Reports. 
1571 This pipeline was never established though. Cf. Radetzki (1999), pp. 21-22. 
1572  Cf. Estrada et al. (1995), pp. 104-105. 
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Furthermore, its global upstream engagement allowed ENI to participate in environmental 
protection initiatives such as zero gas flaring directly on-site (see case study). 
 
The same advantageous position can be found in the case of GdF as the owner of the majority 
of gas infrastructure in France, if not directly as in the South and West of France, then via 
majority ownership in regional distribution companies.1573 By now it is the proprietor of the 
longest transmission and distribution grid in Europe as well as of the second largest storage 
capacities. And, as already mentioned above, GdF also had a well established LNG business, 
being owner of major terminals and having become the second-largest importing nation in 
Europe after Spain. Of particular relevance for this development again was the merger with 
SUEZ which, despite having had to dispose of its 57.25% stake in the Belgium distributor 
Distrigaz in order for the merger to be authorised, contributed essential resources. Amongst 
these were several gas and electricity assets located around the world, such as a compound of 
E&P assets in the U.K., the Gulf of Mexico, Egypt, and Indonesia. In Italy, it had obtained 
regional distribution grids, two 20-year long supply contracts for the provision of natural gas 
within Italy and of LNG in the Gulf of Mexico. In addition to this, it had exchanged 
significant power generation capacity with E.ON (also see E.ON case study) in Belgium and 
the Netherlands for engaging in the German market. Furthermore, GdF also benefited from 
SUEZ’ strong position in the environmental business, despite the EU Commission’s sanction 
of having to spin off 65% of SUEZ Environment for allowing the merger.1574 In fact, the 
‘incorporation’ of SUEZ can be said to have fundamentally balanced and strengthened GdF’s 
presence in core European markets without having had to make major cash expenses. This 
allowed GdF to transform “a double constraint into a dual opportunity for expansion 
consistent with our strategic vision and efforts to maintain a strong balance sheet”1575
 
, as 
recently formulated by the Group itself.  
In comparison to this RWE and E.ON can be assessed as having started from a 
disadvantageous position as they did not possess assets such as storage sites, LNG facilities or 
                                                 
1573  Cf. Estrada et al. (1988), p. 122; Estrada et al. (1995), p. 99. 
1574  Cf. Suez (2008c), pp. 33, 218; GDF SUEZ (2009a), pp. 60, 368; GDF SUEZ (2009d), pp. 4-7, 22-23; Suez 
(2008a); Suez (2008b). 
1575  GDF SUEZ (2009d), p. 7. 
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major pipelines. This was particularly prevalent in the case of E.ON – and its successors 
VEBA and VIAG. At the same time though VEBA and VIAG had already early taken 
advantage of market opening by acquiring customers outside their traditional demarcation 
area by acquiring long-established domestic local and regional suppliers with substantial 
experience in the gas market as well as engaging in generation or supply activities in foreign 
neighbouring markets in order to compensate for declining electricity sales after 
liberalisation.1576 Even more critical for E.ON’s pro-active development in this respect was 
the acquisition of Ruhrgas.1577 Ruhrgas was not only a major TSO but through its ownership 
of the largest and strategically best positioned transmission grid had actually become 
Germany’s main importer and wholesale supplier of natural gas over the course of time, 
controlling and dominating all major flows within the country. In addition to this, Ruhrgas 
had in the past not only managed gas purchases from foreign suppliers for other German 
companies, but also had lead the Continental consortium – including GdF, Distrigaz and 
Gasunie – in buying gas from Norway, thereby taking a leadership position early on.1578 
Ruhrgas was also pointed out as having been the first company in Europe to realise the great 
importance of underground storage,1579 a fact which was later explicitly emphasised by E.ON 
after the take-over.1580 Likewise, Ruhrgas also successfully acquired ownership stakes in 40 
companies across 12 countries.1581 In this respect especially its 49%-acquisition of the 
Slovakian gas monopolist SPP has been assessed as a ‘good catch’ due to SPP’s bottleneck 
position for gas flows from Russia to Western Europe and the exertion of pressure this take-
over put on RWE.1582
 
  
                                                 
1576  Cf. VEBA (1998); VEBA (1999); VEBA (2000); VIAG (2000). 
1577  Founded as a public company for Coal Recovery in 1926, ‘Ruhrgas AG’ had originally been established as a 
long-distance supply company in 1928 to transport the gas produced in coal mines and gas works to places 
of consumption through which it had also become the owner of major German gas supply infrastructure. 
With the entrance of natural gas in the European market, Ruhrgas developed to become an importer and 
long-distance transporter of natural gas and the major owner over critical import pipelines which, due to the 
central location of Germany within Europe, also were crucial to overall Continental European gas trade. 
Examples include the Trans Europe Natural Gas Pipeline (TENP), Deutsche Erdgas-Transport-Gesellschaft 
(DETG) or Mittel-Europäische Gasleitungsgesellschaft (MEGAL). Cf. Körting (1963), pp. 565-582; 
Schreiter (1965), pp. 96-108. 
1578  Cf. Estrada et al. (1988), pp. 107-108, 252; Stern (1998), p. 12. 
1579  Cf. Körting (1963), pp. 495, 565-582, 591; Schreiter (1965), pp. 96-98. 
1580  Cf. E.ON (2004), pp. 92-97, 209. 
1581  Cf. Mez (2002). 
1582  Cf. Weidemann (2002). 
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Apart from the analysis of tangible resources also intangible ones have to be looked at in 
order to provide comprehensive explanations. This will be done in the following. 
 
 
8.2.3.3 Intangible Resources 
 
The analysis of intangible resources is further divided into the following factors: 
 
► Human Resources 
► Organisational Leadership, as represented by the organisations’ CEOs 
► Environmental Perception and Goal Formulation  
► Strategic Focus and Corporate Vision  
 
While the first factor provides an introductory and more quantitative analysis, the following 
provide qualitative explanations, as determined as essential in the analysis above. 
 
 
Human Resources 
 
Here, the development of a company’s workforce is drawn upon to allow for a quantitative 
analysis. This has been done for all four cases. As can be seen in the figure below, the 
development of ENI’s and GdF’s number of employees has remained relatively stable over 
the course of time with only a slight increase towards the end, supporting the finding of 
passive business development as no new fields were opened up or businesses acquired. An 
exception again is the development after the merger of GdF and SUEZ which shows as a 
steep rise in the figure. A different course can again be seen in the case of E.ON and RWE 
where in both cases figures have steeply declined, more so in the case of E.ON than of 
RWE’s. This can be explained by the fact that E.ON more rapidly and drastically divested 
certain businesses while developing with fewer employees. In addition to its efficiency 
strategy (see case study), E.ON became leaner and thus able to faster pursue pro-active 
strategies to finally take a leading position as revealed above. What can also be seen from the 
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figure below is the slight increase in its employee numbers since 2003, following the takeover 
of Ruhrgas. In 2005, E.ON even overtook RWE, resulting in a difference of 27,600 people in 
2008. Recently though, this spread has been reduced by about half again, resulting in a close-
up of E.ON and RWE, but also ENI, supporting the finding of converging organisational 
structures. A similar development can be expected to take place in the case of GDF SUEZ 
which currently has nearly more than three times more employees than its competitors. Along 
with increasing competition it is likely that also GDF SUEZ will be forced to reduce its 
number of employees in order to remain competitive. 
 
Figure 31:1583
 
 Comparison of the development of the number of employees 
 
 
 
Organisational Leadership - CEO 
 
Looking at E.ON first it shows that its active development is likely to have been driven by the 
strategic initiative of the two CEOs of VEBA and VIAG who, already before the merger, had 
pointed out the opportunities arising from the changing environment and the importance of 
                                                 
1583  Own figure based on data from companies’ Annual Reports. 
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becoming active in the gas business.1584 The CEO of VEBA, for example, who later became 
E.ON’s first leader, not only stated his determination of opposing constraining influences, but 
of granting stakeholders priority over political consensus and, if necessary, by legal 
dispute.1585 A similar determination can be found in the case of Bernotat, E.ON’s second 
CEO, who was guided by the personal conviction “that commercial initiatives are always 
preferable to anti-market intervention”1586 and that the growing regulatory influence was a 
serious infringement to corporate rights which “we can’t allow”1587. Beneficial for E.ON’s 
pro-active business development is also likely to have been Bernotat’s aim to double the stock 
quotation.1588 Moreover, he was also praised for paying appropriate prices for acquisition 
objects as well as for its foresight of not getting further involved in a legal battle after the 
defeat in the Endesa take-over, a measure which is believed to have otherwise distracted 
E.ON’s development.1589 In fact, Bernotat was judged as having “turned what had developed 
into a very messy situation into a semi-victory”1590 for E.ON. Even more, through statements 
made in relevant public press1591 he challenged and attacked authorities, stating, for instance, 
that ‘issues did not lie with Russia’ but that instead “the real threat was coming from the 
European Commission”1592. With regards to the threat of ownership unbundling again, he 
claimed that he was “pretty sure unbundling is not coming”1593 as “such processes in Brussels 
take time especially if important member states such as France and Germany are against 
it”1594. Thereby he at the same time belittled authorities and provocatively dismissed the 
threat of ownership unbundling which in any case “would not kill Eon”1595
 
. 
Over the course of time, and under increasing pressure from the European Commission, 
Bernotat decided to take the lead before institutional actors did and sell E.ON’s electricity 
                                                 
1584  Cf. VIAG (2000), p. 11. Interview published in VIAG’s Annual Report. 
1585  Cf. VEBA (1999), pp. 9-10; VEBA (2000), pp. 11, 39. 
1586  E.ON (2007), p. 5. 
1587  E.ON (2007), p. 5. 
1588  Cf. Reischauer (2005), p. 48. 
1589  Cf. Flauger (2006), p. 16. 
1590  Anonymous (2007r). 
1591  This is specifically mentioned as a valid source also pointed out in the methodology chapter. 
1592  Milne et al. (2007). 
1593  Milne et al. (2007). 
1594  Milne et al. (2007). 
1595  Milne et al. (2007). 
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grid, a move that by observers was assessed as a ‘surprising u-turn’, especially as Bernotat 
continued ‘fighting with Brussels’.1596 Recently, Bernotat also openly attacked the prevailing 
situation in France and the market dominance of GdF whose CEO thereupon admitted that ‘in 
no other Western country a gas company was controlling more than 65% of the market’, a 
statement which in consequence initiated an investigation by the EU Commission.1597 The 
tactic of rhetorical attacks was also applied by Ruhrgas’ CEO Reutersberg who attacked 
increasing regulatory measures as “poison pills”1598 and threatened that these would severely 
endanger the willingness to invest and innovate, and as a final consequence security of 
supply. He backed his accusations by referring to assessments of well-known industry 
experts.1599 National governments again were openly accused of ‘siphoning off the dividend 
of deregulation’ and of not considering that E.ON had to abide by the rules of international 
capital markets instead of German public law.1600 At the same time statements can be found 
where Bernotat pointed out the need of not only having to consider the demands of capital 
markets but of all stakeholders,1601 thus including institutional actors. Similar attempts of 
manipulation can be derived from claims by other E.ON leaders, such as “despite all rumours 
to the contrary at the announcement by the relevant authorities, competition on the German 
market is in full swing”1602, or, with regards to the issues of supply security and sustainability, 
that E.ON was already doing more than “any other European energy company”1603 to enhance 
security of supply. Likewise, Bernotat tried to curry favour by arguing that climate policy was 
‘important to him personally’1604, while at the same time stating in media that it depended on 
the public will whether E.ON would build new power plants. Moreover, he also generally 
attacked European energy policy by declaring that it had degenerated to a “wallflower of 
energy and climate politics”1605
 
. 
                                                 
1596  Cf. Anonymous (2008f). 
1597  Cf. Alich/ Flauger (2009a). 
1598  Reutersberg (2008), p. 9. 
1599  Cf. E.ON Ruhrgas (2009), p. 12; Reutersberg (2008), p. 10. 
1600  Cf. Wildhagen (2007), pp. 82-83. Translation by author. 
1601  Cf. Bernotat (2007), p. 2. 
1602  Deters (2009), p. 1. 
1603  E.ON (2007), p. 5. 
1604  Cf. E.ON (2008), p. 7. 
1605  Schürmann (2008), p. B03. Translation by author. 
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Apart from these rather aggressive tactics E.ON’s development was also influenced by the 
CEOs’ utilisation of more ‘appropriate’ tactics when required, such as admitting that 
“initially, we probably didn’t react with enough sensitivity”1606 when facing increasing public 
opposition. Also the depiction by media of Bernotat as the ‘foreign minister for politics and 
publicity’1607 supports this assessment. Particularly recently the application of such 
cooperative institutional tactics could be observed. Being “a bit worried that we see signs of 
re-regulation and renationalisation of the market”1608 and that the energy industry was facing 
an ‘image crisis’ Bernotat called attention to the importance of implementing a broad and 
inclusive as well as objective and honest energy-policy dialogue. He proposed to bring 
together policymakers and the public with the energy industry, believing that trust of 
policymakers and the public was key to continuously operating successfully and creating 
value.1609 This change towards cooperative behaviour also shows in the fact that the EU 
Commission was ‘suddenly’ seen as “our ally”.1610 Ruhrgas’ leader Reutersberg again, 
characterised as a fast and aggressive leader with high professional experience,1611 instead of 
attacking, openly appealed to Brussels and Berlin for supporting projects ‘not only for reasons 
of rationality but also with passion’1612. Support for this assessment can also be found in 
secondary literature where it has been stated that, when favourable for the company, Bernotat 
was aiming to create ‘equality of arms’ and of not seeing governmental tailwind as the ‘work 
of the devil’ anymore, but as a useful tool to increase overall success of the company. In the 
media, the realisation that cooperation with the state can yield benefits has been evaluated as 
Bernotat’s ‘instinct’.1613
                                                 
1606  E.ON (2005), p. 7. 
 Another important ability in driving E.ON’s active development is 
likely to have been the utilisation of institutional issues to gain legitimacy for enhancing 
overall business expansion. Examples include using the argument of supply security to justify 
the acquisition of Ruhrgas, claiming that “only large, financially robust energy companies that 
operate along the entire value chain have the ability to ensure that we maintain today’s high 
1607  Cf. Flauger (2009e); Flauger (2010b), pp. 62-63. 
1608  Milne et al. (2007). Also cf. E.ON (2008), p. 6. 
1609  Cf. E.ON (2008), pp. 6-7, 66. 
1610  Wildhagen (2007), p. 83. 
1611  Cf. Wildhagen (2008a). 
1612  Cf. Reutersberg (2008), p. 11. 
1613  Cf. Wildhagen (2007), pp. 83-84. 
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energy supply standards over the long term”1614, or, with regards to price increases, pointing 
out that “we can’t ignore the fact that (…) security of supply will have an increasingly higher 
price tag”1615. Also the argument of ‘a deep commitment to sustainability’ was used early to 
promote business activities.1616 Generally, Bernotat has been judged as a strong leader and, in 
relation to the positive development of the E.ON share, as the ‘darling’ of shareholders.1617
 
 
Whether such explanatory forces also hold for the other cases is determined in the following. 
Looking at the RWE case example it can be assessed that also RWE was initially1618 guided 
by a visionary CEO, Dietmar Kuhnt. He, after the merger, not only had established the 
objective termed ‘Challenge 2000’1619 and of forming a future-oriented and ‘responsible’ 
multi-utility group, but had made this his personal concern. Moreover, Kuhnt perceived 
changes such as liberalisation and especially the opening of gas markets as an additional 
chance, driving internationalisation and profit orientation while at the same time aiming for 
sustainability and an ‘unrefined’ dialogue with stakeholders,1620 an aspect which shows his 
integrated view. Despite this and the fact that Kuhnt “was not shy of a fight”1621 E.ON was 
also in the lead in this respect as Hartmann “played tit-for-tat with RWE”1622. In fact, RWE 
was criticised for its multi-utility approach adopted under the leadership of Kuhnt, and for a 
lack of ‘creative leaders’ as management was too strongly resembling that of a public 
authority where managerial positions were also granted to former district administrators or 
mayors with no management experience.1623
                                                 
1614  E.ON (2005b), p. 33. 
 The following leader Harry Roels, who became 
CEO at the beginning of 2003, stopped the development towards the implementation of a 
multi-utility business model. In following a strict shareholder orientation he instead started to 
focus RWE’s development on the energy business with engagement in a few core markets 
1615  E.ON (2005), p. 7. A similar statement made is that “energy comes at a price” (E.ON (2005b), p. 9). 
1616  Cf. E.ON (2005a), p. 7. 
1617  Cf. Kowalewsky (2005), p. 53; Reischauer (2005), p. 48; Flauger (2010c). His professional drive can also be 
seen by the fact of recently having applied for becoming the first German Chairman of the Board of a global 
company (BP). Cf. Flauger/ Heilmann (2009c). 
1618  This refers to the beginning of this study. 
1619  Cf. Mez (2001), p. 218. 
1620  Cf. Schweer/ Thieme (1998), pp. 42-50. 
1621  Anonymous (2003). 
1622  Anonymous (2003). 
1623  Cf. Anonymous (1997), pp. 77-78. 
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only. While by few observers having been praised for this1624 - RWE in 2006, for instance, 
was awarded the winner of the Best of European Business award in the utilities category and 
explicitly praised for “its courage to re-examine its portfolio”1625 - Roels was heavily 
criticised by most for not having developed a long-term strategy, even for not having 
‘accomplished anything’ (“nichts zuwege gebracht”1626) and came to be called a ‘lame duck’ 
losing power.1627 According to critics, RWE under Roels’ lead had become rigid, shaken by 
power struggles on the supervisory board, dis-organised, and a candidate under continuous 
threat of being taken over by some of its major rivals like Suez, Enel, EdF and later GDF 
SUEZ.1628
 
 This supports the finding of a change from a pro-active to a passive development, 
in fact the beginning of its zic-zac course. 
This is also supported when examining statements made with regards to impacts of ecological 
change, emissions trading, and grid regulation. Roels’ assessment of such changes as ‘not 
coming into play soon’1629 again not only supports the above mentioned accusation of not 
having adopted a long-term orientation but also indicates a misguided environmental 
perception. Financial investors even accused Roels of having made a strategic mistake 
regarding his decision to sell Thames Water to Macquarie-Bank instead of going into re-
negotiations and accept the offer by Qatar and Swiss bank UBS which would also have 
included a strategically crucial option on LNG deliveries, thereby missing out an important 
opportunity.1630 A similar argument was brought forward by public press, criticising RWE of 
not having realised the need to dispel stakeholder concerns with arguments or dialogue under 
Roel’s leadership.1631 Only recently Roels admitted that it was necessary to “start thinking 
beyond the Kyoto Protocol today”1632 and that it would be “inconceivable for the public 
debate on the future of energy supply not to address climate protection”1633
                                                 
1624  Cf. Anonymous (2007s), p. 29. 
. As criticism on 
his person had become so intense over the course of time, Roels voluntarily offered to resign 
1625  Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (2006). 
1626  Wildhagen et al. (2007), p. 76. 
1627  Cf. Luber (2004), pp. 48-53; Wildhagen (2005); Reitz/ Schneider (2006), pp. 40-41. 
1628  Cf. Wildhagen et al. (2007), p. 76. 
1629  Cf. RWE (2004), p. 6. 
1630  Cf. Wetzel (2006). 
1631  Cf. Koch/ Reiche (2007). 
1632  RWE (2007), p. 139. 
1633  RWE (2008), p. 28. 
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earlier than the official end of his contract. Appointed as his successor, effective of 1 October 
2007, was Jürgen Großmann who had been a member of RWE’s Economic Advisory Board 
since 2000.1634 In comparison to Roels, who had also been accused of having been too 
friendly in times of crisis, Großmann’s leadership style was described as not wavering and as 
driving strategy rather than being driven by external forces as Roels was criticised for.1635 His 
close relationship with relevant stakeholders, e.g. being “more clout with politicians”1636
 
 than 
Roels had been, was seen as another personal benefit of Großmann. 
A major difference to his predecessor which can be assumed to have played a role in RWE’s 
renewed development towards more active behaviour as detected in the case study already 
becomes apparent in his vision and personal ‘mission’. This was to make RWE play a major 
role in shaping the future development as one of Europe’s largest energy companies. 
Großmann aimed to achieve this by making RWE more customer-oriented and by enhancing 
its efficiency. Moreover, he wanted to take advantage of growth opportunities more 
aggressively. In addition to this, he was described as someone not giving up despite 
failures.1637 To progress RWE, Großmann declared that he was taking a “determined and 
modern approach-with more energetic entrepreneurial spirit”1638 and turning “even more 
creative”1639, a statement which supports the finding of the turn towards more pro-active 
behaviour. In what can be assessed as an attempt to co-opt with institutional agents through 
forming potent alliances with them, for example, Großmann called on policymakers and the 
public to enter into an ‘Energy Pact for Germany’ in order to tackle the ongoing 
confrontations between industry, energy companies, and policymakers. This in turn lead to 
talks with respective institutional agents such as the German Economics Ministry, consumer 
associations, and representatives of energy-intensive industries.1640
                                                 
1634  This can be taken from the composition of RWE’s advisory board over time. Cf. Annual Reports. 
 In what can be attributed 
as a first success was the ‘surprising’ ministry approval for participating in a venture with 
1635  Cf. Flauger (2009d). 
1636  Anonymous (2007h). 
1637  Cf. Flauger (2008c); Flauger (2010d), p. 62. 
1638  RWE (2008), p. 26. 
1639  RWE (2008), p. 26.  
1640  Cf. RWE (2008), pp. 54, 133. This was also pointed out in public press. Cf. Köpke (2007c), p. 29. 
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regional suppliers.1641 Moreover, in a personal reply to an article accusing RWE of market 
misuse, Großmann also used the tactic of referring to prestigious agents to refute these 
claims.1642 By making a personal statement he again encountered critics for having brought in 
ex-foreign minister Fischer (see above).1643 His impact on driving RWE’s development has 
also been commented on by others, such as with regards to leading the company’s expansion 
into Russia and Turkey, or into the renewables and nuclear sector. Also the successful 
acquisition of Essent or the bringing-in of powerful constituents in terms of important ‘coups’ 
have been attributed to his leadership.1644 At the same time, examples of less pro-active, 
qualifying as defiant behaviour, can also be found. This, for instance, shows in statements 
such as: “Unfortunately, our demonstration of strength through billions of Euros invested in 
supply security and crisis-proof jobs during this period of economic weakness is often 
counteracted by political decisions. The debate on energy policy conducted in recent years 
and decades is deadlocked. This is a great worry to me.”1645
 
 This not only supports the above 
finding of RWE’s zic-zac path, but also the importance of stringent leadership for 
organisational development. 
The impact of leadership can also be seen in the case of GdF. Especially its increasingly pro-
active development since the long-planned merger with SUEZ has been fundamentally 
determined by the leadership qualities of its new CEO, Mestrallet, who was described as 
having made order out of “political industrial mess”1646. Having a very good educational 
background and successful career,1647 and described as a ‘discrete but belligerent fighter for 
his strategic vision while not being afraid of Sarkozy’1648
                                                 
1641  Cf. Flauger (2007c), p. 17. 
 he, despite all obstacles, had always 
remained determined and convinced of the success of joining the two companies. Already in 
1642  Cf. Großmann (2009), p. 9. 
1643  Cf. Großmann (2011), p. 118. 
1644  Cf. Flauger (2009f); Flauger/ Stratmann (2009b). 
1645  RWE (2009a), p. 25. 
1646  Anonymous (2007n). This assessment is also supported by the already above mentioned evaluation of 
governmental interests being solved via energy policy or statements that Sarkozy had been “foolish enough” 
(Anonymous (2007k)) to make prime minister de Villepin announce the deal as a way to gain public support 
for having fended off French jobs being lost due to a takeover by an Italian company, making the merger 
appear like a “quick political fix to stymie the Italians, instead of a long-planned merger that made lots of 
industrial and financial sense” (Anonymous (2007k)). 
1647  With regards to Mestrallet cf. Meier/ Ruch (2008), p. 3. 
1648  Cf. Alich (2008b); Kuchenbecker (2008); Meier (2008), p. 3. 
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his function as CEO of SUEZ, he had aimed for preparing the company to compete against 
increasing competitive forces from rivals such as the newly privatised GdF. In fact, he had 
already successfully mastered SUEZ’ turnaround to a profitable company, something which 
he achieved through strict cost cutting measures and asset sales that cut debt by half.1649 As a 
state-owned company such measures had been paid little attention to at GdF until then. 
Moreover, Mestrallet had also explicitly pointed out the importance of the merger for the 
“indépendance énergétique de l’Europe tout entière”1650, even the “shape of European energy 
for the next 50 years”1651. He thereby not only made “far more positive noises about meeting 
EU demands than about winning the support of its shareholders for the deal”1652 but also used 
institutional topics as a means to drive business development. The former government-
appointed CEO of GdF had early stated, too, that his mission was to “make GdF the first 
European utility”1653 active ‘from the wellhead to the burner tip’.1654 Under his lead and in 
preparation of European market liberalisation, first internationalisation steps had been taken 
in 1997 with the acquisition of Italian Agip Servizi and through participation in the GASAG 
JV in Germany. Especially this latter move shows his drive as GASAG had been a “notorious 
loss-maker”1655, turning GdF’s participation into a forward-looking ‘strategic manoeuvre’. 
Mestrallet’s scope of activity had remained restrained, however, by the above mentioned 
barriers such as the general governmental involvement or the issue of reciprocity.1656
 
  
As valid for the three cases looked at so far, the impact of organisational leadership also holds 
as an explanatory factor supporting the development determined in ENI’s case study research. 
When becoming CEO at the end of 1998, Mincato had already spent 42 years with ENI, 
bringing a strong reputation and detailed knowledge of the company.1657
                                                 
1649  Cf. Anonymous (2005e). 
 Based on his 
personal conviction of opposing M&As, he followed a selective expansion strategy and 
instead built on organic growth. Believing that ENI was not in the position to be able to 
1650  De Monicault (2007). 
1651  Anonymous (2007k). 
1652  Anonymous (2006k). 
1653  Anonymous (1999d), p. 3. 
1654  Cf. Pederson (2001), pp. 191-194. 
1655  Anonymous (1998). 
1656  This may also explain why in 1998 GdF entered Latin America, setting up a subsidiary, MaxiGas Natural 
which began supplying different regions in Mexico. 
1657  Cf. Grant/ Ritter (2007), pp. 5, 16. 
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‘divest’ possible acquisitions,1658 he gained a reputation for being a ‘defender of domestic 
borders’ with no interest in international expansion. These statements support the finding of 
ENI’s restrained business development. Another indication is the accusation by the Italian 
government of Mincato as being too cautious. The government even tried to achieve 
Mincato’s resignation, but failed due to the rejection by the board of directors. Apart from 
serving as a support for the assessment of ENI’s restrained business development, it also 
distracted management attention from possible evolving opportunities, as did the power 
struggle which had developed after Mincato’s appointment with the chairman at that time 
who then left the company one year later. At the same time Mincato’s preference and 
conviction of not mixing politics and business1659 explains ENI’s active institutional 
behaviour of going to court (see case study). This is also supported by others who praise 
Mincato’s modest approach and his ability to keep the state from interfering. Moreover, it 
brought him respect from other industry players. One recent example is a production project 
in Kazakhstan in which he made ENI take the lead before other majors could. Mincato is also 
said to be unimpressed by public opinion which again could explain ENI’s modest 
institutional behaviour with regards to sustainability issues. Moreover, he managed to 
reorganise ENI into a single entity with three main divisions (see case study) and set up an 
internal change programme to provide it with a clear sense of identity and common 
culture.1660 Apparently, ENI by now is assessed as being even so powerful as to ‘guide’ 
Italian foreign policy.1661
 
 
After having laid out the impact of leadership, other organisational characteristics such as an 
organisation’s environmental perception, its goal formulation, and strategic focus are 
analysed.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1658  Cf. Grant/ Ritter (2007), p. 7; Anonymous (2011a). 
1659  Cf. Anonymous (2011a). 
1660  Cf. case study by Grant (2007). 
1661  Cf. Kort (2008). 
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Environmental Perception and Goal Formulation 
 
Again, E.ON and RWE serve as good starting examples due to their contrary development. 
Strikingly, it shows that E.ON not only was perceptive of different forms of environmental 
influences and driven to develop along, but also had the foresight to recognise the importance 
of having to pro-actively defend its existing competitive position.1662 Moreover, it was always 
positive about change and looking to pro-actively shape the process in order to benefit from 
arising opportunities. Examples include the observation of markets not liberalised at that time 
or the possible investment into ‘forward-looking’ segments like the energy efficiency 
business.1663 A similar positive perception of environmental change, likely to have benefited 
E.ON’s development, can be found in the case of Ruhrgas. This, for example, shows in 
Ruhrgas’ belief that risks resulting from liberalisation are “balanced out by business 
opportunities”1664. Apart from this general attitude more concrete examples support the path 
determined in the E.ON case study. The early realisation that “European rivals have become 
very active in the German market”1665 and having learnt from “tough crowding-out 
competition”1666 in the electricity market, for instance, explains E.ON’s drive of defending its 
national territory by the tactics depicted in the case study. The rapid transition towards pro-
active and creative strategies again can be said to have been driven by initiatives such as the 
‘fast-forward programme’ (see case study). Another example is E.ON’s willingness to accept 
costly out-of-court agreements with competitors (see case study) as a settlement in court 
would have meant further delay. In fact, the fast development of the energy business was 
pointed out a priority, especially in the gas business. E.ON’s related early internationalisation 
strategy, for example, was driven by it having been “very resolute in capitalizing on 
entrepreneurial opportunities abroad”1667 with “its sights firmly set on Belgium and 
Luxembourg”1668
                                                 
1662  Cf. E.ON (2002), pp. 32, 47. 
. The ‘key belief’ that in liberalised markets scale and integration are an 
essential competitive advantage again explains E.ON’s further expansion along and across the 
1663  Cf. E.ON (2001), p. 11; E.ON (2002), pp. 16, 39; E.ON (2003), p. 7. 
1664  Ruhrgas (2004), p. 30. 
1665  E.ON (2003), p. 28. 
1666  E.ON (2002), p. 63. 
1667  E.ON (2002), p. 31. 
1668  E.ON (2002), p. 46. Italicised by author. 
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value-chain. The same holds true with regards to influences from the institutional 
environment and the behaviour observed. E.ON had early recognised that ‘even in liberalised 
markets public policy plays a very important role in the energy business’1669, that substitute 
fuels such as sewage or wood may be used and promoted to the public as a significant tool to 
advance environmental protection,1670 and that biogas could be produced economically and at 
world market prices, even be able to replace natural gas.1671 E.ON’s aggressive institutional 
tactics can, amongst others, be explained by it having seen “the danger of Brussels 
reregulating Germany’s energy market”1672 as well as the increased restriction of business 
expansions through regulatory constraints which would have to be “fought for in 
courtrooms”1673. Crucially, while E.ON acknowledged that change was not foreseeable, it 
believed that significant influences could at least be anticipated, pointing out the need of not 
only having to be aware of influences from EU energy policy, but of also having to take into 
account other sources such as the Stern report1674 (see chapter III). This was later further 
supported by Ruhrgas and holds with respect to all three energy policy goals. Driven by a 
general belief that their enforcement was not only counterproductive but presented an 
intervention into the conduct and corporate freedom of private enterprises, Ruhrgas had 
argued that “the fathers of the Treaties of Rome did not delegate responsibilities for energy 
supply security to European institutions but to the member states themselves”1675, and that the 
Commission needed to account for the principle of subsidiarity. It also declared that 
“ultimately it is the companies who remain responsible for ensuring supply security” and that 
only “as a final resort, the European Union should become involved”1676.1677 Before 
liberalisation, and especially in relation with unbundling requirements, Ruhrgas had 
visualised its consequences in terms of losing control over its most strategic asset and ending 
up as a “collection of pipelines”1678
                                                 
1669  Cf. E.ON (2001), p. 11. 
. Facing such threats in fact made Ruhrgas announce that 
1670  Cf. E.ON (2001), p. 51, E.ON (2002), pp. 61, 65-66. 
1671  Cf. Klein (2007), p. B12; von der Weiden (2007), p. B6. 
1672  E.ON (2005b), p. 56. 
1673  Wildhagen/ Müller (2006), p. 46. Translation by author. 
1674  Cf. E.ON (2007), pp. 22-25, 63. 
1675  Ruhrgas (2004), p. 17. 
1676  Ruhrgas (2004), p. 19. 
1677  Cf. Ruhrgas (2003), pp. 6-7, 10-13; Ruhrgas (2004), pp. 9, 55; Ruhrgas (2005), pp. 9, 55-57. 
1678  Estrada et al. (1988), p. 253. 
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it was willing to “fight to its death”1679, a statement also revealing its underlying attitude 
which in the end translated into pro-active institutional behaviour as laid out in the case study. 
Moreover, this attitude was shown in its rejection of the consensus found with the other 15 
TSOs with regards to the anti-competitiveness of long-term gas contracts between TSOs and 
DSOs, Ruhrgas in the end being the only company to file suit.1680 Similarly, it attacked 
authorities by cynically commenting that “contrary to what is said in benchmarking 
reports”1681, which it thought to represent “a predominantly negative picture”1682, it believed 
“that the EU Commission has confirmed the wisdom of its purchasing policy”1683. Moreover, 
by publicly questioning institutional requirements, arguing, for instance, that an increase in 
regulation had not proven its superiority, it not only aimed to take influence but to even exert 
control over institutional agents’ plans and further measures by taking over the lead in 
initiatives aiming to implement “less radical instruments”1684. At the same time, in order not 
to threaten its legitimacy, it also showed cooperative forms of behaviour, such as by 
promoting the expansion of its sourcing activities or its engagement for NGVs by pointing out 
their benefit for the EU’s security of supply and sustainability goals.1685 Also the fact that 
E.ON had early pointed out that Ruhrgas’ “efforts in the area of environmental stewardship 
often go well beyond compliance with environmental regulations”1686
 
, qualifying as a 
manipulative form of institutional behaviour, shows its awareness of the criticality of these 
issues on legitimacy and its value in this respect. Thus, when taking over Ruhrgas, E.ON not 
only had acquired ownership over or access to strategic assets, but to institutional capital that 
allowed it to drive its institutional as well as market development as shown in the case study 
analysis.  
Closely related to E.ON’s environmental perception are its goal statements. These also 
support explanations for the development path determined. In fact, E.ON’s goal formulation 
                                                 
1679  Estrada et al. (1988), p. 253. Italicised by author. 
1680  Cf. Bundesnetzagentur (2006), pp. 29-30; E.ON (2007), p. 97; E.ON Ruhrgas (2008), p. 59. 
1681  Ruhrgas (2004), p. 16. 
1682  Ruhrgas (2004), p. 15 (page references to binding). Also cf. Ruhrgas (2002), pp. 9-10; Ruhrgas (2003), pp. 
11-12; Ruhrgas (2004), pp. 13-19 (page references to binding), pp. 8-11, 55. 
1683  Ruhrgas (2004), p. 9. 
1684  Ruhrgas (2003), p. 13. 
1685  Cf. Ruhrgas (2004), pp. 18, 37; E.ON (2003), pp. 73, 97. 
1686  E.ON (2004), p. 73. Italicised by author. 
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has been very ambitious right from the start. This already shows with regards to the 
‘founding’ merger from VEBA and VIAG (see case study). The aim of the newly created 
company was to develop ‘the leading European Powerhouse’1687 by continuously improving 
profitability and creating a competitive market positioning. Also here, Ruhrgas’ positive 
influence becomes apparent as it not only had adopted a profit-orientation and willingness to 
take risks early on but was continuously striving for efficiency and growth while defending its 
position as a market leader against major national as well as foreign rivals.1688 This drive can 
in fact still be found in E.ON’s recent and more concrete business related goals, such as 
embarking on the “road to becoming the world’s leading energy services provider”1689. Only 
shortly after these statements had been made, E.ON already saw itself as a market leader 
which was “committed to adapting to changing markets faster and better than our rivals”1690 
and of doing so by “recognizing and actively shaping market trends”1691. Similarly, 
environmental and climate protection issues received a relatively large degree of attention 
right from the beginning. Another success factor is likely to have been the view of evaluating 
asset investments not only according to economic criteria but also to the parameters 
‘environment, customer relationships and the public’.1692 Furthermore, E.ON not only viewed 
itself as “shaping change in global energy markets”1693, but as “superbly positioned to meet 
the new challenges of its changing European market environment”1694. It even considered 
itself as a ‘pacemaker’ of European market integration and of enhancing CSR measures, well 
on the way to becoming the world’s leading power and gas company as formulated above.1695
 
  
In RWE’s case, too, the statements found support the results from above. In line with the pro-
active behaviour detected in the beginning, its environmental perception and goal statements 
                                                 
1687  Cf. E.ON (2001), p. 11. Italicised by author 
1688  Cf. Körting (1963), pp. 495, 565-582, 591; Schreiter (1965), pp. 96-108; Ruhrgas (2003), pp. 16-23; Ruhrgas 
(2004), pp. 13, 21, 41 and others; Anonymous (2003a); Focht (2008c), p. 16. Wintershall, having been part 
of the consortium to build the second major pipeline into Germany (see above) has been assessed as a 
“challenger to Ruhrgas” (Rossert (1996), p. 26), making the latter gain experience in price and legal wars 
though. Cf. Estrada et al. (1995), p. 97. 
1689  E.ON (2003), p. 28. 
1690  E.ON (2004), p. 53. 
1691  E.ON (2004), p. 53. 
1692  Cf. E.ON (2009a), p. 55. 
1693  E.ON (2007), p. 58. 
1694  E.ON (2008), p. 74. 
1695  Cf. E.ON (2007), p. 58; E.ON (2008), p. 58; E.ON (2009a), pp. 5, 7, 38. 
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reveal that it not only was aware of the fact that utilities were ‘highly integrated in a political, 
legal and social structure subject to continuous change’1696, but that “within one year the 
realm in which energy utilities operate has radically changed”1697. While it found the full 
impact difficult to foresee, changes such as deregulation were still seen to leave “an indelible 
mark”1698 that again left ‘little time’ for reaction.1699 Starting with the merger with VEW’s 
businesses, which “against the backdrop of deregulated markets”1700 were seen as 
supplementing and reinforcing RWE’s core activities, RWE had decided to make a 
fundamentally new start by creating a ‘new’ company with a “fresh appearance”1701. This was 
believed to be setting an “inimitable landmark in the competitive environment”1702 for the 
first time in its history. Moreover, by providing “additional momentum”1703, and particularly 
so in the gas business,1704 the merger with VEW was intended to provide the launching pad 
for further expansion. Intensions for rapid development also show in corporate principles such 
as “Don’t waste time in the beginning, don’t let up later on”1705, an approach that was 
believed to be “the most far-reaching change process”1706 in the company’s history. This new 
orientation was to be put into practice by ‘revamping’, i.e. breaking down, the value chain 
into unbundled, fast-responding and effective operating units, each with a certain focus on a 
key competence.1707 This is also reflected in the perception of itself as a forward-looking, 
learning-focussed pacemaker with entrepreneurial creativity and the potential to occupy one 
of the foremost positions in tomorrow’s dynamic utility market,1708
                                                 
1696  Cf. RWE (2001), pp. 7, 45. 
 even more so in that “the 
new RWE has set the pace in the transformation process shaping Europe’s energy and 
1697  RWE (2001), p. 58. 
1698  RWE (2001), p. 28. 
1699  Cf. RWE (2001), p. 54; RWE (2002), p. 6; RWE (2003), p. 51; RWE (2004), pp. 56-57, 60-64. 
1700  RWE (2001), p. 63. 
1701  RWE (2001), p. 16. This also included the establishment of a new logo which shows a symbolic hand against 
a blue background, illustrating the multi-utility concept, i.e. all services from one hand, and the company’s 
brand values of competence, customer proximity and approachability. Cf. RWE (2001), p. 16. The logo is 
still used today. 
1702  RWE (2001), p. 16. 
1703  RWE (2001), p. 62. 
1704  Cf. RWE (2001), p. 71. 
1705  RWE (2003), p. 23. 
1706  RWE (2001), pp. 4, 28. 
1707  Cf. RWE (2001), pp. 4-7, 13, 28, 49. 
1708  Cf. RWE (2001), pp. 4-7, 17; RWE (2002), pp. 4-5, 9, 68. 
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environment markets”1709. Another example is the perception of its subsidiaries as playing the 
role of reference companies.1710
 
 
While this evidence characterises RWE’s orientation at the very beginning, the analysis of the 
following years reveals a critical difference in that the paramount goal of corporate strategy 
became the increase of shareholder value and become a cost leader in the European market. 
The formulation of becoming ‘a’, not ‘the’ cost leader is especially striking here as it reveals 
no strive for leadership as found in E.ON’s case. To achieve this, a major cost-cutting and 
efficiency programme was launched and continuously expanded over the years.1711 The 
paramount focus on costs and efficiency is particularly reflected in the return-driven pricing 
policy which was rooted in the principles of ‘margin before market share’ and ‘margin over 
volume’. As this strategy at the same time required “an increasing readiness to decline low-
margin orders”1712, cost management and financial discipline were believed to provide the 
basis for differentiating from competitors in a commodity business such as energy. While this 
coincides with the development towards more passive behaviour as determined in case study 
analysis, this assessment is further supported by statements that the internationalisation 
process was seen as being “largely completed”1713 as soon as the end of 2002. The fact that 
RWE was looking to follow a strategy of regional focus in clearly defined markets “instead of 
banking on a widely diversified geographic presence”1714 again characterises another major 
difference to E.ON’s strategic orientation. Similarly, instead of expanding, the year 2003 was 
taken as the “year of consolidation”1715
                                                 
1709  RWE (2002), p. 4. 
, guided by the new CEO Roels. As a consequence, 
instead of following the expansion plans set out in the beginning, growth was not a priority 
anymore. Especially ‘growth at any price’ was not believed to be the right strategy, 
particularly in view of the high prices of possible acquisition objects which forced RWE to 
drop out of auctions even in its core regions. Instead, by stating that “patience is of the 
1710  Cf. RWE (2003), p. 51. 
1711  Cf. RWE (2001), pp. 6, 38-39, 49-50, 68; RWE (2002), pp. 4-7, 54; RWE (2003), p. 7; RWE (2004), p. 40; 
RWE (2005), pp. 44-45. 
1712  RWE (2002), p. 71. 
1713  RWE (2003), p. 6. 
1714  RWE (2003), p. 6. 
1715  RWE (2004), p. 4. 
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order”1716 and that “we are not in a rush”1717
 
, Roels himself indicated that ‘growing 
organically in a disciplined and moderate way’ was to remain the preferred mode. 
A slight change in behaviour, in the case study characterised as an indication towards more 
active, i.e. analysing, behaviour, can be found with regards to the extension into the 
renewables business and geographical presence as RWE began to include the ‘whole’ 
European market in its expansion plans, instead of only speaking of a regional focus. When 
looking at the environmental perception during this period, a coinciding change can be 
detected which supports the assumptions made. Precisely, other than in the years before 
where competition and regulatory forces were only expected to become stronger, the years 
2007 and 2008 were characterised as years where competition, customer demands, the 
willingness to switch suppliers, and regulatory requirements were pointed out as in fact 
having become fiercer.1718 Moreover, instead of merely seeing environmental changes as 
threatening challenges, its “outstanding opportunities”1719
 
 were mentioned once more. 
The same also holds true with regards to institutional behaviour observed and RWE’s 
perception of changes in this respect. The augmented attention paid to institutional issues not 
only shows in the fact that the volume of documents and the frequency with which they were 
published increased, but also by the intenseness of reporting. Other than in the years before, 
for instance, the Chairman of the Supervisory Board Report pointed out that “a considerable 
amount of time was dedicated by the Supervisory Board to discuss changes in conditions 
underlying energy policy and their impact (…)”1720. In 2005, while still assuming that 
regulatory and political conditions were “unlikely to become any easier”1721, this perception 
was beginning to change. Perceiving that there was hardly a day passing “without us being 
confronted by new issues of energy policy”1722
                                                 
1716  RWE (2006), p. 23. 
 such as the issue of supply security having 
1717  RWE (2006), p. 6. 
1718  Cf. RWE (2006), p. 21; RWE (2007), pp. 19, 31; RWE (2008), p. 38; RWE (2009a), pp. 32-35. Italicised by 
author. 
1719  RWE (2009a), p. 33. 
1720  RWE (2007), p. 97. This also still holds true for the following years. Cf. RWE (2009a), p. 121. 
1721  RWE (2006), p. 21. Italicised by author. 
1722  RWE (2007), p. 4. 
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“moved up the political agenda”1723 and that politicians were “increasingly inclined to 
regulate functioning market processes more intensely”1724, RWE remarked on the possibility 
that the stricter monitoring of anti-competitive practices could increase the number of 
inquiries and thus of further legal disputes.1725 The implementation of the EU Energy and 
Climate Package 2013-2020, the legal framework created for CCS, or the Third Liberalisation 
Package which required ‘paying intense attention to’ were also recently mentioned.1726 Apart 
from these augmenting regulatory pressures also those from other institutional sources such as 
the public were pointed out. Facing the situation that “the public believes that competition has 
not really got off the ground”1727 and that people were demanding that energy supply was 
affordable, reliable and environmentally friendly, RWE realised that behaviour needed to 
become more pro-active and attention paid to its legitimacy, especially as “the debate on 
rising energy prices has a substantial impact on our reputation in the public eye and influences 
the regulatory context”1728. At the same time, financial markets were “placing mounting 
demands on not only corporate transparency, but also sustainability”1729, too, leading RWE to 
realise that “our company’s performance is not expressed in terms of commercial success 
alone”1730. This new attitude is also reflected in the motto ‘Do it’ of its 2008 Annual Report, 
mirroring RWE’s ambition of ‘not stopping to promote the necessary changes with 
constructive suggestions and initiatives on all political levels’,1731 or in the launch of a new 
campaign ‘The energy to lead’ particularly directed at “the public at large”1732
 
. 
The explanatory power of such factors on organisational behaviour also shows when looking 
at ENI’s and GdF’s development which could be characterised as ‘mono-sectorally’ focussed 
                                                 
1723  RWE (2007), p. 6. 
1724  RWE (2009a), p. 22. 
1725  Cf. RWE (2008), p. 102. 
1726  Cf. RWE (2009a), pp. 25, 32-33, 49-52, 96. In addition to these measures at EU level, several national 
regulations have become stricter, such as the Renewable Energy Act in Germany or regulations implemented 
by the U.K. government which force energy companies to promote energy saving measures to household 
customers and thereby also provide assistance to low-income consumers, a requirement which for RWE 
npower resulted in an additional spending of €90 million. Cf. RWE (2009), pp. 50, 73. 
1727  RWE (2008), p. 26. 
1728  RWE (2009a), p. 141. 
1729  RWE (2009a), p. 145. 
1730  RWE (2009a), p. 141. 
1731  Cf. RWE (2009a), p. 25. 
1732  RWE (2009a), p. 40. 
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(see chapter IV). The notion of environmental perception is particularly valuable in ENI’s 
case as it supports the finding of its initially passive business in comparison to its active 
institutional development. That is, having analysed ENI’s underlying environmental 
perception it is striking that despite the realisation of, for example, increasing competition 
(also see case study), statements initially remained undifferentiated. This reveals in statements 
such as that “the world energy scenario”1733 was generally presenting itself as “quite 
different”1734. Also stakeholders were only addressed in the widest sense. Moreover, those 
forces which were particularly emphasised were related to the upstream business, such as the 
development of the oil price and thus the exchange rate of the Euro over the dollar.1735 This 
also puts goal statements into relation, such as ‘creating shareholder value and increasing size 
through continuous growth as lying at the heart of strategic priorities’1736 which otherwise do 
not coincide with the passive business behaviour determined. Market changes mentioned with 
regards to European energy policy were only indicated broadly. This reveals in statements 
such as that “many of the cultural and industrial certainties that had accompanied ENI’s 
history were starting to fade out”1737. Examples include ENI’s ‘institutionalised role as the 
country’s oil and gas supplier with a virtually monopolistic position on supply, transmission, 
and sales of natural gas’1738. Likewise, change was not further identified and its consequences 
depicted vaguely as creating “risks in terms of margins levels”1739
 
. 
                                                 
1733  ENI (2004a), p. 12. 
1734  ENI (2005a), p. 11. 
1735  Cf. ENI (2002a), pp. 5,8; ENI (2003a), pp. 9, 12; ENI (2004a), p. 11; ENI (2005a), pp. 11-12; ENI (2006a), 
p. 10; ENI (2007a), p. 8; ENI (2008a), pp. 9-10; ENI (2009a), p. 9. In this respect, particularly the oil price 
increase of 2004 was mentioned, on the one hand enabling to generate “huge cash flows” (ENI (2006a), p. 
10) and thus investments while on the other hand increasing the value of the companies’ reserves, making 
acquisitions expensive. Uncertainty also shows in the expected development of oil prices. While in 2002 and 
2003 oil prices were projected to remain around $16 per Barrel until 2007 (cf. ENI (2003c), p. 4; ENI 
(2004c), p. 4), it already peaked over $35 in 2003 (cf. ENI (2004a), p. 9) and increased to over $50 in 2004 
(cf. ENI (2005a), p. 10). 
1736  Cf. ENI (2002a-2009a). Mission statements in Annual Reports from 2001 to 2005, no page numbers. For 
ARs 2006-2008 cf. ENI (2007a), p. 8; ENI (2008a), p. 9; ENI (2009a), p. 9. The continuity of these 
statements was specifically pointed out through remarks such as looking to for ‘continuous growth’ (cf. ENI 
(2003a), p. 13; ENI (2009a), p. 9) or that growth ‘still is’ the main objective (cf. ENI (2005a), p. 12, 
emphasis added). 
1737  ENI (2003a), p. 11. 
1738  Cf. ENI (2003a), p. 11. 
1739  ENI (2003a), p. 12. Italicised by author. 
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An even stronger indication is provided by statements from management which for a long 
time had only ‘believed’ that liberalisation would influence the company’s conduct such as by 
‘possibly’ decreasing margins.1740 This also coincides with the belief that the “original 
entrepreneurial spirit of being a company able to create value”1741 needed to be recovered first 
in order to achieve more ambitious targets than before, e.g. qualifying as a permanent member 
among the oil majors as mentioned above, or that the new energy world only required an 
adequate response.1742 While this restricted focus resulted in ENI having lost a lot of time due 
to “playing catch up with leading oil majors”1743, the perception of its relevant environment, 
which is also reflected in the attitude of feeling of only having to “cope with the process of 
opening up the Italian market”1744 instead of actively driving its development, supports the 
finding of it perceiving change as a threat rather than an opportunity to be capitalised on. This 
attitude also becomes apparent from the fact that, despite pending infringement processes, 
ENI did not consider it necessary to accrue a contingency reserve for penalty payments (see 
example above).1745 Despite still having pointed out oil companies and large customers as 
being its main competitors in 2008,1746 a change in perception towards taking an integrated 
approach can be observed to have begun around 2006. While new entrants were still 
perceived as constituting a threat for the fulfilment of ToP contracts,1747 the ongoing market 
opening was depicted as a development towards a “broadly favourable trading 
environment”1748. This perception indicates that ENI was beginning to see possibilities for 
taking advantage of changes in European energy policy. In the case study this is reflected as a 
change towards more active business behaviour. Moreover, being a ‘master of balancing’ its 
governmental relationships SNAM acted as a door-opener for engagements in important 
international pipeline and LNG projects.1749
                                                 
1740  Cf. ENI (2002b), p. 6; ENI (2003b), p. 6; ENI (2004b), p. 6; ENI (2005a), p. 10; ENI (2005b), p. 7; ENI 
(2006b), p. 7; ENI (2007b), p. 8. 
  
1741  ENI (2002a), p. 5. 
1742  Cf. ENI (2002a), pp. 5, 7. Italicised by author. 
1743  Grant (2007), p. 16. 
1744  ENI (2002a), p. 8. Italicised by author. 
1745  Cf. ENI (2003a), p. 31. 
1746  Cf. ENI (2009b), p. 54. 
1747  Cf. ENI (2007a), pp. 32-33. 
1748  ENI (2007a), p. 8. 
1749  Cf. Estrada et al. (1988), pp. 251-254; Estrada et al. (1995), pp. 101-103. This was also pointed out later by 
Finon et al. (2004), pp. 332-333. 
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In comparison, with regards to the influence of institutional forces it shows that a relatively 
high awareness existed right from the beginning. This, for instance, reveals in statements such 
as that “the scenario of health, safety and environmental issues is characterised by increasing 
rejection of industrial settlements by local communities, stricter regulations, ever increasing 
requests for information and evaluation of results and, therefore, higher availability of 
stakeholders to favour proactive companies capable of coping with the new challenges of 
sustainability”1750. Such a different perception in the case of its institutional environment may 
also be explained by the above mentioned resistance of communities against energy projects 
in Italy, having forced Enel into a partnership with GdF. In 2005, this was even further 
enlarged on. ENI stated, for example, that particularly industries “involved with energy, 
operate in a context that has become increasingly aware of the importance of the protection of 
health, safety and most of all the environment”1751. It also found that many stakeholders not 
only exerted strong pressure on companies and influenced activities, but also paid special 
attention “to the ability of a company to operate in the medium and long term in a framework 
of sustainability, conciliating economic with environmental and social objectives”1752. Having 
realised that there was a “growing request for attention to the environment both in the 
definition of strategies and in the management of operations”1753, ENI responded with active 
institutional behaviour as depicted above. Also the belief that the creation of shareholder 
value should be achieved in compliance with appropriate behaviour towards all 
stakeholders1754
 
 supports the finding that institutional issues seem to have received principal 
attention.  
Similar explanations can be found in the case of GdF. Noticeably, despite seeing itself as 
“proactif”1755
                                                 
1750  ENI (2004a), p. 14. 
, environmental change was not specified initially and only mentioned relatively 
late. This aspect explains the passive development found in the beginning of analysis. 
Moreover, even when considered, change was merely perceived as a constraint in form of 
1751  ENI (2005a), p. 13. 
1752  ENI (2005a), p. 13. 
1753  ENI (2005a), p. 13. 
1754  Cf. ENI (2002a), p. 7. Italicised by author. 
1755  Carrière/ Balard (2004), p. 519. 
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holding “numerous risks for the Company”1756. Especially those deriving from regulatory 
changes, such as from deregulation and liberalisation, were perceived as posing “contraintes 
stratégiques”1757. This can be explained by the fact that GdF at that time was subject to 
several legal investigations,1758 making the impact of such forces more paramount. 
Simultaneously, despite also having pointed out increasing threats from other European 
suppliers,1759 GdF not only still perceived Total, an oil major, as its main competitor, but this 
as also being “rather far behind”1760. Only as late as 2006 perception changed towards 
generally seeing the environment as “an essential component”1761 and market opening 
increasingly as an opportunity to gain access to new clients, develop activities across Europe, 
and to establish itself as a benchmark company in the area of natural gas distribution.1762 
Thus, while the initially restricted perception of competition also supports the finding of 
GdF’s passive behaviour in this respect, the recent change of perception serves as an 
explanation for the more active development revealed. The same holds true with regards to 
mentioning the need to guarantee security of supply, or the notion of sustainability in that 
respective measures were beginning to be looked at as ‘extra assets’ to increase customer 
loyalty, even acquire new ones, while controlling risks and performance. Even more, 
statements show the realisation that previous activities were not sufficient to offset negative 
consequences and that an inadequate view of risks could over time lead to a discrepancy 
between policy and stakeholder expectations. This again was feared as possibly being 
sanctioned through a downgrading of its sustainability ranking and the alteration of the 
Group’s image while investment and compliance costs would increase to finally result in a 
decrease of investor and customer confidence and in the loss of market share.1763
 
 
This is also reflected in GdF’s goal formulation and finally in its behaviour. That is, 
supporting the passive development found, goal statements remained restricted to the 
intention of strengthening its existing businesses while at the same time focussing on local 
                                                 
1756  GdF (2006), p. 15. Also GdF (2007) and GdF (2008a), p. 11. 
1757  Carrière/ Balard (2004), p. 516. Also cf. GdF (2006), p. 17; GdF (2007), pp. 13-14; GdF (2008a), p. 13. 
1758  Cf. GdF (2006), p. 17; European Commission (2007a), p. 260; GDF SUEZ (2009a). 
1759  Cf. GdF (2006), pp. 15, 86-88. 
1760  GdF (2006), p. 88. 
1761  GdF (2006), p. 90; GdF (2007), p. 96. 
1762  Cf. GdF (2007), pp. 32, 69; GdF (2008a), pp. 32, 71. 
1763  Cf. GdF (2006), pp. 20, 83-85; GdF (2007), pp. 17, 39, 87-90; GdF (2008a), pp. 14-16, 30, 39, 56-57, 90-97. 
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needs.1764 And although more active goals were formulated in the following years, this did not 
translate into more pro-active strategies as can also be seen from statements of wanting to 
participate in growth opportunities1765 instead of driving them. In accordance with the 
alteration of development made out above, this began to change after the merger and can be 
found in formulations referring to business as well as institutional goals. This is characterised 
through business-oriented objectives of aiming to ‘boost market performance by reducing 
costs’ and to ‘become the leading multi-energy provider of natural gas’ as well as through 
institutionally-oriented goals such aspiring to turn the company into a ‘sustainable 
development actor’ who shows commitment to the environment by promoting renewables and 
is committed to transparency.1766
 
  
This drive becomes even more prevalent in the joint GDF SUEZ documents where the new 
company’s goal was formulated as becoming ‘a leading global player in the energy and public 
utilities industry’1767. Its mission again was formulated as tackling “the major energy and 
environmental challenges”1768 with sustainable development being ‘an imperative that forms 
the identity of the new Group’ and a ‘decisive criterion in strategic choices’.1769 Also this has 
begun to translate into driving corporate development as depicted in the case study. The 
company’s development towards realising the importance of combining managerial 
performance with social responsibility has recently been pointed out by others as well.1770 
Apart from this, the positive influence from SUEZ also becomes apparent with regards to the 
perception and valuation of its substantial midstream assets (see above) which by now are 
realised as not only ‘significantly contributing to the Group’s financial value’1771 but also as a 
strategic business. While GdF in 2007 still only regarded storage as a tool to balance summer 
and winter demand,1772
                                                 
1764  Cf. Anonymous (1999d), pp. 2-3; Pederson (2001), p. 192. Italicised by author. 
 it was pointed out to be an important strategic asset after the 
1765  Cf. GdF (2005), pp. 3, 16; GdF (2006), pp. 36-37; GdF (2007), pp. 38-40; GdF (2008a), pp. 38-40. Italicised 
by author. 
1766  Cf. GdF (2008a), pp. 56-57. 
1767  Cf. Suez (2008c), p. 129. 
1768  GDF SUEZ (2009a), p. 182. 
1769  Cf. GDF SUEZ (2009d), p. 29. 
1770  Cf. Dufour (2009), pp. 145-155. 
1771 Cf. GdF (2008a), p. 31. 
1772  Cf. GdF (2008a), pp. 51, 68, 70, 100. 
Chapter VIII: Comparing Findings, Determining Explanations and Validating Results 309 
merger.1773 In total, these measures enabled it to limit losses through market opening in this 
segment and as a result GdF’s European sales had “more than made up in volume for its lost 
sales resulting from the opening of the French market”1774
 
 by 2007. 
 
Strategic Focus and Corporate Vision 
 
Closely related to environmental perception and goal formulation is an organisation’s self-
perception and strategic focus. Again, E.ON serves as a leading example. Aiming to create a 
‘one-stop energy shop’1775, E.ON’s development was driven by the focus on core businesses 
and the ‘clear understanding’ that non-core businesses had to be divested over the course of 
time to increase shareholder value and free up resources in order to finally make it one of the 
biggest investor-owned energy service providers and the world’s largest specialty chemicals 
group. This is also symbolised by the connotation of the new name ‘E.ON’, meaning ‘new 
energy’, which had also been chosen to promote the brand’s personality in top international 
publications and campaigns to investors and opinion leaders. This at the same time reveals 
E.ON’s early realisation of the importance of such institutional agents. Another success factor 
likely to have driven E.ON’s development is its focus of having strategically analysed and 
systematically seized opportunities while not having taken its eyes of day-to-day operations. 
Neither did E.ON radically change its course despite substantial organisational restructuring 
after the merger of VIAG and VEBA.1776
 
  
When looking at the other three cases in contrast, several differences can be determined. In 
ENI’s case, strategic focus was initially mainly directed towards upstream operations, while 
opportunities for business development which arose through the changes in European Energy 
Policy were neglected (see case study). GdF’s strategic focus again is likely to have been 
distracted by the fact that it had to separate its grid activities from those of EdF, a process 
                                                 
1773  Cf. GDF SUEZ (2009d), p. 61. 
1774  GdF (2008a), p. 30. 
1775  This expression refers to providing electricity, gas, heat, and possibly water services under one corporate 
roof. Cf. E.ON (2001), p. 11.  
1776  Cf. E.ON (2001), pp. 10, 16; E.ON (2004), p. 23. 
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which had required “significant reorganization”1777 so that organisational resources could not 
be applied to significantly develop other areas. This only began to change after the merger 
and hence again shows Suez’ contribution as already indicated above. Also here, this holds 
for the business as well as institutional development. Essentially, SUEZ not only had a long 
organisational history and thus experience, but had become a multi-utility company with a 
“declared vocation”1778 of selling electricity, water, and waste and engagements in more than 
130 countries.1779 Moreover, it also brought in its experience with shareholder demands and 
its endeavour for profit-orientation. This impact shows, for instance, in the fact that GdF 
mentioned the importance of compiling a cost reduction plan for the first time only in 
2007.1780 Even more, the merger with SUEZ derived GdF of the image of being a 
government-driven company, making expansion, especially across Europe, easier. That this 
was becoming increasingly important can be seen from the fact that the take-over attempt of 
SWL (see case study and above) had actually failed because of a local referendum against 
SWL’s privatisation and its take-over by GdF as a governmentally driven company.1781 The 
same holds true with regards to the targeted purchase of a stake in EWE, Germany’s fifth 
largest regional supplier. Also here GdF lost out as EWE was acquired by German EnBW.1782
 
  
Similarly, despite having been engaged in environmental measures relatively early, these 
issues were only addressed and pointed out much later (see case study) after the merger with 
SUEZ. This shows in “a clear desire to place sustainable development at the very center of the 
Group’s strategy in order to participate in the most strategic stakes, such as the building up of 
its image”1783
                                                 
1777  GdF (2006), p. 18; GdF (2007), p. 15. 
. Another indicator is GDF SUEZ marketing itself as “the only utility group to 
develop operations and expertise over the entire gas and electricity value chain, upstream and 
1778  Anonymous (1999c). 
1779  Suez was founded in 1859 as ‘Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez’ to build the Suez canal. 
Over the course of centuries it developed into a holding company with equity investments in the financial 
services and energy sectors in Belgium and France. In 1997, Compagnie de SUEZ merged with Lyonnaise 
des Eaux to become SUEZ. Cf. Suez (2003), p. 5; GDF SUEZ (2009a), p. 37. This was also pointed out by 
Finon et al. (2004), pp. 324-325. 
1780  Cf. GdF (2008a), p. 39. 
1781  Cf. Schroeter (2007c), p. 5; Lenz (2008). 
1782  Cf. Flauger (2008a); Flauger (2008b). 
1783  GdF (2007), p. 86. 
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downstream, in Europe and around the world”1784 with a unique profile based on global 
presence and capabilities in the energy and environmental sector as core businesses across the 
value chain.1785 The basis of this orientation was seen to be lying in the Group’s large asset 
base, especially its global and diversified upstream supply portfolio which constituted a major 
strategic trademark that “sets us apart from other utilities in Europe”1786. Also its strong 
position in the midstream segment, here in particular its LNG assets, was believed to provide 
it with a competitive advantage in that it allowed the Group to make use of the gas-electricity 
convergence “more than any other player”1787. In the downstream business, GDF SUEZ saw 
its ‘diversified, efficient, flexible and sustainable’ electricity production portfolio, based on its 
renewable, nuclear and natural gas sources, as a critical source for developing a multi-energy 
offer.1788
 
 
The criticality of strategic focus and, respectively, resource allocation is even more prevalent 
in the case of RWE. As laid out in the case study, but also explicitly stated as its strategic 
focus, RWE defined itself as a multi-utility, all-inclusive provider of electricity, gas, water, 
waste disposal, and energy-related services. As pointed out by the company itself, this 
constituted an approach which required significant resources and attention.1789
 
 The realisation 
of this in relation to the operational difficulty of implementing such a multi-utility business 
model is likely to have contributed to the attempt of re-organising corporate structures. As 
laid out in the case study, this did not take place as a stringent process, but was characterised 
by a continuous change between acquisition and divestment activities and accompanying re-
organisation. This lack of strategic focus becomes particularly apparent when depicting 
RWE’s process of organisational restructuring illustratively as shown in the figure below. As 
this process is particularly characteristic for RWE and supports the finding of its diverged 
path, such an illustration has only been made in for its case. 
                                                 
1784  GDF SUEZ (2009d), p. 28. Italicised by author. 
1785  Cf. GDF SUEZ (2009a), p. 50; GDF SUEZ (2009d), p. 28. 
1786  GDF SUEZ (2009d), p. 7. 
1787  GDF SUEZ (2009d), p. 4. 
1788  If not indicated otherwise the following was taken from GDF SUEZ (2009a), p. 50. 
1789  Cf. RWE (2001), pp. 18-19; RWE (2002), p. 24. 
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Figure 32:1790
 
 RWE’s process of organisational restructuring (1998 to 2008) – Revealing a 
lack of strategic focus 
                                                 
1790  Own figure based on findings from above. 
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8.3 Performance Appraisal – Determining Success of 
Incumbents’ Development Paths 
 
Having revealed different organisational paths and their drivers, so far nothing has been said 
about the outcome of these developments. While it has been argued that in the long-run 
passive behaviour is not successful and active, if not pro-active, behaviour sets the basis for 
creating a (sustainable) competitive advantage, it has also been pointed out that there is not 
necessarily one ‘best path’ of development. In the following, a look will therefore be taken at 
incumbents’ performance.1791 In coherence with the approach taken adopted this is done by 
determining business-related performance such as market capitalisation, turnover, and net 
income,1792
 
 as well as stakeholder perception as an institutional performance indicator for 
legitimacy. 
 
8.3.1  Market Capitalisation 
 
Beginning with market capitalisation, which is often used as a major indicator for 
organisational performance from a financial perspective, the following figure shows the 
comparison of the development of market capitalisation of the four case companies. 
                                                 
1791  Some even believe that “research questions are inherently uninteresting or trivial unless they include an 
explicated linkage to performance” (Meyer (1991), p. 825). 
1792  If not indicated otherwise, the figures mentioned have been taken from respective Annual Reports. In order 
to better illustrate the development of the respective period (1998-2008) also data for previous as well as 
following years (if already available) have been included, i.e. 1996-1997 and 2009-2010. 
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Figure 33: Comparison of the development of market capitalisation (in billion €) 
 
 
 
 
According to these figures ENI is the most valuable one. This can be attributed to the fact that 
it is assessed as an oil major and thus as part of a group which has traditionally been highly 
valued by capital markets, especially due to relatively high margins generated in the upstream 
business where ENI is still generating most of its operating income (see case study). At the 
same time the illustration shows that from 2002 on, ENI, E.ON and RWE followed the same 
upward trend until 2007. While GdF was not publicly listed then, its development followed 
suit after 2006. The steepest initial increase can be found in the case of E.ON, showing the 
appreciation of the merger of VEW and VIAG by the market. Noticeably, by 2007, market 
capitalisation of ENI, E.ON, and GDF SUEZ reached a similar value of around €90 billion, 
while that of RWE only rose to €54 billion. A distinction that becomes apparent, however, is 
that the rise of development was steeper in the case of E.ON, GDF SUEZ, and RWE than in 
that of ENI. In fact, ENI’s value even declined by 2% between 2006 and 2007, while that of 
E.ON rose by 35% and that of RWE by nearly 15%. The strongest increase of 210% was that 
of GdF, which once more can be attributed to the merger with SUEZ. Another common 
development is the drastic decline in value from 2007 onwards as a likely consequence of the 
global financial crisis, followed by a brief upward trend in 2008. After that, development took 
different turns again. While market capitalisation of ENI, E.ON, and RWE decreased to €59 
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billion, €44 billion, and €28 billion, respectively, that of GDF SUEZ continued its upward 
trend to amount to €72 billion. 
 
 
8.3.2  Turnover 
 
When looking at the development of turnover of the four companies, the picture is more 
diverse than that of market capitalisation. This can be explained by the fact that turnover is 
much more company specific, while market capitalisation is also determined by common 
stock market trends. The analysis of turnover thus enables the researcher to gain more insight 
into financial performance. In this respect it is to be noticed that until 2001, turnover of E.ON 
and RWE was higher than that of ENI, despite its larger market value (see above). This 
changed though after 2001, when E.ON’s and RWE’s development experienced a significant 
downward trend. While this was steeper in the case of E.ON, with turnover having declined 
by 53% following the divestments made after the merger, than in the case of RWE which 
experienced a decrease of 25%, E.ON’s development afterwards steadily increased again. 
That of RWE, in contrast, continued its decline until 2007, if only modestly so. E.ON’s 
development instead paralleled that of ENI and by 2009 E.ON’s turnover had nearly caught 
up. Then, it accounted for nearly €80 billion, while ENI’s was at €83 billion. RWE’s turnover 
again had remained at not even €48 billion. GdF’s development sticks out in that it started 
from a relatively low level at around €9.4 billion, compared with E.ON’s nearly €70 billion, 
and only slowly increased over the course of time, amounting to €14.5 billion in 2001. A 
dominantly steep increase, however, took place after 2006, when turnover rose by nearly 
158% to €71 billion in 2007. Even more, by 2009 it had reached nearly €80 billion and thus 
almost the level of ENI and E.ON. This development can be attributed to the merger with 
SUEZ and the increase of business expansion as determined in the case study. The depiction 
just made is illustrated in the following figure. 
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Figure 34: Comparison of the development of turnover (in million €) 
 
 
 
 
While the development of turnover is a good indicator for the increase of activity, it does not 
provide information on the effectiveness of operations. This again can be enhanced on when 
looking at net income. 
 
 
8.3.3  Net Income 
 
In fact, as the figure below reveals, the development of the four companies varies much more 
than in case of the other variables laid out above. While this holds particularly for E.ON, 
reflecting its high degree of activity, the development of ENI, GdF, and RWE, with less 
business activity than E.ON as determined in case study analysis, only show very few peaks. 
Another observation to be made is that fluctuations may be so strong that one company may 
suddenly come to outperform the others. This can be observed in the case of GdF in the 
period between 2001 and 2002, when figures climbed above those of RWE and even E.ON, to 
then decline again below that of all three rivals. From 2006 onwards, i.e. again after the 
merger, GdF’s (SUEZ’) net income rose above that of RWE but still remained below that of 
E.ON and ENI. Similarly, E.ON in 2009 outperformed ENI which until then had shown 
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highest net incomes, achieving €8,669 billion compared with ENI’s €4,367 billion. At that 
time, ENI’s net income was even lower than that of GDF SUEZ with €4,477 billion. Again, 
these depictions can be seen in the following figure. 
 
 
Figure 35: Comparison of the development of net income (in million €) 
 
 
 
 
Another striking development that can be seen well in the illustration is that since 2008 the 
development of net income in ENI’s and E.ON’s case continued to be volatile with down- and 
upturns, while having remained relatively stable in the case of RWE and GDF SUEZ. In the 
case of ENI this can be attributed to a negative development of the oil sector following the 
economic crisis and to the large investments required in the upstream business which 
constitute a large cost block that affects profits. In E.ON’s case again there have been 
indications of fundamental financial difficulties. These have been attributed to its former 
‘jewel’ Ruhrgas which has been tied to expensive long-term oil-linked ToP contracts (also see 
chapter II) while gas prices on trading markets were substantially lower, making it difficult 
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for Ruhrgas to sell its gas.1793 Compared with the situation of other energy companies, 
E.ON’s difficulties have been described as a ‘luxury problem’1794
 
 because E.ON still has the 
highest net income. Apart from such evidence, its success also shows in non-quantitative 
figures as is enlarged on in the following. 
 
8.3.4  External Perception 
 
In fact, different studies, which analysed the perception of leading energy players, have 
revealed E.ON as the main leader, thus supporting the findings made above. Looking, for 
example, at the assessment of European utility managers regarding their perception of the 
global leading energy companies over a phase from 2001 to 2008, it can be seen that E.ON, 
together with French EdF, was heading the ranking over the whole period as illustrated in the 
following figure.  
 
 
                                                 
1793  Even if also customers were tied to such contracts these in most cases contained a price revision clause 
which allowed customers negotiations at certain moments in time. After liberalisation though, these price 
revisions were oriented at price developments in trading markets, thus reducing prices of existing contracts 
substantially. As a consequence, Ruhrgas itself then, after hard negotiations, reached an agreement with 
Gazprom to at least link a part of contracted gas imports to spot market prices. Having achieved this means 
that Ruhrgas pioneered a fundamental break with traditional industry structures (cf. Anonymous (2010a), p. 
15; Gassmann (2010a), p. 6) - which again is evidence for its leadership role. 
1794  Cf. Flauger (2008d). 
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Figure 36:1795
 
 Development of the perception of leading energy players (in %) 
 
 
 
Moreover, both players have been portrayed as having ‘grabbed significant mind share’1796
                                                 
1795  Own figure based on data derived and accumulated from PWC (2003a), pp. 4-5; PWC (2004), p. 16; PWC 
(2005a), p. 19; PWC (2006a), p. 17; PWC (2008a), pp. 18-19. 
, a 
fact that coincides with a high degree of legitimacy which in E.ON’s case again can be 
attributed to its pro-active institutional behaviour as revealed in the case study. Another 
finding that can be supported is that of RWE being a follower of E.ON. As the figure shows 
has the distance between the two even increased over the course of time, with RWE’s share 
having sunk to below 5% by 2006 and in 2008 not even being mentioned anymore. EdF’s 
leadership position again can be explained by its large nuclear assets which enable low-cost 
and nearly CO2-free electricity production. While EdF, except for in 2007 where E.ON was 
slightly in front, was able to maintain its leading role, the figure also reveals E.ON’s fast and 
strong close-up since 2003. This fact can be explained by its active and rapid development, 
making it appear more powerful for other utility leaders. Another interesting finding to be 
derived from these results is that neither ENI, GdF nor SUEZ are mentioned. While in ENI’s 
case this could be attributed to it being perceived more as an oil company and thus not 
appearing on utility leaders’ radar, this argument does not hold as British Petroleum is also 
1796  Cf. PWC (2008a), p. 3. 
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mentioned. Apart from this, ENI is a large European producer and importer of natural gas. 
Instead, the fact that ENI has not been perceived as a leading player is more likely to be a 
result of its weak business development in the European market, determined as passive 
business behaviour in the case study and thus supporting this finding. In the case of GdF 
again, a plausible explanation is its initial status as a government owned company and its 
therefore constrained possibilities for active behaviour as laid out above. Noticeably, the 
perception of E.ON as the leading player is also shared by utility leaders in other parts of the 
world, such as the U.S. as well as the MEA and European region. This even is the case when 
looking at the ranking in different years, as shown in the figure below. As this illustration 
reveals, E.ON’s distance is always substantial to the following ranked companies. Moreover, 
investors see E.ON as the leading player, too. In this ranking also SUEZ is mentioned this 
time, a fact which again confirms its importance for GdF’s development as pointed out above. 
 
 
Figure 37:1797
 
 Development of the perception of leading energy players from different 
perspectives (in %) 
 
 
                                                 
1797  Own figure based on data from PWC (2003a), pp. 4-5; PWC (2004a), p. 16; PWC (2005a), pp. 12-13; PWC 
(2006a), p. 17; PWC (2008a), pp. 18-19. 
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While the above reveals a general view, further support for case study findings is provided by 
results of recent studies. These unveil ENI and E.ON, both of which have shown pro-active 
institutional behaviour with regards to addressing sustainability issues, among the highest 
ranked members in the Carbon Performance Leadership Index (CPLI) which serves as a guide 
for investors.1798
 
 
Nevertheless, the above findings can be further enhanced by looking at overall industry 
analysis as explained in the chapter on methodology. This is done in the following section. 
 
 
8.4 Industry Review – Validating Findings 
 
8.4.1 Evaluation against Industry Developments between 1998-2008 
 
8.4.1.1 Results from a Business Perspective – Confirming Findings 
 
Fundamentally, the review of organisations’ business behaviour in the industry over the 
research period reveals several developments which support cases study findings. These are 
looked at in more detail in the following. 
 
 
Diversification as a Common Industry Strategy 
 
In fact, the development trend towards multi-utilities and the merging into “broader energy 
companies”1799 as mentioned above was also pointed out by subsequent researchers1800
                                                 
1798  Cf. PWC (2010a), p. 18. 
 as 
well as by companies themselves (see case study of GdF). More recent again is the 
diversification behaviour for strategic reasons as also found in case study analysis, such as the 
1799  Midttun et al. (2001), p. 390. 
1800  Cf. Chabrelie/ Lecarpentier (2005); Girault (2005), pp. 5-7, 10-11; Anonymous (2006b), p. 4; Anonymous 
(2006o), pp. 4-5; Bozem/ Rath (2008), p. 50; Verde (2008). 
Chapter VIII: Comparing Findings, Determining Explanations and Validating Results 323 
operation of storage facilities as strategic assets. At the same time, a trend of divesting non-
energy businesses relatively recently after they have been acquired has also been found.1801 
While these developments can be said to characterise particularly the first phase after market 
opening and the introduction of change, another phase seems to have started recently with the 
diversification into nuclear power and various renewable energy activities such as solar, wind, 
or hydro power and biomass. In fact, this trend has not only been observed with regards to 
utility companies (also see case studies), but has also been determined as a common 
development amongst oil majors which, for example, have engaged in the solar business or 
started building CCGT plants for participating in large-scale electricity production.1802 Even 
more, and as a further extension to existing products and markets, energy companies have 
again begun to diversify into unrelated businesses such as the automotive sector. This has 
been assessed as a renewed development (for early examples see case studies of E.ON and 
RWE) towards multi-utility business models and the blurring of industry boundaries.1803
 
 
When analysing the drivers behind this trend, a change can be determined from companies 
having used such business extensions as defensive measures to fend off competitive threats to 
increasingly using such new business markets as opportunities to differentiate themselves 
from rivals and create additional value.1804 The same holds true with regards to gas trading 
which initially not only was used by very few players,1805 but also simply as a tool for 
balancing demand and supply. Over the course of time though, the trading function has 
become an important strategic instrument to hedge risks along the whole value-chain and 
provide additional value to contribute to overall performance.1806 Incumbent oil and gas 
companies, for instance, have used their trading business as a service to be offered to third 
parties and as a “critical vehicle”1807
                                                 
1801  Cf. Girault (2005), pp. 10-12; Funk et al. (2006); Anonymous (2007k); Bozem (2008), p. 56. 
 to grow organically. Other studies show that players 
1802  Cf. Emerging Energy Research (2006); Fockenbrock (2006), p. 16. 
1803  Cf. Bozem (2008), pp. 56-58. 
1804  Cf. Pecka (2007), p. 13. 
1805  Even incumbents traded less than 2% of their overall volume. Cf. European Commission (2005e), p. 11. 
1806  Cf. PWC (2003a), pp. 16-19; PWC (2004a), pp. 17-18; PWC (2005a), p. 16. 
1807  Anonymous (2006p), p. 44. 
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invested in renewables and efficiency services as a response to the growing importance of 
sustainability and environmental awareness to maintain or gain legitimacy.1808
 
  
This once more thus emphasises the importance of ‘looking through an institutional lens’ in 
order to enhance explanatory value, as is done further below. In addition to this, it also 
supports case study analysis which has revealed these diversification trends as well. Whether 
this also holds with regards to M&As and vertical integration is determined in the following 
two sections. 
 
 
Vertical Integration as a Common Industry Strategy 
 
Similarly, and as found in case study analysis, another industry-trend to be detected is that of 
vertical integration along the gas value-chain, particularly into the long-distance pipeline 
transportation, the LNG, the storage, and the trading business.1809 The common expansion 
into LNG, for example, has been described as a corporate “rush to build LNG”1810. The trend 
in the storage business again was driven by the growing realisation that storage was a 
strategic asset and to support overall business. Likewise, while this downstream integration 
was particularly prevalent in the first years, there are indications for a second development 
that is characterised by companies exiting certain activities to become more focussed.1811 
Bozem, for instance, recently identified two types of organisations: those that are active only 
in the regulated infrastructure business and those that engage in competitive segments. He 
furthermore distinguished between players with an international, metropolitan, or regional-
local focus.1812
                                                 
1808  Cf. Capgemini (2005), p. 48; Laudicina/ Pau (2007), pp. 11-14. 
 The most common strategic instrument found to carry out vertical integration 
was that of M&As, in particular strategic acquisitions or joint ventures. In fact, their share 
1809  Cf. Chabrelie/ Lecarpentier (2005); Bozem (2008), p. 56; Bozem/ Rath (2008), pp. 50-54. 
1810  Harsh et al. (2006), p. 2. 
1811  Cf. Harsh et al. (2006); Schürmann (2007), p. B3. 
1812  Cf. Bozem (2008), pp. 57-58. 
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rose from 33% in 2007 to 51% in 2008,1813
 
 thus coinciding with the M&A trend identified 
above. 
A major driver identified behind the development towards a growing degree of vertical 
integration was the reaction to increasing downstream competition following liberalisation 
and the aim of players to close up markets by downstream integration to gain control over 
customers, often by acquiring them. This was criticised as having resulted in a “vertical 
blockage of distribution channels”1814. Upstream integration again was found to have been 
driven by the aim to compensate for losses made further down the value-chain, e.g. in the case 
of declining sales because of increased competition.1815 Delmas and Tokat, based on an 
empirical study on U.S. electricity companies, found that companies which had vertically 
integrated to ‘insulate’ themselves from uncertain market transactions as well as those which 
had chosen the market as a way to deal with complex transactions in order to avoid 
organisational slack, were more efficient than those which adopted hybrid forms of 
arrangements. At the same time the researchers indicated that the latter may be the most 
efficient organisational form during the process of deregulation.1816 Another reason was the 
companies’ need to fulfil security of supply requirements imposed by EU regulations.1817
 
 In 
fact, these two examples well reveal that behaviour was driven by business as well as 
institutional drivers.  
 
Strategic Alliances - Mergers & Acquisitions as a Common Industry Strategy 
 
In fact, particularly M&As have been identified as a major development trend, especially in 
form of a ‘first wave’ after market opening.1818
                                                 
1813  Cf. PWC (2008a), p. 5. 
 When analysing this phenomenon in more 
1814  Immenga et al. (2003), p. 49. Translation by author. 
1815  Cf. Fritz-Vannahme/ Gammelin (2006), p. 23. 
1816  Cf. Delmas/ Tokat (2005). The authors particularly point out that despite technical, economic and 
institutional differences their findings are also relevant for other network industries such as natural gas. Cf. 
Delmas/ Tokat (2005), p. 457. 
1817  Cf. PWC (2007a), p. 13; PWC (2008a), p. 5. 
1818  Cf. Bozem (2008), p. 56. 
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detail over the course of time, different phases can be distinguished:1819 While the first period 
after liberalisation was characterised as a “frentic”1820 one where large waves of M&As had 
taken place on a “mega level”1821, deal activity had decreased again by 2003, especially in the 
gas market.1822 This, however, turned out to have been only a short decline as the year 2004 
was characterised by another major wave of M&As. Even more, in gas as well as in electricity 
markets new growth records were set, not only in terms of the total number of deals made and 
the total deal value, but also regarding the number of mega deals and the value behind single 
deals. A big part of this comprised deals in Europe where the value of transactions increased 
by much more than 100% compared with 2004. This situation has been described as one 
where a deal was struck “every day of the working week with just a pause for breath on 
Fridays”1823. Similarly, the year 2005 was termed another “record-breaking year”1824 which 
not only introduced a “new merger cycle”1825, but even “a new era of blockbuster deals”1826. 
In fact, these remained strong in the following years.1827 Also from a geographical perspective 
certain trends can be identified. While early studies had identified M&A activity as having 
remained regionally focussed,1828 a more comprehensive study recently published on M&A 
deals of European energy companies between 1998 and 2007, determined a certain pattern of 
activity which was only initially focussed on domestic territory before having been overtaken 
by cross-border types of M&As in number and by value.1829 Others supported this finding, 
specifying further that in case activity was expanded beyond European territories, European 
companies generally preferred North America, except for the Spanish and Portuguese players 
for which the South American region was more critical due to being culturally closer.1830
 
 
                                                 
1819  In order to better illustrate the development over time, this assessment is built on the accumulation of studies 
available and includes findings made before 2005, thus also extending those mentioned in chapter III. 
1820  Petrovic (2000), p. iii. 
1821  ABS Energy Research (2004), p. 32. 
1822  Cf. PWC (2005b); Roland Berger (2003). 
1823  PWC (2006b), p. 13. 
1824  Anonymous (2005j), p. 14. 
1825  Anonymous (2005h), p. 1. 
1826  Anonymous (2005j), p. 14. 
1827  Cf. Anonymous (2006q); Brühl/ Oei (2006), pp. 334-339; Capgemini (2006); Fautz/ Leuschner (2006), pp. 
180-184; Lewiner (2007); Tykvová (2006), p. 3; PWC (2006b); PWC (2007b); Weinert/ Meyer (2007), pp. 
14-20; Anonymous (2008g), p. 68; PWC (2008b); Verde (2008). 
1828  Cf. PWC (2004); Wiegand/ Krüger (2004); PWC (2005b). 
1829  Cf. Lévêque/ Monturus (2008), pp. 295-322. 
1830  Cf. Hymner (2005), pp. 67-106; Anonymous (2008g), p. 68. 
Chapter VIII: Comparing Findings, Determining Explanations and Validating Results 327 
Wolf et al. again drew three different possible scenarios for future development: one of a 
‘European energy-gas-oligopoly’ where market power is concentrated in the hands of few 
integrated players, a second one of ‘augmented market segmentation’ where there are more 
specialised providers, and a third scenario where re-structuring becomes enforced by 
regulatory authorities.1831 Research on the oil industry revealed the emergence of three types 
of players after similar influential environmental change: ‘Megamajors’ as industry shapers, 
‘Mezzos’ as small-and-medium sized companies, and ‘Specialists’ with a focus on a certain 
value chain activity.1832
 
 
When analysing the drivers behind these developments, not only various reasons but also 
different phases can be determined. Initially, following the liberalisation of energy markets 
with the introduction of competition and the threat of losing market power, in addition to 
prevailing liquid capital markets and increasing globalisation, M&A activity has been driven 
by the strive for growth. This again was required in order to gain access to capital markets and 
become global player to survive as well as to operate more efficiently and increase 
shareholder value.1833 While such aspects remained important in the following years, M&As 
in later phases were mainly driven by the need to access new customers and gain critical scale 
in order to establish a competitive advantage. Other reasons were the aim to create a hedge in 
terms of portfolio risk management and to expand geographically.1834 This again was 
followed by a phase where M&As became a valuable tool to access resources and capabilities. 
At the same time, the wish to broaden an existing product portfolio, the divestment of assets 
to focus on the core business,1835 and regulatory pressures were mentioned as reasons.1836
                                                 
1831  Cf. Wolf et al. (2007), p. 31. 
 
While this indicates active behaviour driven by ‘business goals’, the notion that many of those 
M&As have been interpreted as having been ‘governmentally orchestrated or engineered 
1832  Cf. Stonham (2000), p. 414. 
1833  Cf. Anonymous (2000a); PWC (2002); Anonymous (2005f), p. 16; Müller/ Wetzel (2005); Piller (2006), p. 
13; Snijder (2006), p. 2; Bozem (2008), p. 56; Bozem/ Rath (2008), pp. 50-54; Verde (2008). 
1834  Cf. PWC (2005a), p. 10. 
1835  Cf. Heidenreich (2006), pp. 35-36; Fautz/ Leuschner (2006), p. 182; Voss (2006), pp. 1-7. 
1836  Cf. PWC (2006b), p. 16; Wellmer/ Dalheimer (2000), pp. 1-6; PWC (2007a), p. 15. 
Chapter VIII: Comparing Findings, Determining Explanations and Validating Results 328 
marriages’ with the aim of creating national champions’1837, or as driven by politicians who, 
afraid of losing control, “protectively have been throwing themselves over national energy 
companies”1838, reveals passive responsiveness. The portrayal of the above mentioned waves 
or phases of M&As as a ‘herding phenomenon’1839
 
 could also be interpreted as homogeneous 
field behaviour for reasons of legitimacy as derived as another assumption from case study 
research. 
 
Typological Behaviours and Common Business Models 
 
In addition to the specific strategies and tactics just laid out above, insight from industry 
research also supports the approach of categorising energy companies into different types of 
players according to their degree of activity.1840 Having, for example, differentiated between a 
low and high degree of knowledge and implementation rate of success factors to create a four-
field matrix, a study analysing trends and success factors in the energy industry determined 
four different forms of behaviour which range between a passive ‘Wait-and-See’ type and a 
pro-active ‘actionists’ one.1841 Others again, having analysed and classified the behaviour of 
energy companies in response to deregulation along a continuum, at the one end typified 
aggressive market players taking advantage of market opportunities. At the other end they 
placed those which were identified as too passive. These are characterised as not being aware 
of minimum standards and appropriate management models required for success in an 
increasingly uncertain environment.1842 A similar distinction was made with regards to the 
tactic of diversifying into the renewable energy business where research identified those 
players who had invested early and those who had adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude.1843
 
 
                                                 
1837  Cf. Anonymous (2002c); Anonymous (2004b), pp. 65-66; Anonymous (2004c), p. 60; Anonymous (2005h); 
Anonymous (2005k); Müller/ Wetzel (2005); Anonymous (2006b); Anonymous (2006i); Anonymous 
(2006q); Anonymous (2006r); Lenz (2008). 
1838  Wildhagen (2007), p. 83. Translation by author. 
1839  Cf. Balzer/ Student (2006b), p. 69; PWC (2008a), p. 1. 
1840  This has also been shown for other industries. Cf. Koubek et al. (1996). 
1841  Cf. Management Engineers (2004). 
1842  Cf. Spiegel et al. (2005), p. 34. 
1843  Cf. Salzmann (2006), p. 213. 
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Finally, by bringing together the developments from above, the finding of converging 
organisational behaviour and common business models can be supported. Having analysed 
industry developments from a Business Perspective, the same is now done from an 
Institutional Perspective in order to maintain methodological consistency. 
 
 
8.4.1.2 Results from an Institutional Perspective –  
 Confirming Findings 
 
Common Responses to Measures of Liberalisation and Security of Supply 
 
Fundamentally, commonalities can be found with regards to the institutional strategies and 
tactics applied. Looking at liberalisation measures and especially unbundling, for example, a 
common tactic determined was that of window dressing. Incumbents claimed to be supporting 
liberalisation but, driven by a ‘general reluctance’ and ‘limited interest’, were actually found 
to be ‘allegedly abusing their position’, such as by privileging their own sales company, 
hindering customer switching, or reinforcing their long-term contracts.1844 They were also 
found to have been delaying or even denying access of third parties based on congestion 
arguments.1845 Another finding is that incumbents created confusing information, making 
newcomers complain that finding “your way in the tariff jungle is a real nightmare”1846. With 
regards to ownership unbundling again, players were found to be using the tactic of 
questioning the methods of studies recommending such drastic measures,1847 while others, by 
referring to prestigious constituents, argued that existing regulations were sufficient.1848
                                                 
1844  Cf. Brito/ Hartley (2007). 
 
Similarly, as already revealed by the case examples, recent publications found that E.ON, 
RWE, and GdF were using the tactic of trying to take influence such as by publicly 
questioning requirements or lobbying their governments as a response to regulatory plans to 
1845  Cf. European Commission (2005e), pp. 12-18; European Commission (2007a), pp. 13, 48, 71, 80, 245-260; 
European Commission (2007c), p. 5. 
1846  European Commission (2005e), p. 26. 
1847  Cf. Lütkehus (2008), p. 4. 
1848  Cf. A.T. Kearney (2008). This study was internally initiated and not in behalf of a customer. 
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introduce ownership unbundling.1849 They argued, for example, that large integrated 
companies were needed to face the bargaining power of foreign suppliers.1850 Another 
reaction indicated by others, again supporting case study findings, is the tactic of escaping. 
One example provided is that of E.ON having sold its electricity grid to escape infringement 
measures. E.ON’s move has even been evaluated as serving as a role model,1851 thus 
sustaining the finding of E.ON as an industry leader. Support for the discovery of a 
development towards more active behaviour can be derived from the finding that institutional 
tactics are increasingly characterised by more manipulative forms of behaviour, e.g. showing 
in organisations’ perception of authorities as allies necessary to achieve organisational goals 
and guard against possible inquiries,1852
 
 as has also been pointed out in the case examples. 
 
Common Responses to Measures of Sustainability 
 
The finding of institutional behaviour having become more active over the course of time can 
also be found with regards to sustainability.1853 First evidence in this respect is that initially 
the term ‘environmental protection’ was used, showing the focus on only one aspect of the 
‘sustainability agenda’ (see above). Early studies also found that initially only few players had 
implemented a robust environmental strategy and if they had, that this had primarily been 
done to comply with legislation.1854
                                                 
1849  Cf. Esterhazy et al. (2008), p. 58. 
 More active institutional behaviour can be found to have 
developed over the course of time in response to increasing pressure, revealing particularly in 
form of window dressing. Among the first-movers were oil majors that started investing in 
renewables as a tactic to address stakeholders and pretend they had turned ‘green’ to improve 
their image and hence legitimacy. A prominent example is the U.K. oil company British 
Petroleum which not only had already established a business unit for renewable energy in 
1997, but by now is engaged in producing solar cells and analysing possibilities to enter the 
CCS segment, aiming to invest around $8 billion into renewable energies until 2015. Other 
1850  Cf. Anonymous (2006b), p. 3; Anonymous (2007t). 
1851  Cf. PWC (2008a), p. 7. 
1852  Cf. Focht (2007b), p. 1; Flauger (2008e). 
1853  Also here findings from studies before 2005 are included in order to better depict the development over time. 
1854  Cf. PWC (2002); PWC (2003a); PWC (2004). 
Chapter VIII: Comparing Findings, Determining Explanations and Validating Results 331 
institutional tactics applied by the company include the sponsoring of environmental 
associations with large sums as well as bringing in its CEO into the board of respective 
organisations. It even changed its slogan from British Petroleum into ‘beyond petroleum’ and 
its logo into a symbol representing the sun.1855
 
 
The development towards the increasing importance put on issues of sustainability can also be 
seen in the figure below. This reveals the results of questionnaires on the perception of the 
most important market developments in different years, showing the ranks in descending 
order with the most relevant issue at the top. As shown, in 2004 the need to increase 
transmission capacity, security of supply, and increasing competition from oil majors and 
financial institutions were the prevailing topics. The encouragement of renewable energies 
only ranked last during this time and players appeared slow at integrating the consequences of 
climate change into their business strategy. This had already changed substantially one year 
later as the encouragement of renewable energy had moved to the top of the agenda, also 
described as “one of the clearest environmental pressure points by regulators on utility 
companies”1856. The notion of supply security again remained second and price volatility, 
having become the third most important driver, was replaced by the threat of increasing 
regulations and resulting obligations in 2006, a year where the challenge of change was also 
perceived as “little short of revolutionary”1857. The fact that security of supply ranked top of 
the agenda in 2006 is likely to have been a consequence of the Ukrainian-Russian gas crisis at 
the beginning of that year, when Russia stopped its deliveries to the Ukraine as a measure to 
force the latter to pay its gas bills. With the Ukraine being a transit country for supplies from 
Russia, Western Europe was heavily affected. This incident thus increased public awareness 
on Europe’s vulnerability of secure gas supplies.1858
                                                 
1855  Cf. Fockenbrock (2006), p. 16; Salzmann (2006), pp. 158, 213; Friese (2008). 
 In the following years, measures 
regarding the encouragement of renewable energies remained to be perceived as the most 
influential development, while security of supply issues moved down the agenda as the need 
to increase efficiency and the regulation of emissions became more paramount. 
1856  PWC (2003a), p. 22. 
1857  PWC (2006a), p. 6. 
1858  Cf. Kramer (2006). 
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Table 6:1859
 
 Common change of perception of energy policy topics over time 
 
 
                                                 
1859  Own figure based on data from PWC (2003a), p. 10; PWC (2004a), p. 5; PWC (2005a), p. 5; PWC (2006a), 
pp. 10-11; PWC (2008a), p. 8. 
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Interestingly, all three constitute measures characterising the policy goal of sustainability as 
laid out in chapter III.1860 Furthermore, several studies which analysed corporate 
environmental and sustainability management efforts revealed a large degree of backlog 
demand and optimisation possibilities for energy companies.1861
 
 
The fact that liberalisation measures were not seen as pressuring anymore can be explained by 
the notion that companies had accustomed themselves to these forces as unavoidable, while 
‘green drivers’ were still relatively recent and required more attention, especially as 
consumers, too, have become more aware of and concerned about sustainability issues.1862 By 
2007, companies judged the EU’s climate policy as “very challenging to meet”1863. Others see 
climate change as having emerged as the main driver of EU policies to accelerate transition to 
a sustainable energy system. This, for instance, shows in the change of terminologies used in 
that the expression ‘environmental objectives’ was replaced by that of ‘sustainability’.1864 As 
a consequence, many energy companies have been waking up to climate change and become 
‘much more ready to gear up to seize the sustainability agenda’ in that they pro-actively 
participate and drive developments instead of remaining reactive, especially as such 
developments were “starting to bite with a clear impact on long-term investment 
decisions”1865
                                                 
1860  These three measures have thus all been illustrated in green colours. 
. In fact, this has translated into more active forms of institutional behaviour, 
revealing in strategies of manipulation with the aim to take influence, if not control. 
Prominent tactics applied in this respect have been those of strategic communication, image 
advertising and qualitative narratives. Here, a development can be seen in that the 
performance of environmental and sustainability activities in the beginning was mainly 
communicated through the common Annual Report and sporadic announcements on websites 
or media. And while in 2005 still only one third of respondents used a verified sustainability/ 
environmental report, more than half were planning to do so by 2007 (see figure below), 
indicating the growing awareness for and the importance of such measures. Before that 
though, most of these measures were applied merely ‘for the sake of it’ and without true 
1861  Cf. Salzmann (2006); Seiwert (2007), p. 44; PWC (2008c), pp. 40-47. 
1862  Cf. Knauß (2007), p. 10; Whan (2007). 
1863  Lewiner (2007), p. 6. 
1864  Also cf. Röller et al. (2007), p. 1. 
1865  PWC (2008a), p. 46. 
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commitment.1866 Very recently, measures have even become pro-active, showing in tactics 
such as openly and bluntly displaying the emission trading scheme as additional costs for 
consumers,1867 or, with regards to the uncertain legal framework for CCS, by ‘writing its own 
laws’ to put governments under pressure.1868 Moreover, indications for a more trust-based 
communication with stakeholders can be found.1869 Further evidence for the change of 
behaviour can also be derived from statements such as having “moved from a time when 
climate change barely registered a mention in a company’s annual report to one where it is on 
the lips of every chief executive officer who runs a power utility business”1870
 
. The following 
figure illustrates this development towards more specific instruments of communication. 
Figure 38:1871
 
 Common instruments to communicate sustainability (in %) 
 
 
 
Whether findings can also be confirmed from an integrated perspective will be determined 
next. 
                                                 
1866  Cf. Viedt (2005), p. 626; Salzmann (2006), p. 158. 
1867  Cf. Stratmann (2008a). 
1868  Cf. Stratmann (2008b). 
1869  Cf. Matthes/ Ziesing (2008), p. 33; Mühlstein/ Köpke (2008), p. 14. 
1870  PWC (2008a), p. 1. 
1871  Own figure based on data from PWC (2004), p. 10; PWC (2005a), p. 25. 
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8.4.1.3 Results from an Integrated Perspective – Confirming Research 
Approach 
 
Essentially, the benefit of considering an integrated approach is also confirmed here. This, in 
fact, holds for several aspects. Referring to the above findings under the business perspective, 
for instance, the common strategies and tactics of diversification, vertical integration and 
M&As from an institutional perspective could also be interpreted as imitative and 
homogeneous behaviour. Similarly, when adopting a business perspective to look at 
institutional strategies and tactics these may turn out to have been applied to enhance business 
development, such as via the instruments to communicate on sustainability. This can actually 
be supported with findings from industry research. While initially CDM and JI measures were 
implemented merely for compliance reasons companies today are increasingly using them for 
trading purposes to generate additional income.1872 The notion that companies have gone over 
to taking advantage of what had before been perceived as a threat is also supported by the 
European Commission’s finding that “the declaration of European interest has given a 
renewed stimulation for some projects with a long history”1873 as companies have used the 
goal of supply security to obtain funding for ‘essential’ infrastructure projects. This has 
recently become even more pronounced with regards to the possibility of strategically taking 
advantage of the growing importance of ecological and sustainability issues which have 
opened up opportunities such as enhancing brand value and reputation to exploit a 
competitive advantage.1874
 
 
Still, while research had already pointed out in 2003 that the achievement of sustainable 
synergies between business and environmental performance was dependent on how well 
companies managed to integrate environmentalism into their strategy right from the beginning 
instead of dealing with it as an add-on or regulatory requirement, the same study found that 
the tension between environmental and business strategy was only eroding slowly.1875
                                                 
1872  Cf. PWC (2007a), p. 41; PWC (2008a), p. 46. 
 Instead, 
1873  European Commission (2007l), p. 4. 
1874  Cf. Lewiner/ Easton (2004), p. 6; PWC (2004), p. 10; PWC (2005a), pp. 18-19; PWC (2006a), pp. 19-20. 
1875  Cf. PWC (2003a), p. 23. 
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only few companies were aware of the fact that environmentalism and economic goals could 
reinforce each other. This had changed by 2008, when nearly 60% of European utilities 
believed their environmental strategy and performance had an impact on investors’ 
decisions.1876 Moreover, not only are measures such as climate protection activities becoming 
part of organisations’ core business and integrated into business strategy, but central to 
business strategy and a critical driver of business growth.1877
 
 This supports the finding of a 
development towards an integrated perspective as already determined in case study research. 
In the following, the findings from case study research and those from industry analysis are 
discussed. In order to further enhance analysis, this is done by also including recent research 
results and publications. 
 
 
8.4.2  Evaluation against Findings from Secondary Literature and 
Current Research 
 
 
8.4.2.1 Results from a Business Perspective – Confirming Findings 
 
Apart from researchers still working on the determination and integration of ‘business policy’ 
and ‘strategic management’,1878 research on the general strategy process over the past few 
years has confirmed findings. This holds with regards to depicting organisational change as a 
development process from passive to more active behaviour in fast-changing environments 
and the importance of entrepreneurial orientation,1879 and also is supported by results from 
international business research.1880
                                                 
1876  Cf. PWC (2008a), p. 14. 
 In a second study on the strategic renewal behaviour of 
financial incumbents since the implementation of EU banking regulations (for first study see 
1877  Cf. Bergius (2008b). 
1878  Cf. Nag et al. (2007), pp. 935-936. 
1879  Cf. Corbett (2005); Dess/ Lumpkin (2005); Jacobides (2005); Regnér (2005); Volberda (2005); Hinings/ 
Malhotra (2008), pp. 120-123; Lamberg et al. (2009). 
1880  Cf. Hutzschenreuter et al. (2007). 
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above) Flier et al. confirm their previous finding that organisational development can be 
depicted as a path which consists of strategic action patterns and of such is characterised by 
risk-taking and pro-active behaviour keeping the organisation aligned with its 
environment.1881 More concrete is the support for the finding of the advantage of pro-active 
behaviour. In fact, several publications by now emphasise that adopting a wait-and-see 
behaviour or acting half-heartedly, and thereby risk losing out on opportunities to create 
value, in the long-run was a ‘recipe for disaster’1882. From research on organisational 
behaviour after deregulation of the electricity industry Delmas et al. describe the notion of 
organisations ‘following their habit’ as ‘remaining aloof’ to institutional forces. Organisations 
continue to follow known routes by reproducing institutionalised actions despite pressures to 
change, for instance when having been ‘pushed on a particular strategic path’. The researchers 
found that the enhancement of efficiency as a defensive characteristic particularly follows as a 
reaction to the fact that “there can be profound marketplace penalties for inefficiency”1883 
without monopoly status. They showed that that those companies which strove to differentiate 
themselves from competitors were more efficient and even outperformed their rivals.1884
 
 
Hence, especially when facing radical change, leaders are advised to act instantaneously, 
particularly as there is no evidence for negative effects on performance when reacting 
overhastily. In what can be determined as such pro-active business tactics is the tendency to 
vertically integrate along the gas value-chain. The above finding that companies integrated 
into own production activities to secure resources and benefit from higher margins, and into 
midstream activities to use pipelines, storage or trading as strategic assets and as separate 
profit generating business units (see above), has recently also been pointed out by others.1885 
The same holds true for the diversification movement into related and un-related businesses, 
such as energy production from renewables, or the engagement in the automotive industry 
such as by developing gas- or electricity-based driving systems.1886
                                                 
1881  Cf. Flier et al. (2005). 
 RWE has recently even 
1882  Cf. Viellechner/ Wulf (2010). 
1883  Delmas et al. (2007), p. 195. 
1884  A brief overview over literature is provided by Delmas et al. (2007), pp. 190-191. 
1885  Cf. Buck (2009); Köpke (2009), p. 42; von Bechtolsheim et al. (2009); Otzen (2010a), p. 4. 
1886  Cf. Flauger (2009h); Focht (2009b), p. 42; Sanktjohanser et al. (2009), p. 8. 
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become active in a new business area of laying glass fibre lines for high-speed internet.1887 
This implies that RWE is entering the telecommunications business once more, a segment in 
which it used to be active in at the beginning (see case study), and indicates a possible re-
development to become a multi-utility company again. This reinforces the finding of RWE’s 
zic-zac course. Similarly, also the engagement of oil majors in the renewables business has 
continued.1888 Likewise, M&As are still a major characteristic of development.1889 Closely 
related to these developments is the increasing tendency of competitors cooperating with each 
other along and across the value-chain.1890 At the same time others also recently remarked 
that active strategies do not necessarily imply the best behaviour as a successful change 
achieved too quickly may turn out to be the opposite of a victory.1891
 
 
 
8.4.2.2 Results from an Institutional Perspective – Confirming Findings 
 
Apart from being able to find evidence for individual tactics applied, such as when denying 
third parties access to the gas grid based on congestion arguments or in form of window 
dressing with regards to engagement in the renewables business (see above),1892 several 
general trends can be identified. The development of business models becoming ‘greener’ and 
development paths ‘environmentally friendly’ currently is particularly evident. This especially 
shows in corporate investments into renewable energies and into the field of efficiency 
enhancement.1893
                                                 
1887  Cf. Berke (2010), p. 9. 
 In addition to this, has the topic of sustainability been gaining increasing 
importance on companies’ strategic agenda. Even more concrete, Chevalier sees the year 
2006 as having been a turning point with regards to public awareness on sustainability. 
Apparently, especially the reinforcing recognition from investors in companies’ attitude 
towards ecological issues has heightened the criticality of effective environmental and 
1888  Cf. Flauger/ Heilmann (2009b); Pecka (2009b), p. 20. 
1889  Cf. Flauger (2009g); PWC (2009b); PWC (2010b). 
1890  Cf. Lohmann (2007), pp. 23-25; Flauger (2010e); Otzen (2010b), p. 4. 
1891  Cf. Fronda/ Moriceau (2008), p. 589. 
1892  Cf. Bonse/ Flauger (2009); Esterhazy et al. (2010), p. 51. 
1893  Cf. Focht (2009c), p. 3; Focht (2009d), p. 8; Schürmann (2009c); Schürmann (2009d), p. 8. 
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sustainability reporting (also see above).1894 In fact, this not only is a prevailing topic in the 
gas or energy industry, but has become a global topic which cuts across industries with 
companies aiming to integrate sustainability as part of their core business and define 
shareholder value in a new way.1895 Players from other industries have, for example, begun to 
engage in the renewable energy and efficiency servicing business, for some even leading to 
the transformation of their previous core businesses.1896 Other tactics applied in this respect 
resemble those found above, such as the implementation of respective corporate websites on 
sustainability,1897 emphasising the inclusion in sustainability indices, or the bringing-in of 
powerful constituents – either into the own organisation or by installing own managers in 
essential institutions.1898 E.ON, for example, installed the Vice President of its nuclear power 
subsidiary as the president of the nuclear forum.1899 Similarly, as revealed by figure 38 above, 
several recent publications also pointed out the criticality of continuous open, transparent and 
verified communication as well as trust building measures with all stakeholders, particularly 
with regards to sustainability issues.1900
 
 
At the same time, it was also remarked that several players still do not have respective 
measures in place to keep stakeholders updated in an engaged and continuous way, and 
instead are still “locked into a once-a-year reporting mentality”1901. Increasingly though has 
the companies’ attempt of ‘publicly portraying themselves as climate activists’ been criticised 
as ‘greenwashing’. Tactics such as publishing a sustainability report or calling attention to the 
winning of respective awards, for instance, have been assessed as merely cosmetic or as 
paying lip service “under the guise of sustainability”1902 without being truly committed.1903
                                                 
1894  Cf. Chevalier (2009), pp. 6-7, 56. Some even defined sustainability as ‘a metaphor for some of the most 
perplexing and consequential issues facing humanity which may even include the very survival of our 
species’. Cf. Heal (1998) in Bretschger (2009), p. 3. 
 
1895  Cf. Pfeil (2009), p. 35; Rees et al. (2010), pp. 75-82; TACD (2009); Gey (2010), p. 13; Steinkirchner (2010), 
pp. 54-57. 
1896  Cf. Rees et al. (2009), pp. 75-82; Grüttner (2010). 
1897  For an overview see CSR Globe as a global online directory that collects information on the CSR practices 
of the world’s top companies. Cf. CSR Globe (2011). 
1898  Cf. EnBW (2010); PWC (2010a), p. 24; PWC (2010c), p. 26. 
1899  Cf. Anonymous (2010b). 
1900  Cf. Henzgen/ Klär (2010), pp. 56-59; PWC (2010a), p. 26; PWC (2010c), pp. 16, 18-19, 30. 
1901  Lundquist (2010), p. 2. 
1902  Mahler et al. (2009), p. 1. 
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This becomes especially delicate when considering the finding that only those who are truly 
committed to sustainability outperform their rivals from a financial perspective and are 
guarded from value erosion.1904
 
 
This also holds true regarding the increasing importance of communicating openly with 
stakeholders and providing transparency.1905 Research on gas companies’ behaviour has, for 
instance, shown that due to ‘clumsy communication’, the underestimation of the impact of 
institutional drivers, and of the criticality of an adequate strategic response even in good times 
had extremely damaged their image. Consequently, this resulted in the realisation that in the 
‘new’ environmental situation business does not work without integrating eco-components 
into the portfolio and engaging in constructive stakeholder dialogues in order to retain 
customers.1906 A recent study on global sustainability tactics of publicly listed companies, for 
example, revealed that already 82% of the 300 largest European players provide information 
about their climate strategies.1907
 
 This indicates the development of companies adopting an 
integrated approach and serves as additional support for the findings above.  
Further evidence is provided by statements that climate change no longer simply is a 
compliance issue but one of the ‘greatest single challenges to global sustainability’1908. 
Companies are thus advised to move beyond rhetorics and not to take sustainability just as “a 
philanthropic endeavour”1909 but as key to corporate strategy.1910
                                                                                                                                                        
1903  Cf. Bible/ Ginsburg (2009), pp. 63-64; Brendel/ Müller (2009), p. 85; Kröher (2009), pp. 92-95; Flauger 
(2010f). 
 This also includes the 
integration of sustainability into daily operations and risk management practices as well as 
regular auditing and the generation of a history of green innovations in terms of meaningful 
investments in order to benefit from business results as well as an improved public 
1904  ‘Sustainable’ companies are here defined as being included in either the DJSI or the Goldman Sachs 
SUSTAIN focus list. Cf. Mahler et al. (2009), pp. 1-2. 
1905  Cf. Halda (2009), p. 69; Kröher (2009), pp. 92-95; Hajek (2010), pp. 82-86. 
1906  Cf. Oesterwind (2007), p. 33; Focht (2009e), p. 21. 
1907  Cf. Bergius (2008c); Bergius (2009). Also here national differences can be distinguished. German 
companies, for example, were found to have been keeping back respective information. Cf. Bergius (2009); 
Koenen (2009); Bergius (2010), p. 27; Wildhagen (2010a), pp. 50-51. 
1908  Cf. Laudicina/ Pau (2007), p. 13. 
1909  Mahler et al. (2009), p. 2. 
1910  Cf. Bergius (2009); PWC (2010c), pp. 8- 9. In fact, one of the very few having pointed this out earlier was 
Hoffman (cf. Hoffman (2001), p. 221) - but again not specifically for the energy industry. 
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perception,1911 i.e. legitimacy. In this respect others particularly pointed out that time was 
running out for a pro-active environmental strategy.1912 From this perspective, the recent 
tactics applied by companies can be seen as advanced forms of responses to such 
developments, such as the engagement in initiatives like the Voluntary Carbon Market as one 
step beyond CDM and JI projects. While these are not certified initiatives yet, companies 
hope to create additional benefits through its voluntary character and make public their 
achievements via Google Earth and other websites.1913 Another example is a form of ‘ethical 
investing’ as promoted by the BG Group to become ‘the leading natural gas company’.1914 
E.ON again set up a teaching chair specifically for Corporate Responsibility at the European 
School of Management and Technology whose Head of Department teaches that innovative 
business strategies based on stakeholder communication can improve a company’s social as 
well as economic value.1915 The fact such tactics have become paramount for organisational 
performance, if not for long-term survival, can also be drawn from the evidence that by now 
investors are commissioning studies to determine companies’ performance on responses to 
addressing the ‘sustainability agenda’.1916
 
 
Apart from these industry findings support for the approach adopted can also be found in 
academic research. In particular, Walgenbach and Meyer have recently confirmed the 
importance of Institutional Theory as an antipole to rational economic approaches as well as 
of the concept of organisational fields and legitimacy as critical elements.1917 And as pointed 
out in this work, also others found that business-oriented approaches had neglected the 
institutional environment and the notion of legitimacy for achieving competitive advantage. 
To emphasise the power of legitimacy Bourdieu, for instance, states that its lacking could 
bring down “some of the best established monopolies”1918. Lately, Breitsohl worked out the 
criticality of legitimacy in times of organisational crisis.1919
                                                 
1911  Cf. Mahler et al (2009). 
 Delmas and Toffel even find that 
1912  Cf. Bergius (2008c); Bergius (2010), p. 27. 
1913  Cf. Eckert (2011), p. 23. 
1914  Cf. BG Group (2009). 
1915  Cf. E.ON (2009b). 
1916  Cf. PWC (2010a); PWC (2010c). 
1917  Cf. Walgenbach/ Meyer (2008), p. 120. 
1918  Bourdieu (2008), p. 365. 
1919  Cf. Breitsohl (2009). 
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so far still too few had “employed institutional theory to understand questions of strategy”1920, 
such as on organisational behaviour that goes beyond compliance. Along this line Sauder 
draws attention to the value of seeing the institutional environment as a pool of resources 
which serves as a backdrop for strategic behaviour that diverges from established actions.1921 
Others remarked that organisational actors themselves, “whether they like it or not”1922, over 
the course of time contributed to the institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation of their 
environment. Schneiberg in turn built on institutional theory to explain why certain paths 
continue to exist.1923
 
 
 
8.4.2.3 Results from an Integrated Perspective – Confirming Findings 
 
Fundamentally, both types of analysis, i.e. case study and industry research, have revealed the 
significant impact the change of European Energy Policy had on corporate behaviour and 
provided evidence for the different types of behaviour as determined according to the degree 
of strategic activity. Another common finding is that along with the increasing degree of 
ecological influences the underlying development trend of organisational paths progressed 
from passive to pro-active forms of behaviour as companies turned from being risk-averse 
towards taking advantage of environmental change. This has recently been supported by other 
studies.1924
                                                 
1920  Delmas/ Toffel (2008), p. 1048. 
 Apart from this general trend, findings reveal a development of organisations 
taking an integrated perspective. This is characterised by companies considering influences 
from ‘both types of environments’ and using ‘both types of strategies’ to enhance overall 
success – which again includes the achievement of legitimacy as well as economic goals. 
Thus, instead of, for example, seeing themselves constrained by institutional influences, 
companies have begun to seize change to take advantage of arising opportunities to enhance 
their business development. Delmas et al. earlier described this as a situation where “market-
1921  Cf. Sauder (2008), p. 211. 
1922  de Queiroz et al. (2007), p. 56. 
1923  Cf. Schneiberg (2007), p. 50. 
1924  Cf. Bozem (2008), p. 55; PWC (2008c), p. 1; PWC (2010c), p. 8. 
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like behaviour supplanted the more paternalistic approach under regulation”1925. On an 
aggregated industry level this supports the indication of a homogeneous development. In fact, 
such ‘herding’ behaviour has been particularly mentioned by more recent publications.1926
 
 
Moreover, also here findings are supported by recent academic research. This holds with 
regards to several aspects. One refers to the fact that business behaviour findings could be 
enhanced when also adopting an institutional lens, such as when strategic alliances or even 
divestments turn out to be results of the quest for legitimacy.1927 Another example is the tactic 
of internationalisation following institutional constraints in the domestic territory.1928 Dacin et 
al. again point out that membership in strategic alliances allows the improvement of business- 
as well as institutionally-oriented goals such as enhancing market development while 
increasing legitimacy.1929 The notion of companies seeking governmental help to control 
competition and create economic rents versus merely following market-oriented strategies has 
also very recently been discussed by Fligstein. He, in fact, found that governments played a 
pivotal role in driving entrepreneurial activities.1930 Others in turn show how non-market 
strategies can enhance business development. They, for instance, propose ‘environmental 
communication’ in form of publishing environmental or sustainable development reports, or 
membership in self-regulating industry associations, as instruments to be adopted in order to 
achieve ‘environmental legitimacy’ and hence business success.1931 Brunner particularly 
mentions the value of story telling.1932 Meyer et al. generally advise that insights from 
business- and resource-based approaches should be considered in order to “enrich the 
institution-based view of strategy”1933
 
. 
 
 
                                                 
1925  Delmas et al. (2007), p. 204. 
1926  Cf. Anonymous (2009d), pp. 62-63; Mahler et al (2009), p. 4; Anonymous (2010f), p. 6. 
1927  Cf. Luo/ Chung (2007). 
1928  Cf. Witt/ Lewin (2007). 
1929  Cf. Dacin et al. (2007), for an illustrative overview see page 173. 
1930  Cf. Fligstein (2008). 
1931  Cf. Berrone et al. (2007); Hunter/ Bansal (2007). 
1932  Cf. Brunner (2009), pp. 92-96. 
1933  Meyer et al. (2009), p. 562. 
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8.4.2.4 Results from an Internal Perspective – Confirming Findings 
 
Another finding which has to be emphasised is the explanatory value of organisational 
characteristics. While behaviour and developments were shown to have been initiated and 
driven by the change of European Energy Policy, case study analysis particularly revealed the 
impact of internal factors on organisational development. In fact, evidence shows that the 
influence of environmental change on most companies worked as a constraint in the 
beginning, while pro-active behaviour was positively influenced by organisational 
characteristics and resources, such as its assets, its experience, or capabilities such as 
leadership. Research on the airline industry, for example, found that interdependencies with 
certain alliance partners may turn out to be a possible constraining force in that the space of 
response measures is reduced,1934
 
 an aspect that can also be expected to be of relevance in the 
energy industry due to similar origins and historically grown interdependent structures as 
shown in the case of study research (see above). At the same time, such interdependencies 
may also provide the basis for competitive advantage. This is a possible explanation for the 
increasing engagement in strategic cooperations also between competitors. Further findings 
are laid out in the following. 
 
Environmental Perception 
 
As shown and pointed out in recent literature, an organisation’s capabilities are particularly 
critical for a successful development, independent of the path taken. The notion of the 
criticality of environmental perception, for example, especially in case of an industry “full of 
emotions”1935
                                                 
1934  Cf. Viellechner/ Wulf (2010), pp. 19-21. 
 and shared beliefs such as the energy industry, is supported by the fact that 
those players who only compare themselves with established rivals facing the same problems 
(as ENI did, see above) and imitate those that were successful in the past, tend to be inert to 
change, rather clinging to known forms of behaviour and defending them rather than taking 
advantage of change. In this respect it has been found that inadequate instruments are likely to 
1935  Viellechner/ Wulf (2010), pp. 17-18. 
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increase inertia. Closely related to misguided environmental perception is that of an 
inadequate self-perception in that overconfidence and status-orientation, based, e.g., on 
incumbents’ cognitive structures perceiving themselves as national prestige, lead to lower 
ability to extract value from new strategic options and hinder incumbents from innovating. 
Thereby they not only risk lower performance outcomes but possibly their survival, as 
indicated in the studies above. Organisations being experienced with environmental 
disruption are more likely to behave pro-actively as they can fall back on certain response 
measures.1936
 
  
 
Organisational Leadership 
 
Several other researchers again have emphasised the role of leadership capabilities. In his 
study on ‘Corporate Sustainability Management in the Energy Sector’ Salzmann before had 
already pointed out that particularly in highly complex and hence uncertain situations, soft 
factors such as corporate culture, leadership, managers’ knowledge and mindset are decisive 
factors since leaders have to fall back on them when making decisions. Removing such 
barriers would thus increase the likelihood of more pro-active approaches.1937 Similarly, 
Spiegel et al. had found that “industry leaders clearly distinguish themselves from the 
laggards through their capacity to foresee and understand strategic trends”1938 and to align 
their organisational development accordingly to meet these challenges. As already shown in 
the case study and earlier1939
                                                 
1936  Cf. Viellechner/ Wulf (2010). Interestingly, this has been pointed out by public press, referring to academic 
research results. Cf. Storbeck (2009). 
 research, this holds with regards to business-related issues such 
as making M&As successful as well as in terms of institutional ones. Here, particularly the 
pivotal role of an organisation’s leader or CEO, especially his drive, risk propensity, and 
authority, but also his educational or professional background and his operational experience 
can be determined. While a higher degree of willingness to carry risks has been related to a 
larger likelihood of tackling threats and overcoming resistance, a leader’s authority and strong 
1937  Cf. Salzmann (2006), pp. 151-153. 
1938  Spiegel et al. (2005), p. 41. 
1939  Cf. Flaherty/ Jirovec (2006). 
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guidance has been assessed as beneficial due to energising organisational development as 
“leadership in performance goes hand-in-hand with a willingness to take an active role in 
furthering policy development”1940. At the same time it has been pointed out that a too large 
degree of authority may also be a disadvantage.1941
 
 
This can, in fact, be seen in the case of RWE whose CEO Großmann has recently been 
nominated as the ‘lobbyist of the year’1942 while at the same time having been criticised for 
his patriarchal leadership style. Critically, the latter has not only resulted in severe power 
battles within the Group and so created inefficiencies, but also made important organisational 
members withdraw, such as the chairman of the board or the highly regarded future leader for 
RWE’s efficiency branch with whom Großmann had planned to improve the Group’s 
image.1943 Also public press has reported on the negative consequences of internal conflicts 
within RWE. Recently, this has also been the done in the case of E.ON where the mood inside 
the company was described as having hit “rock bottom”1944.1945 In fact, Bernotat was 
criticised for his ‘unintelligent investment behaviour’1946 which had made organisational 
structures extremely complicated, and for his leadership style that had ‘accrued a lot of things 
which now have to be tidied up’1947. While this supports the assumption that a large degree of 
activity must not necessarily constitute the best path, it also implies that even if pro-active 
behaviour has resulted in a positive performance – as in the case of E.ON so far – this status is 
not sustainable and may be eroded. In fact, RWE has recently overtaken E.ON in different 
sustainability and CSR rankings,1948 and is the first of the publicly listed German DAX 
companies which implemented the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).1949
                                                 
1940  PWC (2010c), p. 26. 
 
Moreover, in the 2010 Investor Relations ranking of German DAX companies RWE is placed 
1941  Cf. Viellechner/ Wulf (2010), p. 25. 
1942  Cf. Trittin (2010), pp. 36-37. 
1943  Cf. Flauger (2009d); Flauger (2009i); Flauger/ Stratmann (2009b). Just recently the chairman of the board 
was replaced by a famous politician, the former Austrian chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel. Cf. Flauger 
(2010g). Großmann’s personality is also criticised by leaders from other industry who trying to ‘get rid of 
him’ as member of their board. Cf. Schneider/ Flauger (2010). 
1944  Lerch (2009). Translation by author. Also cf. Flauger (2010c); Wildhagen (2010b). 
1945  Cf. Gassmann (2009b). 
1946  Cf. Wildhagen (2010c), p. 55. Translation by author. 
1947  Cf. Flauger (2010c). Translation by author. 
1948  Cf. Seiwert (2007), p. 44; Halda (2009), p. 69; Kröher (2009), pp. 94-95; Hajek (2010), pp. 82-86. 
1949  Cf. BMZ (2010). 
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rank number 9. E.ON, on the contrary, is only ranked number 20, having fallen down from 
rank 2 in 2009.1950 E.ON has thus even been portrayed as ‘finding friends only within its own 
shareholders’1951, a statement indicating a significant change when considering it having been 
the ‘darling of investors’ not long ago (see above). RWE has been seen as more successful 
with regards to cost reductions and efficiency enhancements,1952 and has become to be 
recognised as the pioneer in the area of e-mobility, smart metering, and electricity-to-gas 
transformation,1953 areas where E.ON has been judged as being too reluctant.1954
 
 
Even more, E.ON has also recently been accused of having neglected the development of 
renewable energy technologies to become a ‘truly’ sustainable company.1955 This can also be 
attributed to leadership qualities in that Bernotat has been found to have believed that the 
topic of energy efficiency was not suitable for corporate endeavours for a too long time.1956 In 
fact, as a reaction to such accusations E.ON has recently implemented a new leader. Teyssen, 
who has been characterised as the “long-time crown prince”1957 of the company and as being 
deeply rooted within the energy industry with influential contacts, is attributed the 
professional competence to introduce a radical strategic and cultural change. Examples which 
are mentioned include selling E.ON’s U.S. subsidiary and divesting Gazprom shares1958 in 
order to make E.ON leaner and faster, and taking advantage of new opportunities like 
intelligent grids and smart metering, two areas where E.ON has been criticised to be 
following behind.1959 It is also considered critical in this respect that Teyssen wanted to ‘strike 
new tones’ in dealing with political authorities in form of less ‘wigging’1960, and that he is on 
good terms with employees, trade unions and more approachable than Bernotat.1961
                                                 
1950  Cf. Hajek (2010), p. 84. 
 
Furthermore, he has recently imposed the company to ‘re-invent’ itself by radically 
1951  Cf. Anonymous (2007u), p. 160. 
1952  Cf. Hofmann (2008). 
1953  Cf. Flauger (2009h); Flauger (2010f); Flauger (2010h); Schuster (2010). 
1954  Cf. Focht (2009f), p. 40; Flauger (2010f); Wildhagen/ Dürand (2010), pp. 56-57. 
1955  Cf. Flauger (2009e); Stratmann (2009). 
1956  Cf. Wildhagen (2010b). 
1957  Flauger (2010c). Translation by author. Also cf. Flauger (2009e). 
1958  Despite Putin’s appraisal for E.ON’s investment in Russia. Cf. Willershausen (2010). 
1959  Cf. Anonymous (2010c); Flauger (2010i); Hosp/ Sturbeck (2010). 
1960  Cf. Anonymous (2010d), p. 4. 
1961  Cf. Lerch (2009); Flauger (2010b), pp. 62-63; Flauger (2010c). 
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questioning the existing business model and strategy of having to ‘control everything 
ourselves’, i.e. being vertically integrated along the whole value-chain. This even includes 
plans to divest activities so far defined as being part of the core business, such as the 
electricity distribution and gas transportation grid as well as plans to globalise into emerging 
countries. Additionally, Teyssen plans to ‘take it down several gears’ in that E.ON will only 
participate as a junior partner in large projects. Even more, he wants to transform E.ON from 
an energy producer into a specialised provider of energy services. With this approach and 
despite recent criticism, E.ON has again been assessed as the ‘daring’ pioneer and the 
implementation of its new business model as an indicator for the fundamental change of 
energy markets,1962
 
 also supporting the finding of its leadership role. 
Recently, and therefore in line with the overall development as determined above, the notion 
of leadership and top management attention has been pointed out as particularly critical with 
regards to sustainability requiring attention at board level.1963 The CEO of Shell, for example, 
formulated that: “If you want to continue to succeed as an energy company in the coming 
decades, you need to understand and meet people’s expectations for environmental and social 
performance, as well as delivering solid technical and financial performance.”1964
                                                 
1962  Cf. Anonymous (2010e), pp. 1-2; Gassmann (2010b), p. 1. 
 Other 
research found that also tenure of office seems to play a role as those leaders with a long 
tenure have been found to be hesitant to experiment and prefer to focus on existing structures. 
They are thus less likely to adopt appropriate behaviour to match environmental change. At 
the same time a too short period and too high degree of CEO succession is considered as 
disadvantageous for successful development as proven in the case of RWE. A positive 
influence on performance instead has been attributed to CEOs who are given more time to 
develop their paradigms and gain legitimacy. In fact, a pay-off in form of performance 
improvement has been found to materialise after about six years. Other research determined 
that in very demanding environments CEOs tend to be exceptionally successful in improving 
organisational performance only at the beginning of their tenure of office. This could also 
hold true in E.ON’s case, with Bernotat, after having successfully established the company as 
1963  Cf. PWC (2008c), p. 1; Rees et al. (2009), p. 75; Bergius (2010), p. 27; Henzgen/ Klär (2010), pp. 56-59; 
PWC (2010a), pp. 16, 25; PWC (2010c), pp. 16, 19, 29. 
1964  PWC (2008c), p. 7. 
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an industry leader, was recently replaced by a new CEO (Teyssen) (see above). Apart from a 
CEO’s personal characteristics another factor of relevance, although seeming common sense, 
is his formal education in that higher levels are related to a larger degree of organisational 
innovativeness.1965
 
 
In addition to the CEO as an influential factor attention has also been directed to the 
importance of the composition of the top management team. While a heterogeneous structure 
where members have different backgrounds encourages more innovative forms of behaviour, 
personal tension within the team has been determined to have negative effects on 
performance1966 as found in the case of RWE. Also misguidance through past beliefs, e.g. 
having been a leader of natural monopolists or state-owned companies, may constrain 
organisational development so that the behaviour of a CEO may actually reduce 
performance.1967 The CEO of Italian Enel, for instance, stated that “leaders of energy 
companies tend to feel that being in the cradle of stringent regulations will preserve their 
status as insulated, protected enterprises”1968. Enel itself serves as another example for the 
importance of leadership providing strategic direction. While, in response to increasing 
competition, it diversified into the water and telecommunication business under its previous 
CEO, it soon after faced the risk of losing track. The new CEO instead re-focussed the 
company on the energy business, building the business model on activities such as on energy 
production from a variety of fossil and renewable sources, on upstream production activities 
by becoming engaged in Russia as well as on the efficiency-enhancing business. Moreover, 
by applying innovative approaches to public management, such as a multi-stakeholder 
perspective and transparent communication methods, the new CEO also addressed what has 
here been defined as institutional drivers, having turned Enel into one of Europe’s largest 
utility companies.1969
                                                 
1965  Cf. Viellechner/ Wulf (2010), pp. 25-26, 40-41. 
 Interestingly, these examples not only support the importance of 
organisational leadership, but serve as additional evidence for the commonality of business 
models. Another example for the impact of leadership is provided by Kofler Energies (see 
1966  Cf. Viellechner/ Wulf (2010), pp. 28-30, 34. 
1967  Cf. Viellechner/ Wulf (2010), pp. 26-27. Also cf. Salzmann (2006), pp. 152-153. 
1968  Fulvio Conti, CEO of Enel. In: Kleiner (2008), p. 3. 
1969  Cf. Kleiner (2008), p. 1. 
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above) whose founder successfully installed it in the marketplace by ‘cunningly playing to the 
gallery’.1970
 
 Apart from the CEO’s importance for organisational success this case also 
provides another example for the observation of increasingly similar business models and 
forms of behaviour. 
Having shown that not only findings from case study research and industry analysis but also 
from recent studies and publications reinforce each other, these and the other results are now 
concluded on in the last chapter of this thesis. 
                                                 
1970  Cf. Hofer (2008), p. 13. 
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CHAPTER IX CONCLUSION 
 
 
9.1 Findings and Contributions of Study 
 
Essentially, the above analysis has enabled to achieve the fundamental research aim of this 
thesis: Illustrating and explaining organisational behaviour of incumbents active in the 
European gas market in response to elementary changes of European Energy Policy over 
time. In fact, it was shown that behaviour has been significantly influenced by these changes, 
even leading to the re-modelling of traditional business models. Apart from providing a 
detailed analysis of specific examples of the European gas industry, these results enhance 
overall research on organisational behaviour of incumbents in response to disruptive 
environmental change, an area which has recently been criticised for still lacking substantial 
empirical grounding and for focussing only on certain aspects without considering approaches 
and explanations of different research disciplines.1971
                                                 
1971  Cf. Viellechner/ Wulf (2010), p. 3. 
 This again supports the value of this 
work in that analysis has been based on two apparently contradictious theoretical approaches: 
Business Theory and Institutional Theory. While mainly analytical in nature, this has enabled 
to distinguish between different types of environmental drivers and actors and thus 
organisational forms of behaviour. The adoption of such a two-dimensional approach 
significantly reinforces and highlightens explanatory value as findings or observations made 
in some cases revealed different drivers behind organisational behaviour other than normally 
assumed when only adopting a one-sided perspective. Examples include the application of 
business tactics to improve or gain legitimacy instead of economic goals. In addition, both 
approaches illustrate organisational response in reaction to environmental change as lying on 
a continuum between passive and pro-active forms of behaviour. Consequently, this allows 
the illustration of changing organisational behaviour over time in form of development paths. 
By additionally integrating a resource-based perspective explanatory value could be enhanced 
even further. The contributory value of such an ‘integrated’ approach is depicted in the 
following exhibit. 
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Figure 39:1972
 
 Thesis’ contribution – Enhancement through an Integrated Approach 
 
 
 
By creating a model built on both perspectives and adopting an integrated perspective for 
analysis, the author has been able to depict the individual course of development of the cases 
analysed. While it could be shown that the underlying course of action was characterised by a 
development from passive to pro-active behaviour, especially as organisations began 
perceiving environmental change as an opportunity instead of just a threat, analysis also 
revealed that each company had taken a different path. In fact, four different courses of 
development were found: One starting development along an institutional path before also 
driving business development (ENI), another being pro-active and integrated right from the 
beginning (E.ON), a third revealing an integrated but passive course (GdF), and a fourth 
which initially showed an active integrated course of development before turning more 
passive again to only recently indicate more pro-active strategies once more, resulting in what 
above has been termed a ‘zic-zac path’ (RWE). 
 
Apart from these differences, commonalities in development also were revealed through case 
study analysis. Even more, these findings are supported by industry analysis and recent 
research results. They show that business as well as institutional organisational behaviour has 
become more similar over the course of time. From a Business Perspective this reveals in the 
                                                 
1972 Own figure. 
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increasing similarity of business models as companies engage in the same activities along and 
outside the gas value-chain. Through an Institutional Lens this manifests itself through the 
application of similar institutional strategies and tactics. Illustrated on the matrix, this shows 
as a common development towards the top right hand corner. Another commonality is the 
growing awareness of the importance of adopting an integrated perspective. This has been 
particularly revealed in the utilisation of the issue of sustainability for enhancing business 
development and overall performance in order to gain a competitive advantage. In fact, this 
finding is supported by results from case study as well as industry analysis. While this 
emphasises the importance of integrating different methodologies, it also indicates the 
development towards an increasing homogeneity within the industry. Apart from showing the 
criticality of accounting for a temporal dimension to reveal such developments, the finding of 
a growing convergence is particularly crucial with regards to overall industry structure as well 
as for individual companies and their future behaviour in that they need to find ways to 
differentiate themselves in such surroundings in order to establish a sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
 
Essentially, as already indicated above and in addition to having been able to illustrate 
organisational behaviour in response to change over the course of time, this study also 
provides explanations of the findings made. These have allowed an explanation of the reasons 
behind the differences in paths as well as in the development towards an increasing 
convergence of behaviours. An interesting observation made here is that differences were 
initially determined particularly by the differences existing in national regimes of Member 
States. This can be explained by the fact that the EU Commission under the subsidiarity 
principle had left room for individual national preferences in the beginning. The development 
towards increasingly similar forms of behaviour and the growing homogenisation detected, 
has especially been driven by the fact that as EU Energy Policy has evolved over time, 
requirements also became stricter and obligatory for all members without possibilities for 
exemption. Another important finding is the explanatory power of internal factors as well as 
their criticality for organisational behaviour. In particular, it was shown that while 
organisational characteristics such as its history, learning experience and resource endowment 
set the basis for successful development, the ability to change and take advantage of arising 
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opportunities, especially to drive change itself, is predominantly determined by an 
organisation’s capabilities and leadership. This is supported by very recent studies as 
researchers found evidence for the effect of a CEO’s narcissism, age, experience and 
education on organisational behaviour in disruptive contexts.1973 This finding not only shows 
the contribution of this work in that it reveals the importance of integrating the RBV as a 
supplementary approach to external theories for enhancing explanatory power, but also shows 
the criticality of such factors for changing an organisation’s course of direction and 
differentiating itself from competitors in increasingly homogeneous industry structures while 
at the same time maintaining legitimacy. Other recent research revealed that the energy 
companies recognised as the leading ones, are those which are self-correcting by continuously 
adapting to changing conditions but without rushing to embrace changes unilaterally, and that 
those which invest continuously are the most successful in terms of economic performance 
and public perception.1974
 
 
In addition to enhancing theoretical research, this study provides significant value in that it 
allows the extraction of implications for practitioners. First of all, the integrated approach 
adopted raises awareness for and allows the classification of different types of environmental 
drivers which can constrain but also enhance organisational development. Secondly, it 
provides a range of strategies and tactics which can be drawn upon when facing such 
influential forces. This is particularly valuable for reacting pro-actively and shaping change. 
In this respect Miles, for instance, believes that it was “important for executive leaders to 
have a grasp of the full range of options for strategic adaptation if they are to be in a position 
to engage a wide variety of potential threats to organizational integrity before they become a 
full-blown reality”1975
                                                 
1973  Cf. Viellechner/ Wulf (2010). 
. Even more, the two-dimensional model has revealed how business 
strategies may be applied to maintain or gain legitimacy and, respectively, how institutional 
strategies can serve as instruments to obtain business aims, thus revealing the value of 
adopting an integrated perspective. This is a critical aspect to be considered by practitioners 
as the conscious application may hold significant power to enhance competitive advantage if 
1974  Cf. Mahler et al. (2009), p. 4. 
1975  Miles (1982), p. 231. 
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not organisational survival. Bruce, e.g., believes that “who you trade with is going to be one 
of the key decisions you make”1976
 
. The inclusion of internal factors in this study for 
practitioners again highlightens the criticality of organisational capabilities. These 
continuously need to be monitored with regards to their appropriateness and, if required, new 
ones developed if necessary. This also holds in terms of organisational leadership in that 
certain environmental situations may require specific leadership styles, such as in form of 
increased attention to institutional forces and agents in phases where these are particularly 
prevailing. 
In fact, the consideration of these findings can be expected to become even more prevalent as 
European Energy Policy is continuously changing. Requirements are becoming even stricter 
and thus are exerting more pressure on organisations, threatening their business success as 
well as their legitimacy. Recent examples include tightening measures to enhance competition 
and market opening via ownership unbundling. This would lead to the complete dis-
aggregation of organisational value-chains to create separate companies. Other examples are 
additional measures to increase security of supply by enforcing corporate investments into 
strategic infrastructure. Also legislations with regards to sustainability, such as increasing the 
share of renewables in supply portfolios1977 or rulings on the geological storage of carbon 
dioxide,1978 are becoming stricter and may constrain the expansion of business activities. The 
EU’s approach to climate protection and its implication for energy markets have recently even 
been assessed as having become “the single most important defining feature of what Europe is 
all about”1979. Organisational leaders even believe that sustainability is the “single biggest 
business opportunity of the 21st century, and will be the next source of competitive 
advantage”1980
                                                 
1976  Bruce (2009), p. 3. 
. While this supports the results derived from case study and industry analysis, 
it again provides an essential finding for practitioners and especially organisational leaders 
regarding their drive of future organisational behaviour. In fact, changes have been so 
fundamental that totally new approaches are required. From this perspective, research 
1977  Cf. European Commission (2009). 
1978  Cf. European Parliament and Council (2009). 
1979  Keppler (2009), p. 222. 
1980  As expressed by the CEO of Wal-Mart. In: PWC (2008c), p. 4. 
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findings can be said to have portrayed the beginning of a fundamental restructuring taking 
place in the industry. So far, this has been mainly driven by companies deviating from their 
traditional business of producing, transporting and selling natural gas to focus on one part of 
the value-chain or into completely new businesses such as renewable sources. Moreover, this 
is not only restricted to the energy sector anymore, but has been extended into unrelated ones, 
such as the automotive or building industry. While this supports the assumption of converging 
industry boundaries, companies should be aware of findings which show that a too large 
degree of diversification or internationalisation is not honoured by capital markets and key 
investors as profitability and focus get diluted.1981 Oil companies, e.g., have been reported to 
be reassessing their ‘green’ investments and start divesting these activities again.1982 Recent 
research has emphasised that when facing such drastic environmental changes, organisations 
should adopt a new ‘risk culture’1983 as was mentioned as essential after liberalisation had 
‘bust loose change’ (see chapter III). Support for this can also be found in this study. As 
depicted above, there are indications of companies considering of leaving their ‘centre of 
gravity’, i.e. producing energy, to become mere service providers. In doing so, they are totally 
re-defining their business model. In fact, one of the most recent examples refers to rumours of 
E.ON wanting to divest its former ‘jewel’ Ruhrgas.1984
 
 While this would constitute a 
fundamental break with its previous approach, this step would at the same time confirm 
E.ON’s first-mover and leadership attributes. 
Based on this it can be concluded that this work significantly contributes to ‘opening up the 
black box’1985 and turning it into a ‘white box’1986
 
 – as formulated as a requirement above. 
After having laid out the contributions of this work of enhancing academic research as well as 
of providing guidance for practitioners, the limitations of this study, as there are to any 
research, are mentioned. 
                                                 
1981  Cf. Wiegand (2005), p. B2; Hannes (2007), p. B2. 
1982  Cf. Schürmann (2009d), p. 8. 
1983  Cf. Chevalier (2009), p. 51. 
1984  Cf. Anonymous (2011b). 
1985  Cf. Hutzschenreuter et al. (2007), p. 1057; Delmas/ Toffel (2008), p. 1027. 
1986  Cf. Dyckhoff (1996), p. 264. 
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9.2 Limitations of Study and Implications for Future Research 
 
As criticised as a general weakness of qualitative case study research, particularly in relation 
to the small number of cases used and the related limited replicability, it could be argued that 
findings do not hold to the requirement of having to be generalisable. Here, this has been 
countered by the additional industry analysis which in fact has supported results from case 
study research and thus allowed the researcher to draw general conclusions. Mintzberg 
pointed out that small sample numbers have indeed often turned out to be superior with 
regards to their explanatory quality, thus asking ‘why apologise?’ for them.1987 He also draws 
attention to the fact that “there would be no interesting hypothesis to test if no one ever 
generalized beyond his or her data”1988. Others again find that when analysing change, as has 
been done here, observations that are actually valid, are generally not replicable.1989 Still, as a 
proposal for future research, additional insights may be generated by supplementing 
qualitative case study research with quantitative statistical analysis. This could be especially 
valid for further determining the impact of internal forces shown to be of particular influence 
here, above all with regards to organisational capabilities and leadership as chosen as one of 
the most frequent methodologies in research analysing these factors (see literature above). At 
the same time, the obtaining of such data requires an ‘in-depth, real-time and action-research 
on-site clinical diagnosis’ in order to gain full comprehension of strategy formation, a claim 
which, apart from requiring access, has been pointed out as being extremely work-intensive 
and expensive.1990
                                                 
1987  Cf. Mintzberg (1979), pp. 583-584. Also cf. Yin (2003a), p. 145. 
 Another area where the application of quantitative statistical work could be 
supportive lies with the analysis of organisational performance in relation to strategic 
behaviour. This would enhance insight on the notion that a higher degree of active and 
particularly pro-active behaviour is related to organisational economic success and legitimacy. 
From this, further deductions can be drawn on what is likely to constitute a ‘best path’ which 
here as been attributed to E.ON in following an active and integrated path. Additionally, 
larger samples and quantitative analysis could also be helpful in determining whether findings 
1988  Mintzberg (1979), p. 584. 
1989  Cf. Stevenson/ Harmeling (1990). 
1990  Cf. Miles (1982), pp. 257-258. 
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above can be attributed to certain “period effects”1991 where behaviour differs, and possibly 
classified as typologies. Hambrick, for instance, thinks that “empirical determination of a 
strategic typology (...) seems a useful research goal in itself”1992. In this respect Schneiberg 
and Clemens propose to use indices such as the Herfindahl index and refer to a study which 
was able to show how regulations, trade associations, and media coverage shaped 
organisational diversity in the U.S. power industry.1993 Still, also statistical analysis has its 
drawbacks and researchers should consider that “no algorithm exists to weigh each factor, nor 
can a one-size-fits-all answer suit all companies in all situations”1994. Another possible way 
for optimising findings through improving the research methodology could be by asking key 
informants to clarify findings as recently pointed out by researchers having analysed 
incumbent inertia on disruptive change,1995
 
 or by carrying out additional interviews with 
industry experts. 
 
9.3 Final Word 
 
Essentially, however, and independent of the methodology chosen, environmental change 
always holds an element of uncertainty which cannot be eroded by methodology, as perfect as 
it may be. This also is a critical aspect of organisational stewardship, especially as changes 
such as liberalisation are irreversible and once ‘out of the bottle are taking hold’1996
                                                 
1991  Schneiberg/ Clemens (2006), p. 206. 
. This 
becomes even more critical when also keeping in mind developments taking place on a global 
level, such as a generally increasing demand for energy from emerging nations such as China 
and India in times of decreasing resources and the resulting augmented worldwide 
competition for access to natural resource endowments. Apart from this, there may be totally 
unexpected incidents, such as the recent atomic catastrophe of Fukushima which significantly 
changed global approaches to energy supply and probably created a ‘Post-Fukushima’ energy 
era. In Germany, for example, it resulted in the decision to close-down all nuclear power 
1992  Hambrick (1980), p. 572. 
1993  Cf. Schneiberg/ Clemens (2006), p. 216. 
1994  Courtney (2001), p. 47. 
1995  Cf. Viellechner/ Wulf (2010). 
1996  Cf. Bruce (2009), p. 6. 
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plants by the end of the decade. Such decisions expose energy companies, and not only those 
with investments in this segment, to enormous challenges. In addition to increasing pressures 
on a global level – here, particularly the recent boom of unconventional gas production the 
U.S. must be mentioned – also European Energy Policy changes are still exigent and for the 
organisations subject to such influences this implies that “the battle is not over!”1997
                                                 
1997  Lewiner (2007), p. 11. 
 yet. The 
uncertainty inherent in the organisational environment is thus likely to remain. What is certain 
in contrast is that the energy landscape has fundamentally changed over the past decade and 
with it organisational behaviour. It will be interesting to observe how companies continue to 
develop. 
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